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242 pages, Paperback
Published April 16, 2024
>In a since-deleted comment on this story, a university-based exit relay operator related their own experience of being subpoenaed by the Department of Homeland Security to produce three months of records for the IP address of their Tor exit node. This indicated to the Tor developers that these “netflow” logs commonly collected by internet service providers were being actively sought by law enforcement in the US . . .
> Netflow logs are administrative records collected by internet service providers from routers. They provide timestamps for activity, indicating when a router is inactive and when it is sending information. This can be particularly damaging for Tor, as information on the timings of signals sent to and from Tor routers is exactly what is needed to perform the correlation attacks imagined in the padding discussion. In terms of our Cold War metaphor, this would be like a spy agency who has paid our agent’s neighbor to monitor when they leave their flat—timing when they enter the Tor network.. . .
> The developers, by mapping this information, realized that they could reduce the resolution of this timing information substantially at a very low cost by introducing a small amount of netflow padding traffic into the network. This meant that the internet service providers, instead of getting timings down to the second, would get them in much larger blocks, which were useless for timing attacks. In our metaphor from previous chapters, netflow padding makes the difference between an attentive neighbor who records exactly when our agent leaves their flat to meet their source—at 2:32pm—and one who can only see that they left sometime in the afternoon.
> Tor’s three main cultural worlds—the engineers, the maintainers, and the activists—remain rooted in the long-standing traditions and ideas that have shaped the internet. . . .
> in the engineer’s perspective—is for Tor to dissolve into the bloodstream of the internet like a drug, flowing with the other protocols and standards that underpin our digital lives. [The author speaks of it being included in Private browsing mode in Brave and struggles to get it included in Firefox, standardization to be included in core protocols that route traffic on the internet, and finally 'beefing up its threat model to include the kinds of global attacks'] . . .
> For the maintainers, though increasingly united in a more communal, professionalized culture, the focus remains on the pragmatics of the infrastructure and keeping things running. [The author speaks of a web3 integrating cryptocurrencies/NFTs/the block chain at large into the design of Tor due to some "killer app" that runs on the network in the near future.] ... If Tor were incorporated into the backbone of the NFT market (or indeed, any other major digital infrastructure), it would pose immediate practical challenges for the Tor network. The additional load and congestion would increase the material and cultural power of the relay operators, as they would become key to scaling up to deal with the new challenges of scale. If it became the foundation of higher-level mass-use infrastructure, Tor’s more neutral or neutralized maintainer perspective could be revived; the wide variety of use cases, political diversity, and pragmatic challenges would make overt alignment with political causes far more difficult. . .
> An alternative future would see Tor take the opposite approach—engaging even more prominently in political battles and embodying the ideas and practices of Tor’s relatively newly ascendant activist world. In this vision, Tor would become further connected with social movements and human rights struggles—either internally, through statements of values and organizational practice, or externally, through directly joining coalitions with activist groups and putting Tor’s technologies front and center in aligning online privacy with other social justice campaigns.
1. We advance human rights by creating and deploying usable anonymity and privacy technologies.
2. Open and transparent research and tools are key to our success.
3. Our tools are free to access, use, adapt, and distribute.
4. We make Tor and related technologies ubiquitous through advocacy and education.
5. We are honest about the capabilities and limits of Tor and related technologies.
6. We will never intentionally harm our users.
Tor Social Contract (condensed), August 2016