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Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. Has Undermined Peace in the Middle East
Winner of the 2014 Lionel Trilling Book AwardAn examination of the failure of the United States as a broker in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, through three key historical moments For more than seven decades the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people has raged on with no end in sight, and for much of that time, the United States has been involved as a mediator in the conflict. In this book, acclaimed historian Rashid Khalidi zeroes in on the United States’s role as the purported impartial broker in this failed peace process. Khalidi closely analyzes three historical moments that illuminate how the United States’ involvement has, in fact, thwarted progress toward peace between Israel and Palestine. The first moment he investigates is the “Reagan Plan” of 1982, when Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin refused to accept the Reagan administration’s proposal to reframe the Camp David Accords more impartially. The second moment covers the period after the Madrid Peace Conference, from 1991 to 1993, during which negotiations between Israel and Palestine were brokered by the United States until the signing of the secretly negotiated Oslo accords. Finally, Khalidi takes on President Barack Obama’s retreat from plans to insist on halting the settlements in the West Bank. Through in-depth research into and keen analysis of these three moments, as well as his own firsthand experience as an advisor to the Palestinian delegation at the 1991 pre–Oslo negotiations in Washington, DC, Khalidi reveals how the United States and Israel have actively colluded to prevent a Palestinian state and resolve the situation in Israel’s favor. Brokers of Deceit bares the truth about why peace in the Middle East has been impossible to for decades, US policymakers have masqueraded as unbiased agents working to bring the two sides together, when, in fact, they have been the agents of continuing injustice, effectively preventing the difficult but essential steps needed to achieve peace in the region.
209 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2013
64 people are currently reading
1767 people want to read
About the author
Rashid Khalidi
27 books935 followersRashid Ismail Khalidi (Arabic: رشيد إسماعيل خالدي; born 18 November 1948) is a Palestinian-American historian of the Middle East and the Edward Said Professor Emeritus of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University. He served as editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies from 2002 until 2020, when he became co-editor with Sherene Seikaly.
He has authored a number of books, including The Hundred Years' War on Palestine and Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness; has served as president of the Middle East Studies Association; and has taught at the Lebanese University, the American University of Beirut, Georgetown University, and the University of Chicago.
For his work on the Middle East, Professor Khalidi has received fellowships and grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the American Research Center in Egypt, and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others.
In October 2010, Khalidi delivered the annual Edward Said memorial lecture at the Palestine Center in Washington. He is the Edward Said Professor Emeritus of Modern Arab Studies at Colombia University. On October 8, 2024, Khalidi retired from Columbia University citing the university's crackdown on pro-Palestinian student protests, which he had vocally supported, and the transformation of the university into a "hedge fund-cum-real estate operation, with a minor sideline in education" as reasons for his retirement.
He has authored a number of books, including The Hundred Years' War on Palestine and Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness; has served as president of the Middle East Studies Association; and has taught at the Lebanese University, the American University of Beirut, Georgetown University, and the University of Chicago.
For his work on the Middle East, Professor Khalidi has received fellowships and grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the American Research Center in Egypt, and the Rockefeller Foundation, among others.
In October 2010, Khalidi delivered the annual Edward Said memorial lecture at the Palestine Center in Washington. He is the Edward Said Professor Emeritus of Modern Arab Studies at Colombia University. On October 8, 2024, Khalidi retired from Columbia University citing the university's crackdown on pro-Palestinian student protests, which he had vocally supported, and the transformation of the university into a "hedge fund-cum-real estate operation, with a minor sideline in education" as reasons for his retirement.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
April 8, 2015
The Israeli / Palestinian conflict is always in the newspapers and the US always supports Israel. I figured it couldn't be this black and white. After reading "Lawrence in Arabia" I wanted to read more about the Balfour Declaration and the origins of Israel. After some research, I turned to Rashid Khalidi for another point of view and how different it is. Khalidi is a Palestinian-Lebanese American historian of the Middle East, the Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, and director of the Middle East Institute of Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs. He also is known for serving as editor of the scholarly journal Journal of Palestine Studies. I read "the Iron Cage," "Brokers of Deceit,' Resurrecting Empire" and "Sowing Crisis." Each was meticulously researched and heavily footnoted. The footnotes led me to other books by other authors.
Conclusion: Britain and the US have been screwing the Palestinians since they first set foot in the Middle East and we continue to do so today. The US media shows only one side of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and censors anyone who objects. Consider Rula Jabreal, a Palestinian raised in Jerusalem, a acclaimed journalist and a frequent guest on TV news shows until she challenged Bill Mahr's always mean-spirited criticism of her religion and until she pointed out to Chris Hayes MSNBC's biased coverage. She has since disappeared from TV in favor of less critical spokespeople.
Censorship is dangerous. Self-censorship is crazy. Break out of the "Exodus" view of history; read other points of view; draw your own conclusions.
Conclusion: Britain and the US have been screwing the Palestinians since they first set foot in the Middle East and we continue to do so today. The US media shows only one side of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and censors anyone who objects. Consider Rula Jabreal, a Palestinian raised in Jerusalem, a acclaimed journalist and a frequent guest on TV news shows until she challenged Bill Mahr's always mean-spirited criticism of her religion and until she pointed out to Chris Hayes MSNBC's biased coverage. She has since disappeared from TV in favor of less critical spokespeople.
Censorship is dangerous. Self-censorship is crazy. Break out of the "Exodus" view of history; read other points of view; draw your own conclusions.
March 24, 2024
Short but dense book providing a fairly high-level summary of the USA's involvement in the Middle East, specifically regarding Israel and Palestine. I do think the author does a good job showing how the USA has acted more like "Israel's lawyer" than as the supposed neutral brokers of peace they like to position themselves as. I wouldn't say this is a great starting point for those wanting to know more about the history of Israel/Palestine, as the focus is definitely on the USA's involvement in the various "peace talks" over the years. I do think this is worth the read for an additional perspective on a deceptively large factor it the conflict and player on the field.
October 27, 2023
I'm reading books from both sides in a better attempt to understand the tragic conflict. This is an extremely useful breakdown (and the footnotes are great) of how American policy has echoed the hard-line stance of Israel for decades -- refusing to acknowledge the Palestinian people or the need for a state. I appreciated that Khalidi was honest about his biases and the limitations of his book and he does usefully point us to several balanced studies in the footnotes. Having said all that, there are unanswered questions I have -- vital whys that this book doesn't quite answer:
1. If Reagan's inside men understood that you could not negotiate with Israel and Palestine without acknowledging the settlement/colonialism problem, why then did Reagan kibosh the latter point in his 1982 speech?
2. If American diplomats are incapable of reading the room (that is, the finer nuances of Israel-Palestine relationships, such as the backchannel brokering that Israel and the PLO conducted during the Oslo Accords), why were they so short-sighted? Why, for that matter, does every major American leader fail to adopt a more neutral approach? It can't just be the Israel lobby. There seems to be some fundamental briefing problem that has plagued every post-Carter diplomatic envoy. If Khalidi is so apparently eagle-eyed to discern the shortfall, why then are American diplomats so myopic?
3. Most interestingly, Khalidi notes how American political elections have kiboshed American efforts to be more neutral. Rather amazingly, the first Bush was one of the few Presidents to stand up to Israel, warning them that they would not receive aid if they carried on building settlements. Unfortunately, the 1992 election forced him to backpedal. But this DID have the side effect of Israel electing Labor Party man Yitzhak Rabin as PM. Why are such ripple effects kept out of the public eye?
4. Khalidi is very hard on Carter, claiming that he was weak during the Camp David Accords. But this was the only true peaceful gains that America ushered in during the last fifty years. Everyone knows that diplomacy takes time and results in baby steps before you get closer. And while subsequent Presidents SHOULD be condemned for failing to enforce the terms, allowing every PM from Begin onwards to carry on with what Khalidi styles the "low ceiling" of not granting Palestinian agency, why can't there be more continuity between administrations on such a delicate issue? Khalidi is sharp enough to point out that both Israel and Palestine have been very impatient with the snaillike pace of diplomacy (even as he rightly criticizes the five year diplomacy window during the 1990s in which nothing much happened). But he seems to be equally impatient with Carter.
Nevertheless, I am very grateful to Khalidi for getting me to consider these questions. To say the least, this is not an easy topic. But this book is an important volume to help consider the history.
1. If Reagan's inside men understood that you could not negotiate with Israel and Palestine without acknowledging the settlement/colonialism problem, why then did Reagan kibosh the latter point in his 1982 speech?
2. If American diplomats are incapable of reading the room (that is, the finer nuances of Israel-Palestine relationships, such as the backchannel brokering that Israel and the PLO conducted during the Oslo Accords), why were they so short-sighted? Why, for that matter, does every major American leader fail to adopt a more neutral approach? It can't just be the Israel lobby. There seems to be some fundamental briefing problem that has plagued every post-Carter diplomatic envoy. If Khalidi is so apparently eagle-eyed to discern the shortfall, why then are American diplomats so myopic?
3. Most interestingly, Khalidi notes how American political elections have kiboshed American efforts to be more neutral. Rather amazingly, the first Bush was one of the few Presidents to stand up to Israel, warning them that they would not receive aid if they carried on building settlements. Unfortunately, the 1992 election forced him to backpedal. But this DID have the side effect of Israel electing Labor Party man Yitzhak Rabin as PM. Why are such ripple effects kept out of the public eye?
4. Khalidi is very hard on Carter, claiming that he was weak during the Camp David Accords. But this was the only true peaceful gains that America ushered in during the last fifty years. Everyone knows that diplomacy takes time and results in baby steps before you get closer. And while subsequent Presidents SHOULD be condemned for failing to enforce the terms, allowing every PM from Begin onwards to carry on with what Khalidi styles the "low ceiling" of not granting Palestinian agency, why can't there be more continuity between administrations on such a delicate issue? Khalidi is sharp enough to point out that both Israel and Palestine have been very impatient with the snaillike pace of diplomacy (even as he rightly criticizes the five year diplomacy window during the 1990s in which nothing much happened). But he seems to be equally impatient with Carter.
Nevertheless, I am very grateful to Khalidi for getting me to consider these questions. To say the least, this is not an easy topic. But this book is an important volume to help consider the history.
May 4, 2014
There is little that we don't know in this book about the Israel-Palestine topic. Khalidi reveals, like many others before him, how the US has contributed to the imposition of Israel's cruel regime on the Palestinians and how closely entwined have US and Israeli policies been. So closely, in fact, that they should have long now disqualified the US from playing any intermediary role in this farcical "peace process". There is some new information from declassified documents that is interesting and contributes to what we know as well as some good reflection on the long-term problems of the Palestinian leadership and they ways they have deal with the issue during the Oslo Accords. What IS new and worth mentioning, however, is the emphasis on language and how, as the author notes, in the US discourse about the issue, lies about the Palestinians have been made to sound truthful and crimes against humanity are made respectable. A worthy read, especially if you have any illusions that the US has been playing the role of an honest broker in the conflict (although, interestingly, as the book shows, there were moments during which they tried).
April 6, 2014
This book went over the Palestinian/Israeli negotiations that occurred during the Reagan, Bush/Clinton, and Obama presidencies. The analysis of the process was informative, but without prior knowledge of the different peace processes and the background of events at those times, it was hard to engage in the book. As a person in my 20s, I was only politically aware during the final negotiation process covered in the book. The prior knowledge I had made a huge difference in the value I gained from the process during Obama’s presidency versus the prior presidencies. I think this book is valuable as a tool to gain additional insight into the peace process, but is best read after gaining some background on the Israeli/Palestinian situation at the time of the negotiations.
April 15, 2014
* Disclosure-This was a book won through the Goodreads Giveaway*
Although I had read a few books and articles on the subject, my still feeble understanding became less so after reading this one. Well written book with the author presenting many convincing arguments about how the US has been influential in a political process in which peace remains elusive in the Middle East. There were a few places where I had to put my wading boots on to slog through but for the most part a very informative/interesting read.
*Review from my father, Paul F. Hosman, who read the book
"The author builds a strong case for US Policy being strongly supportive of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians-both before May 14, 1948 when Israel was created by the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine and their Declaration of Independence on the same day, and through all the subsequent years up to the present.
He points out that it was not in the best interests of the Palestinians, the US or the Israelis or the rest of the world.
The US has been accepted as an honest peace broker in virtually all the negotiations between the disputing parties during this time. And yet as the author makes clear, one hs to wonder why the world accepted the US in that role.
He Illustrates and stresses the ambiguous language used intentionally that enabled US national leaders (including Presidents) to interpret agreements to their own advantage and to advantage one party and disadvantage the other party to the agreements and the world. Instead of solving global problems, it led to perpetuation of the problems.
The events are perfect examples of how global problems cannot be solved by national agendas. Disputes between parties and attempts to broker negotiations by third nations having their own agendas does not and never will work for the short term and long term best interest of a global society."
Although I had read a few books and articles on the subject, my still feeble understanding became less so after reading this one. Well written book with the author presenting many convincing arguments about how the US has been influential in a political process in which peace remains elusive in the Middle East. There were a few places where I had to put my wading boots on to slog through but for the most part a very informative/interesting read.
*Review from my father, Paul F. Hosman, who read the book
"The author builds a strong case for US Policy being strongly supportive of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians-both before May 14, 1948 when Israel was created by the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine and their Declaration of Independence on the same day, and through all the subsequent years up to the present.
He points out that it was not in the best interests of the Palestinians, the US or the Israelis or the rest of the world.
The US has been accepted as an honest peace broker in virtually all the negotiations between the disputing parties during this time. And yet as the author makes clear, one hs to wonder why the world accepted the US in that role.
He Illustrates and stresses the ambiguous language used intentionally that enabled US national leaders (including Presidents) to interpret agreements to their own advantage and to advantage one party and disadvantage the other party to the agreements and the world. Instead of solving global problems, it led to perpetuation of the problems.
The events are perfect examples of how global problems cannot be solved by national agendas. Disputes between parties and attempts to broker negotiations by third nations having their own agendas does not and never will work for the short term and long term best interest of a global society."
April 29, 2015
First things first: the Middle East (ME) is a complicated place. Regardless of the root causes of the complicated set of relations and powerplays, there is an undeniable, concrete fact on the ground: a people is oppressed on a daily basis by another with constant practices including phosphore bombing, humiliation, deprivation and the like.
Secondly, Khalidi is a professor with a broad knowledge on the ME, its history and peoples, an apt stylist of the English language, and one that I am proud to have been a student of. This is despite of the fact that he is somehow difficult to follow at times, because of his uniquely complex methodology to put things together academically. Reading him might, at times, feel like trying to find one's way in a maze.
That is precisely why, one has to possess a basic knowledge on the history of the region to place events and comments next to each other, where they belong. Hence the chronological timeline at the end of this piece with dates that come up in the book thematically to prove a point.
The thesis of the book is simple and clear: that the US is too biased to claim the right to act as an "honest broker" in its assumed role as mediator between Israel and Palestine. Underlining the black-and-white mindset of the American policy planners during the Cold War, Khalidi suggests that the collapse of the USSR changed very little, if at all, the overarching political landscape of the ME, especially in terms of the US foreign policy: Iran replaced Russia in what he describes a "mini Cold War" that ensued the Cold War. Added to the equation the American domestic political agenda highly biased towards Israel, the US should have disqualified as a mediator between the parties.
What is striking in Khalidi's handling of the US's involvement in the conflict is the terminology adopted by the US, copied verbatim from Israeli textbook. Terms like "Israeli security" (but not that of Palestine), "right to exist" (but not that of Palestine), the "peace process" (as a result of which "conflict management" replaced "conflict resolution") etc. serve the perpetuation of the constant situation. The discursive hegemony that Israel enjoys in this conflict, according to Khalidi, creates an assymmetry between the two parties and effectively disrupts the advantaged party's (and its all-too-known ally's) willingness to end the conflict and the occupation. This is Foucault at its best in describing how language and power interact, but the author fails to refer to the seminal French philosopher to my disappointment, instead suitably citing "newspeak" of Orwell. He follows on these premises through what he dubs as three fateful "moments" in the so-called process to better illustrate his point. The first moment is "Begin and Palestinian Autonomy in 1982" referring to a CIA memo that incisively read Begin's intentions not to allow any sort of jurisdiction to Palestinians, the second "The Madrid-Washington Negotiations, 1991-1993" in which Khalidi himself took part as a negotiator in Washington, the third moment "Barack Obama and Palestine 2009-2012."
Prioritizing is indeed the most important part of diplomacy. Khalidi's own evaluation of the Palestinian people's priorities include the termination (and reversal if possible) of settlements, setting a calendar for the end of occupation, full statehood for Palestine. Yet, as Khalidi puts it, all sorts of agreements reached, in the end led to a unilateral breach by Israel, which deprived Palestine of even its initial possessions (such as the Tripartite Declaration that stipulated an arms blockade to the region, whereas resulted in Israel possessing nuclear weapons, or other agreements promising a halt to the expansion of settlements, which, in the end, hardly ever implemented.)
A note on the Arab world's disregard of the plight of the Palestinians. Khalidi rightly criticizes the Arab states' destructive role in failing to force the US to seek a lasting peace, focusing more on their turf wars and profound dependence on the US due to their lack of domestic legitimacy. In his memoirs of the two Iraq wars, Richard Haass, rather to my surprise, talks extensively about Saudi Arabia's need for protection in view of a possible atrocity from the part of Saddam Hussain and how important the security of Saudi Arabia to the US. Khalidi's point coincides beautifully with that understanding, and further underlines the alignment of the Gulf states as well as Egypt with Saudi Arabia. What is more striking is that he proposes that the Palestinian Authority exceeded its best-before date, and should dissolve itself because it now serves as a cloak for the extremism of Israeli occupation.
The first moment seems to answer to the question whether the US is in a position to know better of Israeli intentions? Khalidi asserts (and rightly, according to the resource he refers to) that the CIA's assessments of Begin's intentions illustrate that the CIA knew he opted for a Palestinian autonomy on people, not territory, especially on the land which he calls "Eretz Israel", encompassing the Arab East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza. And the ceaseless Israeli expansions, it is understood, aim at disrupting the Palestinian territories, literally and figuratively serving as a blade cutting through the land.
In the second moment, the author decries Oslo Accords as a win. As a participant of the Washington part of Oslo Accords, Khalidi (à la Hobsbawm - because he is one of the makers of the history he in the end came to write as did Hobsbawm "the age of extremisms") seems to be disillusioned with the outcome, due to the fact that what the Washington party of the Palestinian team saw as non-negotiable priorities were effectively sacrified by the PLO for a nominal recognition in return. The recognition of the PLO, according to Khalidi, was something the leadership, which lost its contact with the sufferings of the Palestinians after getting ousted from Lebanon, was obsessed with. It turned out to be a grave mistake to be added to other strategic mistakes made by the PLO leadership, such as siding with Saddam in his occupation of Kuwait.
The third moment is his assessment of Obama administration's stance towards Israel and Palestine. On the other hand, he at times comes off as rather apologetic in behalf of Obama administration's continuation of four of the last five administrations' adopted policies (he uses the term "overdetermined"). Khalidi enumerates a set of reasons as to why Obama was hardly in a position tomake a difference in US foreign policy on the subject matter of the book, especially after his second year in office, due to a general lack of control in the ME, Netenyahu's win etc. He even tries to explain why Obama is not regarded as an Israel-loving president despite his unprecedented speech in 2009 at the UN General Assembly and his other favorable acts, citing his being Afro-American (therefore implying that the American far-right borders on racism,) his cool posture and character, and his lack of luck in succeeding such complicit a president as Bush Jr. Indeed, the more interesting part in this section is, in fact, examples to the Bush administration's astounding level of complicity in its alignment with Israel.
A couple of years ago, I read Beinart's "The Crisis of Zionism" and remember turning the last page with a sense of disappointment because Beinart, as apt and just as he is, comes up with three rather dry solutions for the proponents of Israel: boycott settlements, Jews please marry each other, and provide proper education to your kids. I think Khalidi is more brave and realistic in proposing solutions to this side of the dispute, and he is ready to make more concessions than Beinart in his proposals for a just solution.
It is 2 o'clock in the morning and I guess the grammatical and material mistakes I might have made writing this could be blamed on this late hour. Peace!
1917: Balfour Declaration
1945: On his way back from Yalta, FDR's meeting with Al Saud, the Saudi King in Egypt and his reassurance of the latter that the US would never act without first asking to the Arab stakeholders. (The author contrasts FDR's strategic international mindset with domestic politics-oriented Truman.)
1947: UN partition plan
1948: The Bernadotte Plan
1950: Tripartite Declaration (arms blockade, in utter disregard of which France provided Israel with the tools to build a nuke, no less)
1956: The Suez War
1967: 6 Day War (as a result of which the US saw a powerful strategic ally in Israel)
1973: The Yom Kippur War (whereby the USSR got involved as a result of continuing Israeli aggression against Egypt despite ceasefire upon Kissinger's complicity, and the world got closer than ever to a nuclear war) Khalidi suggests that Sadat's threatening actions towards Israel were a result of American-Israeli disregard for his plea of a peace.
1975: The MoU Kissinger signed with Israel guaranteeing to the latter that the US will remain servile to Israeli interests and President Ford's letter to Rabin (which guarantees once again that the US will not get involved in any process without the prior agreement of Israel)
1977: Likud wins elections for the first time (a turning point in Israeli politics that point to the beginning of a rightward shift that will eventually lead to Begin, Shamir, Sharon, and Netenyahu in an escalating manner)
1977: Anwar Sadat visits Jerusalem (which will lead to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (see below)
1978: Camp David Accords
1979: Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (that debalanced the structure in the Middle East decidedly in favor of Israel)
1982: The CIA's assessment memo on Begin's intentions (a new find)
1982: Invasion of South Lebanon by Israel (in a rather maximalist fashion)
1993: Oslo Accords (PLO recognized as an entity)
Secondly, Khalidi is a professor with a broad knowledge on the ME, its history and peoples, an apt stylist of the English language, and one that I am proud to have been a student of. This is despite of the fact that he is somehow difficult to follow at times, because of his uniquely complex methodology to put things together academically. Reading him might, at times, feel like trying to find one's way in a maze.
That is precisely why, one has to possess a basic knowledge on the history of the region to place events and comments next to each other, where they belong. Hence the chronological timeline at the end of this piece with dates that come up in the book thematically to prove a point.
The thesis of the book is simple and clear: that the US is too biased to claim the right to act as an "honest broker" in its assumed role as mediator between Israel and Palestine. Underlining the black-and-white mindset of the American policy planners during the Cold War, Khalidi suggests that the collapse of the USSR changed very little, if at all, the overarching political landscape of the ME, especially in terms of the US foreign policy: Iran replaced Russia in what he describes a "mini Cold War" that ensued the Cold War. Added to the equation the American domestic political agenda highly biased towards Israel, the US should have disqualified as a mediator between the parties.
What is striking in Khalidi's handling of the US's involvement in the conflict is the terminology adopted by the US, copied verbatim from Israeli textbook. Terms like "Israeli security" (but not that of Palestine), "right to exist" (but not that of Palestine), the "peace process" (as a result of which "conflict management" replaced "conflict resolution") etc. serve the perpetuation of the constant situation. The discursive hegemony that Israel enjoys in this conflict, according to Khalidi, creates an assymmetry between the two parties and effectively disrupts the advantaged party's (and its all-too-known ally's) willingness to end the conflict and the occupation. This is Foucault at its best in describing how language and power interact, but the author fails to refer to the seminal French philosopher to my disappointment, instead suitably citing "newspeak" of Orwell. He follows on these premises through what he dubs as three fateful "moments" in the so-called process to better illustrate his point. The first moment is "Begin and Palestinian Autonomy in 1982" referring to a CIA memo that incisively read Begin's intentions not to allow any sort of jurisdiction to Palestinians, the second "The Madrid-Washington Negotiations, 1991-1993" in which Khalidi himself took part as a negotiator in Washington, the third moment "Barack Obama and Palestine 2009-2012."
Prioritizing is indeed the most important part of diplomacy. Khalidi's own evaluation of the Palestinian people's priorities include the termination (and reversal if possible) of settlements, setting a calendar for the end of occupation, full statehood for Palestine. Yet, as Khalidi puts it, all sorts of agreements reached, in the end led to a unilateral breach by Israel, which deprived Palestine of even its initial possessions (such as the Tripartite Declaration that stipulated an arms blockade to the region, whereas resulted in Israel possessing nuclear weapons, or other agreements promising a halt to the expansion of settlements, which, in the end, hardly ever implemented.)
A note on the Arab world's disregard of the plight of the Palestinians. Khalidi rightly criticizes the Arab states' destructive role in failing to force the US to seek a lasting peace, focusing more on their turf wars and profound dependence on the US due to their lack of domestic legitimacy. In his memoirs of the two Iraq wars, Richard Haass, rather to my surprise, talks extensively about Saudi Arabia's need for protection in view of a possible atrocity from the part of Saddam Hussain and how important the security of Saudi Arabia to the US. Khalidi's point coincides beautifully with that understanding, and further underlines the alignment of the Gulf states as well as Egypt with Saudi Arabia. What is more striking is that he proposes that the Palestinian Authority exceeded its best-before date, and should dissolve itself because it now serves as a cloak for the extremism of Israeli occupation.
The first moment seems to answer to the question whether the US is in a position to know better of Israeli intentions? Khalidi asserts (and rightly, according to the resource he refers to) that the CIA's assessments of Begin's intentions illustrate that the CIA knew he opted for a Palestinian autonomy on people, not territory, especially on the land which he calls "Eretz Israel", encompassing the Arab East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza. And the ceaseless Israeli expansions, it is understood, aim at disrupting the Palestinian territories, literally and figuratively serving as a blade cutting through the land.
In the second moment, the author decries Oslo Accords as a win. As a participant of the Washington part of Oslo Accords, Khalidi (à la Hobsbawm - because he is one of the makers of the history he in the end came to write as did Hobsbawm "the age of extremisms") seems to be disillusioned with the outcome, due to the fact that what the Washington party of the Palestinian team saw as non-negotiable priorities were effectively sacrified by the PLO for a nominal recognition in return. The recognition of the PLO, according to Khalidi, was something the leadership, which lost its contact with the sufferings of the Palestinians after getting ousted from Lebanon, was obsessed with. It turned out to be a grave mistake to be added to other strategic mistakes made by the PLO leadership, such as siding with Saddam in his occupation of Kuwait.
The third moment is his assessment of Obama administration's stance towards Israel and Palestine. On the other hand, he at times comes off as rather apologetic in behalf of Obama administration's continuation of four of the last five administrations' adopted policies (he uses the term "overdetermined"). Khalidi enumerates a set of reasons as to why Obama was hardly in a position tomake a difference in US foreign policy on the subject matter of the book, especially after his second year in office, due to a general lack of control in the ME, Netenyahu's win etc. He even tries to explain why Obama is not regarded as an Israel-loving president despite his unprecedented speech in 2009 at the UN General Assembly and his other favorable acts, citing his being Afro-American (therefore implying that the American far-right borders on racism,) his cool posture and character, and his lack of luck in succeeding such complicit a president as Bush Jr. Indeed, the more interesting part in this section is, in fact, examples to the Bush administration's astounding level of complicity in its alignment with Israel.
A couple of years ago, I read Beinart's "The Crisis of Zionism" and remember turning the last page with a sense of disappointment because Beinart, as apt and just as he is, comes up with three rather dry solutions for the proponents of Israel: boycott settlements, Jews please marry each other, and provide proper education to your kids. I think Khalidi is more brave and realistic in proposing solutions to this side of the dispute, and he is ready to make more concessions than Beinart in his proposals for a just solution.
It is 2 o'clock in the morning and I guess the grammatical and material mistakes I might have made writing this could be blamed on this late hour. Peace!
1917: Balfour Declaration
1945: On his way back from Yalta, FDR's meeting with Al Saud, the Saudi King in Egypt and his reassurance of the latter that the US would never act without first asking to the Arab stakeholders. (The author contrasts FDR's strategic international mindset with domestic politics-oriented Truman.)
1947: UN partition plan
1948: The Bernadotte Plan
1950: Tripartite Declaration (arms blockade, in utter disregard of which France provided Israel with the tools to build a nuke, no less)
1956: The Suez War
1967: 6 Day War (as a result of which the US saw a powerful strategic ally in Israel)
1973: The Yom Kippur War (whereby the USSR got involved as a result of continuing Israeli aggression against Egypt despite ceasefire upon Kissinger's complicity, and the world got closer than ever to a nuclear war) Khalidi suggests that Sadat's threatening actions towards Israel were a result of American-Israeli disregard for his plea of a peace.
1975: The MoU Kissinger signed with Israel guaranteeing to the latter that the US will remain servile to Israeli interests and President Ford's letter to Rabin (which guarantees once again that the US will not get involved in any process without the prior agreement of Israel)
1977: Likud wins elections for the first time (a turning point in Israeli politics that point to the beginning of a rightward shift that will eventually lead to Begin, Shamir, Sharon, and Netenyahu in an escalating manner)
1977: Anwar Sadat visits Jerusalem (which will lead to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (see below)
1978: Camp David Accords
1979: Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (that debalanced the structure in the Middle East decidedly in favor of Israel)
1982: The CIA's assessment memo on Begin's intentions (a new find)
1982: Invasion of South Lebanon by Israel (in a rather maximalist fashion)
1993: Oslo Accords (PLO recognized as an entity)
January 24, 2019
Though not a beginner's guide to the Israel/Palestine conflict, Rashid Khalidi nevertheless gives an excellent insider's analysis of the so-called peace process starting in 1978 with the Camp David, Madrid, and Oslo negotiations. These negotiations have not achieved peace and resolution because, as he has argued throughout the book, honest peace and compromise (not to mention adhering to UN resolutions) was not the true goal of the policy makers in the United States and in Israel (with the backing of some of the relevant leaders of Arab states). The concluding chapter gives a good overall summary of the pith of the tension in the region, factoring in the civil war in Syria and the impending war with Iran by the former alliance.
November 4, 2024
Language Matters
This book is a powerful read that outlines the use and misuse of language through the peace talks concerning Palestine and Israel. It has well documented citations, and an honest approach. I appreciate Rashid Khalidi’s writing because he also does not skip over critiques of leadership of the Palestinians. If you are looking for a further understanding on the conflict in Palestine, some books that overview the history of Palestine are mandatory reading before you read this book (Edward Saids Question of Palestine, Rashid Khalidi’s Hundred Years’ War on Palestine)
This book is a powerful read that outlines the use and misuse of language through the peace talks concerning Palestine and Israel. It has well documented citations, and an honest approach. I appreciate Rashid Khalidi’s writing because he also does not skip over critiques of leadership of the Palestinians. If you are looking for a further understanding on the conflict in Palestine, some books that overview the history of Palestine are mandatory reading before you read this book (Edward Saids Question of Palestine, Rashid Khalidi’s Hundred Years’ War on Palestine)
July 7, 2024
While President George Washington has serious controversies concerning how he "dealt" with Native Americans or that he participated in slavery, Khalidi's usage of Washington's 1796 Farewell Address matched well for this books narrative. President Washington wrote, "a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification."
Every U.S. President since Truman has essentially given Israel a blank check in support for Israel. Israel's interests has been manipulated into becoming our own national interests. From international politics into our domestic politics and fears of insecurity for example. As Khalidi argues, the U.S. has never been an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians, not even in the so call "peace process."
Every U.S. President since Truman has essentially given Israel a blank check in support for Israel. Israel's interests has been manipulated into becoming our own national interests. From international politics into our domestic politics and fears of insecurity for example. As Khalidi argues, the U.S. has never been an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians, not even in the so call "peace process."
January 15, 2020
I came across this book when looking for a summary on the US’s involvement in the Middle East and the title caught my attention.
This book goes through 40yrs of the history between the IS, Israel, and Palestine. Through analysis of three or four key moments the author lays out how the US has never acted as the unbiased mediator that is publicly portrayed but instead has acted as Israel’s lawyer in many negotiations.
By the end of the book it becomes clear that while the US is not free of blame, Palestine has also made mistakes and not always acted in their own best interest. The author lays out potential road maps to getting real peace negotiations on track, putting the responsibility on Palestine to reject the one sided accords of the past and enter into negotiations with unified and concrete demands.
This book goes through 40yrs of the history between the IS, Israel, and Palestine. Through analysis of three or four key moments the author lays out how the US has never acted as the unbiased mediator that is publicly portrayed but instead has acted as Israel’s lawyer in many negotiations.
By the end of the book it becomes clear that while the US is not free of blame, Palestine has also made mistakes and not always acted in their own best interest. The author lays out potential road maps to getting real peace negotiations on track, putting the responsibility on Palestine to reject the one sided accords of the past and enter into negotiations with unified and concrete demands.
July 3, 2019
I really do want to learn more about this apparent continuous struggle . Rahid Khalidi does explain many things about this issue from his perspective. I can understand that. My complaint, I still really do not understand the history of the issue. I really, really do wish 'we' knew what in the world is going on, why, and what is the history that has brought us to this point. This book does explain the American basic involvement and how we have helped or hurt. Well worth the read.
December 25, 2025
I listened to this book on audible. Very informative. A book well worth the time. This is my twenty first book on Palestine, Israel, the middle east, so I already knew much about the subject Rashid Khalidi covered in this book. I also read his Hundred Years War on Palestine some years ago. I recommend this book to get a view of the politics keeping the middle east turmoil going. The American bad intentions and the Israeli control and objective.
March 16, 2025
As always , Rashid Khalidi gives another great insight into the Palestinian case and explains the role that US has played in aiding Israel oppressing Palestinian and prevent them from getting their independence. If you really want to understand the Palestinian situation, read Rashid Khalidi books and you’ll be amazed
April 20, 2025
I was incredibly impressed with Rashid Khalidi when I attended a talk he game in 2002. I was rather disappointed by this book because instead of offering hope and self criticism as he did in 2002, it was mostly a combination of hopelessness and grievances and virtually lacking of self criticism. I will reread it again but, the first read left me disappointed.
May 27, 2025
When people talk about how the US is complicit in Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians, they have no idea about their degree of implication. This book shows how bad it really is and how long it’s been going on. Would love to see an updated edition with the events that have occurred since the Obama administration. 4/5
May 30, 2025
Brokers of Deceit is a short but dense book about how the US has failed the Palestinian people. My favorite part was the recurring theme of the power of language: in the context of the Middle East, who defines words like terrorism and safety, and why does that matter?
The book is already more than ten years old, but still relevant.
The book is already more than ten years old, but still relevant.
Read
July 30, 2020Interesting background behind the Israeli and Palestinian situation. One must keep in mind the view point of the author but many points made by him seem acceptable. There is no easy solution and it is becoming more difficult has the years go by.
November 25, 2018
Rashid Khalidi did succeed in showing how Political language is designed to lie and how political crimes are considered noble.
Read
February 5, 2024Too dense and doesn't give me enough back history. DNFed after the very long introduction.
June 4, 2024
At this point, hardly revelatory, but full of important detail and incredibly depressing nonetheless.
January 25, 2016
Overall Khalidi proved his point well throughout the book that the U.S. has been biased in its position as an "honest broker" between Israel and Palestine and has therefore been an impediment to peace instead of a help. I had some issues with points in his argument and limiting the scope of such a complex issue necessitates leaving a great deal out. However his thesis was clear and he argued it well. I particularly think his conclusion was well articulated and his thoughts on how peace could and should be reached had the ring of practicality and fairness to it.
April 6, 2014
Very difficult book to read as the author makes a case for US seeing Middle East through Cold War eyes and not being an 'honest broker' in the Middle East process. He does also blame other Arab states from not helping make the Palestinian case but one can feel the despair and rage about the conversation about US.
April 11, 2016
Of the books we read in Arab Israeli conflict, this one was by far the most fair and the most honest. Khalidi, unlike many writers, doesn't try to pretend that he is unbiased. Instead, he makes it clear to the reader how involved he has been and what his beliefs are, without attacking the opponents on anything except policy.
August 25, 2013
The title says it all. Instead of being honest, non-biased mediators, the US has been in effect, "Israel's lawyer" (words are Henry Kissinger's), ensuring that the endless futile negotiations, falsely described as a "peace process" go on and on without result and without end.
April 30, 2013
A very interesting and well written book.
I really enjoyed reading it.
I really enjoyed reading it.
Read
July 18, 2014956.053 K451 2013
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