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Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815
This account of the final years of Britain's long war against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France places the conflict in a new - and wholly modern - perspective. Rory Muir looks beyond the purely military aspects of the struggle to show how the entire British nation played a part in the victory. His book provides a total assessment of how politicians, the press, the crown, civilians, soldiers and commanders together defeated France. Beginning in 1807 when all of continental Europe was under Napoleon's control, the author traces the course of the war throughout the Spanish uprising of 1808, the campaigns of the Duke of Wellington and Sir John Moore in Portugal and Spain, and the crossing of the Pyrenees by the British army, to the invasion of southern France and the defeat of Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. Muir sets Britain's military operations on the Iberian Peninsula within the context of the wider European conflict, and examines how diplomatic, financial, military and political considerations combined to shape policies and priorities. Just as political factors influenced strategic military decisions, Muir contends, fluctuations of the war affected British political decisions. The book is based on a comprehensive investigation of primary and secondary sources, and on a thorough examination of the vast archives left by the Duke of Wellington. Muir offers vivid new insights into the personalities of Canning, Castlereagh, Perceval, Lord Wellesley, Wellington and the Prince Regent, along with fresh information on the financial background of Britain's campaigns. This vigorous narrative account will appeal to general readers and military enthusiasts, as well as to students of early nineteenth-century British politics and military history.
480 pages, Hardcover
First published February 6, 1996
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About the author
Rory Muir
15 books33 followersRory Muir is a visiting research fellow at the University of Adelaide and a renowned expert on British history. His books include Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon and his two-part biography of Wellington, which won the SAHR Templer Medal.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
February 24, 2020
Now that the U.S. has been in Afghanistan for nearly twenty years, perhaps it is easier for Americans to understand (on a small scale) what Europe and especially Great Britain went through, except for a short period of peace, from the French Revolution to 1815 with the downfall of Napoleon. While it is true that Britain did not field the armies that their varying allies did until 1807 with the Peninsular War, their great role at sea and as the paymaster for ultimate victory put them at the forefront in the defeat of Napoleon.
This is the main premise of Rory Muir's book. Wars cost money and lives. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Spain certainly paid in blood, sometimes as Napoleon's allies, but eventually as his opponents along with Portugal. But it was notably Britain who paid in specie as subsidies to their allies that kept the financial side of war viable. While some might criticize Britain for paying rather than fighting, their position across the Channel made their options tenuous. Their leaders and people generally supported the seemingly non-ending wars although there was an Opposition Party, which made its objections known.
Muir does a good job explainng the politics behind the decisions made. He also does explain some of battles in Europe, and especially those in the Peninsula. This is a not just a book about war, but about some of the behind-the-scenes aspects of war.
This is the main premise of Rory Muir's book. Wars cost money and lives. Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Spain certainly paid in blood, sometimes as Napoleon's allies, but eventually as his opponents along with Portugal. But it was notably Britain who paid in specie as subsidies to their allies that kept the financial side of war viable. While some might criticize Britain for paying rather than fighting, their position across the Channel made their options tenuous. Their leaders and people generally supported the seemingly non-ending wars although there was an Opposition Party, which made its objections known.
Muir does a good job explainng the politics behind the decisions made. He also does explain some of battles in Europe, and especially those in the Peninsula. This is a not just a book about war, but about some of the behind-the-scenes aspects of war.
February 28, 2020
Rory Muir’s Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 is the first title I’ve read from this author, but it most certainly will not be the last. I was impressed by this rigorous and comprehensive study of Great Britain’s efforts in the second half of the Napoleonic Wars. British military history of this period has already been covered closely by the likes of Oman, Fortescue, and many others. In recognition of this coverage, this book seeks to present a wider perspective of the war. Muir’s objective, in his own words, is to “place the campaigns and the negotiations in the context of the wider war, showing how military, diplomatic, political and financial pressures all combined to shape the policy of the British government” (xii).
The book is organized topically rather than being in strict chronological order. Naturally, there is some chronological overlap between chapters as a result, but I thought this decision was successful. Being able to focus on one subject at a time gave Muir the space to really delve into the topic at hand, rather than having to worry about jumping around to mention some minor event merely because it came next in time. Having read a good deal on the Napoleonic Wars I didn’t have any problems with the organization, though perhaps those new to this period of history will think differently.
The narrative feels longer than its 381 pages thanks to the small font, but even so Muir doesn’t have much space to cover eight years of frantic history. Consequently, he keeps his coverage restricted to a birds-eye-view. Battles are summarized in sentences and paragraphs and are by no means the main show. Instead, the focus is on the British government at home, their strategies, and their representatives, ambassadors, dignitaries, statesmen, and generals abroad and how these men shaped Britain’s part in the war. In London, Muir provides details of the leading ministers in the successive governments during this period and their policies—information which was very useful for this American. I knew very little about the British government during this time before reading this book, and I had somehow developed a prejudice against its ability (probably from reading Wellington’s letters and the like in pure military histories). Muir convincingly argues that the government supported the war effort as well as they could. While the government and its ministers were clearly flawed, the efforts they made were greater than I had appreciated. In particular, the amount of money that was used for funding the army and navy and for providing subsidies is staggering.
Of course, much of the book revolves around the British efforts in the Peninsular War, but there were many other aspects of Britain’s fight against Napoleon, all of which are covered in varying degrees of detail. I found the chapters on Britain’s Mediterranean dealings very interesting, for instance, and there is even a chapter on the War of 1812. Much of the second half of the book is spent on the diplomatic efforts between Britain and the Continental Powers of Europe, particularly in the period after 1811.
The most important thing I gained from this book was an understanding Great Britain’s true role in the Napoleonic Wars. Except for the brief Peace of Amiens, Britain and France were at war for two decades. However, for a number of reasons, Britain’s military role was often small compared to the enormous efforts made by Austria, Prussia, and Russia time after time, as Muir eloquently states,
"Britain could not hope to defeat Napoleon, either by herself or with the aid of her Spanish, Portuguese and Sicilian allies. The war in the Peninsula and Mediterranean was a powerful diversion which absorbed Napoleon's resources and, like the economic war, made his rule unpopular, but it could not bring victory. If the Continent was to be redeemed it must be on the battlefields of Central Europe, where Napoleon had established his domination in his great campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807." (176)
In summary, Britain’s efforts are always placed into their proper context, which leads me into a discussion of Muir’s style and academic approach. I appreciated his completely objective perspectives, which often forced me to look at events I had read about before in new ways (e.g. the Battle of Talavera, the Vitoria Campaign, British subsidies). I should mention that the book is meticulously researched, and the notes and bibliography occupy 70 pages. Yet, the text is well-written and kept my attention throughout. I commend the author for delivering a detailed and well-researched study that is nevertheless enjoyable to read for history lover such as myself.
Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 provides what is most likely the best survey of the second half of the Napoleonic Wars, from Britain’s perspective, out there. I would recommend it to both the experienced and inexperienced reader of Napoleonic history due to its distinctive approach of analyzing Great Britain’s war efforts in a holistic sense.
The book is organized topically rather than being in strict chronological order. Naturally, there is some chronological overlap between chapters as a result, but I thought this decision was successful. Being able to focus on one subject at a time gave Muir the space to really delve into the topic at hand, rather than having to worry about jumping around to mention some minor event merely because it came next in time. Having read a good deal on the Napoleonic Wars I didn’t have any problems with the organization, though perhaps those new to this period of history will think differently.
The narrative feels longer than its 381 pages thanks to the small font, but even so Muir doesn’t have much space to cover eight years of frantic history. Consequently, he keeps his coverage restricted to a birds-eye-view. Battles are summarized in sentences and paragraphs and are by no means the main show. Instead, the focus is on the British government at home, their strategies, and their representatives, ambassadors, dignitaries, statesmen, and generals abroad and how these men shaped Britain’s part in the war. In London, Muir provides details of the leading ministers in the successive governments during this period and their policies—information which was very useful for this American. I knew very little about the British government during this time before reading this book, and I had somehow developed a prejudice against its ability (probably from reading Wellington’s letters and the like in pure military histories). Muir convincingly argues that the government supported the war effort as well as they could. While the government and its ministers were clearly flawed, the efforts they made were greater than I had appreciated. In particular, the amount of money that was used for funding the army and navy and for providing subsidies is staggering.
Of course, much of the book revolves around the British efforts in the Peninsular War, but there were many other aspects of Britain’s fight against Napoleon, all of which are covered in varying degrees of detail. I found the chapters on Britain’s Mediterranean dealings very interesting, for instance, and there is even a chapter on the War of 1812. Much of the second half of the book is spent on the diplomatic efforts between Britain and the Continental Powers of Europe, particularly in the period after 1811.
The most important thing I gained from this book was an understanding Great Britain’s true role in the Napoleonic Wars. Except for the brief Peace of Amiens, Britain and France were at war for two decades. However, for a number of reasons, Britain’s military role was often small compared to the enormous efforts made by Austria, Prussia, and Russia time after time, as Muir eloquently states,
"Britain could not hope to defeat Napoleon, either by herself or with the aid of her Spanish, Portuguese and Sicilian allies. The war in the Peninsula and Mediterranean was a powerful diversion which absorbed Napoleon's resources and, like the economic war, made his rule unpopular, but it could not bring victory. If the Continent was to be redeemed it must be on the battlefields of Central Europe, where Napoleon had established his domination in his great campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1807." (176)
In summary, Britain’s efforts are always placed into their proper context, which leads me into a discussion of Muir’s style and academic approach. I appreciated his completely objective perspectives, which often forced me to look at events I had read about before in new ways (e.g. the Battle of Talavera, the Vitoria Campaign, British subsidies). I should mention that the book is meticulously researched, and the notes and bibliography occupy 70 pages. Yet, the text is well-written and kept my attention throughout. I commend the author for delivering a detailed and well-researched study that is nevertheless enjoyable to read for history lover such as myself.
Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 provides what is most likely the best survey of the second half of the Napoleonic Wars, from Britain’s perspective, out there. I would recommend it to both the experienced and inexperienced reader of Napoleonic history due to its distinctive approach of analyzing Great Britain’s war efforts in a holistic sense.
November 29, 2009
I found this book surprisingly very easy to read and it held my interest throughout. It covered most facets of Britain's role in the war against Napoleon. As the previous review mentions it looks at why the British Government carried out certain policies and the affects of those policies on it's field army under Wellington, its continental allies and the rest of the countries and people involved in the Napoleonic Wars.
This was a very interesting and enjoyable account of the war against Napoleon and I did not find it dull at any time. Although it only scratched the surface of the military campaigns it gave enough detail for the reader to understand completely what was happening and why.
Overall this is a well written and researched account of Britain's role in Napoleon's downfall and should appeal to anyone interested in this period of history.
February 28, 2026
taká mid kniha, neprofesionalne napísaná, ale veľmi informatívna, objaví sa v bibliografii
October 29, 2017
I'm pretty sure that I've had this book since it came out in '96, and it's been collecting dust on my shelves over the intervening years. However in the last few years I've become more captivated by the Congress of Vienna and "The Hundred Days"...and finally grabbed this off the stacks. I'm sad to say that I took so long to read this one -- it's a fantastic read.
Muir does a wonderful job of painting in the small details of the primary characters involved in Britain's long wars against Napoleon. There's no questioning the extent of his archival research, and yet he maintains a degree of readability rare for an academic work such as this. More importantly, he gives a skillful nod to the wealth of material that's been hashed and rehashed about the Napoleonic Wars while focusing the effort of his writing on the whole-of-government approach with which the British government helped to win the war.
The hidden key to Britain's overall success which Muir so ably brings to light was the highly evolved character of the British Cabinet -- relative to their peers and foes, as well as when compared to the level of political development that existed in the Cabinet when Britain waged its efforts in the American War for Independence. This book came out before 9/11 and the Wars on Terror, so whatever bias there may be has nothing to do with that. There are certainly no formulas to waging war precisely to achieve intended outcomes, but in Muir's book you will find a great deal of precedent which suggests that this art is certainly made up of a few repeatable ingredients.
Muir does a wonderful job of painting in the small details of the primary characters involved in Britain's long wars against Napoleon. There's no questioning the extent of his archival research, and yet he maintains a degree of readability rare for an academic work such as this. More importantly, he gives a skillful nod to the wealth of material that's been hashed and rehashed about the Napoleonic Wars while focusing the effort of his writing on the whole-of-government approach with which the British government helped to win the war.
The hidden key to Britain's overall success which Muir so ably brings to light was the highly evolved character of the British Cabinet -- relative to their peers and foes, as well as when compared to the level of political development that existed in the Cabinet when Britain waged its efforts in the American War for Independence. This book came out before 9/11 and the Wars on Terror, so whatever bias there may be has nothing to do with that. There are certainly no formulas to waging war precisely to achieve intended outcomes, but in Muir's book you will find a great deal of precedent which suggests that this art is certainly made up of a few repeatable ingredients.
May 4, 2025
A great book, providing an in-depth analysis of the campaigns and strategies that enabled Britain's eventual victory over Napoleon. The author, Australian historian Rory Muir, focuses on the methods Britain used to overcome the 1807 stalemate with France, offering insights for both British success and failures. The book serves as a valuable companion to “Britain Against Napoleon” by Roger Knight in its focus on the political, military, financial, and logistical mechanisms of Britain's war effort. Muir relates the government’s international efforts with domestic politics, examining how political intrigue, public opinion, and the capabilities of individual ministers shaped Britain’s strategic actions. The book emphasizes Britain’s extensive use of subsidy payments to allies and a preference for peripheral military campaigns as dual efforts to control the strategic direction of the conflict. Through this detailed assessment of Britain's approach to coalition warfare in this period, Muir provides an important lesson on the necessity of direct involvement in shaping strategic outcomes, rather than relying solely on financial support or tangential military efforts. Highly recommended for those interested in the broader structures behind Britain's military success against Napoleon and the importance of effective domestic governance in making possible a winning wartime strategy.
June 4, 2024
Slightly unusual decision to only focus on the winning years without the essential back ground - one would almost have expected a prequel to follow, but no. That said, one of the best overarching histories of the Napoleonic era ever. Muir notably critical of Wellington and to a lesser extent Castlereagh but does much to rehabilitate Canning and quite sympathetic to the opposition who were little more than extremist traitors.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews