Kinds of Minds: The Origins of Consciousness

by Daniel C. Dennett

What kinds of minds are there, and how do we know? The first question is about what exists and the second is about our knowledge. The aim of Kinds of Minds is to answer these questions, in general outline, and to show why these two questions have to be answered together. What exists is one thing. What we can know about is something else. But we know enough about minds, Dennett argues, to know that one of the things that makes them different from everything else in the universe is the way we know about them. 'Provoking but clarifying ...Daniel Dennett's book is a memorable and stimulating work of popular scientific explanation. It thoroughly readjusts the reader's mental image of what the mind is and how it got there but leaves one surprised that the explanation can be ultimately so simple when the implications are so vast' Anthony Smith, Observer

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Psychology, Nonfiction, Neuroscience, Audiobook, Biology

192 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 1996

About the author

Daniel Clement Dennett III was a prominent philosopher whose research centered on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He was the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett was a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.

Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.

Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.

Reviews

[Joshua Nomen-Mutatio · Rating 4 out of 5]

I listened to this via audio book format as read wonderfully by Dennett himself. Last night/early morning I woke up abruptly in the grip of a vague sort of existential terror and once I got my footing again, I felt a type of comfort in hearing Dennett's calm yet extremely engaged and enthusiastic voice--explaining complex things about the improbable evolution of sentient beings--emerging from the tiny speakers of my laptop.

At first, I was seized by a thought like, "I don't want to hear about this, I don't wanna die!" but then I stopped acting like a child who thinks the universe is created for them to enjoy, that their life is supposed to never end, and fell back into trying to appreciate the fact that I'm allowed to live at all, to appreciate the astounding confluence of myriad forces holding all that is beautiful and makes life worthy living together.

I see Dennett as an unknowing player in a third wave of existentialism ( Owen Flanagan incisively identifies three waves of existentialism ), a more proactive period in philosophy which makes real and serious attempts to overcome the "nausea" Sartre spoke of, and all the other variations of this so-called "existential despair."

This would get five stars if I wasn't already so familiar with many of the central ideas in this book from Dennett's other work and lectures. Much of this seems like a rehashing of the (great) ideas found within The Intentional Stance (the name of one of the chapters), Consciousness Explained, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Freedom Evolves and Elbow Room. Dennett's explanation of and solution to the problem of free will is brilliantly executed, albeit not terribly unique. His position on this is called "compatiblism" and it's been floating around at least since the days of David Hume, but regardless it is explained in a very uniquely understandable and morally edifying way.

Dennett is fast becoming one of my favorite philosophers of all time. I really enjoy his use of metaphor throughout all of his writing. He makes incredibly deep ideas "tangible" through this adept and dare I say "literary" or "poetic" use of language, and his immensely clear and direct wielding of concepts. His work is pretty consistently a wonderful interweaving of multiple fields of philosophy and both the "hard" and "soft" sciences and he also displays a quasi-polymathic understanding of the fine arts as well. Even when those he's pitted against philosophically describe this as an insult, I find it to be a compliment, i.e., Thomas Nagel once glibly referred to Dennett as "Gilbert Ryle meets Scientific American." But I say fuck you, Nagel, and I say three cheers for scientifically informed philosophy and philosophically informed science.

[Riku Sayuj · Rating 3 out of 5]

Raises very potent questions but answers almost none. Dennett is content with showing 3-4 potential ways of looking at any question and then telling us that to go beyond is a challenge even for modern science.

The arguments are smooth and the book gives a good evolutionary understanding of the way we frame thoughts and ascribe consciousness. The model of mind that Dennett has created is a bit dated for me, but I enjoyed the long range perspective he brought into it. the section on dogs was probably the best part for me.

PS. References to Susan Sontag is becoming overwhelming in books I read and I guess I will end up ordering one of her books soon.

[Noor · Rating 5 out of 5]

After reading Oliver Sacks The River of Consciousness and Christof Koch's Consciousness: Confessions of a Romantic Reductionist, I now turn to Daniel Dennett. After three books on consciousness, my memory feels like brain spaghetti tangled strands of ideas where I cant tell who said what anymore. Previous two books were engaging while I read them, but it seems I will need to revisit them several times to fully grasp the subject, build a clearer model, and distinguish what each author is suggesting.

Daniel Dennett suggests that minds evolved in layers, beginning with tiny organisms and gradually building up to complex humans, each stage adding new abilities. It fits neatly with the "Theory of Evolution" rather than relying on mystical explanations. The real question is: do we welcome ideas because they genuinely expand our understanding, or are we just bending every new thought to fit "The Model" we already believe in?

Animal Minds and Consciousness
Dennett pushes back against the human centered view of consciousness, showing that many creatures have their own intelligence, and reminds us to see animals with more empathy. Which makes me hesitate the next time I order a steak or fried chicken, dinner suddenly feels a lot more mindful than I expected.

Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
As a software developer, I’m excited about the possibility of AI consciousness, which Dennett also sees as likely. He challenges the "hard problem", arguing that consciousness arises from complex information processing rather than mysticism. I share this optimism, hoping AI can enter areas we treat as sacred and push us to rethink mind and meaning.

Consciousness is not a topic that can be neatly summarized or concluded. Star Trek’s “Last Frontier” points us outward to distant worlds, but for thinkers like Francis Crick, Christof Koch, and Oliver Sacks, the frontier shifts inward, from outer space to the inner space of the mind.

[Greg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dan Dennett wrote a fairy tale. No really.

It begins a long time ago, in a galaxy far far away (think about it). And it's a beautiful story about minds...all kinds of minds.

Dennett tell us a story through space and time that explains not only the evolution of minds from simple molecules, but of the evolution of minds in the developing human. Along the way he tackles intentionality and representation, and the importance of relative time frames and language. Not only does he explain difficult philosophical concepts, but he explains them in such an easy accessible manner that before you realize it's happened, you've learned a concept that philosophy students spend countless hours studying.

Dennett is masterful at storytelling, and in this book his style of writing really shines.

------------------------

A few quibbles.

His story is mostly told from the standpoint of evolution, and I think it's dangerous to overgeneralize both evolved functionality and behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. It's a difficult story to tell, precisely because so much of it is dark to us.

Dennett believes, and makes a strong case for, the fact that language is absolutely necessary for thought and representation. That without words you can't have concepts, and without concepts there is nothing going on, on the inside. I spend a lot of time thinking about the relationship between language and consciousness, and I think Dennett certainly makes some very valuable points, but the fact is...we have no idea what it's like to be a creature of our prospective intelligence, but without a way to create structured symbols to represent concepts. Also, from a neurophysiological standpoint, I'd argue representation IS possible without language, though it's a degraded form of it.

But I will say, even with as much as I've read in this field, Dennett surprised me with a few examples and arguments that might have to make me rethink some concepts in Philosophy of Mind/consciousness that I took for granted.

Thank you Dan, always a pleasure.

[Paul Ataua · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's a fairly interesting read. Dennett employs philosophy, evolution, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence to examine the nature of minds. Most irritating, however, is Dennett's arrogance. I found myself adding ' I would argue that' before every time he said 'it is', and adding ' and some people still do' when he said 'people used to think...". Dennett is one smart cookie, and really doesn't need to appeal to the power of persuasive language to make his points.

[Gendou · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice, short book that examines the philosophy of mind, consciousness.
One theme is exploring what sets humans apart, and what we have in common with other animals.
Another theme is the moral issue of pain and suffering.
I wouldn't say this book is very mind-blowing, no outrageous conclusions are reached.
Instead, Dennett presents a useful re-framing of common questions, as philosophers are oft to do.
The book's thesis might be that consciousness, as we know it, inherits from the language instinct.
Dennett proposes our conscious self is a concept attributed to the dominating forces in our behavior.
These dominating forces themselves are concepts, too, and so a part of our linguistic development.

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Quick read with some interesting points about the differences between one animal and another ... and human animals, too. Instinctual minds, conditioned minds, behavior-based minds, and hypothesizing minds. Each of these are different levels and capable of different things, but also limited in certain ways.

The author has a nice piece about pain vs suffering which I particularly enjoyed. It especially went well with some other reading I've not too distantly read, such as Eating Animals. Puts an animals pain vs suffering in context. Although I'm not sure this is what the author intended, his point was applicable to complex minds making suffering capable.

[Panteha · Rating 3 out of 5]

According to Daniel Dennett, even though we would like to think that non-human species are thinking beings, there are different degrees of sentience. In a nutshell, intentionality is what separates the higher order beings from those who are incapable of keeping secretes for example, verbal communication, and acquiring and reflecting on concepts. In combing through this question, he invokes everyone from Socrates to Skinner.

[Chris Osantowski · Rating 5 out of 5]

I can’t get enough of Dennett and his writing. I find consciousness incredibly fascinating and I think there are very few people that can talk about this in a clear and helpful way.

[Aysja Johnson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a short book which describes how we should expect to get minds from evolution and what kinds of minds evolution has created. I listened to the audio book with a friend, so this review is all from memory and I may get a few things wrong.

There are a few key ideas that I have taken away from this book. The first is the difference between lock and key type mechanisms and models. I’m forgetting which word he uses for the latter, but suffice it to say that there is a difference between a sense like smell, or any purely chemical cascade, and a sense like sight. In the former you have more of a look-up table; a chemical comes into contact with the system and the system has a predefined way of reacting. It is also based entirely on local dynamics -- you don’t need to sense anything far away. In the latter case you need models. It’s possible to have a look-up table for vision, but it would probably be prohibitively expensive and near useless. There are so many different situations that arise when you are observing distal visual cues in your environment that to be able to react to them quickly you likely need to model your environment. It is this switch, from being a thing that reacts (Darwinian/Skinnerian creatures) to being a thing that models (Popperian) that gets closer to the kinds of minds we humans have, and farther from the kinds of mind insects have.

The second idea is his famous intentional stance. This is in contrast to both the physical and design stance. All three are defined as different ways we predict our environment. When using the physical stance (e.g., physics or chemistry) we predict outcomes based on physical laws, when using the design stance (e.g., biological or mechanical systems) we predict outcomes based on design principles, and when using the intentional stance (e.g., other people) we predict based on mental properties. He notes that the intentional stance can be applied to most living things if we let time vary. For instance, watching a video of a tree growing in fast forward leaves us feeling as if it were ‘trying’ to go towards the light, that it ‘wanted’ the light, etc. However, trees do not have minds like ours. IIRC he explains that the speed which we (humans) need to react to our environment necessitates a mind like ours, but the slower pace which trees react in doesn’t. I am not totally compelled by his thoughts on this. To me it seems like trees don’t have minds because most of their computation is very localized, e.g., group of cells sense light over there, grow a little more over there. It doesn’t depend on a central system to execute orders because it doesn’t need to have a central intelligence. There is not much more to being a tree than avoiding growing into other trees, growing towards light, getting water, etc., all of which can be accomplished by local computation (as far as I can tell).

The final idea that I found interesting was how heavily landmarks factored into his ideas about intelligence and knowledge. He talks about how, much like in our external environment, we rely heavily on landmarks, e.g., a signpost which signifies something important, so too do we in our internal lives. The most common landmarks clearly arise in language. He claims that when babies babble they are generating these salient landmarks, getting ready via word repetition to assign them to something without having the conceptual connection already there. This was a novel idea to me, which is interesting since I have taken an entire course on language acquisition. To him, I think, all verbal thoughts serve as landmarks for concepts.

He also argues that language gives us the propensity to reason abstractly, which I of course don’t disagree with, but I tend to think people overstate the gains language affords us. It is not as though abstract reasoning was impossible before language, otherwise how does one acquire it? It seems like we have to have the ability to associate many slightly different kinds of rock with the word ‘rock’ when we’re developing language, which amounts to a mental representation of rock that is stable across many, which is what abstract reasoning is. Of course, we are a different species from, say, dogs, but I think this kind of capability is visible in many species. For instance, I think it is certainly plausible that some animals can have image like landmarks, much like we jump to a certain, specific mental image of a tree whenever we hear the word, of concepts they encounter frequently and can reason on this basis alone.

This was a super cool book and although I didn’t quite understand his thoughts about pain and suffering towards the end, I think he came up with many good handles for important concepts and is clearly a well thought and ingenious person. He’s also an engaging and fun writer, with many good intuition pumps along the way. I would highly recommend.

[Viddy · Rating 5 out of 5]

"This book began with a host of questions, and -- since this is a book by a philosopher -- it ends not with the answers, but, I hope, with better versions of the questions themselves." p 168.

This is an important caveat for those hoping, upon picking up this book, to find a definite and unblurred demarcation between "conscious" or "sentient" beings. Dennett offers no quick and easy answer, but he does offer a compelling perspective in which to view this question under a different light.

The crux for consciousness is on natural language and its ability to represent internal and external objects within the mind. This is not an entirely new concept; the idea that symbols are the hallmark of consciousness is implicit in the very idea of consciousness... there cannot be an "I" to suffer if the organism experiencing pain is incapable of representing the concept of "itself" as the one experiencing the suffering. Without a concept of self, a concept necessarily reliant on symbolizing, then it cannot be legitimately said that an organism is suffering... it is merely pain. We do not recoil in horror at inflicting pain on "lesser" animals (e.g. crabs, spiders, etc.) since we are unquestionably certain that we are not harming a conscious being.

The morally imperative difference between sensitivity to pain and sentience of suffering is contingent on the development of an organism being capable of reflecting on the pain it endures with a yearning for relief, a despair of its current state, a bitter regretting of the foolish actions that led it to this crisis. Such sentience is contingent on the ability to internally symbolize the being experiencing pain as "myself". It is only with the introduction of "I" that morality becomes a key component. (This is, obviously, a vast oversimplification... I'm not condoning rampant torturing of "non-sentient" organisms. Dennett advocates a gradient of "sentience", one which is not readily discernable at present, but he provides many thought experiments to test your intuitive notions that certain creatures are endowed or bereft of this magical X quality. Read the book for the subtleties.)

The development of symbols, being capable of internalizing the external world, allows for representation of the environment within the mind. And the fascinating characteristic of symbols is the ability to re-represent them, to not only be capable of thinking about objects when they are not present but to think about the thinking itself. This sort of bootstrapping takes the creature from mere thinking about the environment (including the self) to thinking about the thinking itself. Symbols of the external world now become concepts which may be thought about in their own right in an ever-increasing hierarchy of representation, re-representation, re-re-representation, etc.

Symbols are the prerequisites of language, the ability to convey meaning in the absence of what is being referred, and allowing a culture to form. Symbols may also be "off-loaded" onto the environment in the form of tools, books, and other artifacts. We alleviate the cognitive burden of keeping everything in mind by off-loading these symbols and then manipulating them to perform cognitive feats that would be impossible (or at least extraordinarily difficult) otherwise. Try multiplying a couple three digit numbers (385 x 924) without the use of paper. By off-loading symbols we can manipulate them and incorporate the product. We need not off-load only to the environment outside ourselves, but can do so within the echo chamber of our minds. This ability to represent and re-represent is a characteristic of the human mind and a (seemingly) unique feat in the animal kindgom. And due to this off-loading outside ourselves we impinge our minds to the environment, we store our minds outside ourselves, and so where, really, does the "I" exist?

[Pablo · Rating 4 out of 5]

I listened to the audiobook.

Although I expected the book to be different I really enjoyed it. It deals with topics such as the idea of the intentional stance, the importance of speed in our understanding of consciousness and intelligence, functionalism, a simple hierarchy for classifying minds and pain and suffering, offering interesting views and arguments.

Definitely an interesting read if you are interested in the discussion of consciousness or animal rights.

Some ideas I found interesting on this book are:

- The distinction between the physical, design and intentional stance and their usefulness on prediction (even if we apply them to things that are not designed of are not agents).
- A mind might have to be at least as speed as the events it acts onto be considered sentient
- Language might be the defining characteristic of human mind. There is no equivalent internal stream of consciousness in other animals
- Dissociation may help us explain the difference between human-like experience of suffering and non human suffering
- Pain as time✕intensity might not make a lot of sense since an agent might prefer 5 seconds of intense pain instead of a year of low pain.

[Rakan · Rating 4 out of 5]

ما هو الوعي؟ ما الفرق بين وعي الانسان والحيوان والنباتات والكائنات الدقيقة؟

في هذا الكتاب يُعرف الفيلسوف دانييل دينيت الوعي ويتحدث عن تطوره من الكائنات الدقيقة الأولى إلى ما نراه الآن في الانسان والقردة العليا والكائنات الأخرى التي تشابهها في درجة الوعي

يتطرق دينيت إلى ما يسميه بـ(الحالة المتعمدة) أو (المقصودة) وهي طريقة رائعة تجعلنا ننظر إلى الوعي من زاوية مختلفة تماماً، تقارب بين الكائنات "الواعية" و"غير الواعية"ـ

الكتاب لا يجيب على الكثير من الأسئلة لكنه بلا شك يفتح الباب لفهم الوعي والإدراك

[Chris Rock · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think I'm going to have to listen to this one again. This book was my first introduction to thinking about consciousness and the definition of "mind". As such it was pretty good. I found a lot of the arguments compelling and convincing.

The ending snuck up on me--I was a little surprised when it finished, as I felt that we had barely scratched the surface of the topic.

Recommended for anyone interested in understanding how we can determine what makes an organism sentient.

[Richard · Rating 3 out of 5]

makes you wonder and thats about it. Consiousness is a deep concept that is not easily guessed at or scientifically understood. Dennett brings up some interesting and fascinating ideas but thats all they are.

[Dennis Duty · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was worried by Dennett's hypotheticals at first. I'm somebody who constructs those sorts of mental models myself instinctively, and I was worried I would just be reading an echo rather than anything new. But by the second half I found some very useful framing tools. Dennett's spent an entire lifetime studying this topic and he's synthesized as unique POV as a result. So while I feel like I could have written this myself given the same background, but I'm damn glad I didn't have to.

[Gijs Limonard · Rating 3 out of 5]

Big fan of Dennett but this was not one of his strongest works; a lot of musings on the supposed workings of the mind but he’s not putting much meat on the bone of his ideas; the intentional stance as a way of examining conscience and intelligence is a worthwhile exercise though, but the explanatory power of this proposed thinking tool is virtually absent.

[Ivi · Rating 2 out of 5]

2,5*

[سالم عبدالله · Rating 4 out of 5]

لم يزدتي هذا الكتاب الا المزيد من التساؤلات..
لازال العقل شي محير
متى تكون واين مكانه
لكن الكتاب فعلا مثير

[Rozalia · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dennett jest Francuzem, nawet jeśli o tym nie wie. Co w połączeniu z byciem filozofem daje nieznośnie mętny wywód i wnioski, z którymi trudno się zgodzić. Na przykład, że zwierzęta nie myślą, ponieważ nie posiadają języka takiego jak ludzki. Nie jest to wystarczający argument, nawet sam autor na koniec przyznaje, że nie jest. Ake, jest dobrze rozumiem, potrzebuje go, żeby wyjaśnić przepaść ewolucyjną między człowiekiem a, dajny na to, kotem.

[Eli · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very thought-provoking. I began this book resistant to its message, as I had watched speeches by Dennett that had left me unconvinced. Specifically I had taken away from those presentations that to Dennett consciousness, or "mindhood", was nothing more than a byproduct of the organization of the brain, which, while potentially true, was dismissive of the subjectiveness of being, something separated from objective analysis by (to me) an unbridgeable chasm. I've heard it facetiously argued that perhaps those who utterly dismiss subjectivity and "qualia" themselves have no minds -- they are walking philosophical zombies.

Well the charge is false with Dennett, because he devotes a whole chapter to such concerns in this book. The contemptuousness held toward the subjective was entirely imagined on my part. Still, while I can agree that consciousness might be nothing more than a principle of organization, no amount of puzzling over it has ever allowed me to intuit such a result.

The main premise of Kinds of Minds is that, instead of an arbitrary cutoff between conscious and unconscious creatures, there is a fuzzy gradation, with the fundamental kinds of consciousness changing along the way. What's more surprising is the way he uses current science to actually flesh out reasonable guesses as to what some of of these kinds of consciousness might look like. He uses the same experiments and thought experiments to propose that human consciousness might be further removed from the animal kind than we tend to think, and that language is the key innovation that has endowed us with conceptual consciousness.

It's clear to me that my own tendency has been to extend the envelope of consciousness to a broader host of organisms than most people do. But when I think about it now I will be reminding myself that other animals are not just Humanity, Lite, but qualitatively different, in a way that may be difficult or impossible to imagine in anything other than a stretched analogy.

I read this because I very much like such imaginings, and I was not disappointed.

[Andrew Feist · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very short, concise account of Dennett's approach to the mind and how it relates to other creatures. It is very well explained, however not that strongly argued. It is certainly written as an addendum to Consciousness Explained, however it might be better to read this first. In fact, I'd say its a great introduction to anyone who interested in a materialist philosophy of mind, or generally, cognitive science. It explains the big problems, and what he opines to be the best approaches. He gives no consideration to non-materialist approaches, its more of an explanation of his view than and argumentation for it.

Nevertheless, I always enjoy Dennett's style and thought process. I read this in a day (traveling), would recommend it highly. It gives a great tour through philosophy methods and ethology findings, resulting in a greater understanding of human consciousness and animal minds (or protominds).

[Hilary "Fox" · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although I do not necessarily agree with all that Dennett stated in this book, I have to say that he stated it exceptionally well. This was an accessible, high level philosophical book detailing the conception of animal minds vs. human minds. Each philosophical concept he put forward he carefully defined and explained with often amusing examples.

The ideas that he came up with himself (i.e. The Tower of Generate and Test, mamataxis, etc.) were novel and interesting without being too difficult to grasp. I enjoyed the quotes at the beginning of each chapter. Although the book was dense in its content, it never strayed too far from what is easily grasped with a bit of mental effort. I'd recommend this alongside Species of Mind which addresses several small flaws in some conclusions that he draws.

[William · Rating 3 out of 5]

Like most Dennett books, it is chalk full of mental fiber and powerfully intuitive thought experiments that effortlessly make his points for him. Dennett gets so many points for eschewing abstruse 'philoso-speak' although here, I wanted a bit more structure.

The book lacks a central agenda and thesis, and I think that this is the reason why I didn't like it as much as I might have—although I may simply be a grinch and unwilling to accept "there are many kinds of minds" as a satisfactory thesis, where other readers might be happy to do so.

Thinking back on the text, I seem to have a hard time pinning down exactly what all those clever remarks and thought experiments were...perhaps I am at fault here, but I suspect that Dennett's conversational tone has gone too far here, wanting structure. He spends so little time with each experiment, it is easy to misplace them.

[cody]

as self admitted, this is more an attempt to restructure questions than to outright answer them. what kinds of minds are there, and where should we decide moral consequence? well, it seems important to explore what we really mean by this, first. dennett embraces a functionalist approach that, when flirted with, flows quite wonderfully. it is rather funny which asides he chooses to detail exhaustively and which central arguments he seemingly brushes over (the wittgenstein referencing as an attempt to elegantly dismiss solipsism flew over my head at first, for example), but the playful language and ease of access is continuous, and the invitation to really consider what we so eagerly take for granted is a beautiful success

[Feliks · Rating 2 out of 5]

There's been a boom in "armchair"-style cognitive pop-science books lately but you really have to be familiar with what the long-standing landscape of the topic was; before jumping at every latest fad title. Start with something like this. Anytime any new discovery happens, a spate of books ensues by anyone even remotely involved; the lamers who write science-feature articles for Yahoo are all looking to get their first book out. Remain calm and don't get excited at every little 'startling development'. A book like this helps you gain a sense of perspective.

[Joaquín Baldwin]

This is a very accessible book, which is probably why I didn't enjoy it much. It raises a lot of questions, answers almost none, and deals with it in a very easy to understand language and never gets too technical. I feel that the simplicity in which he expressed his ideas is not a good way to deal with the complexity of the themes underneath.

For a first book on consciousness, starting to explore the themes, it's a good book. If you have read some more about it, I wouldn't recommend it. "Godel, Escher, Bach" followed by "I Am A Strange Loop" would be much more enlightening.

[Sam · Rating 3 out of 5]

I picked this up at Midway Bookstore in St. Paul. It intrigued me because I'd like to learn more about the question of Other Minds. The first section was fascinating, but later chapters descended into a myopic examination of the possibility of animal intelligence, which Dennett seems to believe is impossible. I think that Dennett mistakes the epistemological difficulty of examining non-human minds with human exceptionalism.

[MeisterKleister · Rating 5 out of 5]

"This book began with a host of questions, and -- since this is a book by a philosopher -- it ends not with the answers, but, I hope, with better versions of the questions themselves." p 168.

One of my favorite non-fiction books. But I'm biased, since I'm interested in the subject. It cleared my thoughts about consciousness by showing me which ideas / questions even make sense or not and why. I watched lectures by Dennett before reading, so I knew what I was getting into.

[David Layton · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was written as part of a series of science primers for those readers who probably have a college degree, but not in a field of science. Dennett is a philosopher, so what is he doing writing a book in this series? Well, Dennett is one of the new wave of philosophers from the late 20th century who look not to the history and tradition of philosophy for grounding conjectures and arguments, but rather to science for such grounding. Indeed, throughout this short volume, Dennett mentions very few philosophers - Descartes, Plato, Sartre, Searle, Ryle - and each for no more than a couple of sentences and most just to say that they were wrong. Most of the references for his arguments come from computer science, biology, and psychology (note, this is psychology we are talking about here and not the pseudoscience of psychoanalysis). Dennett warns the reader up front that this book is about questions rather than answers. As Dennett sees it, consciousness is the most difficult existing philosophical problem. Philosophers "know" that it is there in some sense, but do not yet know what it is. Dennett argues that this problem exists because the usual questions used to address the problem are either poorly worded or begin from the wrong assumptions. This book, then, is an attempt to work out what the right questions might be, or at least what the basis for formulating the right questions might be, which explains this book's subtitle of "Toward an Understanding of Consciousness."

Dennett starts by working on the assumptions. First, according to Dennett whatever consciousness might be, it must arise from the natural and material development and life of being human. In essence, consciousness must of necessity be a product of evolution by natural selection. Second, according to Dennett, since consciousness either involves intentionality or the appearance of intentionality, any inquiry into consciousness must start from what he calls "the intentional stance." In pursuit of the first assumption that consciousness is derived from natural selection, Dennett walks the reader through the development of the increasing complexity of minds in evolutionary history, from mere sensitivity through various stages such as self/other recognition, simple problem solving, choice, future orientation, symbolism, and language. In the process, he gradually separates humans from other animals to show that it at least appears, with no compelling evidence to the contrary, that only humans have full consciousness, though other species even down to fairly basic levels have "minds" of some sort. Dennett is aware of the controversy of that position and takes a little time to address counterarguments. In philosophy, the more controversial assumption is the second, that of the intentional stance. Basically, Dennett argues that we determine whether something other than ourselves has a mind, and thus potentially has consciousness, by ascribing reasons to its activity. Thus, we assume that there is an intention to the actions, and thus some kind of thought process for the action. Dennett is aware of the major objections to the argument from the intentional stance. He dismisses, for instance, solipsism. He also states that he knows that the intentional stance may be convenient rather than actual. He argues that its convenience, its utility, still makes the intentional stance highly useful for orienting thinking toward deriving the right sorts of questions by which to determine the nature of consciousness. He also shows that there is no compelling argument against the intentional stance, which means that while it still might possibly not be true in an absolute sense, it is true enough in the immediate sense to get us started on thinking about consciousness in the right way.

Dennett as a writer is refreshing to read compared to most other philosophers. Dennett strives as much as possible not to weigh down his explanations in jargon, and to use plain language. He provides brief and accurate summaries where needed, and spends only small space in arguing against some other position. Dennett is very careful to state where he is asserting something and where he is simply exploring possibilities. Probably because the book is meant to be a primer rather than a fully developed argument, there some gaps in the presentation. Dennett assumes quite a bit about evolutionary development, skipping from one "advance" in mental states to another and assuming just that the change happened. He does not really show how it happened (perhaps that is not possible given the fossil and geological records), and assumes that any development is an "answer" of a kind to an imaginary abstract problem in nature. It could be argued that this is taking the intentional stance too far by reading intention into nature itself. While it is plausible that consciousness developed in nature the way he says it developed, there is more than a little of "just take my word for it" in these parts of the presentation, which are begging for more and better substantiation.

In the end, Dennett has for the most part accomplished his goal with this book of arguing in favor of rethinking the kinds of questions that are going to get us toward understanding consciousness. He has provided mostly sound arguments for believing he is on the right track toward what those questions might be and how we might go about answering them.