Our Own Backyard: The United States In Central America, 1977-1992

by William M. Leogrande

In this remarkable and engaging book, William LeoGrande offers the first comprehensive history of U.S. foreign policy toward Central America in the waning years of the Cold War. From the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua and the outbreak of El Salvador's civil war in the late 1970s to the final regional peace settlements negotiated a decade later, he chronicles the dramatic struggles--in Washington and Central America--that shaped the region's destiny.
For good or ill, LeoGrande argues, Central America's fate hinged on decisions that were subject to intense struggles among, and within, Congress, the CIA, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House--decisions over which Central Americans themselves had little influence. Like the domestic turmoil unleashed by Vietnam, he says, the struggle over Central America was so divisive that it damaged the fabric of democratic politics at home. It inflamed the tug-of-war between Congress and the executive branch over control of foreign policy and ultimately led to the Iran-contra affair, the nation's most serious political crisis since Watergate.

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"A masterly and comprehensive chronicle of U.S. policy toward Central America in the 1980s.-- Atlantic Monthly

"[LeoGrande] has risen above partisanship to produce a book central to any historical evaluation of those troubled times.-- Foreign Affairs

"[LeoGrande] takes the reader confidently through a complex, often tortuous story. . . . Throughout, the analysis is thorough and clear.-- New York Times Book Review

"Full of unorthodox, original perspectives, LeoGrande's clearly written, magisterial study holds timely post-Cold War lessons that transcend the Central American setting.-- Publishers Weekly

Illuminating one of the most controversial chapters in the history of American foreign policy, William LeoGrande presents a comprehensive account of U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1980s. From the military clashes fought on the ground in Central America to the bitter political discord that wrenched apart Washington, he chronicles the dramatic struggles that characterized what he calls "the last battle of the Cold War." -->

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, American History, War, Political Science, The United States Of America

773 pages, Hardcover

First published September 21, 1998

Reviews

[Harald · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was published in 1998, several years after the conflicts over Nicaragua and El Salvador had subsided, yet it still reads very fresh and surprisingly relevant. Although Dr. LeoGrande covers the whole fifteen-year period from 1977 to 1992, the core of the book deals with the eight years of the Reagan era. He focuses both on the struggles within the Republican administration and the mastery of the White House in getting support in Congress for widely unpopular policies towards Central America. How President Reagan managed to split the Congressional Democrats and win votes for his military interventions in El Salvador and Nicaragua has clearly relevance for understanding the present Congressional deadlock.
The book also provides an excellent overview concerning the events in the affected countries in the same period. The reader remains in the end with the question whether the loss of lives and the wide-spread destruction was all in vain.

[wallacescott · Rating 5 out of 5]

A truly excellent and comprehensive history of the U.S. involvement in Central America and the proxy wars we fought in El Salvador and Nicaragua in the 1980s.

[Alex Miller · Rating 4 out of 5]

A genuinely excellent survey of US policy towards Central America in the 80s, if somewhat too detailed in describing the legislative minutia that affected the policy.

[Thomas Ray · Rating 3 out of 5]

Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992, William M. Leogrande, 1998, 773 pages, Dewey 327.73072809048, ISBN 0807823953

This is a very detailed account of U.S. actions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 1977-1992. And of the U.S. internal politics leading to the decisions.


We went to war in Central America to exorcize the ghosts of Vietnam and to renew the national will to use force abroad. p. 590.

Congresspeople were terrified of being tarred as "soft on Communism" by a popular president. p. 525, 588. "We need a bill that's 60% acceptable to 52% of the members of Congress. We have a 75% chance of doing that." p. 533.

The American public opposed Reagan's Central America policy--but so long as no U.S. combat troops were sent, the American public didn't care much. p. 589.

After the USSR folded its tents, the U.S. declared victory and forgot about Central America. p. 579.


NICARAGUA

Some 30,000 Nicaraguans died in the contra war--proportionate to population, more than the U.S. lost in the Civil War, WWI, WWII, Korea, and Vietnam /combined/. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans became refugees. Millions were pauperized as real wages fell 90%, inflation spun out of control, and a third of the labor force was unemployed. p. 582.

President Taft sent marines to Nicaragua in 1912 to prop up the unpopular pro-U.S.-business government. Marines left in 1933, leaving Somoza in charge. Somoza murdered Liberal Party leader Sandino. Somoza and his progeny ruled as a kleptocracy until 1979.

The Somoza regime was so universally hated that the business elite joined with Marxist guerrillas to kick them out.

The new governing party called themselves, "Sandinistas."

Presidents Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush did not want a Communist government "in our own backyard." Reagan especially considered it unacceptable, and felt that no price was too high to destroy the Nicaraguan government.

Remnants of the Somoza national guard roved the Nicaraguan countryside, plundering farms and villages.

Reagan sent the CIA to support these thugs. The CIA illegally organized, funded, and armed them, creating a "contra-revolucionario" army with help from Argentina's and Honduras's militaries.

Reagan sent hundreds of millions of dollars to these "contras" throughout his presidency, and gave them training and CIA support, including information on Nicaraguan armed-forces movements.

When the U.S. Congress refused to fund Reagan's war against Nicaragua, he told his national security team to keep the contras in the field however they could. They used illegal arms sales to Iran to fund the contra war. (And gave money to other countries, who would give part of it to the contras. pp. 389, 502.) Team Reagan acted with secrecy, deception, and disdain for the rule of law. pp. 499, 586. Reagan administration hard-liners were building a permanent secret U.S. government. p. 503. Revealing the scandal did not end aid to the contras. pp. 503, 517, 529, 549, 555. Reagan's hard-liners were willing to fight to the last Nicaraguan. p. 539.

In the 1980s, the CIA involved the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran militaries in drug trafficking, to fund the Nicaraguan Contras: up to $2 million per week, sold in Los Angeles. Government complacency attracted Colombian trafficking families to Guatemala in the 1990s. --A History of Violence, Óscar Martínez, 2016, pp. 47-48. https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

The CIA also mined Nicaragua's harbors, sinking other countries' trading ships.

The U.S. government embargoed trade from Nicaragua, and made sure that no international financial institution would loan Nicaragua money. This devastated the Nicaraguan economy. p. 538, 548.

Nevertheless, the contras were unable to overthrow the Sandinista government.

Reagan tried unsuccessfully for eight years to defeat the Nicaraguan government militarily, using the contras.

George H.W. Bush was willing to remove the Sandinistas by having destroyed the economy, and, in addition to /overt/ funding amounting to $7 per Nicaraguan voter, sending the CIA to interfere in elections, to make sure the U.S.-approved candidate won. p. 561, 579.

With the Sandinistas out, Nicaragua's importance to the U.S. plummeted. p. 564, 579. After the war, the U.S.-approved president of Nicaragua spoke to a joint session of Congress, begging for economic aid. Few Congressional representatives or senators bothered to attend.

The USSR sent Nicaragua significant military aid only /after/ Reagan started the contra war. p. 585.


EL SALVADOR

Despite over a billion dollars in U.S. military aid, the Salvadoran armed forces could not defeat the guerrillas. Some 80,000 Salvadorans died, mostly innocent civilians killed by the military and the government's security forces, armed and bankrolled by Washington. Three billion dollars in U.S. economic aid prevented the Salvadoran economy from collapsing like Nicaragua's, but by 1991, a third of the population was unemployed and 90% lived in poverty, not earning enough to adequately feed a family of four. The eventual peace agreement could have happened in 1981, but Reagan didn't want it. p. 583. See /A History of Violence/, Óscar Martínez, 2016, for some of the aftermath of Reagan's war: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

0.1% of El Salvadorans were the ruling elite, who owned 60% of the farmland, all the banks, and most of the industry. 87% of rural families owned too little land to subsist on. All of El Salvador's small land area is in use. El Salvador hasn't fully recovered from a 1969 recession. The oligarchy has ruled from behind the skirts of a military dictatorship since the 1932 slaughter of a peasant uprising. The elite fear any threat to their position, and look to maintain it with all the savagery required. The army counted the ballots: elections were a charade. It was illegal for peasants to organize politically. Export agriculture expanded: peasants were forced off the land. pp. 34-35. The army was the state, 1931-1992. p. 578.

Unlike Nicaragua, the U.S.-approved right-wing government stayed in office. But Marxist guerrillas waged a war that neither side could win. The U.S. supplied funding, weapons, and advisers. Eventually, the war ended in a negotiated settlement. p. 579.


ELSEWHERE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Nicaragua and El Salvador are just the tip of the iceberg. More accounts of destruction by U.S. forces: https://www.goodreads.com/review/list...


PAY TO PLAY

The author received fellowships from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Open Society Foundation, that enabled him to work as a congressional staff member. p. xiv. Meaning that congressional staff are so low-paid that only the financially-independent can accept the positions. Usually family members of the rich. One small part of the reason we have the best government money can buy.

[Eren Buğlalılar · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bir Amerikan liberalinin gözünden, ABD'nin Orta Amerika politikası. Birkaç açıdan iyi:

- ABD senatosu içerisindeki Cumhuriyetçi-Demokrat çelişkilerini, bu çelişkilerin ABD Hükümetlerinin Orta Amerika politikası üzerindeki etkisini gösteriyor.

- Orta Amerika'daki uzlaşma süreçlerinin nasıl geliştiğini anlamak açısından faydalı. Çünkü 1977-92 yılları arasında emperyalizm dış politikada büyük bir değişiklik yapıyor. Yazar emperyalizmin işbirlikçi rejimleri ve silahlı devrimci hareketleri nasıl ehlileştirdiğini adım adım anlatmış. Tabii kendi liberal üslubunca.

- Araştırması derinlikli, konuya da hakim. Böyle olunca tüm süreci ilginç anektodlar, iğneleyici değinmelerle adeta bir hikaye gibi anlatabilmiş. Kitabı sıkıcı bir diplomasi vakayinamesi olmaktan kurtarmış.

Yine de, şu liberal emperyalizm anlatımlarını yazara sövmeden okuyabilmek mümkün değil. Orta Amerika'daki ölüm tugaylarını yöneten generaller suçlu da, maaşlarını ödeyen, eğitimlerini veren ve silahlandıran ABD Başkanları, CIA yöneticileri, ABD ordusunun danışmanları suçsuz mu? Yaklaşık 500 bin insanın katledildiği ABD fonlu bir katliam döneminin sonunda devrimci hareketlerin düzene dönmesini, aklı selimin zaferi olarak açıklamaya çalışan herkimse, gerçeklerden kaçıyor demektir.

[Joey · Rating 3 out of 5]

I needed to bone up on modern Central American history, so someone recommended this book. It's actually not that great for boning up on Central America as a whole, but pretty good for the Nicaragua and El Salvador of the 1980s, and also for learning all the failings of the Reagan administration. And that's probably the main reason this book is only three stars: it's just too one-sided and biased. It would be interesting to follow this book with a view of the same time period written by an ideological Reganite.

That said, Leogrande makes his case well. Reagan's dogged insistence of getting his way led him and his cronies to run roughshod over the Constitution, and it's ironic but not surprising to hear today's Republicans self-righteously level the same criticism at their liberal opponents. For, at the root of Leogrande's work is the unspoken reality that Reagan's willful circumnavigation of the law is par for the course for the American executive branch. Reagan was not the first, nor will Obama be the last. That's the chilling takeaway from this book.

[Joan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this for a class in college. Great history of US involvement in Central American politics. And, an interesting read.