What do you think?
Rate this book
Hyökkäys - Venäjän verinen sota ja Ukrainan selviytymistaistelu
The Guardianin kirjeenvaihtajana Ukrainassa työskennellyt bestseller-tietokirjailija Luke Harding analysoi Hyökkäys -kirjassaan tarkasti Ukrainan sodan seurauksia Ukrainalle, Venäjälle ja koko maailmalle. Hardingin aiempi teos Venäjän vakoojaverkosto oli yksi myydyimmistä tietokirjoista Suomessa vuonna 2021.
Harding kirjoittaa ajasta ennen hyökkäyksen alkua, ensimmäisistä sokin täyttämistä kuukausista, surusta ja sodan julmasta todellisuudesta. Kirja sisältää ennen kuulemattomia tarinoita uutisotsikoiden takaa ja käy läpi kahden hyvin erilaisen johtajan, Volodymyr Zelenskyin ja Vladimir Putinin, taustat. Putinin pimeistä päämääristä jo aiemmissa kirjoissaan varoittanut Harding avaa nyt Putinin sotastrategiaan johtaneet syyt. Lisäksi hän käsittelee sodan seurauksia, joista yksi on Suomen hakemus Naton jäsenmaaksi.
Teos on väkevä kuvaus Euroopan laajimmasta aseellisesta konfliktista toisen maailmansodan jälkeen. Taistelukenttä ulottuu maalta merelle ja taivaalle ja on sisältänyt niin Mariupolin ja Butšan julmuudet kuin Hersonin ja Donbasin etulinjat. Sodan mainingit kantautuvat voimakkaina Ukrainan ja Venäjän rajojen ulkopuolelle, ja onkin tärkeää ymmärtää, miten tilanne Ukrainan etulinjassa vaikuttaa meihin kaikkiin.
Harding kirjoittaa ajasta ennen hyökkäyksen alkua, ensimmäisistä sokin täyttämistä kuukausista, surusta ja sodan julmasta todellisuudesta. Kirja sisältää ennen kuulemattomia tarinoita uutisotsikoiden takaa ja käy läpi kahden hyvin erilaisen johtajan, Volodymyr Zelenskyin ja Vladimir Putinin, taustat. Putinin pimeistä päämääristä jo aiemmissa kirjoissaan varoittanut Harding avaa nyt Putinin sotastrategiaan johtaneet syyt. Lisäksi hän käsittelee sodan seurauksia, joista yksi on Suomen hakemus Naton jäsenmaaksi.
Teos on väkevä kuvaus Euroopan laajimmasta aseellisesta konfliktista toisen maailmansodan jälkeen. Taistelukenttä ulottuu maalta merelle ja taivaalle ja on sisältänyt niin Mariupolin ja Butšan julmuudet kuin Hersonin ja Donbasin etulinjat. Sodan mainingit kantautuvat voimakkaina Ukrainan ja Venäjän rajojen ulkopuolelle, ja onkin tärkeää ymmärtää, miten tilanne Ukrainan etulinjassa vaikuttaa meihin kaikkiin.
370 pages, Paperback
First published November 29, 2022
133 people are currently reading
2953 people want to read
About the author
Luke Harding
42 books322 followersLuke Daniel Harding is a British journalist working as a foreign correspondent for The Guardian. He was the correspondent of The Guardian in Russia from 2007 until, returning from a stay in the UK on February 5, 2011, he was refused re-entry to Russia and deported back the same day. The Guardian said his expulsion was linked with his critical articles on Russia, while Russia's foreign ministry said that an extended certificate of foreign correspondence was not obtained in time. After the reversal of the decision on February 9 and the granting of a short-term visa, Harding chose not to seek a further visa extension.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 120 reviews
June 18, 2023
There was hesitation in my approaching this. I’d read and been disappointed by his Collusion about Trump and Putin. This however wasn’t grounded in speculation and the circumstantial. This is compelling journalism.
It begins just before the invasion with the author dining with the Ukrainian author Andrey Kurkov. This explores the backstory and the war in the Donbas which began in 2014. The next section details Zelensky that unlikely hero. The most compelling sections describe the destruction of Mariupol.
The author asks analysts how the world’s second largest military could be halted so decisively. Many point to the nature of Planet Putin, how it is a vertical model. Decisions are made inefficiently and often with incomplete information. Conversely expertise and materiel appear to be abundant on the Ukrainian side, though one has to ponder the human cost, the inevitable attrition of such a slugfest.
It begins just before the invasion with the author dining with the Ukrainian author Andrey Kurkov. This explores the backstory and the war in the Donbas which began in 2014. The next section details Zelensky that unlikely hero. The most compelling sections describe the destruction of Mariupol.
The author asks analysts how the world’s second largest military could be halted so decisively. Many point to the nature of Planet Putin, how it is a vertical model. Decisions are made inefficiently and often with incomplete information. Conversely expertise and materiel appear to be abundant on the Ukrainian side, though one has to ponder the human cost, the inevitable attrition of such a slugfest.
March 18, 2023
Reviews that describe Invasion as reportage cobbled into a book are not telling the truth. Of course, Harding is a journalist and journalism informs the book, how could that be otherwise? News becomes history. And yes, this book includes many events that are well-known, but these are the events that will become nodes in the future for more elaborate networks of historical analysis.
Invasion is far more than second hand reporting. Harding has a long connection with Ukraine-Russia and the book offers numerous first-hand viewpoints, from novelists such as Kurkov in Kyiv to people on the streets of Kherson and Mariupol. Harding relates events from the start of the "special operation" to the gathering of NATO forces. The book is not up-to-date, but it does a first-rate job in analysing, describing, and weighing up the circumstances leading to Putin's barbaric war.
In an astute review of Invasion, The Guardian's reviewer recalls the singular viewpoint that shaped the Washington Post: journalism is the first-rough draft of history. This book is more than a rough-draft. Harding writes elegantly, with a novelist's eye, and captures the gathering storm as perceived by ordinary people that have no desire to be part of Russia's homogenous proletariat. It is a book that ought to be read.
Invasion is far more than second hand reporting. Harding has a long connection with Ukraine-Russia and the book offers numerous first-hand viewpoints, from novelists such as Kurkov in Kyiv to people on the streets of Kherson and Mariupol. Harding relates events from the start of the "special operation" to the gathering of NATO forces. The book is not up-to-date, but it does a first-rate job in analysing, describing, and weighing up the circumstances leading to Putin's barbaric war.
In an astute review of Invasion, The Guardian's reviewer recalls the singular viewpoint that shaped the Washington Post: journalism is the first-rough draft of history. This book is more than a rough-draft. Harding writes elegantly, with a novelist's eye, and captures the gathering storm as perceived by ordinary people that have no desire to be part of Russia's homogenous proletariat. It is a book that ought to be read.
March 26, 2023
The book's title, Invasion: Russia's Bloody War and Ukraine's Fight for Survival, explains Putin's failure to tramp down Ukraine: in Luke Harding's words, Russians are fighting for washing machines, Ukrainians are defending their country. Delusional Putin, whose inner circle has been shrinking for years, bid on the false premise that the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine would greet the Russians as liberators. Luke Harding's interviews on the spot during the war - and sometimes on the frontline - showed that Ukrainians are one, no matter what language they speak. (here go my reflections) All citizens of Ukraine identify themselves as Ukrainians, and the Ukrainian authorities, however corrupt, played a part in strengthening the bond, firstly by issuing Ukrainian passports to everybody after the collapse of the USSR. In my Estonia, national tensions run high because of the mutual distrust between the Russian-speaking citizens, who identify themselves as Russians (but different from Russia's Russians), and the Estonian government, fearing the fifth column in case of any conflict. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians had to take an exam in Estonian to get Estonian citizenship; some were left with 'alien' passports (meaning they did not belong to any country). Despite the current war, the older generation, born or raised in the USSR, still lives in the Russian media's information sphere, tech-savvy of them finding ways to watch or read the news via VPN. This year, Estonian Centre Party, as always, played the 'Russian card' during its election campaign, while other parties abandoned any pretense of appealing to Russian speakers, putting forward slogans like 'Save Estonia' and establishing charity organizations to save the Estonian language. The last year's law to make the Estonian language dominant in Russian schools by 2030, thus assimilating, not integrating local Russians, didn't help establish a mutual understanding. At the same time, due to the Russian population's general disinterest in politics and disunity, amplified by the generational (read: worldview) gap, Estonian politics becomes more nationalistic yearly. The problem between the majority and the minority still exists. If the peace persists, the problem will be dissolved naturally when the younger generation of Russians start to name themselves Estonians.
If Luke Harding's book had been the first I read on Ukraine, it would have gotten four stars. The two books complement each other: Owen Matthews's more academic approach in his book Overreach and Harding's journalistic enthusiasm. They also touch on different topics and debunk various myths the Russian media presents. For example, Owen Matthews talks at length about Bucha and Mariupol; Luke Harding explains the situation around the Snake Island's defenders (if they surrendered or not). In Owen Matthews's book, the whole chapter is dedicated to Russia's financial losses because of the war; Luke Harding lists the logistical problems of the Russian military in Ukraine.
At the end of the day, I can recommend both books. They differ, yet they illuminate the war, Ukraine's plight, and Russia's downfalls in engaging straightforward language.
(I listened to an audiobook.)
If Luke Harding's book had been the first I read on Ukraine, it would have gotten four stars. The two books complement each other: Owen Matthews's more academic approach in his book Overreach and Harding's journalistic enthusiasm. They also touch on different topics and debunk various myths the Russian media presents. For example, Owen Matthews talks at length about Bucha and Mariupol; Luke Harding explains the situation around the Snake Island's defenders (if they surrendered or not). In Owen Matthews's book, the whole chapter is dedicated to Russia's financial losses because of the war; Luke Harding lists the logistical problems of the Russian military in Ukraine.
At the end of the day, I can recommend both books. They differ, yet they illuminate the war, Ukraine's plight, and Russia's downfalls in engaging straightforward language.
(I listened to an audiobook.)
December 2, 2022
A compelling, urgent & detailed account of Putins atrocities.
June 23, 2023
“Never think that war, no matter how necessary, nor how justified, is not a crime.” - Ernest Hemingway
22 Feb 22 recorded the highest number of weddings in so many countries round the globe. Popularly called as “Lucky Twosday”, expecting parents thronged gynaecologists for planning their babies’ delivery on this Tuesday. However, Putin and his friends had other plans for the Lucky Twosday: To wage a war against Ukraine. Luke Harding so poignantly covers what happened before and after of 22/2/22.
I half-expectedly started this book with the notion that the book is all but an account of events. It was, and it was more than that. It is about how a man blinded by a belief, decides to wreck a home - in this case, Ukraine. It is about how a former TV actor-turned-President and his people, stood up to the second largest Army in the world. It is also about resilience, patriotism and the shattering of a whim that fire-power can pin down the grit of a common man.
It is more than 16 months since Russia invaded Ukraine and about 7 months since this book was published. The war still goes on. So is it relevant? Undoubtedly, yes. For the book is not a mere second-hand journalism reportage. The author explains why Putin did what he did, how he amassed and brain washed 17 year old boys to war, and how he expected the people of Ukraine to welcome his soldiers with open arms (which grossly misfired). He also explains how Zelenskyy stood his ground, the people’s love for Ukraine and what lies ahead. Both the countries have been at war since the 17th century but Luke Harding’s Invasion is significant, for Putin’s war is homogenous to Hitler’s. Genocide - a word that can be associated with both.
22 Feb 22 recorded the highest number of weddings in so many countries round the globe. Popularly called as “Lucky Twosday”, expecting parents thronged gynaecologists for planning their babies’ delivery on this Tuesday. However, Putin and his friends had other plans for the Lucky Twosday: To wage a war against Ukraine. Luke Harding so poignantly covers what happened before and after of 22/2/22.
I half-expectedly started this book with the notion that the book is all but an account of events. It was, and it was more than that. It is about how a man blinded by a belief, decides to wreck a home - in this case, Ukraine. It is about how a former TV actor-turned-President and his people, stood up to the second largest Army in the world. It is also about resilience, patriotism and the shattering of a whim that fire-power can pin down the grit of a common man.
It is more than 16 months since Russia invaded Ukraine and about 7 months since this book was published. The war still goes on. So is it relevant? Undoubtedly, yes. For the book is not a mere second-hand journalism reportage. The author explains why Putin did what he did, how he amassed and brain washed 17 year old boys to war, and how he expected the people of Ukraine to welcome his soldiers with open arms (which grossly misfired). He also explains how Zelenskyy stood his ground, the people’s love for Ukraine and what lies ahead. Both the countries have been at war since the 17th century but Luke Harding’s Invasion is significant, for Putin’s war is homogenous to Hitler’s. Genocide - a word that can be associated with both.
October 21, 2023
Having lived in Ukraine for 50 years, it has always been interesting to me how foreigners view our country from their perspective.
Ukraine has transformed from an almost unknown post-Soviet country to one that has been on the front pages of the international press for the last 1.5 years.
Our victory depends entirely on the support of our Western partners, so it is crucial to understand what our unjust and unfortunate war looks like from the perspective of foreign authors.
The advantage of Luke Harding is that he has been in the country all along, writing his articles for the Guardian on different pages of the war.
I think the material is very structured and objective.
Looks like a stringing together of different articles, but has a very logical sequence and timeline.
The strongest chapter on Mariupol. It compares to Thermopylae and the details of what happened immerse you in the horror and surrealism of that war.
The personal stories are also very strong. And it is very helpful that Luke spoke personally with survivors: military and civilian.
Trying to understand the motivations and actions of all possible participants gives us a very broad perspective on how war touches everyone's life. Sometimes it destroys it, including family, friends, and cities.
This war has no meaning from a logical point of view, but it has a deep meaning because of Ukraine's historical path and its desire to be as far away from Russia as possible. And for Russia, this is an absolutely unacceptable scenario, given its politics, geography, and imperialistic plans.
For Putin, countries were either sovereign or colonies, as he said in the summer of 2022.
One chapter was devoted to Zelensky. Luke mentioned him as Churchill with Iphone.
In the whole book there was only a small critical look at Zelensky, because the last one did not believe in war and did not take any warning seriously.
For Ukrainians, this critic sounds quite modest, although the positive image of our president in the international arena helps us a lot.
Unfortunately, the internal Ukrainian affairs are not as impressive as the external ones.
And the effect of “stardust”, by which the author explains Boris Johnson's interest in Ukraine, works in reverse, attracting internal talents within our society, because in the environment of Zelensky there are such personalities as Yermak (head of the Presidential Office), Tatarov (chief of force structures) and Getmantsev (main ideologist of the tax authorities).
Of course, Ukraine has its own heroes: Valery Zaluzhny – head of the army. Mikhail Fedorov – chief of digital transformation, Ukrainian soldiers fighting for our freedom and regular Ukrainian civilians who actively participated in the victory over Russia. All these actors are described very vividly in the book by Luke Harding.
Luke tried his best to describe as many crimes as possible by Putin and his army, starting with the murders and tortures in Bucha and Mariupol and ending with:
“Putin was attempting to do something uknown to history: to steal a civil nuclear power plant from another state”.
And what I like most about the book is that he didn’t write it with swagger.
Even when he absolutely supports the idea of our victory, he mentions the dialogue with one of our experienced soldiers:
-Could Ukraine win?
-That’s a difficult question. After fifty thousand people have died, there is no victory. War is absolute madness.
Ukraine has transformed from an almost unknown post-Soviet country to one that has been on the front pages of the international press for the last 1.5 years.
Our victory depends entirely on the support of our Western partners, so it is crucial to understand what our unjust and unfortunate war looks like from the perspective of foreign authors.
The advantage of Luke Harding is that he has been in the country all along, writing his articles for the Guardian on different pages of the war.
I think the material is very structured and objective.
Looks like a stringing together of different articles, but has a very logical sequence and timeline.
The strongest chapter on Mariupol. It compares to Thermopylae and the details of what happened immerse you in the horror and surrealism of that war.
The personal stories are also very strong. And it is very helpful that Luke spoke personally with survivors: military and civilian.
Trying to understand the motivations and actions of all possible participants gives us a very broad perspective on how war touches everyone's life. Sometimes it destroys it, including family, friends, and cities.
This war has no meaning from a logical point of view, but it has a deep meaning because of Ukraine's historical path and its desire to be as far away from Russia as possible. And for Russia, this is an absolutely unacceptable scenario, given its politics, geography, and imperialistic plans.
For Putin, countries were either sovereign or colonies, as he said in the summer of 2022.
One chapter was devoted to Zelensky. Luke mentioned him as Churchill with Iphone.
In the whole book there was only a small critical look at Zelensky, because the last one did not believe in war and did not take any warning seriously.
For Ukrainians, this critic sounds quite modest, although the positive image of our president in the international arena helps us a lot.
Unfortunately, the internal Ukrainian affairs are not as impressive as the external ones.
And the effect of “stardust”, by which the author explains Boris Johnson's interest in Ukraine, works in reverse, attracting internal talents within our society, because in the environment of Zelensky there are such personalities as Yermak (head of the Presidential Office), Tatarov (chief of force structures) and Getmantsev (main ideologist of the tax authorities).
Of course, Ukraine has its own heroes: Valery Zaluzhny – head of the army. Mikhail Fedorov – chief of digital transformation, Ukrainian soldiers fighting for our freedom and regular Ukrainian civilians who actively participated in the victory over Russia. All these actors are described very vividly in the book by Luke Harding.
Luke tried his best to describe as many crimes as possible by Putin and his army, starting with the murders and tortures in Bucha and Mariupol and ending with:
“Putin was attempting to do something uknown to history: to steal a civil nuclear power plant from another state”.
And what I like most about the book is that he didn’t write it with swagger.
Even when he absolutely supports the idea of our victory, he mentions the dialogue with one of our experienced soldiers:
-Could Ukraine win?
-That’s a difficult question. After fifty thousand people have died, there is no victory. War is absolute madness.
January 9, 2023
A very thoroughly documented latest invasion of Russia into the Ukraine.
Since February 24 2022 I’ve been following the news on the war like a hawk, without missing a day. In addition to what I hear from my family and friends who are still in the Ukraine, I am piecing together the news from the world news channels including the Ukrainian, interviews and analytical streams of political and military experts and journalists.
This book has all that and much more.
Luke have been following the events since the year of 2014, he have made a countless interviews, have risked his own life many times going into an active fighting zones, into the cities shelled by Russian rockets, talking to a soldiers and civilians, who have witnessed and survived these attacks.
I would highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the war of Russia against the Ukraine, who wants to know the truth.
Since February 24 2022 I’ve been following the news on the war like a hawk, without missing a day. In addition to what I hear from my family and friends who are still in the Ukraine, I am piecing together the news from the world news channels including the Ukrainian, interviews and analytical streams of political and military experts and journalists.
This book has all that and much more.
Luke have been following the events since the year of 2014, he have made a countless interviews, have risked his own life many times going into an active fighting zones, into the cities shelled by Russian rockets, talking to a soldiers and civilians, who have witnessed and survived these attacks.
I would highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the war of Russia against the Ukraine, who wants to know the truth.
December 20, 2022
Picked good areas of the general picture from the war in Ukraine to illuminate what that country is going through. I appreciated the personal touches to tell this story.
February 19, 2023
Excellent narrative. Ukrainians are proud and patriotic, and Putin a disgusting despot. The book is an incisive nonfiction of the 2022-23 invasion.
September 4, 2023
interesting and detailed account of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and some of it 1st hand accounts of what was happening
March 14, 2025
книга хороша, доносить відносно правдиву інформацію до іноземців про велику війну в Україні, про звірства кацапів, про наші потреби тощо. Що не сподобалося: 1) дифірамби зеленському - молодець який, шо не втік, ось він нібито так змінив всю країну, що українці раптом вчинили запеклий опір кацапам (тут у автора сплутані причини і наслідки, бо це опір українців змінив зеленського з його какойразніцой, і він став грати роль відносно нормального президента, принаймні на початку повномасштабки). 2) пише про оборону Миколаєва і ні пів слова про ген. Марченка - людини, що її організувала. 3) раптом називає Куркова найвідомішим сучасним укр письменником (ну добре, він відомий, але аж ніяк не най); 4) дофіга цитується всякий непотріб типу подоляків і абдрістовичей, так, я розумію, що вони труться/терлися там при владі, але для мене це тупо флюгери-запроданці; 5) претензії до перекладу - думала, що вже всі знають, що правильно Велика Британія, а не Великобританія; країни Балтії, а не Прибалтика. Виявилося, що не всі. Добили мене куличі (!!!), які святили на Великдень у Святогірській лаврі. Не знаю, як в оригіналі у Гардінґа, але йбтвмть, які в сраку можуть бути в укр перекладі кулічі??
July 15, 2023
Summary of the first 6 months or so of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, including the historical context going back to the Soviet era & before. No mention of Nestor Makhno, however. This is a decent overview for someone who hasn't followed the news that closely, or who don't know the history that well, but certainly not the final word on anything. I suppose that book will have to wait until the shooting stops & archives become available (& enough scribes & copyists can be assembled from the scattered survivors of humanity). Harding talks to Ukrainian officials, ordinary citizens, soldiers, and refugees as well as to exiled Russian journalists & dissidents. I was hoping for more personal stories from ordinary people like those he talked to, but there's only so much one can get in such a small book.
February 20, 2023
I was looking for a book that captured the human cost of the war and what it is like on the frontlines today in Ukraine. While it’s pretty soon to write a book about an ongoing conflict, I was hoping that a journalist embedded in the country and the war could share interesting human stories from the frontline.
Instead, this book was mostly background on the conflict and interviews with civilians caught in the crossfire. While that was still fulfilling, I felt that as someone who has been following the news closely around the war, this book provided little new information.
If you know little about the conflict and want to know how it started and the experience of common people caught in the middle, I would still recommend this book.
Instead, this book was mostly background on the conflict and interviews with civilians caught in the crossfire. While that was still fulfilling, I felt that as someone who has been following the news closely around the war, this book provided little new information.
If you know little about the conflict and want to know how it started and the experience of common people caught in the middle, I would still recommend this book.
January 8, 2023
This book is one of the most disappointing books I’ve ever read. I was expecting it to be filled with information and insights and instead I just received a book narrative of the news. Don’t waste your money
January 8, 2023
I know everything about this war being Ukrainian, but still Luke has shaped this war for me in my head. It’s a beautifully written book which affords to see this war with journalist’s eyes.
October 14, 2023
Harrowing of course at times, but a well written account that gives plenty of essential background.
LH knows Russia intimately so you feel in safe hands.
He has interviewed many people all over the region and elsewhere and this gives the narrative depth and solidity.
LH knows Russia intimately so you feel in safe hands.
He has interviewed many people all over the region and elsewhere and this gives the narrative depth and solidity.
April 27, 2025
Як на мене дуже потрібна і хороша книга. Історичний нарис про події першого року повномасштабного вторгнення росії до України. З цитатами політиків, простих людей. З історіями життя людей. Дуже детальний покроковий опис подій в Бучі.
Зняла 1 зірочку за розділ про «хороших» росіян. Ну якось 🤮
Зняла 1 зірочку за розділ про «хороших» росіян. Ну якось 🤮
April 1, 2023
I decided to read the book just to see whether I could recommend it to my foreign friends and colleagues who would like to learn and understand what's happening in Ukraine.
I think it is a very good book for this purpose. Written by an outside obsever and a professional journalists who travelled extensively and talked to a lot of people it tells the story of the first six months of this brutal and absolutely sensless war in an easy-to-read fashion.
So, if you want to know, please read it.
My only problem with it is that it talks about "separatists" as if they were an independent entity. I really strongly prefer "proxies".
I think it is a very good book for this purpose. Written by an outside obsever and a professional journalists who travelled extensively and talked to a lot of people it tells the story of the first six months of this brutal and absolutely sensless war in an easy-to-read fashion.
So, if you want to know, please read it.
My only problem with it is that it talks about "separatists" as if they were an independent entity. I really strongly prefer "proxies".
December 5, 2022
This tail's wagging that dog. Fantastic cherry picking at its ripest. Yawnsters.
March 24, 2023
Luke Harding was a boots-on-the-ground reporter before, during, and after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 24, 2022. He had access to upper echelon Ukrainian political and military leaders and to everyday citizens and rank-and-file soldiers. Harding visited many of the war-torn towns. His nonfiction book, INVASION: The Story of Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight For Survival, is an excellent, informative report of the brutal and destructive war up to August 2022.
I hand-wrote a six-page review, but I’ll try to make this review more concise.
When Russia initially invaded, it seemed the invasion would be over quickly. Differences between the two countries proved that presumption wrong for several reasons. Russia’s military is strictly a top-down organization. Captains, majors, lieutenants, etc must wait for higher ups – often Putin himself or generals in Moscow - to give directions. Meanwhile, Ukrainians are more flexible and can take initiatives at the field level. Partly because of this and partly because Moscow tried to keep the invasion plans secret, most Russian soldiers didn’t know exactly what they were fighting for, many thought they were duped and lied to about the operation, and many just wanted to go home. The Ukrainians knew they were fighting for FREEDOM – something they take very seriously; and to protect their country and way of life.
Russia, moreover, didn’t plan their attack well. That can be seen in the logistic failures right off the bat. For some perspective, Ukraine is slightly smaller than Texas. Using Texas for geographic reference, the initial effort to capture Kyiv was like going south from Oklahoma to capture Dallas. Russia’s shock and awe plan was to travel the road in a formation four-tanks wide. Sounds intimidating. But the road narrowed in a thick forested area so the tanks and trucks had to move in single file. Then they ran out of fuel and food, and a destroyed tank or truck would stop their movement and retreat.
While the fighting is intense, it is not everywhere in Ukraine. Using Texas as a reference point again, Kyiv and the embattled town of Bucha, is located in northern Ukraine much like Dallas is in Texas. Mariupol, pretty much destroyed, is the equivalent of Galveston (but not an island) (it is a port city however). Bakhmut was in the daily news as I read the book, and based on my reading I could understand more fully what was happening. Bakhmut is on the front by the Donbas region on the far east side of Ukraine. The Donbas region is composed of two Oblasts (the size of a large county or small state), Luhansk and Donetsk. They are located in Ukraine similar to the area of Texas from Houston to Texarkana. The Mykolaiv and Kherson region is like Corpus Christi down to the Rio Grande Valley.
Down at the southern tip of Ukraine (think a mile off the mouth of the Rio Grande River near Brownsville, Texas, is a speck of an island known as Snake Island. When the Russian navy demanded the small Ukrainian force surrender, a radio man wrote back something that translates as “Russian warship, go fuck yourself.” The phrase became a national rallying cry similar to “Remember the Alamo” was to the war for Texas Independence. The phrase appears in songs, clothing, coffee cups, bumper stickers, and even on official postage stamps.
That’s enough from me. Perhaps the book was published prematurely, but it conveys much that is incomplete on daily news stories. Harding writes clearly. Highly recommended --Five Stars.
I hand-wrote a six-page review, but I’ll try to make this review more concise.
When Russia initially invaded, it seemed the invasion would be over quickly. Differences between the two countries proved that presumption wrong for several reasons. Russia’s military is strictly a top-down organization. Captains, majors, lieutenants, etc must wait for higher ups – often Putin himself or generals in Moscow - to give directions. Meanwhile, Ukrainians are more flexible and can take initiatives at the field level. Partly because of this and partly because Moscow tried to keep the invasion plans secret, most Russian soldiers didn’t know exactly what they were fighting for, many thought they were duped and lied to about the operation, and many just wanted to go home. The Ukrainians knew they were fighting for FREEDOM – something they take very seriously; and to protect their country and way of life.
Russia, moreover, didn’t plan their attack well. That can be seen in the logistic failures right off the bat. For some perspective, Ukraine is slightly smaller than Texas. Using Texas for geographic reference, the initial effort to capture Kyiv was like going south from Oklahoma to capture Dallas. Russia’s shock and awe plan was to travel the road in a formation four-tanks wide. Sounds intimidating. But the road narrowed in a thick forested area so the tanks and trucks had to move in single file. Then they ran out of fuel and food, and a destroyed tank or truck would stop their movement and retreat.
While the fighting is intense, it is not everywhere in Ukraine. Using Texas as a reference point again, Kyiv and the embattled town of Bucha, is located in northern Ukraine much like Dallas is in Texas. Mariupol, pretty much destroyed, is the equivalent of Galveston (but not an island) (it is a port city however). Bakhmut was in the daily news as I read the book, and based on my reading I could understand more fully what was happening. Bakhmut is on the front by the Donbas region on the far east side of Ukraine. The Donbas region is composed of two Oblasts (the size of a large county or small state), Luhansk and Donetsk. They are located in Ukraine similar to the area of Texas from Houston to Texarkana. The Mykolaiv and Kherson region is like Corpus Christi down to the Rio Grande Valley.
Down at the southern tip of Ukraine (think a mile off the mouth of the Rio Grande River near Brownsville, Texas, is a speck of an island known as Snake Island. When the Russian navy demanded the small Ukrainian force surrender, a radio man wrote back something that translates as “Russian warship, go fuck yourself.” The phrase became a national rallying cry similar to “Remember the Alamo” was to the war for Texas Independence. The phrase appears in songs, clothing, coffee cups, bumper stickers, and even on official postage stamps.
That’s enough from me. Perhaps the book was published prematurely, but it conveys much that is incomplete on daily news stories. Harding writes clearly. Highly recommended --Five Stars.
Read
June 27, 2023Faithful chronological record of the war that matches well with firsthand news dispatches from the warzone, including quotes from civilians affected. It's good for what it does, this is not the book for a deep historical dive or cogent analysis
October 18, 2023
Fantastic journalism, excellent writing.
December 6, 2023
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Они умеют постанывать в такт,
Имитируя страсть.
Извлекая из грязи экстракт,
Именуемый «власть».
И поэты рождают божественный бред,
Президенты бомбят города,
Чтобы тихо плодиться и тихо стареть,
Чтобы вместе и навсегда.
Вместе и навсегда.
Очень слабая книга, которая пересказывает всё то, что можно было услышать и прочитать в западной прессе в первые месяцы войны. Это удивительно, но автор не предложил в своей книге качественного и объективного обзора того, что случилось в те первые месяцы конфликта. Это особенно удивительно, если сравнить эту книгу с книгой «The Long Hangover» by Shaun Walker, чей автор также является сотрудником газеты «The Guardian». Поразительно всё же, как два журналиста из одной и той же газеты могут написать две совершенно разные книги. Я не говорю, что Shaun Walker предложил более качественный анализ, я говорю о подходе. Если Shaun Walker в своей книге The Long Hangover старался быть объективным, дав высказаться и представителем сепаратистов Донбасса, то в книге «Invasion» читать найдёт точку зрения только одной стороны – украинской (возможно, поэтому переведена на украинский только одна книга?). Так может это и правильно? Тогда чем пропагандист отличается от журналиста? Я даже больше скажу, чем условный Дмитрий Киселёв или Владимир Соловьёв отличается от Luke Harding? Мне скажут: он отличается тем, что транслирует пропаганду светлой стороны и что это «пропаганда во спасение». На войне как на войне, поэтому западные журналисты могут позволить себе быть ретрансляторами украинской президентской администрации. Такой взгляд или подход имеет право на существование, но лично я его не принимаю. Я не буду сейчас повторять тривиальные вещи, но спустя почти два года, устаёшь от пропаганды, даже от пропаганды со стороны света. Я долго верил в неё и где-то год читал о том, что российская армия состоит из одних бомжей, наркоманов и пьяниц которые не сегодня-завтра сбегут с поля боя, но время идёт, а ситуация меняется и не в лучшую сторону. Всё чаще в европейских странах на выборах побеждают партии, выступающие против военной помощи Украине, и даже США снижают обороты. Это всё создаёт сильный диссонанс с тем, что написано в книге.
Наверно самый большой минус этой книги состоит в том, что она ничего не рассказывает о том, что случилось после 24 февраля 2022 года. Если принять всё то, что пишет автор, получается очень странная историй: 24 февраля, ни с того ни с сего, российские войска перешли границу чтобы окончательно решить украинский вопрос. Как говорится в книге, русские не считают Украину государством и поэтому решили под корень истребить все, что хоть немного связано с Українська мова, жёлто-синим флагом и прочим в таком духе (звери, хули). Возникает вопрос: почему? Ну, т.е. что такое случилось с русскими, что они решили, как рассказывает нам книга, устроить геноцид украинского народа? Сидели, пили водку, слушали, как медведь играет на балалайке, а потом встали, и пошли резать украинцев от нечего делать, так что ли? Если читать эту книгу, то именно такое возникает ощущение. На самом деле автору следовало начать с самого начала – оранжевой революции и рассказать, что там случилось. Я дам слово бывшему министру обороны Украины (Anatoliy Hrytsenko), который вот как охарактеризовал жителей Донбасса:
I am not talking about the split along the East-West…. I am talking about a more bitter and more essential phenomenon that is typical for all regions—the distinction between the people and the population, between citizens and slaves.
Проблема началась с того, что лидеры оранжевой революции решили поиграть с национализмом, т.е. выяснить, кто является (настоящим) украинцем, а кто нет. Начали воевать с прошлым (включая советский красный флаг), считать, сколько погибло во время голода в Украине организованным Сталиным, пытаясь поставить его в один ряд с Холокостом и пр. Другими словами, пришедшие к власти люди занимались чем угодно, но только не развитием страны. Вот какой вывод сделала UN в своём докладе уже от 2017 года: «With the passage of time … divisions in Ukrainian society resulting from the conflict will continue to deepen and take root». Вместо того чтобы объединять две Украины, делали ровно наоборот. Как говорится, «Galicia will remain, Pridneprovie will become Galicia». Значит ли это, что я, таким образом, хочу снять всю ответственность с России, сказав, что она тут вообще не приделах? Нет, я этого не хочу сказать. Я хочу сказать, что история российско-украинского конфликта намного сложнее, чем показывает автор и что часть вины, пусть и меньшая, должна лежать и на украинской политической элите, которая решила углубить украинский западно-восточный конфликт, а также на западной элите, которая прекрасно знала, что Украина с её коррупцией, слабой демократией, отсутствием реформ и пр. ещё не скоро войдёт в ЕС и НАТО, но зачем-то продолжала настойчиво обещать, что это вот-вот случится (зля тем самым Москву). Другими словами, автор не рассказал главного: как политические элиты стравили два народа, а также два региона в рамках одной страны (Украины). Это не оправдывает российского вторжения, но это объясняет историю вопроса и того, что на самом деле случилось. Тут важно отметить, что это также не означает, что оккупированные территории хотят жить с Россией (как и Россия не очень горит желанием жить вместе с этими территориями). Как сказано в одной книге, желающих жить с Россией было где-то около 17%. Может все 17% живут как раз в ДНР и ЛНР? А может, все желающие уже переехали в РФ?
Далее что мне очень не понравилось в этой книге, это постоянно цитирование украинских политиков и чиновников. Причём автор чуть ли не жопу им целуй, такие они молодцы. Но скажите мне, кто должен был организовывать эвакуацию гражданского населения из областей, объятых войной? Почему граждане сами это делали под аккомпанемент падающих снарядов? Почему за восемь лет не было всё заминировано так, что бы ни одна армия не смогла пройти, не потеряв при этом миллион солдат? Это я говорю не про военных. Я говорю про политиков и чиновников, чья прямая обязанность - заботиться о гражданах. Но они это не сделали. Автор что-то сказал об этом? Нет. Люди выбирают политиков, которые потом назначают чиновников, среди самых умных, мудрых, профессиональных, короче тех, кто лучше всего может решить жизненно важные проблемы, как например, организовать спасение во время цунами или не допустить коллапса во время снегопада. Чиновники и политики - люди, чья задача решать вопросы, которые не может решить простой человек, который живёт в Мариуполе или Харькове. Это баба Дуся в Мелитополе может сказать, «Да я никогда бы не подумала, что Россия может вторгнуться!». Но политик и чиновник такого не может заявить. Поэтому молчание автора насчёт того «как это допустили?» и «почему не спасли?», вызывает удивление. Автор ничего не сказал, почему мирным гражданам приходилось самостоятельно выбираться из пекла войны. В этой книге всё свелось к лозунгам. Если бы я жил в каком-нибудь украинском городе, меня бы волновал вопрос, почему правительство прозевало и почему оно ничего не сделало, чтобы спасти жизни простых людей. Россия? С Россией и так всё понятно. С ней было понятно уже в 2014 году. Странно, что это оказалось полным сюрпризом для НАТО и украинского правительства.
Буча. Прошло почти 2 года, и мы видим такую новость: «Путина выдвинули на звание человека года по версии Time». 4 декабря, 2023. Честно сказать, писать-то после этой новости мне больше и нечего. Хотя нет, дополню это следующей новостью, которую я прочитал в DW: «Украинские компании и заводы и после начала войны продолжают поставлять в Россию запчасти для самолетов и вертолетов, в том числе военных, пишут "Важные истории".» 27 ноября 2023 г.
Но что мы можем знать наверняка? Что погибло очень много людей, что много разрушений. К сожалению, как показали эти два года, туман войны очень сильный и сказать, что точно произошло там-то и там-то, довольно сложно. Но стоит всё же сказать пару нелестных слов и о другой стороне конфликта, которая делает прямо противоположные заявления, мол, никто не пострадал, используется высокоточное оружие. Давайте вспомним события в Москве в 1993 году. Сколько погибло тогда людей? Как сказано в Википедии, 3—4 октября 1993 года в Москве погибло 124 человека. Вы только вдумайтесь в эту фразу! Заметим, что Москву никакая армия в эти два дня не штурмовала, не обстреливала, и что конфликт был очень локальным (в нескольких районах центра города). При этом погибло 124 человека. А теперь подумаем, может ли никто или почти никто не пострадать в городе, который штурмует армия с использованием всего доступного вооружения? Так что истории, которые рассказывают простые люди в этой книге, они правдивые и это единственное, что есть в книге ценного.
It is a poor writing book that retells everything that could be heard and read in the Western press in the early months of the war. Surprisingly, the author did not offer in his book a qualitative and objective overview of what happened in those first months of the conflict. It is especially surprising when one compares this book with "The Long Hangover" by Shaun Walker, whose author is also a contributor to The Guardian. It is amazing how two journalists from the same newspaper can write two completely different books. I'm not saying Shaun Walker offered a better analysis. What I'm talking about is the approach. If Shaun Walker tried to be objective by letting the representative of the separatists of Donbas speak out, then in the book "Invasion" you will find the point of view of only one side - the Ukrainian side (perhaps that's why only one book has been translated into Ukrainian). So maybe that's the right thing to do? Then how does a propagandist differ from a journalist? I will even say more: how does Dmitry Kiselyov or Vladimir Solovyov differ from Luke Harding? I will be told, that he is distinguished by the fact that he broadcasts propaganda of the light side and that it is "propaganda for salvation". In war as in war, Western journalists can afford to be relayers of the Ukrainian presidential administration. Such a view or approach has the right to exist, but I do not accept it. I will not repeat trivial things now, but after almost two years, you get tired of propaganda, even propaganda from the good side. I believed in it for a long time, and for about a year, I read that the Russian army consisted of only homeless people, drug addicts, and drunks who would run away from the battlefield as soon as possible, but time went by, and the situation is changing and not for the better. More and more often in European countries, the parties opposing military aid to Ukraine are winning elections, and even the USA is reducing its turnover (military aid). This all creates a strong dissonance with what is written in the book.
The biggest disadvantage of this book is that it tells nothing about what happened after February 24, 2022. If you accept everything the author writes, you get a very strange story: on February 24, out of the blue, Russian troops crossed the border to finally solve the Ukrainian question. As the book says, the Russians do not consider Ukraine to be a state and therefore decided to exterminate everything that is even slightly connected with Українська мова (Ukrainian language), yellow and blue flag, and other such things. The question arises: why? Well, i.e., what happened to the Russians that they decided, as the book tells us, to organize a genocide of the Ukrainian people? They just sat, drank vodka, listened to the bear playing the balalaika, and then got up and went to slaughter Ukrainians out of nothing to do, right? If you read this book, that's exactly the feeling you get. The author should have started from the very beginning - the Orange Revolution - and told what happened there. I will give the floor to the former Minister of Defense of Ukraine (Anatoliy Hrytsenko), who described the people of Donbas like this:
I am not talking about the split along the East-West…. I am talking about a more bitter and more essential phenomenon that is typical for all regions—the distinction between the people and the population, between citizens and slaves.
The problem started when the leaders of the Orange Revolution decided to play with nationalism, i.e., to find out who was a (real) Ukrainian and who was not. They started fighting with the past (including the Soviet red flag), counting how many died during the famine in Ukraine organized by Stalin, trying to put it on a par with the Holocaust, and so on. In other words, the people who came to power were doing anything but developing the country. Here's what UN concluded in its report from already: «With the passage of time … divisions in Ukrainian society resulting from the conflict will continue to deepen and take root». Instead of uniting the two Ukrainian societies, they did exactly the opposite. As they say, «Galicia will remain, Pridneprovie will become Galicia». Does that mean that I want to absolve Russia of all responsibility by saying that Russia had nothing to do with it? No, that's not what I'm saying. I want to say that the history of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is much more complicated than the author shows and that part of the blame, albeit less, must also lie with the Ukrainian political elite, which decided to deepen the Ukrainian West-East conflict, as well as with the Western elite, which knew perfectly well that Ukraine with its corruption, weak democracy, lack of reforms, etc. would not soon join the EU and NATO, but for some reason continued to insistently promise that it was about to happen (thus angering Moscow). In other words, the author did not tell the main story: how the political elites played off two nations as well as two regions within one country (Ukraine). This does not justify the Russian invasion, but it does explain the background and what actually happened. It's important to note here that it also doesn't mean that the occupied territories want to live with Russia (nor is Russia very eager to live together with these territories). As one book said, those who wanted to live with Russia were somewhere around 17%. Maybe all 17% live in the DNR and LNR? Or maybe all those who want to live with Russia, have already moved to Russia?
What I didn't like about this book was the constant quoting of Ukrainian politicians and officials. And the author almost kiss their ass, so they are so good. But tell me, who should have organized the evacuation of civilians from the war-torn regions? Why did the citizens do it themselves to the accompaniment of falling shells? Why, in eight years, had not everything been mined so that no army could pass through without losing a million soldiers? I'm not talking about the military. I'm talking about politicians and officials whose direct duty is to take care of citizens. But they didn't. Did the author say anything about that? No. People elect politicians, who then appoint officials among the smartest, wisest, and most professional people, in short, those who are best able to solve vital problems, like organizing a rescue during a tsunami or preventing a collapse during a snowfall. Officials and politicians are people whose task is to solve issues that cannot be solved by an ordinary person who lives in Mariupol or Kharkiv. It's the common man who can claim: "I never thought that Russia could invade!". But a politician and an official cannot say such a thing. Therefore, the author's silence about "how was it allowed?" and "why were they not rescued?" is surprising. The author did not say anything about why civilians had to get out of the hell of war on their own. Everything in this book has been reduced to slogans. If I lived in any Ukrainian city, I would be concerned about why the government overslept and why it did nothing to save the lives of ordinary people. Russia? Everything is already clear with Russia. It was clear with it already in 2014. Strangely, it came as a complete surprise to NATO and the Ukrainian government.
Bucha. Almost 2 years have passed, and we see this news: "Putin nominated as Time's Man of the Year". December 4, 2023. Frankly speaking, I have nothing more to write after this news. But no, I'll complete it with the following news, which I read in DW: "Ukrainian companies and factories continue to supply Russia with spare parts for airplanes and helicopters, including military ones, even after the war started, according to "Important Stories"." November 27, 2023.
But what can we know for sure? That a lot of people died, that there was a lot of destruction. Unfortunately, as these two years have shown, the fog of war is very thick, and it is difficult to say exactly what happened here and there. But it is still worth saying a few unflattering words about the other side of the conflict, which makes the exact opposite statement, saying that no one has been hurt and that precision weapons are being used. Let us remember the events in Moscow in 1993. How many people died then? According to Wikipedia, on October 3-4, 1993, 124 people died in Moscow. Just think about this phrase! Note that no army stormed or shelled Moscow during those two days and that the conflict was very local (in several districts of the city center). At the same time, 124 people were killed. Now let's think: can no one or almost no one be hurt in a city that is stormed by the army using all available weapons? So, the stories told by ordinary people in this book are true, and that is the only thing of value in the book.
Они умеют постанывать в такт,
Имитируя страсть.
Извлекая из грязи экстракт,
Именуемый «власть».
И поэты рождают божественный бред,
Президенты бомбят города,
Чтобы тихо плодиться и тихо стареть,
Чтобы вместе и навсегда.
Вместе и навсегда.
Очень слабая книга, которая пересказывает всё то, что можно было услышать и прочитать в западной прессе в первые месяцы войны. Это удивительно, но автор не предложил в своей книге качественного и объективного обзора того, что случилось в те первые месяцы конфликта. Это особенно удивительно, если сравнить эту книгу с книгой «The Long Hangover» by Shaun Walker, чей автор также является сотрудником газеты «The Guardian». Поразительно всё же, как два журналиста из одной и той же газеты могут написать две совершенно разные книги. Я не говорю, что Shaun Walker предложил более качественный анализ, я говорю о подходе. Если Shaun Walker в своей книге The Long Hangover старался быть объективным, дав высказаться и представителем сепаратистов Донбасса, то в книге «Invasion» читать найдёт точку зрения только одной стороны – украинской (возможно, поэтому переведена на украинский только одна книга?). Так может это и правильно? Тогда чем пропагандист отличается от журналиста? Я даже больше скажу, чем условный Дмитрий Киселёв или Владимир Соловьёв отличается от Luke Harding? Мне скажут: он отличается тем, что транслирует пропаганду светлой стороны и что это «пропаганда во спасение». На войне как на войне, поэтому западные журналисты могут позволить себе быть ретрансляторами украинской президентской администрации. Такой взгляд или подход имеет право на существование, но лично я его не принимаю. Я не буду сейчас повторять тривиальные вещи, но спустя почти два года, устаёшь от пропаганды, даже от пропаганды со стороны света. Я долго верил в неё и где-то год читал о том, что российская армия состоит из одних бомжей, наркоманов и пьяниц которые не сегодня-завтра сбегут с поля боя, но время идёт, а ситуация меняется и не в лучшую сторону. Всё чаще в европейских странах на выборах побеждают партии, выступающие против военной помощи Украине, и даже США снижают обороты. Это всё создаёт сильный диссонанс с тем, что написано в книге.
Наверно самый большой минус этой книги состоит в том, что она ничего не рассказывает о том, что случилось после 24 февраля 2022 года. Если принять всё то, что пишет автор, получается очень странная историй: 24 февраля, ни с того ни с сего, российские войска перешли границу чтобы окончательно решить украинский вопрос. Как говорится в книге, русские не считают Украину государством и поэтому решили под корень истребить все, что хоть немного связано с Українська мова, жёлто-синим флагом и прочим в таком духе (звери, хули). Возникает вопрос: почему? Ну, т.е. что такое случилось с русскими, что они решили, как рассказывает нам книга, устроить геноцид украинского народа? Сидели, пили водку, слушали, как медведь играет на балалайке, а потом встали, и пошли резать украинцев от нечего делать, так что ли? Если читать эту книгу, то именно такое возникает ощущение. На самом деле автору следовало начать с самого начала – оранжевой революции и рассказать, что там случилось. Я дам слово бывшему министру обороны Украины (Anatoliy Hrytsenko), который вот как охарактеризовал жителей Донбасса:
I am not talking about the split along the East-West…. I am talking about a more bitter and more essential phenomenon that is typical for all regions—the distinction between the people and the population, between citizens and slaves.
Проблема началась с того, что лидеры оранжевой революции решили поиграть с национализмом, т.е. выяснить, кто является (настоящим) украинцем, а кто нет. Начали воевать с прошлым (включая советский красный флаг), считать, сколько погибло во время голода в Украине организованным Сталиным, пытаясь поставить его в один ряд с Холокостом и пр. Другими словами, пришедшие к власти люди занимались чем угодно, но только не развитием страны. Вот какой вывод сделала UN в своём докладе уже от 2017 года: «With the passage of time … divisions in Ukrainian society resulting from the conflict will continue to deepen and take root». Вместо того чтобы объединять две Украины, делали ровно наоборот. Как говорится, «Galicia will remain, Pridneprovie will become Galicia». Значит ли это, что я, таким образом, хочу снять всю ответственность с России, сказав, что она тут вообще не приделах? Нет, я этого не хочу сказать. Я хочу сказать, что история российско-украинского конфликта намного сложнее, чем показывает автор и что часть вины, пусть и меньшая, должна лежать и на украинской политической элите, которая решила углубить украинский западно-восточный конфликт, а также на западной элите, которая прекрасно знала, что Украина с её коррупцией, слабой демократией, отсутствием реформ и пр. ещё не скоро войдёт в ЕС и НАТО, но зачем-то продолжала настойчиво обещать, что это вот-вот случится (зля тем самым Москву). Другими словами, автор не рассказал главного: как политические элиты стравили два народа, а также два региона в рамках одной страны (Украины). Это не оправдывает российского вторжения, но это объясняет историю вопроса и того, что на самом деле случилось. Тут важно отметить, что это также не означает, что оккупированные территории хотят жить с Россией (как и Россия не очень горит желанием жить вместе с этими территориями). Как сказано в одной книге, желающих жить с Россией было где-то около 17%. Может все 17% живут как раз в ДНР и ЛНР? А может, все желающие уже переехали в РФ?
Далее что мне очень не понравилось в этой книге, это постоянно цитирование украинских политиков и чиновников. Причём автор чуть ли не жопу им целуй, такие они молодцы. Но скажите мне, кто должен был организовывать эвакуацию гражданского населения из областей, объятых войной? Почему граждане сами это делали под аккомпанемент падающих снарядов? Почему за восемь лет не было всё заминировано так, что бы ни одна армия не смогла пройти, не потеряв при этом миллион солдат? Это я говорю не про военных. Я говорю про политиков и чиновников, чья прямая обязанность - заботиться о гражданах. Но они это не сделали. Автор что-то сказал об этом? Нет. Люди выбирают политиков, которые потом назначают чиновников, среди самых умных, мудрых, профессиональных, короче тех, кто лучше всего может решить жизненно важные проблемы, как например, организовать спасение во время цунами или не допустить коллапса во время снегопада. Чиновники и политики - люди, чья задача решать вопросы, которые не может решить простой человек, который живёт в Мариуполе или Харькове. Это баба Дуся в Мелитополе может сказать, «Да я никогда бы не подумала, что Россия может вторгнуться!». Но политик и чиновник такого не может заявить. Поэтому молчание автора насчёт того «как это допустили?» и «почему не спасли?», вызывает удивление. Автор ничего не сказал, почему мирным гражданам приходилось самостоятельно выбираться из пекла войны. В этой книге всё свелось к лозунгам. Если бы я жил в каком-нибудь украинском городе, меня бы волновал вопрос, почему правительство прозевало и почему оно ничего не сделало, чтобы спасти жизни простых людей. Россия? С Россией и так всё понятно. С ней было понятно уже в 2014 году. Странно, что это оказалось полным сюрпризом для НАТО и украинского правительства.
Буча. Прошло почти 2 года, и мы видим такую новость: «Путина выдвинули на звание человека года по версии Time». 4 декабря, 2023. Честно сказать, писать-то после этой новости мне больше и нечего. Хотя нет, дополню это следующей новостью, которую я прочитал в DW: «Украинские компании и заводы и после начала войны продолжают поставлять в Россию запчасти для самолетов и вертолетов, в том числе военных, пишут "Важные истории".» 27 ноября 2023 г.
Но что мы можем знать наверняка? Что погибло очень много людей, что много разрушений. К сожалению, как показали эти два года, туман войны очень сильный и сказать, что точно произошло там-то и там-то, довольно сложно. Но стоит всё же сказать пару нелестных слов и о другой стороне конфликта, которая делает прямо противоположные заявления, мол, никто не пострадал, используется высокоточное оружие. Давайте вспомним события в Москве в 1993 году. Сколько погибло тогда людей? Как сказано в Википедии, 3—4 октября 1993 года в Москве погибло 124 человека. Вы только вдумайтесь в эту фразу! Заметим, что Москву никакая армия в эти два дня не штурмовала, не обстреливала, и что конфликт был очень локальным (в нескольких районах центра города). При этом погибло 124 человека. А теперь подумаем, может ли никто или почти никто не пострадать в городе, который штурмует армия с использованием всего доступного вооружения? Так что истории, которые рассказывают простые люди в этой книге, они правдивые и это единственное, что есть в книге ценного.
It is a poor writing book that retells everything that could be heard and read in the Western press in the early months of the war. Surprisingly, the author did not offer in his book a qualitative and objective overview of what happened in those first months of the conflict. It is especially surprising when one compares this book with "The Long Hangover" by Shaun Walker, whose author is also a contributor to The Guardian. It is amazing how two journalists from the same newspaper can write two completely different books. I'm not saying Shaun Walker offered a better analysis. What I'm talking about is the approach. If Shaun Walker tried to be objective by letting the representative of the separatists of Donbas speak out, then in the book "Invasion" you will find the point of view of only one side - the Ukrainian side (perhaps that's why only one book has been translated into Ukrainian). So maybe that's the right thing to do? Then how does a propagandist differ from a journalist? I will even say more: how does Dmitry Kiselyov or Vladimir Solovyov differ from Luke Harding? I will be told, that he is distinguished by the fact that he broadcasts propaganda of the light side and that it is "propaganda for salvation". In war as in war, Western journalists can afford to be relayers of the Ukrainian presidential administration. Such a view or approach has the right to exist, but I do not accept it. I will not repeat trivial things now, but after almost two years, you get tired of propaganda, even propaganda from the good side. I believed in it for a long time, and for about a year, I read that the Russian army consisted of only homeless people, drug addicts, and drunks who would run away from the battlefield as soon as possible, but time went by, and the situation is changing and not for the better. More and more often in European countries, the parties opposing military aid to Ukraine are winning elections, and even the USA is reducing its turnover (military aid). This all creates a strong dissonance with what is written in the book.
The biggest disadvantage of this book is that it tells nothing about what happened after February 24, 2022. If you accept everything the author writes, you get a very strange story: on February 24, out of the blue, Russian troops crossed the border to finally solve the Ukrainian question. As the book says, the Russians do not consider Ukraine to be a state and therefore decided to exterminate everything that is even slightly connected with Українська мова (Ukrainian language), yellow and blue flag, and other such things. The question arises: why? Well, i.e., what happened to the Russians that they decided, as the book tells us, to organize a genocide of the Ukrainian people? They just sat, drank vodka, listened to the bear playing the balalaika, and then got up and went to slaughter Ukrainians out of nothing to do, right? If you read this book, that's exactly the feeling you get. The author should have started from the very beginning - the Orange Revolution - and told what happened there. I will give the floor to the former Minister of Defense of Ukraine (Anatoliy Hrytsenko), who described the people of Donbas like this:
I am not talking about the split along the East-West…. I am talking about a more bitter and more essential phenomenon that is typical for all regions—the distinction between the people and the population, between citizens and slaves.
The problem started when the leaders of the Orange Revolution decided to play with nationalism, i.e., to find out who was a (real) Ukrainian and who was not. They started fighting with the past (including the Soviet red flag), counting how many died during the famine in Ukraine organized by Stalin, trying to put it on a par with the Holocaust, and so on. In other words, the people who came to power were doing anything but developing the country. Here's what UN concluded in its report from already: «With the passage of time … divisions in Ukrainian society resulting from the conflict will continue to deepen and take root». Instead of uniting the two Ukrainian societies, they did exactly the opposite. As they say, «Galicia will remain, Pridneprovie will become Galicia». Does that mean that I want to absolve Russia of all responsibility by saying that Russia had nothing to do with it? No, that's not what I'm saying. I want to say that the history of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is much more complicated than the author shows and that part of the blame, albeit less, must also lie with the Ukrainian political elite, which decided to deepen the Ukrainian West-East conflict, as well as with the Western elite, which knew perfectly well that Ukraine with its corruption, weak democracy, lack of reforms, etc. would not soon join the EU and NATO, but for some reason continued to insistently promise that it was about to happen (thus angering Moscow). In other words, the author did not tell the main story: how the political elites played off two nations as well as two regions within one country (Ukraine). This does not justify the Russian invasion, but it does explain the background and what actually happened. It's important to note here that it also doesn't mean that the occupied territories want to live with Russia (nor is Russia very eager to live together with these territories). As one book said, those who wanted to live with Russia were somewhere around 17%. Maybe all 17% live in the DNR and LNR? Or maybe all those who want to live with Russia, have already moved to Russia?
What I didn't like about this book was the constant quoting of Ukrainian politicians and officials. And the author almost kiss their ass, so they are so good. But tell me, who should have organized the evacuation of civilians from the war-torn regions? Why did the citizens do it themselves to the accompaniment of falling shells? Why, in eight years, had not everything been mined so that no army could pass through without losing a million soldiers? I'm not talking about the military. I'm talking about politicians and officials whose direct duty is to take care of citizens. But they didn't. Did the author say anything about that? No. People elect politicians, who then appoint officials among the smartest, wisest, and most professional people, in short, those who are best able to solve vital problems, like organizing a rescue during a tsunami or preventing a collapse during a snowfall. Officials and politicians are people whose task is to solve issues that cannot be solved by an ordinary person who lives in Mariupol or Kharkiv. It's the common man who can claim: "I never thought that Russia could invade!". But a politician and an official cannot say such a thing. Therefore, the author's silence about "how was it allowed?" and "why were they not rescued?" is surprising. The author did not say anything about why civilians had to get out of the hell of war on their own. Everything in this book has been reduced to slogans. If I lived in any Ukrainian city, I would be concerned about why the government overslept and why it did nothing to save the lives of ordinary people. Russia? Everything is already clear with Russia. It was clear with it already in 2014. Strangely, it came as a complete surprise to NATO and the Ukrainian government.
Bucha. Almost 2 years have passed, and we see this news: "Putin nominated as Time's Man of the Year". December 4, 2023. Frankly speaking, I have nothing more to write after this news. But no, I'll complete it with the following news, which I read in DW: "Ukrainian companies and factories continue to supply Russia with spare parts for airplanes and helicopters, including military ones, even after the war started, according to "Important Stories"." November 27, 2023.
But what can we know for sure? That a lot of people died, that there was a lot of destruction. Unfortunately, as these two years have shown, the fog of war is very thick, and it is difficult to say exactly what happened here and there. But it is still worth saying a few unflattering words about the other side of the conflict, which makes the exact opposite statement, saying that no one has been hurt and that precision weapons are being used. Let us remember the events in Moscow in 1993. How many people died then? According to Wikipedia, on October 3-4, 1993, 124 people died in Moscow. Just think about this phrase! Note that no army stormed or shelled Moscow during those two days and that the conflict was very local (in several districts of the city center). At the same time, 124 people were killed. Now let's think: can no one or almost no one be hurt in a city that is stormed by the army using all available weapons? So, the stories told by ordinary people in this book are true, and that is the only thing of value in the book.
January 30, 2023
This book by Luke Harding is really a work in progress since it went into print in September 2022. It doesn't give much detail on military matters, but has a lot of detail of the author's conversations with civilians and soldiers as the author traveled about the conflict zones. A horrifying picture builds up of the suffering and destruction caused by Russia's brutal invasion.
January 6, 2023
A publication worth looking into for the insight on how the Russo-Ukraine War of 2022 has progressed from the perspective of an individual close to sources in Ukraine and Russian news circles.
Given the kind of war that the Russo-Ukraine conflict had become with OSINT and social media outlets, those who have been following the war may not find the author's description of the events particularly ground-breaking as many highlights of the war can be found in social media and news article as they happened live.
Harding adds to the conversation with interviews with men and women who are at the scenes of happening, in the offices observing, or the government bodies deciding. They provide the more "human" perspective of the situation to better understand how local Ukrainian or Russians feel about the war at the time.
Due to the ongoing nature of the war, this is an incomplete telling of the war, with the book concluding around September period. At this time period, I think it is one of the best published book we English-speakers got to help explains the war in a geo-political and human manner for both Russian and Ukraine perspectives.
Given the kind of war that the Russo-Ukraine conflict had become with OSINT and social media outlets, those who have been following the war may not find the author's description of the events particularly ground-breaking as many highlights of the war can be found in social media and news article as they happened live.
Harding adds to the conversation with interviews with men and women who are at the scenes of happening, in the offices observing, or the government bodies deciding. They provide the more "human" perspective of the situation to better understand how local Ukrainian or Russians feel about the war at the time.
Due to the ongoing nature of the war, this is an incomplete telling of the war, with the book concluding around September period. At this time period, I think it is one of the best published book we English-speakers got to help explains the war in a geo-political and human manner for both Russian and Ukraine perspectives.
December 6, 2022
Maybe too early
A worthy summary of the war so far but was too like journalism (and to be fair, Luke Harding is a respected journalist) and not the history I wanted. If you follow Harding in the Guardian there will be little here feels remarkably new. The first chapter wonderfully captures the mood of eve of the war and the atmosphere in Kyiv, maybe in a future book Harding will return with a more textured appraisal.
A worthy summary of the war so far but was too like journalism (and to be fair, Luke Harding is a respected journalist) and not the history I wanted. If you follow Harding in the Guardian there will be little here feels remarkably new. The first chapter wonderfully captures the mood of eve of the war and the atmosphere in Kyiv, maybe in a future book Harding will return with a more textured appraisal.
March 7, 2023
A moving and readable account of the first six months of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Writing a book about the war in Ukraine in late 2022 or early 2023 must be a tempting but oddly thankless task for journalists and experts specialising in Russia and Ukraine.
Tempting, because demand for these books must be at a peak. As open conflict between Ukraine and Russia drags into its second year with no clear end in sight, the narrative of the war is, inevitably, becoming complicated. It is challenging, if not impossible, for interested non-experts to monitor events in a coherent way. There is exceptional, granular reporting available (The Telegraph podcast Ukraine: The Latest is one highlight), but this increasingly assumes a high level of prior engagement. At the other end of the spectrum, superficial media coverage serves up a steady stream of violent images and footage, with little more than a cursory attempt to place new events in context. Readable narratives, that fill in the gaps for newly engaged audiences, are essential at this point.
Thankless, because only a part of the story can be written. An author who attempts a present the war as a narrative is confounded by the missing final (or not-so-final) act, while an author who attempts a more thematic analysis is stymied by a lack of information and uncertainty about what factors will ultimately prove decisive.
Veteran journalist and Russia specialist Luke Harding’s Invasion admirably meets the need for an accessible narrative of the period from February 2022 to October 2022. Beginning on February 23, 2022, “the evening before everything changed”, Harding provides a broadly chronological account. All of the major events and locations of the first 6 months of the war are covered, from Bucha to Snake Island, and from the Azovstal steelworks to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. For each major development, Harding provides extensive coverage with a focus on the perspectives of the people of Ukraine. The result is insightful.
For example, Chapter 5 recounts the Russian occupation of Bucha, a suburb outside Kyiv whose name is synonymous with Russian brutality. What is exceptional about Harding’s account is that he describes, in heartbreaking detail, what daily life was like for Ukrainians under occupation. When twenty-six-year-old Volodymyr Cherednichenko is introduced at the beginning of the chapter, the reader knows what fate awaits him. We have heard so many of these stories – they play out on our television and computer screens every day. We find them enraging, distressing, depressing. But Harding’s description of Volodymyr’s aunt Natasha chatting with a homesick Russian soldier after his disappearance (and possibly after his death) is a chilling reminder of how terrible these stories really are. One cannot begin to imagine how she must have felt trying to make friendly small talk with the people who killed her nephew.
The focus on the experiences of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians makes this a sombre book, but Harding clearly views the Ukrainians’ struggle as a heroic and worthy one. The book is drenched in the language of myth and heroism. This is the war in Ukraine as the Ukrainians will remember it, as Western media increasingly portrays it, and as Hollywood will inevitably exploit it. Ukrainians (understandably) see this as a battle of good versus evil, and by giving us their words Harding casts it in the same terms. The doomed defence of the Azovstal steelworks is a new Thermopylae. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is the heroic embodiment of his country, with a mastery of twenty-first century media and rhetorical flair to match.
Harding is not much interested in the causes of the conflict. Major Russian figures are mentioned peripherally, if at all (Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev gets a single mention, to the effect that if he took over from Putin, Russia would not improve). He is also not particularly concerned with the literal truth of what he reports. Zelenskiy’s famous ‘I need ammunition, not a ride’ quip is repeated without further analysis. By contrast, journalist Owen Matthews in his own recent book acknowledges the possibility that Zelenskiy’s words, almost too good to be true, might be apocryphal.
None of this – the emotional tenor, the unremitting focus on specific stories, or the breathless reporting, is really a weakness of the book. Indeed, what Harding clearly understands is that this has been an emotional war. If Ukraine wins, it will be because the Ukrainian people were able to produce such a powerful emotional response in each other and in the West that it changed the course of history. This story ultimately belongs to the Volodymyr and Natasha as much as it does to Zelenskiy and Biden, and Harding has told it with compassion and power.
Strongly recommended to readers seeking an understanding (or a reminder) of what has happened since February 2022 and the stories we have told about it.
Readers interested in a more thematic approach, with a stronger focus on events in Russia and the historical origins of the conflict could consider Owen Matthew's Overreach.
Writing a book about the war in Ukraine in late 2022 or early 2023 must be a tempting but oddly thankless task for journalists and experts specialising in Russia and Ukraine.
Tempting, because demand for these books must be at a peak. As open conflict between Ukraine and Russia drags into its second year with no clear end in sight, the narrative of the war is, inevitably, becoming complicated. It is challenging, if not impossible, for interested non-experts to monitor events in a coherent way. There is exceptional, granular reporting available (The Telegraph podcast Ukraine: The Latest is one highlight), but this increasingly assumes a high level of prior engagement. At the other end of the spectrum, superficial media coverage serves up a steady stream of violent images and footage, with little more than a cursory attempt to place new events in context. Readable narratives, that fill in the gaps for newly engaged audiences, are essential at this point.
Thankless, because only a part of the story can be written. An author who attempts a present the war as a narrative is confounded by the missing final (or not-so-final) act, while an author who attempts a more thematic analysis is stymied by a lack of information and uncertainty about what factors will ultimately prove decisive.
Veteran journalist and Russia specialist Luke Harding’s Invasion admirably meets the need for an accessible narrative of the period from February 2022 to October 2022. Beginning on February 23, 2022, “the evening before everything changed”, Harding provides a broadly chronological account. All of the major events and locations of the first 6 months of the war are covered, from Bucha to Snake Island, and from the Azovstal steelworks to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. For each major development, Harding provides extensive coverage with a focus on the perspectives of the people of Ukraine. The result is insightful.
For example, Chapter 5 recounts the Russian occupation of Bucha, a suburb outside Kyiv whose name is synonymous with Russian brutality. What is exceptional about Harding’s account is that he describes, in heartbreaking detail, what daily life was like for Ukrainians under occupation. When twenty-six-year-old Volodymyr Cherednichenko is introduced at the beginning of the chapter, the reader knows what fate awaits him. We have heard so many of these stories – they play out on our television and computer screens every day. We find them enraging, distressing, depressing. But Harding’s description of Volodymyr’s aunt Natasha chatting with a homesick Russian soldier after his disappearance (and possibly after his death) is a chilling reminder of how terrible these stories really are. One cannot begin to imagine how she must have felt trying to make friendly small talk with the people who killed her nephew.
The focus on the experiences of ‘ordinary’ Ukrainians makes this a sombre book, but Harding clearly views the Ukrainians’ struggle as a heroic and worthy one. The book is drenched in the language of myth and heroism. This is the war in Ukraine as the Ukrainians will remember it, as Western media increasingly portrays it, and as Hollywood will inevitably exploit it. Ukrainians (understandably) see this as a battle of good versus evil, and by giving us their words Harding casts it in the same terms. The doomed defence of the Azovstal steelworks is a new Thermopylae. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is the heroic embodiment of his country, with a mastery of twenty-first century media and rhetorical flair to match.
Harding is not much interested in the causes of the conflict. Major Russian figures are mentioned peripherally, if at all (Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev gets a single mention, to the effect that if he took over from Putin, Russia would not improve). He is also not particularly concerned with the literal truth of what he reports. Zelenskiy’s famous ‘I need ammunition, not a ride’ quip is repeated without further analysis. By contrast, journalist Owen Matthews in his own recent book acknowledges the possibility that Zelenskiy’s words, almost too good to be true, might be apocryphal.
None of this – the emotional tenor, the unremitting focus on specific stories, or the breathless reporting, is really a weakness of the book. Indeed, what Harding clearly understands is that this has been an emotional war. If Ukraine wins, it will be because the Ukrainian people were able to produce such a powerful emotional response in each other and in the West that it changed the course of history. This story ultimately belongs to the Volodymyr and Natasha as much as it does to Zelenskiy and Biden, and Harding has told it with compassion and power.
Strongly recommended to readers seeking an understanding (or a reminder) of what has happened since February 2022 and the stories we have told about it.
Readers interested in a more thematic approach, with a stronger focus on events in Russia and the historical origins of the conflict could consider Owen Matthew's Overreach.
April 2, 2023
An excellent account of life in Ukraine after Russia's invasion. Slava Ukraini.
August 8, 2023
Хороша документальна книга про вторгнення московії в Україну, подекуди з екскурсом в історію задля розуміння контексту, подекуди – з особистими історіями людей у стані війни. Дізналась навіть дещо нове про перші дні, оскільки тоді, сидячи в Харкові, слідкувала майже винятково за локальними новинами, ловлячи крихти зв'язку в холодному через відсутність опалення будинку. Тішить, що це написано закордонним небайдужим журналістом, що у світі звучать не тільки українські голоси, що написано все з мінімумом позицій та поглядів самого автора, який тут дає перевагу висловитись іншим.
Втім, таки 4/5 – через один-єдиний розділ. Розділ про т. зв. «хороших московитів», де автора якраз було більше ніж достатньо. Списала там усі береги, хотілось ригати і плакати. З одного боку, Люк Гардінґ багато років працював на московії та з московитами, і зрозуміло, що він набагато глибше й більше знає саме про ту сторону і має багато знайомств. З іншого, писати про те, що черговий хароший узкій щоранку прокидається в Чорногорії в готелі з видом на море і страждає від того, що він, відчайдушний патріот, не може повернутися на свою родіну-уродіну через путінскій рєжим, і все це після описів Бучі й Маріуполя – це мощно. Особливо сподобалися виправдання Гардінґом друга-московита, мовляв, «а што ані могут сдєлать, оні же малєнькіє люді», і взагалі «он счітаєт, што 58% поддєрживающіх вайну – ета огромное прєувєлічєніє». Прям-таки жалка етава дабряка. Водночас усі, абсолютно всі українці, які розповідали Люкові про родичів на московії, казали, що або обірвали зв'язки з ними через їхню підтримку війни, або мінімізували спілкування, торкаючись тільки нейтральних тем. І чомусь жодного родича (хоча, здавалося б, хто з московитів ще може бути проти вторгнення, як не люди, безпосередньо дотичні до мешканців України), який висловлювався б, хоча б натякаючи на незгоду.
За півтора роки вторгнення вже неможливо говорити бодай щось про «небажання московитів воювати й гинути». Сотні тисяч людей протягом вже майже 18 місяців щоденно прокидаються з думкою, як іще обійти українську ППО, де ще знаходяться об'єкти української критичної інфраструктури, що ще можна зробити, аби завдати більшого болю, більших втрат, більших збитків, більшого горя. Вони не просто «виконують накази», вони цілеспрямовано кожного дня йдуть на роботу, сплачують податки на зброю і ракети, а хтось ці самі ракети створює просто зараз, у цей самий момент. Салдати абсолютно свідомо прокидаються, снідають, цілують дітей, а потім сідають у літаки і запускають ракети по українських школах і садочках. Абсолютно всі утікачі рятували винятково власні нікчемні життя. Вони чхали на те, що робить їхня влада, вони бажають єдиного: не бути до того дотичними, аби не забруднити білих інтелігентних ручок і зберегти свої пожитки. А багато хто з тих емігрантів і далі працює на московію, зберігаючи свої відкриті на московії ФОПи й працюючи дистанційно.
Також трохи підбішували згадки про героїчність верхівки української влади, хоча єдині герої в нашій країні – це ЗСУ, але не хочу про це. Зі своєю владою українці розберуться, але першочерговим є звільнення нашої землі від окупантів і повернення всіх дітей і полонених з території московії. Страшно уявити, що вони там переживають просто в цю хвилину, і неможливо дивитися без сліз на змарнілих воїнів, яких вдається повернути зараз. Неможливо не думати про людей, які зараз в окупації, про знищені міста, про жахливою смертю загиблих цивільних людей, про зниклих безвісти, про викрадену й привласнену чи знищену пам'ять і культуру, про, про, про...
«Коли все це було написано, Україна ще не перемогла. Попереду на неї чекало багато випробовувань, але її сміливо можна було назвати державою, перевіреною часом. Вона витримала чимало катаклізмів: дві світові війни, сталінський Голодомор, Великий терор, чорнобильську катастрофу. А згодом – десятиліття підривної діяльності й окупації з боку Росії, від захоплення сходу до повномасштабного вторгнення. Як співається в державному гімні, Україна ще не вмерла. Вона плекає надію на те, що вільні люди щасливо житимуть на рідній землі».
P. S. Пару слів про українське видання. Дуже неприємно здивував чи то переклад, чи то редактура: не існує в українській мові таких понять як «Великобританія» чи тим паче «Прибалтика» (оцей монстр взагалі не зрозуміло, звідки взявся). І ще здивували деякі нарощення числівників (напр., «56-тої») та доволі часте використання сполучника «од» замість «від» (все-таки це більше художній просторічний варіант, дивно бачити його в документальному нонфікшені). Втім, вкрай потішили неадаптовані московитські імена – маю надію, що згодом це закріпиться в українському правописі.
Втім, таки 4/5 – через один-єдиний розділ. Розділ про т. зв. «хороших московитів», де автора якраз було більше ніж достатньо. Списала там усі береги, хотілось ригати і плакати. З одного боку, Люк Гардінґ багато років працював на московії та з московитами, і зрозуміло, що він набагато глибше й більше знає саме про ту сторону і має багато знайомств. З іншого, писати про те, що черговий хароший узкій щоранку прокидається в Чорногорії в готелі з видом на море і страждає від того, що він, відчайдушний патріот, не може повернутися на свою родіну-уродіну через путінскій рєжим, і все це після описів Бучі й Маріуполя – це мощно. Особливо сподобалися виправдання Гардінґом друга-московита, мовляв, «а што ані могут сдєлать, оні же малєнькіє люді», і взагалі «он счітаєт, што 58% поддєрживающіх вайну – ета огромное прєувєлічєніє». Прям-таки жалка етава дабряка. Водночас усі, абсолютно всі українці, які розповідали Люкові про родичів на московії, казали, що або обірвали зв'язки з ними через їхню підтримку війни, або мінімізували спілкування, торкаючись тільки нейтральних тем. І чомусь жодного родича (хоча, здавалося б, хто з московитів ще може бути проти вторгнення, як не люди, безпосередньо дотичні до мешканців України), який висловлювався б, хоча б натякаючи на незгоду.
За півтора роки вторгнення вже неможливо говорити бодай щось про «небажання московитів воювати й гинути». Сотні тисяч людей протягом вже майже 18 місяців щоденно прокидаються з думкою, як іще обійти українську ППО, де ще знаходяться об'єкти української критичної інфраструктури, що ще можна зробити, аби завдати більшого болю, більших втрат, більших збитків, більшого горя. Вони не просто «виконують накази», вони цілеспрямовано кожного дня йдуть на роботу, сплачують податки на зброю і ракети, а хтось ці самі ракети створює просто зараз, у цей самий момент. Салдати абсолютно свідомо прокидаються, снідають, цілують дітей, а потім сідають у літаки і запускають ракети по українських школах і садочках. Абсолютно всі утікачі рятували винятково власні нікчемні життя. Вони чхали на те, що робить їхня влада, вони бажають єдиного: не бути до того дотичними, аби не забруднити білих інтелігентних ручок і зберегти свої пожитки. А багато хто з тих емігрантів і далі працює на московію, зберігаючи свої відкриті на московії ФОПи й працюючи дистанційно.
Також трохи підбішували згадки про героїчність верхівки української влади, хоча єдині герої в нашій країні – це ЗСУ, але не хочу про це. Зі своєю владою українці розберуться, але першочерговим є звільнення нашої землі від окупантів і повернення всіх дітей і полонених з території московії. Страшно уявити, що вони там переживають просто в цю хвилину, і неможливо дивитися без сліз на змарнілих воїнів, яких вдається повернути зараз. Неможливо не думати про людей, які зараз в окупації, про знищені міста, про жахливою смертю загиблих цивільних людей, про зниклих безвісти, про викрадену й привласнену чи знищену пам'ять і культуру, про, про, про...
«Коли все це було написано, Україна ще не перемогла. Попереду на неї чекало багато випробовувань, але її сміливо можна було назвати державою, перевіреною часом. Вона витримала чимало катаклізмів: дві світові війни, сталінський Голодомор, Великий терор, чорнобильську катастрофу. А згодом – десятиліття підривної діяльності й окупації з боку Росії, від захоплення сходу до повномасштабного вторгнення. Як співається в державному гімні, Україна ще не вмерла. Вона плекає надію на те, що вільні люди щасливо житимуть на рідній землі».
P. S. Пару слів про українське видання. Дуже неприємно здивував чи то переклад, чи то редактура: не існує в українській мові таких понять як «Великобританія» чи тим паче «Прибалтика» (оцей монстр взагалі не зрозуміло, звідки взявся). І ще здивували деякі нарощення числівників (напр., «56-тої») та доволі часте використання сполучника «од» замість «від» (все-таки це більше художній просторічний варіант, дивно бачити його в документальному нонфікшені). Втім, вкрай потішили неадаптовані московитські імена – маю надію, що згодом це закріпиться в українському правописі.
July 3, 2023
Anne Applebaumová na obálce tvrdí: Vynikající první popis dějin... Excelentní a dojemné vyprávění o pokračující tragédii.
S tou tragédií bych souhlasila, ale tím zbytkem si nejsem jistá.
Jako příběhy... no, Světlana Alexijevičová to není, ale dejme tomu.
Jako historie... ne.
Čekala jsem hlubší rozbor, souvislosti, zdroje citací a tak. A rejstřík. Který v originále je, ale v překladu ne.
Sankcemi se hrozilo už před invazí? To mi nějak ušlo.
Pokud budeme věřit autorovi a několika verzím V. Zelenského, tak VZ byl zjevně poslední, kdo se o invazi dozvěděl. Autorovi to už před půlnocí zavolal žvanil z ministerstva zahraničí a sdělil mu přesnou hodinu invaze.
s. 17- 20
Autor, který už věděl, že to přijde, „spal málo“.
Odvážil se vyjít ven, aby promluvil s místním lidem. Třeba s Viktorem, který si kupoval kávu. ...že když slyšel první ruské výbuchy na předměstí, zavolal svému synovi. Zapnul televizi. Sledoval, jak Zelenskyj promlouvá k národu, zavádí stanné právo a vyzývá občany ke klidu.
Není mi jasné, který projev přesně myslí.
s. 45 Zelenského televizní postava je středoškolský učitel dějepisu, který studentům jednoho dne přednáší o beztrestnosti a špatné vládě, což jsou témata dobře známá každému Ukrajinci. Jeden ze studentů ve třídě Holoborodkův projev tajně natočí a klip se virálně rozšíří po internetu.
Překladatel zjevně seriál neviděl. Protože Holoborodko normálně učí dějepis a nadává až potom v prázdné třídě.
Zelenskiy’s character is a secondary-school history teacher who one day rants about impunity and misrule, themes familiar to every Ukrainian. A student secretly films Holoborodko’s classroom outburst, and the clip goes viral online.
s. 122 namaloval renesanční mistr – Rembrandt nebo Caravaggio
Rembrandt byl renesanční malíř? No vida.
s. 166 My demokraté knihy nepálíme.
Čekala bych, že pokud bude mluvit o „odebírání knih ze škol, knihoven a vysokých škol“ ruskou vojenskou policií, zmíní se i o tom, že ukrajinské knihovny vyřazovaly „špatné“ knihy, včetně klasiky, brakovek, detektivek a fantasy.
Tohle je knížka, kde by měl jít překladatel slovo po slovu.
s. 12 sovětskými satelity: Rumunska, Bulharska, Polska, Česka a pobaltských států
countries that had once been Cold War satellites: Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, plus the Baltic states.
s. 242 Kromě jaderných hrozeb zastavila Moskva Německu dodávku plynu, což se dlouho očekávalo. Zastavila plynovod Nord Stream 1 a uvedla, že dodávky budou obnoveny až po zrušení sankcí ze strany západu. Zdálo se, že aspoň dohoda o Černém moři, která měla Ukrajině umožnit vývoz obilí na Blízký východ a do Afriky, se drží. Bylo zřejmé, že Moskva se zapojila do křížové výpravy na více frontách.
As well as nuclear threats, Moscow turned off the supply of gas to Germany—a move that had been long expected. It shut down the Nord Stream 1 pipeline “for a few days” because of alleged technical problems. And then said the supply would resume only when the West lifted its sanctions. A deal to allow Ukraine to export grain to the Middle East and Africa from its Black Sea ports appeared to be holding, despite Putin, who agreed to it, voicing his unhappiness. He claimed, wrongly, that the grain was going exclusively to Europe. It was clear that Moscow was engaged in a multi-vector crusade.
Taky bych čekala třeba zmínku o tom, že Rusko obilí ve velkém kradlo. Ale nic.
Na s. 46, 47 se mluví o Viktoru Medvědčukovi. Čekala bych poznámku, že ho Ukrajina polapila. A zase nic.
Originál vyšel v listopadu 2022, takže se dají chápat poznámky redaktora z pozdější doby. Ale proč tam ještě plácli novoroční projev VZ, bez jakékoliv poznámky, že v originále není... To mi nedává smysl. Byť ten projev je nejlepší částí celé knihy.
s. 101 u Thermopyl (480 př. n. l.)
s. 119 u Thermopyl v roce 430 př. n. l.
V originále je 480.
s. 122 Samojlenko / s. 123 Samoijenka
s. 133 Kryvém Rihu / s. 247 do Krivého Rihu
s. 114 DETI / s. 120 DETI / s. 231 DJETI
V originále jsou jenom „deti“.
s. 13 srovnalo se zemí Aleppo o další syrská města
s. 19 Jaroslavem
I.
s. 111 29.
března
s. 208 Česká
špatné dělení slov - s. 234
ji/jí - s. 214
S tou tragédií bych souhlasila, ale tím zbytkem si nejsem jistá.
Jako příběhy... no, Světlana Alexijevičová to není, ale dejme tomu.
Jako historie... ne.
Čekala jsem hlubší rozbor, souvislosti, zdroje citací a tak. A rejstřík. Který v originále je, ale v překladu ne.
Sankcemi se hrozilo už před invazí? To mi nějak ušlo.
Pokud budeme věřit autorovi a několika verzím V. Zelenského, tak VZ byl zjevně poslední, kdo se o invazi dozvěděl. Autorovi to už před půlnocí zavolal žvanil z ministerstva zahraničí a sdělil mu přesnou hodinu invaze.
s. 17- 20
Autor, který už věděl, že to přijde, „spal málo“.
Odvážil se vyjít ven, aby promluvil s místním lidem. Třeba s Viktorem, který si kupoval kávu. ...že když slyšel první ruské výbuchy na předměstí, zavolal svému synovi. Zapnul televizi. Sledoval, jak Zelenskyj promlouvá k národu, zavádí stanné právo a vyzývá občany ke klidu.
Není mi jasné, který projev přesně myslí.
s. 45 Zelenského televizní postava je středoškolský učitel dějepisu, který studentům jednoho dne přednáší o beztrestnosti a špatné vládě, což jsou témata dobře známá každému Ukrajinci. Jeden ze studentů ve třídě Holoborodkův projev tajně natočí a klip se virálně rozšíří po internetu.
Překladatel zjevně seriál neviděl. Protože Holoborodko normálně učí dějepis a nadává až potom v prázdné třídě.
Zelenskiy’s character is a secondary-school history teacher who one day rants about impunity and misrule, themes familiar to every Ukrainian. A student secretly films Holoborodko’s classroom outburst, and the clip goes viral online.
s. 122 namaloval renesanční mistr – Rembrandt nebo Caravaggio
Rembrandt byl renesanční malíř? No vida.
s. 166 My demokraté knihy nepálíme.
Čekala bych, že pokud bude mluvit o „odebírání knih ze škol, knihoven a vysokých škol“ ruskou vojenskou policií, zmíní se i o tom, že ukrajinské knihovny vyřazovaly „špatné“ knihy, včetně klasiky, brakovek, detektivek a fantasy.
Tohle je knížka, kde by měl jít překladatel slovo po slovu.
s. 12 sovětskými satelity: Rumunska, Bulharska, Polska, Česka a pobaltských států
countries that had once been Cold War satellites: Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, plus the Baltic states.
s. 242 Kromě jaderných hrozeb zastavila Moskva Německu dodávku plynu, což se dlouho očekávalo. Zastavila plynovod Nord Stream 1 a uvedla, že dodávky budou obnoveny až po zrušení sankcí ze strany západu. Zdálo se, že aspoň dohoda o Černém moři, která měla Ukrajině umožnit vývoz obilí na Blízký východ a do Afriky, se drží. Bylo zřejmé, že Moskva se zapojila do křížové výpravy na více frontách.
As well as nuclear threats, Moscow turned off the supply of gas to Germany—a move that had been long expected. It shut down the Nord Stream 1 pipeline “for a few days” because of alleged technical problems. And then said the supply would resume only when the West lifted its sanctions. A deal to allow Ukraine to export grain to the Middle East and Africa from its Black Sea ports appeared to be holding, despite Putin, who agreed to it, voicing his unhappiness. He claimed, wrongly, that the grain was going exclusively to Europe. It was clear that Moscow was engaged in a multi-vector crusade.
Taky bych čekala třeba zmínku o tom, že Rusko obilí ve velkém kradlo. Ale nic.
Na s. 46, 47 se mluví o Viktoru Medvědčukovi. Čekala bych poznámku, že ho Ukrajina polapila. A zase nic.
Originál vyšel v listopadu 2022, takže se dají chápat poznámky redaktora z pozdější doby. Ale proč tam ještě plácli novoroční projev VZ, bez jakékoliv poznámky, že v originále není... To mi nedává smysl. Byť ten projev je nejlepší částí celé knihy.
s. 101 u Thermopyl (480 př. n. l.)
s. 119 u Thermopyl v roce 430 př. n. l.
V originále je 480.
s. 122 Samojlenko / s. 123 Samoijenka
s. 133 Kryvém Rihu / s. 247 do Krivého Rihu
s. 114 DETI / s. 120 DETI / s. 231 DJETI
V originále jsou jenom „deti“.
s. 13 srovnalo se zemí Aleppo o další syrská města
s. 19 Jaroslavem
I.
s. 111 29.
března
s. 208 Česká
špatné dělení slov - s. 234
ji/jí - s. 214
Displaying 1 - 30 of 120 reviews