About ten years ago, when I was working as a product manager for a software startup, I had the misfortune of having to take a meeting at Bridgewater Associates' office in Westport, CT. Signs that Bridgewater was different, not in a good way, started with the NDA (nondisclosure agreement): normally NDAs bind firms, but Bridgewater demanded that anyone in attendance at the meeting sign an individual NDA taking personal liability for any violations. Naturally, our lawyers balked, but we wanted Bridgewater's money, so a few of us signed and we went up there. We were also told that every meeting at Bridgewater was recorded and available to any employee to watch, so we had to sign away the rights to that, as well. (I'm sure if Jamie Gorelick hadn't later demanded that most of the Transparency Library be deleted for legal liability reasons, that recording would still be in there.)
The meeting was unmemorable as to its content. The only things I remember was that a) the customer "champion" flamed us and told us we were idiots (not terribly special, actually, if you're a product manager in enterprise software) but more importantly, b) looking around the room at the other employees and their perpetually downcast expressions, one couldn't help but feel like they were inmates being held against their will. They also seemed to be glued to their iPads, which were so locked down with mobile device management (MDM) software from Good Technology to the point where they only had about 5 apps they were permitted to use. One of those, as I later found out in Copeland's book, was probably the Dot Collector program with which they were likely rating each other while the meeting was going on!
On the way out of the facility, there were copies of Principles by Ray Dalio on the receptionist's counter. I took one, resolving to read it and understand more about Bridgewater in the name of learning more about our prospective client, even if I suspected (and heard through the grapevine) that they were essentially a cult. I was surprised and somewhat disappointed later, once I'd read through it, that there was no smoking gun pointing to Bridgewater being a cult. It certainly wasn't actually a set of principles. As another short-lived Bridgewater executive points out in Copeland's book, a list of 10 or 12 items are principles. 278... those are just slogans or aphorisms. I tossed my copy of Principles; I didn't and couldn't draw the line between this anodyne list of mottos and the cult member-like behavior I'd observed in that meeting room. Not until I read Copeland's excellent The Fund.
Bridgewater Associates is best described as cult-ish, in Amanda Montell's definition. There are certainly elements of a cult (chief amongst them, a creation of an alternative vocabulary only used inside Bridgewater), and Ray Dalio is a grade-A sociopath and tyrant who has inflicted severe psychological trauma on his employees and caused some of them to almost commit suicide. As you learn from Copeland's well-reported book, his firm is like an unholy marriage of the worst aspects of Wall Street finance bro culture and Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution -- including public "trials", "hangings", humiliations of employees senior and junior in front of hundreds or thousands of their peers, and other massively abusive practices. Fortunately, unlike 1960's China, nobody was actually murdered at Bridgewater (though it could easily have happened), and also, unlike an actual spiritual cult, employees did have complete agency to leave. Which many of them did, including the revolving door of senior executives -- among them, James Culp (ex-CEO of Danaher), Jon Rubenstein (former executive at Apple), and James Comey who were hired on the premise that Bridgewater was a normal firm only to show up on day one and have it dawn on them that I've made a huge mistake. Comey, though, stuck around long enough to spearhead enough virtual trials/executions/investigations to demonstrate that he had no moral compass -- and in effect, that we should have seen his single-handed throwing of the 2016 election to Donald Trump coming.
Despite the onerous NDAs/nondisparagement agreements with former employees and Dalio/Bridgewater's litigiousness, Copeland still managed to assemble an impressive array of sources, on and off the record, possibly because the trauma suffered by these ex-employees and their need to heal outweighed their fear of being sued by Dalio. Copeland's case that Bridgewater was and is a toxic organization and that Dalio is a first-class asshole is airtight. Where the book falls down a bit is in drawing correlations that the more Dalio obsessed over his personality cult and building a system of tyrannical control, the worse the returns in Bridgewater's funds became. Despite being an asshole, Dalio is actually very persuasive and knowledgeable, and his success since 1975 is built not only on those instincts but a considerable dose of luck, too. While he was bootstrapped by rich patrons in the Lieb family, as well as his wife's wealthy family, it takes some skill to grow that fortune into an even larger fortune. Given that Dalio is the linchpin of the company -- no major investment decision gets made without his involvement -- he is also more than deserving of credit for having built up a firm from nothing to billions of dollars under management. And while, in recent years, Dalio has certainly pissed away a lot of that money in the service of his cult-like pursuits (like blowing >$100M on trying to create a Principles OS, or PriOS), Bridgewater is still today one of the world's largest hedge funds. Even if its returns are uneven and don't outperform a basket of 80% stock ETFs/20% bond ETFs, many institutional investors are still reluctant to pull their money, hoping for a return to the glory days of Bridgewater. In essence, many hedge funds are the ultimate confidence game, in that large investors stay invested simply because they have confidence in the fund's leadership, despite strong signals that they shouldn't.
It would be satisfying to think that such a tell-all memoir would result in the collapse of Bridgewater, but that's not how the world works. Were that a moral compass, ethical behavior, and not being an asshole were causal inputs to financial success, and vice-versa! So while we know a lot more about Bridgewater and Ray Dalio in the wake of this book, Bridgewater itself (under the new, but only slightly less assholic leadership of Nir Bar Dea) is likely to survive another day, and many more.
Five stars for the journalism, though.