Using extensive materials from both published and private sources, this concise text focuses on United States-Soviet diplomacy to explain the causes and consequences of the Cold War. It explores how the Cold War was shaped by domestic events in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union and presents a variety of other points of view on the conflict--Chinese, Latin American, European, and Vietnamese. The text includes both engaging anecdotes and quotes from primary sources to support key points and exemplify policies, and recent scholarship and materials from openings of the U.S., Soviet, and Chinese archives.
One of the foremost scholars of American foreign policy, Walter Fredrick LaFeber was the Andrew H. and James S. Tisch Distinguished University Professor in the Department of History at Cornell University. Previous to that he served as the Marie Underhill Noll Professor of History and a Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellow at Cornell.
The revisionist school of CW historiography can be pretty crudely materialist at times, but LaFeber in this survey manages to issue a balanced and partially revisionist account. I read an earlier version of this book that ended in the mid 1980s. LaFeber's account of the origins of the CW focuses on incompatible visions for security, prosperity, and ethics. The US wanted an open Europe and an open international trading system on the belief that the closing of world trade and the cementing of closed blocs throughout the world had exacerbated the Depression. The US also believed that Europe would have to be rehabilitated, including Germany, and democratized to remain a stable trading partner. LaFeber doesn't reduce US motives to pure economics; rather, he nicely shows how you could separate US political, economic, and ideological motives (this is a nice improvement from something like William Appleman Williams' more simplistic account). The USSR, on the other hand, wanted a security zone that extended to the middle of the Continent and believed it had the right to impose communist governments on those zones and close them to trade with the West. All the showdowns and crises the US and the USSR had post 45 stemmed from these fundamental differences, although I still think that the USSR showed more aggression, brutality, and betrayal of the values of the Allies than the US (in other words I think it was mostly their fault, although that's not a terribly productive historical framework)
The rest of the book is a solid survey of the evolution of the Cold War that I'm sure I will draw on in research and teaching. Because of the opening of new sources, there are better texts out there, but I'm still glad I got the gist of this revisionist account. My main criticism of the book would be that the closer it gets to the present the crankier LaFeber gets and the weaker the sources get. It is just about at Nixon that he becomes really biased, lacking the historical distance to assess Nixon and his successors more impartially. This is a fine book but I don't particularly recommend it as an intro to the CW; try Gaddis' Cold War A New History first.
It takes one hour to read twenty pages, but the author brings in so much information that you don't feel like you'll never understand this subject. I felt smarter and more aware, and then I started to forget what I read after a week or two. This may be my problem.
In his many-editioned survey America, Russia and the Cold War Walter LaFeber places the uncertain transformations of the post-war years within a longer narrative of tense American-Russo relations. From the late nineteenth century onward the two countries had been locked in a high friction relationship predicated on the American desire to find external markets for its manufactures and agriculture, and the Russian desire to close economic competitors out of its empire and maintain uncontested political control of its hinterlands. The conflict, which centered on northern China, prompted the United States to support Japanese ambitions on the mainland in order to contain Russian ambitions. The Russians were “utterly insincere and treacherous” Theodore Roosevelt observed in a fit of pique, “they have no conception of the truth . . . and no regard for others.” The conflict between Russian political culture and American values, Russian political expansionism and American commercial expansionism, led President Wilson’s deployment of ten thousand Americans to fight against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution, and the non-recognition of the Soviet Union prior to 1933. In the 1930s the Roosevelt administration’s desperate quest to lower trade barriers in order to spur economic growth and Stalin’s forced industrialization brought the same inherent tension again to the fore. Ill will ran deep even before the Moscow-Berlin treaty that set the stage for World War II, and the delay of Britain and the United States in establishing a western front against Nazi Germany while millions of Russians died did nothing to ease tensions.
Yet despite the antagonism which set the stage for the Cold War, LaFeber tends to emphasize the difficulty experienced by the hawkish forces within the Truman administration of bringing the rest of the nation around to the need for unremitting confrontation. It was far from clear that the half-developed and war ravaged Soviet Union posed any threat to Western Europe. Yet through his years in office Truman’s administration treated the USSR as an existential threat to America – first as a roadblock to the global economic access which threatened a relapse into depression, and finally with the publication of NSC-68 and the outbreak of the Korean War that crystalized the struggle with Moscow as a Manichean battle to the death. Many things, including NSC-68, would need to be kept from the American people in this struggle in order to allow the President to preserve the country, but the public would be informed again and again and again of the deceitful, brutal, fanatical nature of the enemy which necessitated such extraordinary sacrifices. Having established the framework of a struggle over open markets in the first three chapters, LaFeber’s account rarely returns to it afterwards. Instead he draws out two other central themes. First the utility of periodic crises and provocations for political leaders, be it Truman taming a Republic Congress or Khrushchev placing a lid on the post-Stalin thaw. Second, the confusion and miscalculation of American strategists, who perceived all developments as a zero sum competition, when confronted with the nationalist movements emerging from deteriorating European empires.
Opening this book tonight gave me a strong feeling of disassociation. Nowadays we worry about the threats of Islamic extremism and the rise of China as a world power. Back in 1982 everything seemed simple. LaFebers book was in its 4th edition, and had been been published in 1980 during the last year of the presidency of Jimmy Carter when the threat of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR was always in the background of everyday events. I would still recommend it to anyone who wants to read about the Cold War. This was required reading for a course I took at Temple University on "History of the Cold War" in 1982.
Walter LaFeber sets out to tell the story of the Cold War. Starting after World War II, The United States and the Soviet Union began a competition for global dominance for their own ways of life, or at least what each would have you believe. LaFeber seems to have the thesis that the time, manpower, and money spent on the Cold War might have been spared had both sides been more willing to negotiate rather than indulge in an arms race that in the end damaged both nations' economies. LaFeber criticizes all Presidents from Truman through George H. W. Bush for their handling of relations between the two nations. Of course Soviet leaders don't come off much better. Kruschev at tleast tried to moderate his country's position, and Gorbachev, while sincerely interested in reform, brought about the break up of the country by moving too quickly. My oldest daughter who is 28 asked me one time why songs from the '80's seemed full of doom and gloom. This book, although being dry as dust, gives a good explanation.
Wonderful overview for someone that doesn't have a lot of background about American history of this period (and especially foreign policy). To my mind, the author tends a bit toward the negative (it seems EVERYONE did EVERYTHING wrong), but certainly with hindsight it was mostly bad, yes. I think he may be trying to push the theme "if everyone listened to historians, the world would be a better place." Maybe.
LaFeber approaches the Cold War as an economic battle between the Soviet Union and the West. Of particular importance is his analysis of the Vietnam War, where he attributes the U.S. aim at controlling the region as an attempt to create a market for Japanese goods, ultimately allowing the Japanese to purchase American goods.
Excellent, readable, updated history of the Cold War with plenty of updates following the end of the Soviet threats in the early 1990s. It doesn't go into amazing detail on any specific event but does offer a thorough look at the whys and hows of world affairs from 1945 to the present.