Primates and Philosophers How Morality Evolved by de Waal, Frans [Princeton UP,2009]

The University Center for Human Values Series

by Frans de Waal

"It's the animal in us," we often hear when we've been bad. But why not when we're good? Primates and Philosophers tackles this question by exploring the biological foundations of one of humanity's most valued traits: morality.

In this provocative book, primatologist Frans de Waal argues that modern-day evolutionary biology takes far too dim a view of the natural world, emphasizing our "selfish" genes. Science has thus exacerbated our reciprocal habits of blaming nature when we act badly and labeling the good things we do as "humane." Seeking the origin of human morality not in evolution but in human culture, science insists that we are moral by choice, not by nature.

Citing remarkable evidence based on his extensive research of primate behavior, de Waal attacks "Veneer Theory," which posits morality as a thin overlay on an otherwise nasty nature. He explains how we evolved from a long line of animals that care for the weak and build cooperation with reciprocal transactions. Drawing on both Darwin and recent scientific advances, de Waal demonstrates a strong continuity between human and animal behavior. In the process, he also probes issues such as anthropomorphism and human responsibilities toward animals.

Based on the Tanner Lectures de Waal delivered at Princeton University's Center for Human Values in 2004, Primates and Philosophers includes responses by the philosophers Peter Singer, Christine M. Korsgaard, and Philip Kitcher and the science writer Robert Wright. They press de Waal to clarify the differences between humans and other animals, yielding a lively debate that will fascinate all those who wonder about the origins and reach of human goodness.

The University Center for Human Values Series.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, Evolution, Psychology, Biology, Anthropology

Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 2006

About the author

Frans de Waal has been named one of Time magazine’s 100 Most Influential People. The author of Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, among many other works, he is the C. H. Candler Professor in Emory University’s Psychology Department and director of the Living Links Center at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center. He lives in Atlanta, Georgia.

Reviews

[Irena Pasvinter · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is a University Press collection of essays. The topic is "How did morality evolve, and are humans the only species who possess morality?". The first essay is written by Frans de Waal and states his views on the topic and on the place of anthropomorphism in scientific approach to the related research. This is followed by essays of other scientists who argue with de Waal's position on anthropomorphism and defend the niceties of their own point of view. A rather long introduction at the beginning of the book sort of summarizes what de Waal has to say and what the opponents reply.

I made it through de Waal's essay (which had some interesting anecdotes and research data about primates) and through part of the first polemicizing essay before deciding that enough is enough. Life is too short to plow through the fields of academic drudgery unless you're paid for this. De Waals's opponent wasn't even referring to the essay published in this book but to de Waal's book "Chimpanzee's Politics", which is probably more interesting than all these essays taken together.

[J.D. Steens · Rating 3 out of 5]

De Waal sets up his ethical argument by describing what he calls veneer theory: humans are basically bad (self-oriented), and civilized behavior is superficial and fragile. De Waal’s theory in contrast is that we are by nature good. Drawing from his work with primates, he anchors moral behavior in our natural inclinations and desires. (1) To this De Waal adds a cognitive layer, empathy, which enables us to “adopt the other’s viewpoint,” leading us to assist others by following golden rule-like precepts. Because we are good natured, we seek to help when we recognize that others are in need. (2) Here, de Waal draws on Mencius’s example of our natural tendency to help, without any thought of reward, a child who has fallen into a well as the “distress at the sight of another’s pain is an impulse over which we exert little or no control.” In other words, altruism is pure. De Waal correctly outlines our cooperative and other-regarding social nature. He goes on to acknowledge, though, that this is “very much an in-group phenomenon,” and writes that “Universally, humans treat outsiders far worse than members of their own community.”

This where de Waal gets stuck. He offers no argument for why or how we might, motivation-wise, transcend our tribalism. How might de Waal’s theory be extended beyond the in-group? A good many people are other-regarding by nature, just as de Waal believes. But, in contrast to de Waal, an argument can be made that compassion (caring for others) does, for many individuals, extend to non-group members, to humankind, and even, for some, to life itself. This can be validated, daily, in our own lives. With these individuals, though, the motive force is, in the end, self-interest as “pain” (broadly construed as caring) is experienced as one’s own pain. (3)

For those who don’t feel the pain of others in this way, many can nevertheless act in an other-regarding way toward non-group members because they see that it’s in their interest to do so. This is a good form of utilitarianism. The motive force is not the good, caring nature as de Waal would have it but, rather, a pragmatic recognition that it’s in our interest to respect others. When the social order unravels through a free-for-all, the interest of each is compromised and harms our own interests in the long run. This is also the point of the Golden Rule that de Waal mentions. It can and should govern our social relationships in a trans-tribal way because in the end, and overall, it is good for us.

A third category of behavior, though, undermines de Waal’s fundamental premise that we are inherently good, and this is a chronic source of intra- as well as inter-group conflict. De Waal charges that veneer theorists do not have an explanation for our clearly evident good, social nature. But the same argument can be made about de Waal’s perspective as well—how to explain our equally clear “bad” nature, as seen daily and throughout human history. There are a good many who are neither compassionate by nature nor motivated to restrict their own behavior out of deference to others (within the group as well as outside the group). These are the egoistic people who are willing to assert themselves at the expense of others if that’s what it takes to get to success. (4) In the end, it could be that the dichotomy that de Waal sets up--that we are either good natured or bad natured--is false. We see both poles of human nature at work and everything in between. And both poles, it can be argued, are consistent with the (genetic) variation that lies at the heart of Darwinian theory and each has their own strong survival benefits. (5)

The book ends with comments by various theorists on what de Waal has put forward. The main counter-argument comes from Christine Korsgaard who argues that only humans can be moral beings since moral beings act on principles that are cognitive by nature, which is missing in animals. In making her case this way, she eliminates a biological foundation for ethics. With Kant, she asserts that we should respect others as Ends. A counter question is, “Why?” and the answer to that question, it can be argued, can be traced back to biology: it’s in our own self-interest to respect the freedom of others (their ends) because the alternative is a free-for-all and social disorder that compromises the freedom of all. To bolster her argument, Korsgaard calls opposing theories and perspectives “laughable,” “absurd,” and “rather silly.” These are rank words and they are annoying to see in what should be a serious and respectful discussion.

(1) De Waal contrasts his perspective with that of Hobbes and Rawls who, he believes, argue that our social nature occurred only by a social contract whereby each agreed to restrain the self’s freedom in deference to the freedom of all. A social contract, de Waal writes, is a “rational decision by inherently asocial creatures.”

(2) De Waal writes that “Reciprocity is of course…at the heart of the Golden Rule, which remains unsurpassed as a summary of human morality.” The Golden Rule with its built-in sense of reciprocity is a meaningless precept if one is not motivated to follow it. It can be also argued that understanding another’s situation through empathy does not lead ipso facto to a desire to help alleviate their situation. In fact, some argue that empathy cuts both ways as the capacity to understand another’s situation enables one to better manipulate others. Which form empathy takes depends on one's inner motivation - to be other-regarding or to be self-regarding only.

(3) De Waal endorses the more or less standardized explanation among evolutionary biologists for other-regarding behavior in his discussion of kin-selection (we favor our kin in our actions to promote our common genes) and reciprocal altruism (since we obviously favor non-kin as well, other-regarding behavior is explained in terms of tit-for-tat benefits). But de Waal strikes me as ambivalent on the motive force for other-regarding behavior. He sees our social tendencies as naturally altruistic, devoid of self-interest. But he also relies on “reciprocal altruism” as the theoretical foundation for extending other-regarding behavior to non-kin group members, even though “reciprocal” altruism has by definition a fundamental self-interested component.

Kin selection and reciprocal altruism are better viewed as products that flow from a much deeper evolutionary need that ties the individual to the group. And an argument can be made that both of these have a self-interested component because, as Darwin highlighted about the origins of our tribal nature, individual survival occurs via the group. Within a group, the individual survives; without a group, the individual dies. Ultimately, the motive force for social behavior in de Waal’s sense is the self’s survival and de Waal himself implies this when he writes of Darwin that “Evolution favors animals that assist each other if by doing so they achieve long-term benefits of greater value than the benefits derived from going it alone and competing with others.” But de Waal cannot put “self-interest,” broadly construed, at the core of “altruistic and sympathetic” tendencies because he believes that these are inherently “other-regarding.” De Waal, rather, relies on these purified tendencies as the motive force underlying good (social) behavior.

(4) And the implication of this view is that protecting one’s self-interest through the application of power against those who abuse their freedom is necessary, as much as we wish it would not be the case.

(5) To be a member in good standing within a group promotes survival – in a “good for one, good for all” way. Being self-oriented at the expense of others within a group, when combined with deceit, manipulation, power, etc., also has survival value.

[Joshua Nomen-Mutatio · Rating 5 out of 5]

From a blog I wrote early on in my reading of this book (I'll be writing more about the rest later on):

"Climbed to the Highest Point on the Tree and the Empathy Therein"

I'm reading a book right now that's quite impressive called Primates & Philosophers by the primatologist Frans de Waal which is mostly about the evolution of morality. The book is finished with a series of exchanges between philosophers (like Peter Singer for instance) so basically like a conversation in essay form about the subject of evolutionary ethics among other things. De Waal critiques what he calls "Veneer Theory" which posits that human morality exists as a thin layer on top of our amoral core. According to de Waal, and I agree, this model just doesn't add up when we look to the empirical evidence provided by evolution and the rich sources of information we currently have on animal behavior studies. Anyway, I suggest that people check it out. It argues very well for the idea that nature and culture, human nature and moral reasoning are not at odds but rather are so intertwined that the Veneer Theory (culture as a layer on top of biology) just breaks down and falls apart. It's really interesting and has some great descriptions of non-human primate behavior and non-primates (such as dolphins with their relevant presence of higher levels of cognition). One very moving and interesting story is an account of a bonobo attempting to care for an injured bird and help it fly again:

"Here is another story about Bonobo empathy: Betty Walsh, an animal caretaker, observed the following incident involving a 7 year old female Bonobo named Kuni at Twycross Zoo in England. One day, Kuni captured a starling. Out of fear that she might hurt the bird, the keeper urged Kuni to let it go. Kuni took the bird and gently set it on its feet, right side up. When it didn't move, Kuni tossed it in the air. However, it returned to sitting on the earth, probably because it was too stunned or terrified to fly. Kuni then picked it up, climbed to the highest point on the highest tree, wrapped her legs around the trunk so that she had both hands free and carefully unfolded the bird's wings and spread them wide open on her palm and then threw the bird into the air as hard as she could. Unfortunately, it was still too stunned to make it over the barrier, so it sat on the edge of the moat where Kuni guarded it for a long time from the juveniles until it finally flew away."

-an excerpt from from another review of the book

[Graham · Rating 4 out of 5]

Richard Dawkins and others have fallen into the trap that somehow Biological Evolution leads to Social Darwinism. In the same vein, these biologists claim that morality is a construct unique to humans and we use it to counter our selfish animal tendencies. Animals less sophisticated than humans allegedly allow natural selection to take out the weak. Not only is the quote "Survival of the Fittest" mis-attributed to Darwin, but so is the concept of such brutal views of natural selection.

De Waal is one of the most respected primatologists second to only Jane Goodall. In Primates and Philosophers, De Waal uses several accounts of primate behavior to show that morality is as continuous with other Great Apes, Chimpanzees and Bonobos in particular, as is our genome.

It turns out these primates most close to us genetically, show a myriad of the building blocks for morality. They are capable of empathy, sympathy, reciprocity, peacemaking and retaliation. Quick to answer charges of anthropomorphism, De Waal convincingly argues that any other answers for these behaviors would be more cognitively complicated and therefore less plausible.

Unique to humans however are two qualities. The impartial spectator that Adam Smith describes, and the ability to reason and judge between two conflicting moral decisions. While significant, it hardly amounts to the gaping hole between our social behavior and that of wild animals that others have suggested.

An excellent read for anyone pondering the origins of morality
or the true implications of Darwinism on a social species.

[Jim Razinha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thought provoker, but then de Waal tends to do that. I finished this a couple of days ago and still don't know if I can do this review justice, but... The basis of this is his criticism (and dismissal) of the Hobbesian view that morality is a layer (a veneer) overlaying the baser, brutish animal that humans really are. This Veneer Theory, as dubbed by de Waal, has advocates and opponents (de Waal being one) and his leading essay here outlined his positions as to why the veneerists are wrong...in his view. No, humans are not moral "by choice" as Hobbes, Huxley and, it seems, Dawkins would have...rather, morality evolved from social constructs evidenced by some of our primate cousins. Four essays respond to his, and then he responds to them...an interesting format. A civilized debate; a food network throw down for people who actually think. They want to address "why don’t we think it is good to be bad?" And none of the five feel "that there is any reason to suppose that humans are different in their metaphysical essence from other animals, or at least, none base their arguments on the idea that humans uniquely possess a transcendent soul." See? For people who think.

The editors observe that all five share the understanding that

moral goodness is something real, about which it is possible to make truth claims. Goodness requires, at a minimum, taking proper account of others. Badness, by the same token, includes the sort of selfishness that leads us to treat others improperly by ignoring their interests or treating them as mere instruments. The two basic premises of evolutionary science and moral reality establish the boundaries of the debate over the origins of goodness as it is set forth in this book. This means that those religious believers who are committed to the idea that humans have been uniquely endowed with special attributes (including a moral sense) by divine grace alone are not participants in the discussion as it is presented here.

Emphasis mine. Some of the counterarguments call out de Wall for anthropomorphizing his studies (more on that), but he has long observed enough behavior that he justifies well his "scientific anthropomorphism" (as distinguished from the Peter Rabbit-ish writings.)

The point is that de Waal’s evidence, quantitative and anecdotal, for primate emotional response is based entirely on observations of actual behavior. De Waal must base his account of primate morality on how primates do in fact act because he has no access to their “ought” stories about what moral reason might ideally demand of them, or to how they suppose they ought to act in a hypothetical situation.So there seems to be a risk of comparing apples and oranges: contrasting primate behavior (based on quantitative and anecdotal observation) with human normative ideals.

(their emphasis) Important distinction. There is no anthropomorphism in that. Humans want to project "ought" and it is the duty of the impartial scientific observer to maintain a distance.

So, to frame the argument, de Wall says

Hobbes and Rawls create the illusion of human society as a voluntary arrangement with self-imposed rules assented to by free and equal agents. Yet, there never was a point at which we became social: descended from highly social ancestors—a long line of monkeys and apes—we have been group-living forever. Free and equal people never existed. Humans started out—if a starting point is discernible at all—as interdependent, bonded, and unequal.

Our evolution didn't spontaneously pop out a "moral" product.

For a human characteristic, such as empathy, that is so pervasive , develops so early in life, and shows such important neural and physiological correlates as well as a genetic substrate, it would be strange indeed if no evolutionary continuity existed with other mammals. The possibility of empathy and sympathy in other animals has been largely ignored, however.

I don't know how anyone can deny that some animals have empathy and either it developed independently (which has happened for multiple many features) or has passed down from some earlier species. de Wall argues that Veneer Theory "lacks any sort of explanation of how we moved from being amoral animals to moral beings. The theory is at odds with the evidence for emotional processing as driving force behind moral judgment." de Waal:

If human morality could truly be reduced to calculations and reasoning, we would come close to being psychopaths, who indeed do not mean to be kind when they act kindly.

Extreme? perhaps, but it bears thought. He notes this on morality:

It should further be noted that the evolutionary pressures responsible for our moral tendencies may not all have been nice and positive. After all, morality is very much an in-group phenomenon. Universally, humans treat outsiders far worse than members of their own community: in fact, moral rules hardly seem to apply to the outside.

This is lost on so many people! Racism, xenomisia, nationalism...hello!

Morality likely evolved as a within-group phenomenon in conjunction with other typical within-group capacities, such as conflict resolution, cooperation, and sharing.
The first loyalty of every individual is not to the group, however, but to itself and its kin. With increasing social integration and reliance on cooperation, shared interests must have risen to the surface so that the community as a whole became an issue.

This makes sense, no? de Waal:

Obviously, the most potent force to bring out a sense of community is enmity toward outsiders. It forces unity among elements that are normally at odds. This may not be visible at the zoo, but it is definitely a factor for chimpanzees in the wild, which show lethal intercommunity violence. In our own species, nothing is more obvious than that we band together against adversaries. In the course of human evolution, out-group hostility enhanced in-group solidarity to the point that morality emerged. Instead of merely ameliorating relations around us, as apes do, we have explicit teachings about the value of the community and the precedence it takes, or ought to take, over individual interests. Humans go much further in all of this than the apes, which is why we have moral systems and apes do not.

Still. the fringe elements supported and promoted by the current US administration seem to have a closer connection to the cousins...

Journalist (and sociobiologist/evolutionary psychologist) Robert Wright picks at de Waal's use of anthropomorphic language in his writings and arguments. He says

There are two broad categories of anthropomorphic language. First, there is emotional language: We can say that chimpanzees feel compassionate, outraged, aggrieved, insecure, et cetera. Second, there is cognitive language, language that attributes conscious knowledge and/or reasoning to animals: We can say that chimpanzees remember, anticipate, plan, strategize, et cetera.

His beef with de Waal seems to be that "It isn’t always clear from the behavioral evidence alone which kind of anthropomorphic language is in order." and that de Waal seems to prefer cognitive anthropomorphism. de Waal does tend to impart a more human reasoning to explain some of his (many) observations of simian behavior, the cognitive anthropomorphism, but then he does have decades of behaviors observed!

Philosopher Christine Korsgaard sides with de Waal in arguing against Veneer Theory in her essay:

There are a number of problems with Veneer Theory. In the first place, despite its popularity in the social sciences, the credentials of the principle of pursuing your own best interests as a principle of practical reason have never been established. [...]
In the second place, it is not even clear that the idea of self-interest is a well-formed concept when applied to an animal as richly social as a human being.[...]
So the idea that we can clearly identify our own interests as something set apart from or over against the interests of others is strained to say the least.
And yet even this is not the deepest thing wrong with Veneer Theory. Morality is not just a set of obstructions to the pursuit of our interests. Moral standards define ways of relating to people that most of us, most of the time, find natural and welcome.[...]
It is absurd to suggest that this is what most human beings are like, or long to be like, beneath a thin veneer of restraint.
But it is also absurd to think that nonhuman animals are motivated by self-interest. The concept of what is in your own best interests, if it makes any sense at all, requires a kind of grip on the future and an ability to calculate that do not seem available to a nonhuman animal.

She then looks at de Waal's consideration of intent as he establishes the primacy of the bases for the evolution of our morality.

The question of intention is a question about how an episode in which an animal does something looks from the acting animal’s own point of view, whether it is plausible to think that the animal acts with a certain kind of purpose in mind. I think there is a temptation to think that the question whether we can see the origins of morality in animal behavior depends on how exactly we interpret their intentions, whether their intentions are “good” or not. I think that, at least taken in the most obvious way, this is a mistake.

She has a point - interpretation is necessary, as we cannot (yet) know what animals are thinking, so care must be taken to normalize that interpretation.

Peter Singer, philosopher, in his response essay "Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals" points out

Once we recognize that nonhuman animals have complex emotional and social needs, we begin to see animal abuse where others might not see it [...]

I didn't pull much from his counter, but I thought that worth sharing. In de Waal's response to the responses, he asks

So, we need to distinguish intentional selfishness and intentional altruism from mere functional equivalents of such behavior. Biologists use the two almost interchangeably, but Philip Kitcher and Christine Korsgaard are correct to stress the importance of knowing the motives behind behavior. Do animals ever intentionally help each other? Do humans?
I add the second question even if most people blindly assume a affirmative answer. We show a host of behavior, though, for which we develop justifications after the fact.

I submit that Daniel Kahneman answers that. Our emotional brain reacts first, much as we rational beings hate to admit it, and that emotional brain developed much earlier than the human primate overlay.

Okay, I veneered the second half of the book (first half, too, really, but...) I need to read more de Waal, but my confirmation bias thinks he's right, whether he uses the appropriate descriptive language or attributions.

[Thomas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Primatologists & Evolutionary Biologists 1 - 0 Utilitarians & Deontologists

[Alfredo González · Rating 2 out of 5]

I consider this book more appropriate for scholars than the lay person. I just finished reading a book about the same subject: The Quest of a Moral Compass by Keenan Malik, and the author does not mention primates nor any other animal, his quest took a different path altogether, he looked in the Bible, in Religion and Philosophy, no wonder he could not find any morality there, anyone that reads the history of the Popes gets the message very clear, they were not guided by morality.
My feeling is that De Waal is in the right track, but I was hoping for a more clear path, perhaps is my lack of scholarship that did not grasp all that is in the book. However, I did find many sections very enlightening and very well worth reading.

[Alexander Theofanidis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Κουβαλώντας την άχαρη φύση κάθε βιβλίου που έχει προκύψει από κείμενα διαλέξεων, το "πρωτεύοντα και φιλόσοφοι" πραγματεύεται την ύπαρξη ριζών ηθικής στα πρωτεύοντα από τα οποία και τις κληρονομήσαμε. Δυστυχώς, όπως προείπα, είναι κείμενα διαλέξεων και παρά το γεγονός ότι το μισό βιβλίο είναι κριτικές και απαντήσεις "ομοτίμων" δε σώζεται ακριβώς η παρτίδα. Παραμένει μια λίγο "φτηνή αρπαχτή" από κάποιον που θα μπορούσε να μας έχει δώσει ένα πολύ καλύτερο, εκτενέστερο και με μεγαλύτερη εσωτερική συνοχή βιβλίο.

2,5 στην πραγματικότητα, 3 χαριστικά

[Garry Alexander · Rating 5 out of 5]

Primates and Philosophers is offering us to analyse the origins of morality, but focuses on one of the subject: whether human morality goes deep into our evolutionary past or is new with the arrival of our evolving brains and cultures. The answer depends on how morality is defined.

[Kent Winward · Rating 4 out of 5]

de Waal and other philosophers arguing over how morality in humans evolved, but the human monkeys mostly split philosophical hairs while agreeing in generalities. Great stuff if you are a primate that digs that kind of discussion.

[Marina · Rating 4 out of 5]

<>. ▪️ ¿Es el hombre un lobo para el hombre? O, sin embargo, ¿somos buenos por naturaleza? Frans de Waal rechaza en este libro la <> según la cual los seres humanos somos egoístas de forma natural y nuestra moralidad es únicamente una capa cultural que recubre ese instinto egoísta más primario. Para rechazarla se basa en numerosas investigaciones elaboradas con primates que demuestran que procedemos de un largo linaje de animales que sí se preocupan por los menos afortunados y que además, cooperan entre sí. Este hecho significa que existe cierta continuidad entre la conducta animal y la humana, por lo que elabora una nueva teoría: <> donde la empatía abarca todos los estados emocionales del sujeto. Más adelante, De Waal añade una serie de comentarios de otros filósofos y científicos que muestran su parecer en torno a sus argumentaciones. Estos son: Peter Singer (uno de los creadores del proyecto Gran Simio) , Philip Kitcher, Christine M. Korsgaard y Robert Wright. Todos ellos añaden su propia perspectiva y enriquecen así lo expuesto por De Waal. Me ha parecido un mecanismo muy interesante para debatir y no terminar por exponer un libro que parezca incluir la verdad absoluta sobre una cuestión tan complicada como es el origen de la moralidad. En cuanto a mis conclusiones, lo que extraigo de la lectura es que existe un claro consenso científico e intelectual acerca de que la moralidad es un mecanismo que surge de nuestra condición de animales sociales y que tanto la empatía como las emociones aparecen de forma parecida en determinados animales. Nuestra principal diferencia son los mecanismos cognitivos que, ayudados por las emociones, utilizamos para razonar y ser conscientes de nuestros actos así como decidir sobre lo que es justo e injusto. Como humanos, la cultura es lo que más nos diferencia de los animales, pero eso no significa que no existan animales capaces de cooperar y sentir empatía. Y, aunque es cierto que asumir que la moralidad humana proviene de los animales es algo prematuro de hacer, sí que existen evidencias que ayudan a avanzar en estas investigaciones e incluyen a los animales en el proceso de entendimiento de nuestra naturaleza humana mediante la cual, si bien no nacemos con un gen moral, sí con los mecanismos que nos permiten el aprendizaje de las normas y las culturas. Un libro muy entretenido para cualquier interesado en estos temas que además el autor expone de una forma muy clara y amena. 🌹

[Wouter Hk · Rating 1 out of 5]

Frans de Waal windt er in zijn Tanner lectures geen doekjes om: menselijke moraliteit is een proces van evolutie. En zo komt de Waal tot een opmerkelijk uitgangspunt: ‘Humans are by nature good’. Met deze stelling betreedt de Waal het gladde ijs van de filosofie, waar hij op het domein van de moraal wetenschappelijke argumenten tracht te poneren om deze stelling te onderbouwen. De hamvraag blijft natuurlijk of de Waal het speculatieve van de filosofie weet te overstijgen. De benaming van het eerste deel van dit boek vat het geheel eigenlijk perfect samen. ‘Morally Evolved: Primate Social Instincts, Human Morality, and the Rise and Fall of “Veneer Theory”’. Het is echter wel vreemd dat de Waal zijn argumentatiestructuur in het boek net omgekeerd is.

De duivel heet in dit boek ‘Veneer Theory’. “Menselijke moraliteit is slechts een dun korstje waaronder het bijna overkookt van antisociale, immorele en egoïstische passies.” Uiteraard wil geen enkele - zelfverklaarde morele - mens omschreven worden zoals in voorgaande definitie. Maar er zijn meer drogredenen zoals “It is silly to think that” en “Darwin must be turning in his grave”. Of nog: “Huxley [...] rejected natural selection and did not represent genuine Darwinian thought in any way….” Dit laatste citaat ontleent de Waal als een autoriteitsargument van Ernest Mayr, en kop van jut is Thomas Huxley. Nadat de Waal zijn historische opponenten (denk aan Hobbes, Huxley, Freud of Dawkins) heeft afgedaan als irrationeel en ietwat achterlijk, is het tijd voor de waarheid van de Waal. Eigenlijk is deze strategie niet meer dan retoriek. Vergelijk deze schijnwetenschap gerust met de wetenschapskritiek van Chaïm Perelman en Lucie Tyteca in hun baanbrekend boek La nouvelle réthorique.

Als de Waal eindelijk klaar is met zijn retorische geweld is meteen een eerste grote luik van de argumentatiestructuur afgerond. Tegenover het egoïstische fundament van de mens, poneert hij de waarlijke mens als van nature altruïstisch. Uit zijn empirische praktijk als primatoloog voert hij argumenten aan dat primaten, die kort gerelateerd zijn aan de mens, symptomen van empathie vertonen. Als de Waal ervan uitgaat dat onder andere empathie de basis vormt voor moraliteit, bewijst hij dat de menselijke moraliteit - gereduceerd tot zijn absolute emotionele fundament - gedeeld wordt met primaten uit de dierenwereld. Kortweg: ons fundament van moraliteit is geen rationeel cultuurproduct, maar zit inherent ingebakken in de menselijke natuur.

Nu wordt de Waal zijn situatie wederom prangend. Want om te stellen dat dieren empathie voelen en concrete handelingen uitvoeren op een zuiver altruïstisch fundament, moet de Waal deze proefdieren antropomorfiseren. Om nu autoriteit te zoeken voor mijn kritiek refereer ik naar sociologe Mary Douglas. Douglas stelde de praktijk aan de kaak van de blanke Westerse antropoloog die het leven van ‘primitieven’ gaat analyseren vanuit het hautaine, verlichte Westerse perspectief. Om uitspraken te kunnen doen vertrok de antropoloog louter vanuit het Westerse paradigma, om de ‘primitief’ daarin te kunnen recupereren. Zonder dit argument volledig uit te werken wil ik wijzen op de parallel tussen de analyse van Douglas - die in haar tijd revolutionair was, maar vandaag vanzelfsprekend - en de manier van recuperatie bij de Waal.

Moraliteit lijkt mij een wezenlijk onderdeel van de menselijke cultuur, hetgeen ontegensprekelijk voortkomt uit de menselijke natuur. Maar waarom zijn er in de zeer uiteenlopende menselijke culturen zulk een verschillende invullingen van diezelfde moraliteit? Tot zelfs mensen- en kinderoffers bij bepaalde cultuurstammen, maar ook dichter bij huis, het meedogenloos uitroeien van (religieus, maar ook economische) andersdenkenden. Douglas analyseert de basis van de menselijke cultuur als een kwantitatief vaststaand, doch kwalitatief onbepaalde hoeveelheid paradigmatisch invullingen zoals rituelen en handelingen. Hieronder bevindt zich onder meer de moraliteit, hetwelk volgens haar rechtstreeks verband houdt met de invulling van cultuur, rituelen en handelingen. Dit onderscheidt tussen kwantitatief/ kwalitatief is volgens Douglas het enige dat een antropoloog kan concluderen uit onderzoek van ‘primitieven’, wat ik meteen wil doortrekken naar onderzoek bij ‘primaten’, zonder dat deze daarmee op een lijn worden gezet.

Voorgaande analyse zegt uiteraard niets over empathie en emotionele gevoeligheid. Deze gevoeligheid lijkt mij eerder een - eventueel van nature ingegeven - instrument om moraliteit te ‘kanaliseren’ en specifiek in te vullen, uiteraard vanuit de ‘evolutionaire’ cultuurgeschiedenis . Want zoals Douglas opmerkt, culturen evolueren. Elke rationele ingreep in moraliteit brengt meteen een onbewuste creatie van een nieuwe handeling teweeg. Empathie is hier een belangrijk instrument voor culturen om een paradigmatisch en ethisch discours te volgen, en rationeel bij te sturen waar nodig. Absoluut ethisch kan dit nooit zijn. Dit wordt aangetoond door de contradicties in het zogenaamde ‘ethische’ Westerse paradigma. Neem nu de neobarbaarse ideologie - neoliberalisme, waar blijkbaar niemand aanstoot neemt aan de ethische uitbuiting van miljoenen mensen, maar durf met geen vinger aan mijn huisdier te raken. Belangrijk tot slot is dat mijn kritiek en zelfs de ‘Veneer Theory’ - zoals Peter Singer beargumenteerd in zijn kritiek - perfect in te schrijven zijn in een evolutieleer.

Kijk, in mijn ‘kort door de bocht’ en veel te summier uitgewerkte reactie op het geschrift van de Waal wil ik er enkel op wijzen dat zijn thesis slechts waardevol is wanneer het zich inwerkt in de meer speculatieve filosofie. Wel wil ik uitdrukkelijk de filosofische hand uitreiken naar empirische data, zoals de zeer waardevolle observaties van de Waal. Doch, zelfs hier drijft hij zichzelf in het nauw. Zijn analyse verplicht hem na te denken over hoe wij - mensen - ethisch moeten omgaan met onze dichtst gerelateerde primaten. De Waals argumentatie is uitermate incoherent, zo wil hij enerzijds dieren geen rechten geven omdat ze geen advocaat kunnen betalen, maar vindt hij anderzijds wel dat we deze proefdieren moeten behandelen zoals we andere mensen zouden behandelen. Awel, mijnheer de Waal, ik voel mezelf als mens aangesproken. Ik hoop van harte dat u mij niet - zoals uw proefdieren - voor de rest van mijn verdere leven opsluit in een kooi.

[Emmanouil · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ιδιαίτερη η δομή του βιβλίου που εκδόθηκε από το Πανεπιστήμιο Πρίνστον και στηρίζεται στη σειρά των διαλέξεων Τάννερ για τις Ανθρώπινες Αξίες του Φρανς ντε Βάαλ. Αρχικά ο ντε Βάαλ παρουσιάζει την άποψη του σύμφωνα με την οποία είναι έμφυτη η ικανότητα του ανθρώπου να πράττει το καλό και κοινή με άλλα πρωτεύοντα ζώα. Εκφράζει την αντίθεση του στην άποψη που παρουσιάζει την ανθρώπινη ηθικότητα σαν μια λεπτή κρούστα πολιτιστικής καταγωγής κάτω από την οποία βράζουν εγωιστικά πάθη. Στην συνέχεια τρείς φιλόσοφοι και ένας μελετητής της εξελικτικής ψυχολογίας τοποθετούνται στις απόψεις του ντε Βάαλ. Στον επίλογο ο ντε Βάαλ απαντάει στις κριτικές των συναδέλφων του.

[Riversue · Rating 3 out of 5]

A fascinating philosophical discussion of how morality evolved. I prefer de Waal when he is exploring non-human primate behaviour.

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an interesting book that deals with the question of whether morality is inherent in primates. The author cites humans, bonobos, and dolphins as capable of moral behavior. Chimpanzees, on the other hand, have no sense of morality, and one particularly rascal female chimp at his primate research center will see visitors, go get a mouthful of water from a spigot, then spray the visitors from her mouth. Clearly no morality there. On the other hand, I once wrote a story on two dolphins in Hawaii who were being taught English word recognition. The dolphins resided in a pool that had a step-down enclosure outside the pool for observation. When I went down there, one of the dolphins swam over and spit a huge spray of water over the side of the pool, drenching me. Now I question whether dolphins have any inherent moral sense.

I will say for human beings, however, never in my work life have I had a colleague fill his mouth with water and then come over and spit it all out on me. So I agree that humans have an innate sense of morality, but as far as I'm concerned, the jury is still out on dolphins. I've never interacted with bonobos, so this remains an open question.

[Colin Bendell · Rating 4 out of 5]

A slow and dense read but a fantastic primer that I would use if I were ever to teach a Normative Philosophy class.

Throughout the book, de Waal presents 5 essays and rebuttals by other prominent thinkers. This creates a nice balance to the analysis of morality - specifically traits we think are very unique such as altruism and empathy. In general the conclusion is that we are not as unique in terms of moral characteristics as we like to think and more importantly how we define morality is mostly ambiguous and self referential. (our only reference to demonstrated moral behavior comes from our own exhibited behaviors and how that balances with our executive function of our frontal lobes)

This is the basis for the Veneer Theory which is explored in great depth. Veneer Theory proposes that culture is a layer overtop of our biology. In the end moral reasoning and human nature are not at odds but complimentary. Further, this is also found and demonstrated by looking at our fellow primates and the complex social structures and complex behaviors they exhibit. In the end, we are not alone in our moral behaviors as a species.

I'll admit I just pushed through some sections regardless of whether I fully comprehended the arguments being proposed. This made for some tough slogging and skimmed sections. Based on that reason alone, this would be a great primer for Normative philosophy class.

[Bart · Rating 5 out of 5]

When one of Kim Stanley Robinson’s characters in Green Earth talks about humans being from the savanna, that sounds familiar because of I’ve read quite a lot of Frans De Waal, probably the most prominent primatologist alive. His Chimpanzee Politics (1982) was revolutionary for the field. To me, the biological outlook proved to be a revelation and still is something that’s liberating when talking about ethics, behavior and society. At the same time he proves time and time again that the gap between animals and humans isn’t nearly as wide as we tend to believe. De Waal’s prose is accessible, even witty at times.

A lot of De Waal’s work has some overlap, so I could have just as well listed Our Inner Ape: A Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are (2005). I haven’t read his more recent books The Age Of Empathy – Nature’s Lessons For A Kinder Society (2009) and Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (2016), but I’m sure they’ll be good entry points too.

More non-fiction recommendations & SFF reviews on Weiging A Pig...

[Sadat Issah · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was phenomenal!!!!
We begin this book with Mr Frans de Waal bringing his expertise working with primates for years into the controversial and ongoing debate on the sources and reasons for human morality,after he has had his say on the matter three prominent philosphers and an evolutionary psychologist(i.e Robert Wright,Christine M.Korsgaard,Philip Kitcher and Peter Singer) also weigh in on the subject matter where they talk about which part(s) of Frans argument they agreed and disagreed with.
Having four great thinker bring different and unique perspective into the discussion was a breath of fresh air from the usual monologue nature books like this tends to be but at the end of the day i found that my views on morality aligned with that of Mr Frans de Waal with very little disagreement between us.

[jg · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book starts with a short but informative and well referenced summary of important results in the field of animal cognition (empathy, reciprocity, consolation in chimps and capuchins). The main issue considered is the continuity between animal behaviour and human morality. As it turns out experiments show strong similarities between animal and human moral behaviour, which is of course to be expected.

Unfortunately what follows is a most inconsequential philosophical discussion by Wright, Korsgaard, Kitcher and Singer (journalist and three philosophers) of their personal interpretations of the research :-).

I cannot recommend this book. See other de Waal books for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject matter devoid of the layman philosophical babble.

[Youp · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a bit of a weird read. The premise of the book is making a case for the evolution of morality. However, a huge part of it is dedicated to a biological and philosophical discussion about anthropomorphism, and whether or not certain biologists are 'veneer theorists'. Furthermore, having read a few books by Frans de Waal, much of the material is awfully familiar, as if the same book has been written a couple of times by the same author. Nevertheless, as a standalone work it's enjoyable and could provide valuable insights for people unfamiliar with the author. For those who've read some of De Waal's work this might not be worth your time.

[Foppe · Rating 3 out of 5]

Are human beings capable of good behavior 'out of the box', or do we require a lengthy 'education' on the importance of behaving in socially acceptable ways before engaging in such behavior? And related to, and in some sense underlying this question: why we are here? What is life's purpose? Are we alive simply because (as The Selfish Gene seems to teach us) our genes needed a medium to allow them to reproduce? Are we no more than utility optimizers, who are constantly calculating how to act in order to maximize our reproductive success, and is it true that, at bottom, we only help others if and when we think it to our advantage? Or are we more than that, because through sheer luck, we have become capable of influencing the course of our lives? And if this is the case, are we the only ones who can do this, and who have this freedom, or do we share this ability with other animals? And, finally, if this is true, what does that tell us? Does it mean that we can claim to be the only moral animals?
One way in which one might find answers to this jumble of interrelated questions is by looking at what other animals, and especially nonhuman primates, are capable of, as this might tell us which parts of our behavior are unique to humans, and which are more widely shared. To do so, we might thus turn to the work of ethologists and primatologists -- like Jane Goodall, and Frans de Waal. Because De Waal especially has spent much of his career trying to answer this question. And as he is both a prolific and a fairly gifted writer, he has told a broad public of his findings.
Among his readers we also find philosophers, and a few of them have agreed to participate in the writing of this book, which is about the question to what extent ethical theories are compatible with the empirical evidence (and the question what other evidence scientists like De Waal need to gather in order for their accounts to become even more compelling). This book, then, is divided in three parts. After an introduction by the editors, we get De Waal's main essay, then four responses (by, among others, Christine Korsgaard and Peter Singer), and then a conclusion by De Waal.
In his opening essay, De Waal sets out two aims. The first is to criticize what he calls "Veneer Theory," which is the (roughly Hobbesian) position that human beings are inherently bad, and purely self-serving, and which assumes that we only act in praiseworthy ways because we are indoctrinated and frightened into doing so. De Waal finds this Hobbesian picture of human nature as inherently self-serving scientifically dubious as well as harmful, and shows that not only are humans capable of engaging in social or good behavior, but that this ability to do so is also found in other animals, and especially in nonhuman primates. And not only are they capable of this, but it is also true that they engage in such behavior when they stand to gain nothing from doing so. For instance, Goodall (cited in the book) tells of a case in which a Chimpanzee drowns in an attempt to save a baby chimp from the water. This is his second goal: to show that nonhuman animals are just as capable of engaging in social behavior as humans are, and that a lot of the behaviors that we praise when we find them in humans can also be found (in somewhat simpler form) in other animals.
De Waal invokes the work of Adam Smith and David Hume as an indication of the king of moral theory he feels is more on the right track. He does this especially because of the central role empathy (or, as Hume called it, sympathy) played in both of their works, which De Waal also considers key. So, to show that humans aren't the only animals capable of engaging in social, caring behavior that comes at a (steep) personal cost, and that this is in fact behavior that can be found in animals more generally, he discusses two (ethically rather dubious-sounding) experiments, one in which rats show a (transient) capacity for empathy, and the other in which "rhesus monkeys refuse to pull a chain that delivers food to themselves if doing so shocks a companion. One monkey stopped pulling for five days, and another one for twelve days after witnessing shock delivery to a companion. These monkeys were literally starving themselves to avoid inflicting pain upon another." (It should be noted that this tendency was stronger when the monkeys were acquainted or related.)
The last point De Waal emphasizes is the fact that apes also possess what is called 'theory of mind': the ability to guess how others are feeling. He here discusses examples of how, after fights, chimps who did not participate in the fight (that is, who weren't acting simply to reestablish a working relationship with the loser) go over to the losers, and try to console them, by putting an arm around their shoulders.
These are all important building blocks for our ability to engage in social or moral behavior. And, as we see, they can also be found in other animals. Therefore, it is therefore highly dubious that the intention to act in moral(ly right) ways is new to humans (which is not to say that it isn't more strongly developed in humans), and it is especially dubious to try to argue that people only act morally because they have been 'shackled' and indoctrinated by a social contract of a Hobbesian or Rawlsian make. Additionally, it would seem that the idea that all our motivations are necessarily 'selfish' is also nonsense. But although these points are well worth emphasizing, what frustrates me about this approach is that Veneer Theory is a fairly uninteresting target, which is demolished fairly easily by De Waal. Because once he has done so, he doesn't really have anything else he has to argue his way towards. And this is problematic because there is still quite a lot more that could be said about morality in general, and about the relationship between moral functioning and moral judgment in particular, about which animal or primate observations could possibly tell us much more than it has so far. Moreover, because of this choice to argue against VT, the other contributions are also less interesting than they could have been (though I mostly blame the others for this, as they are all trained philosophers, capable of going beyond mere reactive arguing, and of reframing the discussion a bit to make it more interesting).
Having said that, I would now like to turn to the responses. I should start by noting that I found none of them particularly interesting or thought-provoking, though Kitcher's response was probably the most constructive of the lot, even if still flawed. I am making this judgment as someone who is already already somewhat familiar with the field (though an amateur compared to the likes of Singer), but I suspect that anyone who ponders the book a bit will feel roughly the same way. Especially the first two responses, and to a lesser extent Singer's response struck me as fairly defensively written, in that they contain repeated assertions to the effect that we should see human and nonhuman moral behavior as being qualitatively different, without the authors offering much more than intuitive arguments as to why we should accept those claims. Now, while I wholeheartedly agree that there indeed important differences, and that human morality is rather more complex than nonhuman primate moral behavior can be (if only because other primates cannot speak, and thus cannot defend or criticize their own or others behavior, making it much harder for all involved to learn which behaviors are and aren't appropriate, and making it nigh-impossible for them to allow for the amount of cultural variation that human modes of organization allow for), it seems to me that the authors do the reader an injustice by making such lazy arguments.
Let me start by saying something about the first, and least interesting contribution, by Richard Wright. This contributor seems to have been included mostly because De Waal spends some time criticizing his book The Moral Animal as being a prime example of Veneer Theorizing. In it, Wright -- who appears to be an old-school evolutionary biologist (of the 'everything reduces to self-interest' variety). In his response, he suggests that we should distinguish between "emotionally" and "cognitively" motivated actions, and that we should think of all nonhuman animal motivation as being purely emotionally motivated. To defend this, he invokes something akin to Occam's Razor (the idea that simpler explanations are always correct), which he calls the "principle of anthropomorphic parsimony". Furthermore, he suggests that emotions should be understood as "proxies for strategic calculation," and that only purely rationally motivated actions may be understood as belonging to the realm of the "purely moral" -- a term which he doesn't bother to define except in this way. The problem with all of these moves is that they are pretty question-begging: it is not clear to me at all why he thinks it more likely that animals act "purely emotionally" (instinctually?), if only because emotions are usually already fairly complex things, which by definition already have a cognitive component. (And note that the idea that we can neatly separate emotional and cognitive aspects of a thought in humans is hardly universally accepted either.) The second, and more telling issue with this text is that Wright keeps pushing the idea that all motivations are based on self-interest narrowly defined, and that even emotions should primarily be understood as calculative.
The second response is by Christine Korsgaard. She is an important contemporary defender of Kantianism, which means that she places a rather heavy emphasis on the question whether actions were motivated by the right intentions. Now, if you have to judge someone's actions, or choose how to act in a given situation, thinking carefully about your intentions and whether or not they are appropriate to have is very important. Furthermore, it also seems fair to say that humans are the only animals who try to reconcile their beliefs with each other ("If I am a vegetarian, does that mean that I should also be against slave labor?") And, as Korsgaard correctly notes, it seems somewhat of a stretch to say that animals are capable of going through the same reflective processes, and through the same processes of belief revision that humans do. Therefore, a number of issues that are important for human moral functioning are probably not present in animals. However, while this is correct insofar as it goes, what Korsgaard ignores is that it is equally true that human actions are just as often unreflective. However -- and this is a crucial point -- it is not true that those actions which are unreflective in this way are therefore im- or amoral. That is, it is probably the case that the majority of the actions that we judge good or bad were not taken by people who carefully considered the pros and cons of acting in this way; rather, they simply acted. And the problem with Korsgaard's perspective is that she is technically not allowed to call those actions moral, since affixing that judgment requires active and conscious reflection. This point, it seems to me, is one of the more interesting consequences following from the perspective offered by De Waal, but Korsgaard -- sadly -- carefully avoids having to comment on it. Because if we can justify calling automated or 'instinctual' (that is, thoroughly internalized taught behavior) human actions moral, then why can't we do so when talking about the actions taken by other animals? This question is currently left unanswered.
The third response is, as I've already suggested, in some ways the most constructive, in that it simply notes that De Waal should've chosen a position more nuanced than Veneer Theory to argue against. Apart from that, Kitcher makes two points worth mentioning. First, that it makes a huge difference that humans can plan ahead, since it means that humans have the ability to create much longer-term alliances than other primates, which has enormous implications for social organization. Second, that aspiring ethicists should beware what he calls the Hume-Smith Lure, which is the tendency to think that once we have social behavior, and once we understand why people are willing to cooperate, nothing more need be said about morality. Now, while I think that this suggestion does little justice to Hume (who, in my opinion, most certainly did think about the question how moral behavior relates to issues of normative justification), it certainly is a fair observation to make, as it is indeed easy to forget that morality is about more than simply good behavior and cooperation.
The fourth reply is by Peter Singer, and it falls into two parts, the second of which I will ignore. Singer here tries to give a twist to the 'Veneer' discussion, by suggesting that we might also understand 'Veneer Theory' as referring to the fact that so much of morality is evolutionarily new, and a cultural development. The problem with that suggestion is that it ignores De Waal's actual (and, in my opinion, quite valid) criticism of Veneer Theory: his complaint is not that Veneer Theorists take the specific moralities that we have developed to be cultural, but rather that they assume that good behavior only came with those additions, and that they take self-interest arithmetic to be the only source of motivation. Singer simply ignores that critique, even though it seems to me fundamental (perhaps because he himself is also a utilitarian, and because he is also very much into constant calculation of pluses and minuses, good and bad?). And this is why I think it a fairly forgettable (if telling) contribution.
Anyway, in sum I would say that this book would've been more interesting if De Waal had chosen a more interesting target to criticize. Having said that, reading this book will still tell you quite a bit about the shortcomings of both De Waal's grasp of the finer points of the meta-ethical literature, and of the philosophers who have to come to grips with these findings (and who have largely failed to do so). As such, it seems to me that it is mostly the latter who are found wanting.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book does something unusual—the author not only offers his opinion on the topic at hand but invites other experts in the field to critique his work and offer their own opinions. De Waal is a primatologist whose career includes observation and experimentation on the social behaviors of primates and in this book he applies his knowledge and experience to opine on the origins of morality.

De Waal’s primary target is the destruction of Veneer Theory, which asserts that man is an immoral or amoral brute who makes pretenses of decency. Thus, a thin veneer of morality hides a species that is basically selfish and self-serving at its core. De Waal’s primate studies support Naturalistic Theory, which holds that moral impulses are rooted in our genes, meaning that we are “good-natured”, and morality is a direct outgrowth of our social instincts. However, he also notes that moral norms are not genetically prescribed. He sees parallels between the biological foundation of morality and language. A child is not born with any particular language, but with an ability to learn any language. We are born to absorb moral rules and weigh moral options, making for a flexible system.

According to de Waal, morality evolved as a progression of social behaviors. At the lowest level is herd behavior, where animals of all sorts pay attention to each other and mirror their neighbor’s behavior (e.g., a bird flies away when it sees other birds fly away). The next level is expressed in emotional contagion, which is when the emotional state of one individual animal induces a matching or closely related state in another. In some highly social species, emotional contagion leads to empathy, feeling what someone else feels, which sometimes invokes altruistic behaviors. At an even higher level, is sympathy, which consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for a distressed or needy other, rather than experiencing the same emotion as the other person. Personal distress is a reaction to emotional contagion different from sympathy in that it results in a self-oriented, egoistic reaction. Sympathy, unlike personal distress, evokes prosocial, altruistic behavior. Personal distress is an egoistic behavior motivated to increase one’s own welfare.

According to de Waal, the biggest step in the evolution of human morality was the move from interpersonal relations (the seat of empathy and sympathy) to a focus on the greater good of the community. Ironically, the most potent force to bring out a sense of community is enmity toward outsiders, whereby outgroup hostility enhances ingroup solidarity. De Waal pinpoints this irony in noting that “…our noblest achievement—morality—has evolutionary ties to our basest behavior—warfare. The sense of community required by the former was provided by the latter.”

The four commentators basically take a nuanced position toward de Waal's thesis, agreeing that pure Veneer Theory is flawed, but that it has elements that hold true. I found Singer’s comments most interesting. He points out that the evolution of morality may have ties to emotions, not cognitive reasoning, based on neuroscience research showing that many of our moral responses don’t initiate in the neocortex but in primitive areas of the brain. However, he believes that our highest level of moral reasoning is expressed by the detached, impartial perspective of an imagined third party that allows an individual to objectively judge the ethical status of his or her actions, employing something similar to the idea of the universality of ethics described by Kant and others. Singer concludes that the morally correct answer is also the cognitively rational answer (although acknowledging that those giving the correct answer are in the minority).

De Waal responds to the comments with a further nuance of his own position but doesn't buy into the universality concept. He describes different levels of morality and circles of inclusion. He notes that moral systems are inherently biased toward the ingroup. Morality evolved to deal with one’s own group first. Expansion of the circle is constrained by affordability; circles are allowed to expand in times of abundance but will inevitably shrink when resources dwindle. The circles track levels of commitment. The circle of morality reaches out farther and farther only if the health and survival of the innermost circles are secure. The idea of a level playing field (as Singer suggests) clashes with ancient survival strategies that are biased toward our innermost circles (ourselves, our families, our community, our species). Loyalty is a moral duty.

What inherent good is a moral system that is stacked in favor of the ingroup and lacks universality? One answer comes from de Waal's definition of morality: “We understand morality as a sense of right and wrong that is born out of groupwide systems of conflict management based on shared values.”

[Doctor Moss · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Frans de Waal takes on what he calls the "Veneer Theory" of morality. Veneer theory, which de Waal most identifies with T.H. Huxley, treats morality as a separate layer of human behavior and conscious experience that sits over and controls a lower animal layer. After de Waal's argument, several moral philosophers critique de Waal's claims, and de Waal responds in the book's final chapter.

Veneer theory resonates with some traditional theories of morality. Both social contract theory and Kantian morality can be read as suggesting a kind of veneer theory. Social contract theory, at least in its Hobbesian flavors, explicitly treats morality and political order as rational, intentional agreements to counter a state of dog-eat-dog nature. Kantian moral theory identifies morality with reason, distinguished from and at least at times opposing "inclination."

I think that, knowing what we know now of animal behavior (partly owing to de Waal), almost no one would deny that animals, especially higher primates, exhibit complex social behavior, or that that social behavior includes actions taken out of concern for others and actions taken to build and maintain group identity and order. Some may deny true altruism, arguing that apparently altruistic actions are either not fully intentional or that they are really disguised pursuits of self-interest (e.g., arrangements in which present assistance is traded for future reciprocation).

And nature isn't quite so dire as a stark veneer theory would have it. It's not "dog eat dog" -- in fact, so far as I know, dogs don't routinely eat other dogs. Animals do behave with regard for the lives of others, and de Waal gives lots of examples from his research with primates. De Waal is right, I think, in so far as he gives us reason to reject veneer theory as a theory that supposes all animal behavior to be base and morality to provide, exclusively for human beings, the ability to rise above and control those base behaviors.

But part of the attraction of veneer theory is that treating morality as separate from our animal natures provides for a struggle between morality and self-interest. Our conscious lives are full of that conflict -- should I tell a white lie to avoid an unpleasant situation or just say "to heck with it" and do whatever I want?

I think that struggle is important to our understanding of human morality. We do struggle to be moral, and part of being moral is succeeding in that struggle. We struggle both to determine what is the right thing to do, and then to do it. In trying to do the right thing, our "better natures" fight to overcome our "baser natures", just as the veneer theorists would have it.

But where they are wrong is in supposing that only one is truly our "nature" while the other isn't. De Waal successfully shows that at least some of the foundations of our better nature are shared with other animals, especially higher primates.

Oddly, it may be that this struggle between morality and self-interest isn't shared with those primates. Nothing, so far as I can see, in the research that de Waal presents here, provides evidence that the same kind of struggle -- struggle either in determining the right thing to do or in overcoming inclinations not to do it -- occurs in the conscious life of apes. Hard to know, certainly, but I'd be interested in knowing what de Waal thinks about that question.

In any case, our closest animal relatives are not mere creatures of self-interest, and our own evolutionary ancestors are accordingly not. There is no absolutely discontinuous evolutionary gap or separation between human morality and the lives of our ancestors. That is the mistaken view that de Waal seems to rightly reject.

None of this, I think, decides the issue of how we should treat apes, something that Peter Singer raises prominently in his critique of de Waal. Singer, a long time advocate for extending our moral "circle" beyond our fellow human beings, is concerned of course about use of chimpanzees and other apes and monkeys in medical experiments and other research. He rightly points out that it matters more simply that apes suffer in such experiments than that they are in some sense on a par with us as moral creatures. I do think however that the more that we perceive them as "like us" the less we are likely to countenance their suffering.

[Y · Rating 4 out of 5]

Before people proceed to criticize de Waal for any part of his work, I think it's important to remember that he is primarily an ethologist and biologist (also a professor of psychology), but he is not a philosopher. De Waal makes the case for "temporarily taking morality out of the hands of philosophers and into the hands of biologists." He achieves this purpose well and, for that, this book deserves praise.

This book was largely regurgitative and lacked much-needed evidence in Part I. I really wish de Waal used more primate behavioural evidence and neuroscientific/neuropsychological evidence to make his points. I will be reading his book, Chimpanzee Politics, in the future just to become more familiar with his work on primate behaviour because not nearly enough observational evidence was used in this book.

I like how de Waal incorporated the critical writings of others in Part II of his book and proceeded to respond to them in Part III. It showed maturity, a respect for the ideas of others, a commitment to self-improvement, and intellectual integrity. I really enjoyed reading each writer's perspective on Part I of his work; they each bought something different to the table that was not previously accounted for. They brought up important criticisms and insights, and this is especially true because de Waal is himself NOT a philosopher and thus not fully proficient in the jargon of moral philosophy.

And now, for my BIGGEST CRITICISM OF THE BOOK:

De Waal didn't address the possibility that we can potentially access "moral truths," outside of influence from our emotions, through our ability to reason abstractly. For example, our ability to reason may allow us to arrive at abstract mathematical truths (if such truths exist), so why could it not do the same for moral truths (IF abstract moral truths do exist). Some of our emotions are vaunted as good and moral (e.g. empathy), while others are deemed the opposite– as emotions we have to overcome through reason and control (e.g. envy, jealousy, or hate). De Waal does not address this paradox himself: how can our evolutionarily derived emotions both be independently "moral" and "immoral," and what distinguishes whether we label an emotion as one or the other? Singer brought this crucial point up in his comments, but de Waal either created a 'straw man' out of his argument to quickly dismiss it, or completely misunderstood its essence. Reason undeniably plays a role in human morality; we can have lengthy moral deliberations about an issue or can rationally choose to reject the influence from some emotions (e.g. envy) while embracing and affirming the influence from others (e.g. empathy).

[Jurij Fedorov · Rating 2 out of 5]

Chapters

PART I Morally Evolved:
Primate Social Instincts, Human Morality,
and the Rise and Fall of “Veneer Theory”
Frans de Waal

PART II Comments
The Uses of Anthropomorphism
Robert Wright
Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action
Christine M. Korsgaard
Ethics and Evolution: How to Get Here from There
Philip Kitcher
Morality, Reason, and the Rights of Animals
Peter Singer
PART III Response to Commentators
The Tower of Morality
Frans de Waal

Review

I read the audiobook. I don't really get the point here. It's a collection of essays and the debate largely is about group morality and how one should understand it. I actually totally agree with de Waal so imagine how disappointed I would be if I didn't agree with his moral and scientific points. The issue is that the book is not deep or focused. A bunch of writers add their own ideas to it with single chapters. And de Waal then concludes that apes indeed have a deep and well-functioning moral and that human morality therefore is animalistic. The issue is that it's a loose debate and so it's quite banal. We never really see a fight with science with people stating that this experiment says this and that experiment says that. Rather they just debate with feelings. One guy feels it's this way, then de Waal responds by saying he feels another way. It's not conductive to learning in the reader as you have heard such arguments a million times before and they never conclude much. There is nothing new here. Nothing deep here. No smart argument or way to make the argument. It's just a bunch of people stating their personal opinions in an academic style.

It's just a bunch of chapters trying to explain animal moral in their own way. I just don't see who this is for. It's not for people familiar with the topic as this is very shallow. It's not for people who don't like dry and at times a bit dull philosophy. I would say I would very much recommend this to philosophers who are studying a subject without applying much science or scientific thinking. So they don't really have the tools to deep dive into topics anyhow and need such shallow overviews. But this is not the case for most people. We want more experiments and clear examples not just a few monkey studies presented by de Waal. So even though I would recommend this book to specific readers it's not relevant for most people and if you have read de Waal before, which we all have many times before, this will be more of the same just a tad more dull.

You will either find it too basic or too abstract. Unless you studying philosophy then you will likely like it a lot.

[Per Kraulis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Frans de Waal, accomplished primate biologist, writes on morality and its precursor or foundation in primate evolution. He argues against what he calls Veneer Theory, the view that morality in humans is just a thin layer on top of an amoral core. Instead, morality, or at least its fundamental building blocks, can be found in social mammals, and in particular in primates such as the chimpanzee. He posits that morality evolved, and evolution does not do discontinuities (saltatory changes). So the development must have been gradual. His views are discussed by the philosophers Robert Wright, Christine M Korsgaard, Philip Kitcher and Peter Singer.

I believe de Waals has a number of valid points, and describes his own and other's findings very well. However, he is rightly criticized by Kitcher and Singer that he is vague when he claims that the "building blocks" of morality are there in chimpanzees, and therefore, by evolutionary extension, also in the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees. That concept seems to hide more than it reveals.

The basic issue here, I think, is the emergent nature of morality. Emergence is a tricky concept: it says that something new can spring out of something that already exists, given certain context and conditions. But it may also say that this new thing has some kind of beginning, a proto-existence, in the preceding state. And this new thing, when it has come into existence, can be viewed as something "higher up". It is based on what is below, but can also affect what is below. The terms often used, such as "based on", being "the core of" "the foundation of" and similar have a hard time conveying this sense that the emergent property can be both a function of, but also affect, the basis of its existence.

Morality is such an emergent property. It is based on psychological propensities common to humans and higher animals such as chimpanzees, but its reliance in humans on culture makes it different from what exists in chimpanzees. So although de Waal has a point that Veneer Theory is a bad way of describing morality, he too lightly skips over the large differences that culture and language produce when combined with the psychological common traits of humans and chimpanzees. In general, de Waal underplays the importance of culture in humans. Both Peter Singer and Philip Kitcher have valid critical points here.

[Abdul Alhazred · Rating 3 out of 5]

A book aimed more at the academic reader than general reader (for which his book Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? is the better choice), this book deals in more detail about the experiments de Waal will return to in his later books. The big difference in content is a heightened and more restrained writing that's met with contrarian replies at the end - what I thought would be the most enlightening, but in fact turned out to be exactly what you'd think; de Waal is accused of anthropomorphism, of expanding his conclusions beyond the confines of the most minimal interpretations, of confounding problems.
It's not that the criticism is unfair, and it's mostly delivered with good natured respect for de Waals work, it's that the minimalist view on animal intelligence and morality is already pretty familiar; it predates science itself as a view on "beasts" as fundamentally separate and unfeeling, a sentiment that's followed through the battles over evolution into the modern era, with scientists arguing that animal testing was ethical because animals simply couldn't experience pain as we could. Thankfully that hardline stance was reappraised and dismissed. Even in de Waals work evolutionary similarity is a key feature of the moral argument for higher functionality, and primates are his main focus here (while later books explore alternative examples from the animal kingdom), but experimentally the problem seems just as dependent on the ability to design problems the target animal can and wants to solve (compare experimental approaches to octopus intelligence, corvid intelligence and primates), with some research showing certain animals are too aloof and uninterested in the type of experiments we design (feline vs canine intelligence experiments for instance) rather than clearly lacking the ability.
The greater point in the premise of the book extends into an argument about the evolutionary development of intelligence, higher reasoning and consequently morality in humans, but the book is far more restrained than his more popular science books, and while more rigorous, also lacking what made those really good.

[pythag · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was deeply thought provoking. Morality is a topic which has always fascinated, especially its mysterious foundations. Frans De Waal is probably the leading voice on primate behavior. Jane Goodall gets more acclaim, but I think De Waal is ultimately better positioned to commentate on primate morality. I could be wrong, though. The opening extended essay by De Waal is characteristically well written and full of delightful and illuminating anecdotes. But, this isn't a merely a book about cute animals and "look, see!! they're helping each other", De Waal has to seriously defend his claim that 1) morality is evolutionarily grounded; 2) this means we share much more in common with great apes; 3) ultimately, we are good natured at our core. He lambasts Veneer Theory as per usual. But, I agree with the respondents that VT seems stupid and antiquated. Do people still countenance this view? That's an empirical question for which I lack an answer. De Waal is a undoubtedly honest and good-intentioned man. However, especially by the end of the book, I couldn't help but feel he was advancing an agenda albeit in quite a subtle way. It felt like it pained him to admit that humans are unique in meaningful ways that really do distinguish us from chimps, especially regarding morality. Every time he had to concede such a point, he'd follow it up with a "don' forget, though, morality originated with chimps!!" This struck me as a bit odd. Each of the four responses had their strengths and weakness. Robert Wright made a case for "naturalistic veneer theory", claiming that, yes, morality is evolutionarily rooted but it still serves a special, and crucial, role in suppressing certain instincts/desires for humans which can't be said about chimps. Wright draws on the different way reason and emotion in guide our moral behavior. He doesn't claim that they can be neatly disentangled, but that one can still talk about them separated in a meaningful way, at the very least for the sake of argument. He doesn't have a big problem with anthropomorphizing, but in certain instances, the intention/motivation of a chimps "altusitic/moral behavior" is so unknown to us that we shouldn't even conjecture like de Waal does.

[YHC · Rating 4 out of 5]

Are we born with morality? or the morality is learned and passed down as part of cultures?
This is a very interesting question discussing in this book. de Waal brought up why Veneer theory (he is against; "a cultural overlay, a thin veneer hiding an otherwise selfish and brutish nature".
The idea of the veneer theory goes back to Thomas Henry Huxley) is not fitting in his ideas.

3 levels of morality.
1. moral sentiment: also exists in other primates.
2. Social pressure: less systematic in other primates.
3. Judgement and reasoning. Only exists in Human.

He was against T.H. Huxley and Dawkins, and was quite provocative so there are 4 critics in this books: ROBERT WRIGHT; CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD; PHILIP KITCHER; PETER SINGER, they don't totally agree with him and not totally against Veneer theory. Therefore he also answered back to them.
I like this kind of interaction intellectually between these scientists. After i read this book, i have to say that given so many observations of chimps and other primate's behaviors, of course they seem to have basic morality, and seem to behavior altruism, but the motivation is really deep down the same consciousness like we humans or more like natural in their genes? Bees, ants also behave altruism, but obviously it's more mechanical than reason.

One thing these scientists discuss in this book is we, homo sapiens, are the fully aware of morality and still capability to do the contrary such as wars, genocide and massacre, we think animals are brutal, cruel, but that is because they don't grow same kind of consciousness like we do, they behave naturally, hunting for surviving. But we evolve into a very different kind of animal that we behave greedily, look what we have done to this planet. After i read this book, i am truly ashamed that we don't think to do better according to what we have evolved into.

[. · Rating 4 out of 5]

When reading this book, instead of reading Part 2 (where the philosophers respond), you could learn as much by banging your head on the wall a bit.

Part 1 was expertly edited, taking a series of lectures and turning them into a seamless commentary on morality as taken from the perspective on recognizing humanity's place in the animal kingdom.

Then, in Part 2, most sentences become long-winded, superfluous, and self-serving. My conclusions here:
1 - I'm pretty sure Robert Wright is an idiot.

2 - Christine Korsgaard and Philip Kitcher chose to ignore all modern knowledge available to them within the realm of neuroscience and instead treated humans as though we're purely logicians who act with utmost intention. Here I'm more likely to side with Jesus, who rightly claimed "they know not what they do."

This duo also venerates Adam Smith and David Hume to a level that Adam Smith and David Hume would surely find repulsive. Smith and Hume stayed well-read in contemporary thought and adjusted their views accordingly. If they, as 18th century philosophers, learned that 21st century philosophers would cite their works in order to NOT advance... and could still be respected as professional philosophers... they would be inconsolably appalled.

3 - Best I could tell, Peter Singer is simply a blowhard. He was rather verbose while offering nil in terms of substance. He must be politician-adjacent.

Part 3 just made me feel bad for de Waal in having to respond to a lack of substantial feedback. It's like he was replying to a spam email.

Anywho, this book is a definite must-read, but everything past Part 1 should be considered commentary rather than part of the book.