Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively, but also to understand the political context in which they are operating.
Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of 11 vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and toward civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates.
Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives.
Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.
This is a good and solid book with a familiar and similar style to Freedman’s other works.
The greatest strength of this book is its breadth. The conflicts chosen for study are worthy, including both those familiar to western audiences and ones which are criminally underrepresented. It was interesting to learn more about some of these such as the Arab/Israeli war of 1973 and the India/Pakistan conflict. The writing style is academic yet accessible, much like Freedman’s other work meaning it’s both a good starting point and one for a military history/strategy enjoyer.
There are two main problems I had with this book.
1. That it’s called Command. Whilst there is unquestionably extensive coverage of this concept in the book and the concept of civil military relations, much of each chapter is merely providing the extensive levels of context for each conflict required in order to understand it. This means sometimes it feels as though Command takes a back seat and it does not always feel like you are reading what you thought you would be when you picked up this book. No doubt the context is helpful and necessary, however I feel it may have been better to decrease the number of conflicts discussed in order to have the available word count to delve into a smaller yet much more coherent and specific pool of Command situations.
2. Formatting and Grammar. I do not know if I simply had a rotten apple copy of this book but what I do know is that the grammar and formatting of sentences was, in some instances, atrocious. Whole sentences were joined together without spaces and I had to do a double take of countless sentences and paragraphs because I simply could not understand the way in which they were written. Whilst it did not detract from the content of the book, it certainly made the reading experience far less enjoyable.
Despite these complaints, I would recommend reading because there is no doubt that Freedman knew what he was talking about and gave valuable insight into various conflicts and their conduct. I’m giving this a 4/5 because a 3/5 is unfair and a 3.75/5 does not exist here.
Very solid, full of anecdotes, half academic book and half a blog kind of style - that is, the usual Mr Freedman. Could use more focus or larger volume because 16 chapters forced the author to speed through all the conflicts while juggling personal stories of commanders, big picture consequences, explanations of history for people unfamiliar with the events, references to other chapters, timid attempts at drawing a theory of military command... But that was expected and I love authors dying in the flames of ambition
Lawrence Freedman is clearly enjoying his retirement. This latest book is a quick and accessible but fascinating romp through an ambitious number of post-WWII case studies of higher military command in war. The theoretical lens is not tightly focused and he largely ties it all together with general commentary on the challenges faced by different types of military and political leaders faced with different problems, and their various responses to those challenges. His principle thesis is that politics is deeply intertwined with military command by its very nature, and that finding effective ways to reconcile the sometimes conflicting demands of political and military imperatives is critical to success. While he’s not necessarily breaking any particularly new ground here, and the number of examples obliges him to move through them quickly, it’s a great survey that includes many case studies that aren’t in the usual lineup.
Throughout history, the concept of command - - as both a way to achieve objectives and as an assertion of authority -- has been essential to military action and leadership. But, as Sir Lawrence Freedman shows, it is also deeply political. Military command has been reconstructed and revolutionized since the Second World War by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. Freedman takes a global perspective, systematically investigating its practice and politics since 1945 through a wide range of conflicts from the French Colonial Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bangladesh Liberation War to North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of 1972, the Falklands War, the Iraq War and Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine. By highlighting the political nature of strategy, Freedman shows that military decision-making cannot be separated from civilian priorities and that commanders must now have the sensibility to navigate politics as well as warfare. This book is a great complement to Freedman’s tome, Strategy!
Magisterial and perceptive, Freedman covers a number of post WWII conflicts from Korea to the latest episode of a long lasting Russia v Ukraine conflict. His style will be familiar to those who read his thoughtful blog - academic but not impenetrable. He draws lessons from across history but weaves common lessons on failures. Very good for anyone interested in leadership - especially the rather strange dynamics between political and military leaders.
Despite Freedman's encyclopaedic knowledge of war, this still felt like a series of articles rather than a coherent whole. The book isn't without interest, but the conclusions drawn don't seem to me to be very revelatory. Competence and character are important in difficult situations? Dictators can control the narrative of events, which perpetuates delusion, discourages candour and punishes competence? All fairly commonsensical one would think. A lot of information, but not necessarily a lot of insight, maybe Freedman toned down the complexity to make the read more accessible. I will read it again next year some time to double check if I've missed anything.
I opened the book hoping for a treaty elaborating the argument that "war is a continuation of politics by other means". Instead, the politics here refers to a much personal level, i.e. among the conflicting wishes and personalities of field commanders, politicians, and stakeholders. It does not touches on the political forces, e.g. parties, nationalities, religions etc. Nonetheless, the author has showed how those little details had huge impact on the various outcomes of operations, although I suspect he missed larger political forces at play, and perhaps were giving those details much more credit than they should bear.
Another problem I have with this book lies in the chapter on Ukraine-Russia conflict from 2014 till present. The author made hasty and one-sided comments that were limited by the information available when the book went to press. With hindsight, perhaps the author would have another chapter, but this time pointing out the similar, if not more, serious mistakes made by the Ukrainian side, mostly pushing operational objectives motivated by political agenda than battlefield reality. I also doubt the author's claim that Putin was delusional in his decision to start the war, and the author's hint that others in Russian did not support this initiative. Polls suggested otherwise. But alas, those are hindsight not available to the author. Yet they crucially explains the unfounded optimism in the West on Russian's expected failure.
If ultimately, US is the modern Rome, to be saved only by military dictatorship, how will our future generations view this book?
Using an eclectic mix of battles and campaigns, Freedman drives home the point that effective command is difficult,, problematic, and hostage to a vari3ety of often conflicting factors and influences – political, military, strategic, tactical, individual. Egos, competences, preconceived ideas, ideologies – not to mention actual realities on the ground – all come into play, positively, more often negatively. Starting in Korea with the dismissal of MacArthur, and proceeding into the modern day with the campaigns against ISIS inside Syria, Freedman lays out a tapestry of examples of command successes (some) and difficulties, if not outright failures (most). The best part of the book is just that – a reacquaintance with a series of conflicts, in brief, across the years from Korea to now. The Congo, Kosovo, Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Chechnya... and more. I found his brief recaps of the conflicts, coupled with perceptive insights into the personalities, the realities and the contexts in which they occurred, to be very interesting. His diagnoses of command issues are astute, although often obvious, and the book is mostly observational in content, not prescriptive or instructive for those looking to avoid command failures in the future. However, as a guide to understanding what went specifically wrong in each of his selected examples of conflicts, it is excellent.
A good book, providing an assessment of the political aspects of senior military command. The author, noted British military historian and strategic analyst Lawrence Freedman, presents a series of case studies to demonstrate positive and negative examples for the political aspects of senior military leadership. Using post-WWII examples ranging from major combat operations to small scale insurgencies, Freedman delivers a set of guidelines for the interaction of politics with military decision making. The book covers a wide definition of politics, with interactions highlighting both internal domestic affairs, intra-military deliberations, and external diplomatic initiatives. The central character, through all the case studies, is a senior military leader confronting not explicit battlefield challenges but rather civilian political leaders with divergent viewpoints, adversaries on a diplomatic front, local civilian populations which must be won over without resorting to violence, and the internal power dynamics inherent to complex military organizations. Through these examples, Freedman points out essential politico-centric characteristics for leaders, such as subtle communication, self-awareness, and adaptability. A great book for understanding that victory in war involves more than just battlefield success. Highly recommended for any senior military officer.
#NonfictionGeek #Bookreview 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐝 by 𝐒𝐢𝐫 𝐋𝐚𝐰𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐅𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐦𝐚𝐧 (The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine) "𝙃𝙚 𝙬𝙝𝙤 𝙬𝙞𝙨𝙝𝙚𝙨 𝙩𝙤 𝙗𝙚 𝙤𝙗𝙚𝙮𝙚𝙙 𝙢𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙠𝙣𝙤𝙬 𝙝𝙤𝙬 𝙩𝙤 𝘾𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙖𝙣𝙙" - 𝙉𝙞𝙘𝙘𝙤𝙡𝙤 𝙈𝙖𝙘𝙝𝙞𝙖𝙫𝙚𝙡𝙡𝙞 , 𝙏𝙝𝙚 𝙋𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙚 A classic book on Military and political perspective to learn about essential elements. Command is a hard-pressing and diligent Job for superiors in different circumstances. Lawrence Freedman's name doesn't need any introduction in the realm of the subject. He highlights command challenges from the Korean War where General Douglas McArthur showed insubordination to then President Harry Truman. Neglected Political cost and strategic alignment with presidential policies regarding War. French army defeat in Indochina caused by senior commanders alienated from gross root level troops and subordinate commanders. Cuban missile crisis John F Kennedy had their agenda but military junta wants Cuba to be attacked. Arab-Israel Wars in 1967 and 1973 where Ariel Sharon's role as insubordinate commander conducting Audacious moves irrespective of Overall military Strategy. Author also underlined Changing nature of War inculcated by precision guided munitions, Air Strikes and Air Power , Drones and Artificial intelligence which demands command to be agile and clarity about objective and role of War. #Highly Recommended! #Thanks
Not every chapter has equally interesting events or insightful conclusions to offer. Looking at you, East Pakistan & Kosovo.
This remains of course a personal choice, with the post-Mobutu Congo begging attention because I'm Belgian, damn it.
The retrospective of the (second) Gulf War vs the shambles of the 2003 invasion, which sits next to a hyper recent & dusturbing chapter on Afghanistan, complete with a short sketch of air power from bomber to drone... and a surprising backflip to Algeria, as in "lean mean sob's to emulate, but alienating brutal tactics to avoid".
Distance in time, as usual in history, helps clear up the emotional mist. The ruthless bluff of the Cuban missile crisis & the absurdities of miniature imperialism around the Falklands come into focus.
Ukraine... well, it's there. Mostly to be compared to the "leisurely" Russian ventures in Chechnya & Syria, because Freedman published his book in 2022 with more than a hint of regret that yet another war is on.
“Command” is a masterful lesson in the histories and complexities of some of the most impactful military operations in modern times. I am not acquainted with Lawrence Freedman’s other works, but the way he weaves together his case studies and delivers powerful messages on what it means to command is both approachable and instructing.
To those unfamiliar with each historical case study his style makes it easy to pick up the central tenets and come away with a core message. Even in cases where the reader is familiar, as I was in regard to the 1991 Gulf War, there are plenty of new insights to be had.
The cumulative effect of the historical progression from 1950’s Korea to the modern battlefields of Ukraine is a collection of lessons for the future of command that is excellently portrayed at the book’s end. For those with even a passing interest in the relationship between politics and military affairs this book is an excellent choice that will undoubtedly teach a reader new ideas regardless of how knowledgeable they believe they are to start with.
Military operations often interact with politics. I suppose this is surprising for someone, perhaps entirely unaware of any military or political history since antiquity. If there was a deeper message here then I missed it.
The book is mostly comprised of vignettes from recent military history. Generals overstepping the mark, politicians failing to understand the ground operation, inflexible institutions unable to learn from their mistakes. There is no analysis of these cases during the telling, only a relentless narrative push forwards. There are many better sources for such history.
It is a shame, as I have generally had a good impression of Professor Freedman's writing. I enjoyed his earlier work The Future of War: A History a great deal more, and felt more of a sense that I was in the presence of someone truly erudite and farsighted in military matters. I hope he focuses more on such work in future.
In dit boek staan de militaire structuren met betrekking tot leidinggeven uitgeschreven in vijftien oorlogssituaties en conflicten vanaf het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog tot de Russische invasie van Oekraïne in 2022. Het is interessant om te zien dat er verschillende opvattingen zijn over de rol van defensie in bijvoorbeeld een democratie en de politieke en militaire rol die een dictator kan hebben zoals Saddam Hoessein. Voor de militaire amateurstrategen een zeer toereikend boek met nieuwe informatie en overzichtelijk beschreven besluitvorming rond conflicten. Het vereist wel de nodige aandacht en concentratie om de verschillen en overeenkomsten op te slaan en bewust onderscheid te maken tussen bijvoorbeeld de Falklandoorlog en de nucleaire dreiging omtrent Korea en Cuba.
A discussion of the tensions between political and military leaders from Korea to Ukraine. I found the subject matter interesting, but rather heavy going in places owing to the amount of detail. The different objectives of different powers are well illustrated by the war in Syria where attacks on hospitals and medical facilities have been deliberately attacked by the Russian air force supporting President Assad in a deliberate attempt to get civilians to abandon rebel held areas. In one case this was after medical staff had shared the map co-ordinates of medical facilities to the UN in the hope that they would be protected from attack. These co-ordinates were then shared with the Russians, and all were subsequently attacked. Now we see the same policy in Ukraine.
B: The Australian Naval Institute published a review of Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine was published on 24 February, just as I had finished the chapter on Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War. Tim Coyle’s assessment that “Command must be an essential read for leaders at all levels.” I completely agree.
The book needs a bibliography, trying to find a reference in the notes leads the reader on a search through numerous notes when you just have a last name and an op.cit. to guide you.
I have a new reading list that includes Larteguy’s The Centurions and The Praetorians.
Quite academic in nature, studying the military command along with political. Need to have some previous understanding of chains of command along with the several layers of military divisions. I hadn't realised that there were so many different military layers in the US and then to complicate it even further, political issues.
I think this book has evoked my desire to understand more about the military and how it functions. It really is a complex instution, more than I had thought.
I do recommend this book as it has plenty of contemporaneous insights on the recent wars such as Afghan, Ukraine, and Syria.
This a beautifully written, beautifully read analysis of the way in which military command has been exercised in various campaigns and conflicts from the Korean War to the present. With a good use of sources and a clear narrative basis, Professor Freedman has skilfully analysed and drawn conclusions from these experiences. The reader/listener gets a ready grasp of the main facts and then follows the arguments that are presented about the lessons from them. These are drawn together in am excellent concluding discussion. The book is pitched for a general reader as well as the military or political student and is strongly recommended.
Outstanding. Leads a discussion about command and the inherent civil - military relationship that results through several case studies of conflict across the global. So interesting and worthy of inclusion on several types of senior leader reading lists. In fact I would recommend this book for inclusion on the US war colleges curriculum. There is some controversy in the final chapters about the characterization of how the United States executed drone warfare, but that lends itself to further discussion. Brilliant.
Well written! I certainly lived thru all of the episodes but don’t really remeber Korea. However, a lot was a reliving of much that I remember with a reminder of much. Well done!
There's a lot of interesting history in this book, the political-vs-military point of view that is mostly missing in other books. Some of the ideas/lessons are applicable to organizations in general.
An excellent book. The author provides us with several examples of leadership, or lack of it, since World War II. Should be recommended reading to decision makers.