Mohammad Mosaddeq is widely regarded as the leading champion of secular democracy and resistance to foreign domination in Iran's modern history. Mosaddeq became prime minister of Iran in May 1951 and promptly nationalized its British-controlled oil industry, initiating a bitter confrontation between Iraq and Britain that increasingly undermined Mossaddeq's position. He was finally overthrown in August 1953 in a coup d'etat that was organized and led by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. This coup initiated a twenty-five-year period of dictatorship in Iran, leaving many Iranians resentful of the U.S. legacies that still haunt relations between the two countries today.
Contents include: "Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History: Arbitrary Rule, Democracy, and the 1953 Coup" - Homa Katouzian; "Unseating Mosaddeq: The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces" - Fakhreddin Azimi; "The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh" - Maziar Behrooz; "Great Britain and the Intervention in Iran, 1953" - Wm. Roger Louis; "The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti-Mossaddeq Coup of 1953" - Mary Ann Heiss; "The Road to Intervention: Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran, 1945-1953" - Malcolm Byrne; "The 1953 Coup d'etat Against Mosaddeq" - Mark J. Gasiorowski
Mark J. Gasiorowski's magnum opus, "Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran," is a monumental work of historical scholarship that delves into the intricacies of one of the most pivotal moments in the 20th century—a moment that shaped the course of Iranian history and had far-reaching implications for global politics.
Gasiorowski's book is a tour de force of meticulous research, analytical precision, and narrative sophistication. It takes the reader on a journey through the tumultuous landscape of post-World War II Iran, where the convergence of domestic politics, Cold War dynamics, and oil diplomacy set the stage for a seismic shift in power.
At its core, this book is a biography of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the charismatic and idealistic Iranian Prime Minister who sought to nationalize Iran's oil industry—a move that would challenge the interests of Western powers. Gasiorowski masterfully navigates the complex web of Mosaddeq's motivations, ambitions, and political maneuvering, presenting him not just as a historical figure but as a multidimensional character.
Gasiorowski's command of primary sources and declassified materials is nothing short of awe-inspiring. He weaves a narrative that is firmly anchored in historical veracity, leaving no stone unturned in his quest for a comprehensive understanding of the events leading up to the 1953 coup. His rigorous analysis of diplomatic cables, government documents, and firsthand accounts lends an unparalleled depth to the narrative.
One of the book's strengths lies in its exploration of the international dimensions of the coup. Gasiorowski illuminates the roles played by the United States and the United Kingdom in orchestrating Operation Ajax, the covert mission that led to Mosaddeq's downfall. He peels back the layers of Cold War realpolitik, revealing the intricate motivations and strategic considerations that drove these Western powers to intervene in Iran's domestic affairs.
As a historian, Gasiorowski goes beyond mere historical chronicling. He interlaces the narrative with biographical elements, allowing readers to connect with the human aspects of the story. Mosaddeq emerges as a tragic and complex figure, driven by his unwavering commitment to Iranian nationalism but ultimately caught in the crossfire of global politics.
For those familiar with the events of 1953, Gasiorowski's book offers fresh insights and a deeper appreciation of the complexities at play. For those new to the topic, it serves as an enlightening and comprehensive introduction to a critical chapter in history.
Now, for some spoilers: Gasiorowski's book takes readers on a suspenseful journey as it chronicles the build-up to the coup, the covert operations, and the ultimate overthrow of Mosaddeq's government. It unveils the clandestine efforts of intelligence agencies, the role of key figures like Kermit Roosevelt Jr., and the interplay of domestic Iranian factions. The book culminates in the dramatic events of August 1953 when Mosaddeq is arrested, leading to the restoration of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to power—a moment that had profound and lasting consequences for Iran's political trajectory.
In conclusion, "Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran" is an intellectual tour de force. Gasiorowski's monumental work is not just a book; it is a cornerstone of historical understanding. It is a tribute to the heights that scholarship can achieve, a rich tapestry of history that will undoubtedly shape the discourse on this critical period for generations to come. Whether you are a scholar, historian, or simply an avid reader interested in the complexities of geopolitics and the enduring legacy of the 1953 Iranian coup, this book is an essential read.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
This book has different narratives or essays from different authors about the coup and the involvement of the US and UK influences in the coup, it does sound sometimes a bit repetitive though. I think there are other books that provide a better background (or at least ones I like better than this book) like All the Shah's Men, which is an excellent recount of events that I think flows better.
The popular movement which was known as national front became successful in projecting their candidate as prime minister in sixteenth majlis and brought resolution in parliament for nationalization of Anglo Iranian Oil Company. The reason behind that move was to get rid of foreign influence in Iranian politics. England later joined by America manoeuvred the political landscape in such a manner by supporting anti mosaddeq elements that his premiership lasted only for twenty eight months. Main Arguments of the Book.
Initially the popular movement had the support of conservatives in the Majlis but after the Mosaddeq’s demand for extra powers the rift between Mosaddeq and conservatives became intensified. The shah was hesitant to act against Mossadeq openly because Mossadeq was seen as anti-imperialist and civic nationalist which means to oppose Mossadeq was likely to be seen as a tool of British Imperialism since the majority of population hated the British. The Shah was of the view to unseat Mossadeq through Majlis in this regard he supported Hassan Emami to became speaker of seventeenth majlis.
Extreme liberal democracy became one of the reasons for Mossadeq’s downfall. The government did not arrest and even opposed the clemency of General Zahedi for political sanctuary in Majlis. The conservatives blamed the government of siding with the Tudeh party because of government’s leniency towards Tudeh party and allowing them to demonstrate protests on arrival of American delegation for oil settlement dispute. The protests turned into bloody clashes between Tudeh party supporters and conservatives. The National front pursued a policy of parliamentary democracy and co-existence on the other hand the opponents predominantly the conservatives, Tudeh party, Anglophiles and royal court were following politics of elimination. The economic difficulties due to non-oil economy because of boycott of Iranian oil by all international oil companies further aggravated the problems of government, for instance, lack of funds for welfare of workers, unemployment and unchecked lower class poverty. The main supporters of Mossadeq which includes Ayatollah Abolqasem kashani, Hossein Makki, Mozaffar Baqai sided with the opponents of Shah. The main reason for that was all of them were resentful towards Mossadeq for his demand of extra powers which included the control of Army. Kashani was elected as speaker of Majlis with the help of Mossadeq’s opponents while Hossein makki was elected as a member of committee for monitoring the government’s note issue contributed to Mossadeq’s determination to resort to a referendum in order to dissolve the Majlis. The conservatives predominantly Ayatollah Mohammed Behbahani played an active role against Mossadeq by invoking the threat of communism and tried to extract a fatwah aginst Mossadeq. He was reported to have received money from mother of Shah for dislodging Mossadeq. Another preacher Mohammad toqi falsafi was also working for British embassy against government. The Anglophiles were of the view that convergence of interests between Iran and British is crucial for independence of Iran. They feared the decline of British influence more then they feared the decline of Monarchy actually they were in support to maintain the status-quo. They want monarchy strong enough to sustain existing order and weak enough to be incapable of undermining it. They had close links with Majlis deputies, Army officials, mob leaders and they played an active role in mobilizing anti-Mossadeq riots. Their main support base in terms of finance was British embassy. They used to link oil nationalization to communism. The British opted two pronged policy against Mossadeq that was either share the oil profit with Iran 50-50 or replace Mossadeq by Ahmed qavam and negotiate with him. The former policy prevailed due to Anglophiles. They emphasized that if Britain negotiates, then wave of nationalism will swept the existing order and will undermine all efforts to unseat Mossadeq. A British press attaché gave almost one and half million pounds to anti Mossadiq elements and was also indulged into paying Princess Ashraf to encourage Shah to act against Mossadiq. The Rashidian brothers also received huge amount of money from British embassy to organize anti-Mossadeq riots. The main reason behind the dislodging of Mossadeq from power was his announcement of holding a referendum in order to dissolve the majlis beacause he feared that majority of Majlis deputies were bribed to vote against him. When Mossadeq announced the holding of referendum majority of deputies resigned which allowed Shah to issue a notice of Mossadeq’s removal. In that case Majlis lost the chance to block the edict because majority of deputies had already resigned. The dislodging of Mohammad Mossadeq was not possible without cooperation between external and internal elements. Only external factors would have been insignificant to dislodge Mossadeq because in Iran, Nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments were high likewise only internal elements against Mossadeq would have been crippled without external support, for instance, Britain’s refusal to negotiate with Mossadeq.