There were times when I wanted to give this book one star because I thought it was poorly conceived and transparently executed. However, there is also a great deal of interesting information and it is well researched and contains quotations from studios’ official correspondences. My first inkling that something was amiss was when the author stated how the information he found on Hollywood’s collaboration with the Nazis was scattered around Los Angeles. Um, perhaps that’s because there is no such thing as a singular film production entity called ‘Hollywood’? The individual studios were/are indeed spread out across Los Angeles, and many of them donated their entire libraries to USC, UCLA or AMPAS, so I don’t think there’s any kind of conspiracy there.
Before I start getting too critical, I should list some fun facts I learned about the Nazis’ taste in films. They loved “The Lives of a Bengal Lancer” because it depicted how a master race must hold lesser races in its thrall. They didn’t like Lubitsch or Dietrich, seeing them as somewhat fallen Germans. They hated “Tarzan Finds His Mate” for finding humor in the possible suffering of animals (of the slapstick kind), and for positing that a jungle man would be a suitable partner. Goering loved “It Happened One Night” for its [Nationalist] socialist tendency, and for the recognition that moral action counts even when moral words are not present. He also loved “San Francisco” – and who wouldn’t?
Okay, now I’m going to get critical, and if you are the author of this book, you should probably stop reading this review right now. The author goes into detail about several major films produced in the 1930s, but he shapes the information to suit his needs. Although “Gabriel Over the White House” can easily be read as making a case for fascism or Germany’s National Socialism, it can also be read as reflecting anxiety over the power FDR was intending to yield, or paving the way for FDR to try to become a benevolent dictator. I do not believe it was the intention of the novelist (who had help Lloyd George set up Britain’s welfare state) or the filmmakers (who were mostly liberal Democrats infatuated with FDR) to espouse totalitarian government. The film contains many gray areas and occasional conflicts between what was intended, what was reshot after Louis B. Mayer saw it, and how it was received by Americans and Germans. This author, however, does not take any of that into account. He presents the film’s production strictly as a capitulation to German demands, which I find doubtful. Just because the Nazis loved something, it does not mean it was intended for them. Hitler LOVED Laurel & Hardy films, were they fascists as well?
The author does at least present a complicated and ironic picture of Darryl F. Zanuck’s “The House of Rothschild”, which was meant to be a maverick film with a positive view of Jewish people, produced by Zanuck’s somewhat independent 20th Century (pre-merger with Fox). Zanuck was one of the few studio heads who was not Jewish, and the author posits that he was also less likely to cave in to the Nazis’ demands. Unfortunately, the final product of “The House of Rothschild” traded in so many stereotypes, from devious money-grubbing to masterminding and dividing Europe to be under the Rothschilds’ power, that it was easily used by the Nazis to make their case against the Jews.
I think the author makes tremendous missteps in his analysis of King Vidor’s “Our Daily Bread” and Frank Capra’s “Mr. Deeds Goes to Town” by failing to take into consideration the careers and political leanings of their filmmakers. Just because the Nazis felt that these films supported a National Socialist agenda, it does not mean that the filmmakers sympathized with or capitulated to Germany! I feel like every time the author quotes a positive Nazi appraisal of one of these films, he is saying, “See! See! I told you that Hollywood collaborated with the Nazis!”
The author continually interprets the actions of individuals and studios (or studio heads) as those of a singular entity of ‘Hollywood: the Collaborator’. Hollywood was not a singular entity, despite its monolithic presence in cinema history. There were directors and writers trying to make quality product, often battling or subverting studio chiefs who were trying to make popular product, and all of these studios were in competition with each other. Yes, there were some studios that wanted to play ball with the Nazis as well and as long as possible, but that often had to do with the product they already had being popular in Germany, which in MGM’s case was greatly due to its European actresses MGM had chosen to make into its primary stars. Interestingly, MGM proposed to Paramount and 20th Century Fox (the only studios still doing business in Germany by 1936) that they collectively bow out of Germany together, but they declined MGM’s proposal. Paramount then hired a Nazi to run their German operations. By 1936 these three studios had only a combined total of 8films admitted to the German market, and the author states that they “needed 10 or 12 each just to break even.” But what does ‘break even’ refer to? The cost of exporting pictures to Germany? Maintaining offices in Berlin? Subtitling or dubbing the pictures? And when the author states that the studios were blocked from removing any of their capital from Germany and therefore invested it in newsreel cameras and film to document the rising tide of Nazism, how does this come under the author’s thesis of collaboration? Wouldn’t that be considered subversion?
What troubles me is how the author selectively uses information, such as MGM’s canceling production on an anti-fascism film, “It Can’t Happen Here” which causes the author to conclude that “Hollywood remained at peace with Germany.” He continually refers to decisions made by an individual studio to be the decisions made by a singular entity of ‘Hollywood’! Never mind that by that point in time only three studios were still in business in Germany, and others such as Warner Bros. didn’t care what Germany thought, and never altered its policy of making left-leaning ‘ripped from the headlines’ stories, which was why Germany stopped approving their films.
I nearly lost my mind when he discussed MGM’s reshoots of “Three Comrades” which he writes, “would have been the first explicitly anti-Nazi film by an American studio. At this critical moment, when a major Hollywood production could have alerted the world to what was going on in Germany, the director did not have the final cut. The Nazis did.” Uh…so, it was the responsibility of Hollywood narrative fiction to alert the world, and not journalists and politicians? Again, I’m not apologizing for the business practices of the studio heads, I’m only complaining about the shoddy manner in which this information is synthesized and lack of nuance in his analysis. (And by the way, not even a major director like Frank Borzage would get final cut in those days, that was the discretion of the studio heads and the Breen Office.)
The author’s tone is so overreaching, and he takes into account very little that does not support his claim. He briefly explains what the Breen Office was and when it truly took effect, late 1934. However, he does not explain that around that time Jews were not the only people to disappear from the screens; homosexuals, unwed mothers, explicit communists, and ethnic minorities (other than domestics or banditos) also disappeared, in addition to many behaviors surrounding sexuality, drugs, religion, and protest. There was a whitewashing of Hollywood’s depiction of America, a reactionary swing towards culturalism conservatism due to the disempowerment of the American male because of the Depression and exhaustion from the collapsed boundaries of Prohibition, and as a counterbalance to the political liberalism that was taking place under FDR. The author does not seem equipped to consider this, even though it was happening in conjunction with Hollywood’s Nazi collaboration. And what of the streams of Jewish or anti-Nazi refugees Hollywood embraced – writers such as Bertolt Brecht and Thomas Mann, and directors such as the Jewish Max Ophuls and Billy Wilder, or Douglas Sirk (whose wife was Jewish) or Fritz Lang, who came to MGM after fleeing Germany the very night Goebbels offered him the control of the German film industry? And what about the many actors, composers and cinematographers who fled Germany or its occupied countries, and who found adequate employment in Hollywood films? This does not fit with the author’s simplistic agenda.
If we were to look at Hollywood’s (particularly Disney and RKO) participation in FDR’s ‘Good Neighbor Policy’, could we say that Hollywood (the singular entity) prevented the WWII from spreading to Central and South America? If we consider Paramount’s support of the Shanghai film industry of the 1930’s, when Chinese cinema tended to be quite leftist, can we say that Hollywood collaborated with the future Communist nation? And what of other industries which found ways to do business in Nazi Germany, such as the German Coca-Cola plant concocting Fanta out of ingredients available within Germany, rather than ingredients blocked by the trade embargo? There is so much that the author fails to consider, both in the Hollywood studio system and in business in general. Instead, he repeatedly says the same thing and expects it to be shocking, when in fact the information is not particularly revelatory.
It does come together in the end, thankfully, when the author explores the diluting of the message in “This Mortal Storm”, particularly in its reticence to reference Hitler too often, and most especially downplaying Jewish identity. I completely agree with the author when he writes that MGM was “setting a dangerous precedent. They were proposing the idea that Hollywood should attack the Nazis without engaging in any special pleading on behalf of the Jews. They were abandoning the first half of their agreement with Nazi Germany, while leaving the second half intact.” He then tells the story of writer/director/producer Ben Hecht’s enlightenment and embrace of his Jewish identity at the beginning of the war, and how he eventually helped form the War Refugee Board, which pushed FDR into helping Jews out of Europe. The author then ends on a wry (and much appreciated!) note, stating that once Germans were able to see Hollywood films produced in the late 1930s and early 1940s, they did not have to be reminded of what had occurred under the Nazis because it had barely been mentioned. Great ending, even though the middle 70% had me tearing me hair out. And just to be clear, I do agree with the author’s thesis, I simply believe that he can be misleading in how he presents, omits and interprets the studio system. If the author had kept the focus on the Breen Office's collaboration with Germany, that would have been much less reaching. If there were a single entity or power during the studio system, it was the Breen Office, and the author repeatedly mentions them. The author may not have had the film history background to recognize that this is where he should have focused.