This is an excellent text that summarizes the military struggle between the forces of the Mongol World Empire, in Centra/East Asia and the Chinese dynasties of the Song and the lesser dynasties of the Jin, which led to the ultimate collapse of Han rule and transitioned to a Han-supported, but Mongol ruled Yuan dynasty which itself lasted less than a 100 years, and saw the restoration of Han rule with the ascension of the Ming dynasty of the 1400s. The author’s central thesis is that the Mongol invasions of the various Eurasian nations during the almost 100 years of expansion which saw it assemble the largest land empire in human history, was fundamentally negative for the various nations/tribes/empires/kingdoms that happened to encounter (and fall under) the Mongol yoke.
This thesis is somewhat contrary to more recent scholarship which seeks to understand how various standardization and cultural/technology/scientific exchanges facilitated and secured by the arms of the Mongol World Empire ignited innovations across various regions of Eurasia, and are in some circles linked to the start of the great synthesis of ideas in Europe during the late medieval era, which ultimately ignites the Renaissance of Western Europe. The author doesn’t comment much on Europe in this matter, but instead states that in both the regions of Western and Eastern Asia, conflict with the armies of the Mongol World Empire led to a retarding of institutional reforms in favor of a hardening of medieval structures, specifically a strengthening of centralization to maintain large standing armies to defend and strike against Mongol armies by the peoples of those regions, which siphoned resources away from other potentially more productive activities towards a constant mustering martial power. I am less certain on the merits of this thesis, though it seems plausible, not all plausible theses are actually true (in fact by definition only one plausible thing ends up ever being true, and sometimes the true thing ends up coming outside of the set of things we accept to being plausible!).
Still, it’s a cohesive narrative, and one that serves the author well as he describes the nature of mass mobilization, and how vast numbers of individuals were thrown at Mongol invaders, and how a largely infantry army dealt with a highly mobile steppe force. The Song often fielding multiple armies of men in the hundreds of thousands (an organizational and logistical feat not matched until the era of the Napoleonic wars in Western Europe), and thus one can see how the stress of constantly being engaged in such a titanic conflict would eventually retard societies output in other venues of human activity, such as the arts, sciences, industry etc. This later dimension is relevant, as it’s been hypothesized that the Song may have been the closest of the medieval civilizations across the world to achieving industrialization. Though this is a facet that is not dwelt on much by the author. Instead, the focus here is really the ebb/flow of the various Mongol / Song / Jin campaigns, and even the nature of the war fighting technology deployed on the field, which was very interesting, but far too little of it in the text (with the meat of this content focused towards the middle of the text).
Among these technologies include rapid-fire-reload crossbows, various explosive bombs, and even imported technologies such as the counter-weight trebuchet, which Song engineers refined from Muslim craftsman and siege-mongers. Also within these wars, was a significant naval component, with river navies playing a major part with both Song and Mongol forces. Here, some of the campaigns reminded me of the river battles fought between the Union and Confederacy many centuries later during the American Civil War. This leads to the question, how should we understand this war of conquest? One of the Mongol World Empire invading another sovereign, or as modern Chinese narratives have characterized it, as a Chinese civil war?
The author seems to come on the side of the later, if only because as the war matured, not only were an increasing number of Han generals and troops abandoning their posts in the Song and joining the Mongol forces, but Mongol forces themselves found their steppe cavalry tactics were just less effective in the Southern Song lands for many reasons the authors detailed, and quickly realized that only fielding armies of the style deployed by the various Han dynasties/petty kingdoms were they able to strike successfully and eventually overwhelm Song positions. Further Khubelai Khan eventually declared himself wielding the ‘mandate of heaven’, and he sets up court in the Han/Chinese style in Beijing, a lesser city in the era, but would eventually become the capital of subsequent dynasties and obviously remain the capital in all iterations of modern China outside of the Warlord era of the early 20th-century).
An interesting fact about the Song, not only was it one of China’s most advanced dynasty, it may have been one of it’s most cosmopolitan, and yet the author points out, despite the “merits” of the cosmopolitan ruling class, the collapse of the Song from Mongol pressure was far swifter than one would think given the “legitimacy” endowed by it’s good and “rational” governance. Perhaps a lesson for our modern era as well.
Overall, I enjoyed this book, it outlines an era ill-understood by your general Chinese history reader, as much of the focus seems to be the Ming or the older empires, There just doesn’t seem to be much books on the Song in the popular nonfiction/generalist press in the United States. So this text definitely fills a need. Conditional recommendation for those interested in better integrating their knowledge of medieval warfare in Asia, with respect to campaigns that involved the Mongol World Empire in East Asia, as well as generalists in Chinese history.