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Partners In Command
Explores the productive friendships of such contrasting personalities as Grant and Sherman and Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, bringing to life the struggle between McClellan and Lincoln and Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston.
304 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1993
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About the author
Joseph T. Glatthaar
26 books14 followersMilitary historian, specializing in the American Civil War and American military history
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
February 20, 2020
Lincoln vs. MacMellan. Lee and Stonewall. Grant and Sherman... Usually told between battles, these brothers-in-arms stories take center stage. Nice enough, but nothing new. Not exactly general conclusions on the benefits and pitfalls of these "partnerships" either. Which is what you'd expect from the title.
June 22, 2025
This book was okay. Granted, it isn’t very long, but I was hoping for some more insightful passages on the way the subjects personalities interacted. Instead, it was mostly just a quick recap of each’s contributions to the war and some excerpts from their correspondence with each other.
March 10, 2025
3.5;
can’t believe how much grant sherman and porter are in love
can’t believe how much grant sherman and porter are in love
May 20, 2015
It’s all about who you know. Or is it? According to Joseph T. Glatthaar’s Partners in Command: The Relationships Between Leaders in the Civil War, command relationships are the bases for effective battlefield executions, but the origins of those relationships also have major impacts when employing resources to win on the battlefield. Glatthaar examines those relationships between commanders in chief and their commanding generals and between individual Union and Confederate generals and their staff. The result is an attempt to provide the reader with a “fly on the wall” view of leaders whose relationships had direct impacts on the outcome of the Civil War. Unfortunately, Glatthaar falls short with this narrative as he offers no fresh insights into his selected relationships between these intelligent and complicated men. Worse, he tries his hand at pop culture psychology in an attempt to clinically describe General McClellan’s ineffectiveness as a leader through an armchair personality disorder assessment. He should have stuck to the field in which he trained.
Joseph T. Glatthaar is the Stephenson Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and an award-winning author of six books on American military history. In this his second book, he acknowledges his work stemmed from a course at the U.S. Army War College. It shows. While this work likely performed well for a college course, it lacks the depth and insight of William C. Davis’ Crucible of Command: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee—the War They Fought, the Peace They Forged in analyzing relationships between Grant, Sherman, and Lincoln and between Lee and Davis, and Gary W. Gallagher’s Robert E. Lee and His High Command in explaining the complicated relationships between Lee, Jackson, and Johnston. One chapter in either of those books offers more fresh insight and analysis than Glatthaar’s entire book.
Glatthaar states that industrial resources, political support, and manpower are not sufficient for one side to win a war. Relationships at the highest levels of command are responsible for leveraging those resources, and dysfunctional command relationships at any level can bring down a war effort. He is generally even-handed in describing the personalities which contributed to or detracted from successful command relationships. McClelland was not without his positive attributes and Lee was not flawless. Sherman readily apologized for his slights of colleagues and Porter sidelined his suspicions of the army with evidence of true collaborative intentions. None of the men were perfect and all were complicated. Glatthaar’s intention is to have the reader understand that overcoming personality differences for the greater good of the war is essential for success. He achieves that goal by demonstrating that more often than not, Union commanders cooperated with each other and Confederate commanders did not. Cooperation led to maximizing resources which led to victory. Petty arguments led to inflexibility which led to lost battlefield opportunities. Glatthaar’s point to the reader: play nice! Or else.
Glatthaar does veer off the well-worn path in Chapter Six in which he includes Rear Admiral Porter’s relationships with Grant and Sherman. The successful collaborations of these men do not receive the attention they should from scholars who frequently leave Porter out of relationship analyses in examinations of leadership in the Western Theater. The Union strategy depended upon an Army-Navy collaboration. In bringing the Union Navy into context with Grant’s army, Glatthaar piques the reader’s interest to discover more about Porter and the Navy’s roles in implementing General Scott’s Anaconda Plan. But again, his insights are not new. Sherman biographers John S.D. Eisenhower and Robert O’Connell both describe Sherman’s first meeting with Porter in essentially the same way Glatthaar describes in this book.
Unlike his first book, this effort received no awards, with good reason. It reads more as a book of opportunity rather than an extensively researched and well argued text like his first book, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers. Unlike the book’s dust jacket praise, it is not “highly original” or “trail blazing.” It is the path more taken, not less taken. Nonetheless, aside from the ridiculous Appendix on McClellan’s “tragic flaws” as explained by a non-psychologist, Glatthaar’s Partners in Command does provide a good entry level narrative on key leaders in the Civil War. For the history enthusiast beginning a study of command relationships in Union and Confederate militaries, this book is an appropriate starting point. Its value, however, diminishes for the well read Civil War historian. It is not derivative, but it is also not original. It is more of a remake of a classic hit, which is never as good as the original.
Joseph T. Glatthaar is the Stephenson Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and an award-winning author of six books on American military history. In this his second book, he acknowledges his work stemmed from a course at the U.S. Army War College. It shows. While this work likely performed well for a college course, it lacks the depth and insight of William C. Davis’ Crucible of Command: Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee—the War They Fought, the Peace They Forged in analyzing relationships between Grant, Sherman, and Lincoln and between Lee and Davis, and Gary W. Gallagher’s Robert E. Lee and His High Command in explaining the complicated relationships between Lee, Jackson, and Johnston. One chapter in either of those books offers more fresh insight and analysis than Glatthaar’s entire book.
Glatthaar states that industrial resources, political support, and manpower are not sufficient for one side to win a war. Relationships at the highest levels of command are responsible for leveraging those resources, and dysfunctional command relationships at any level can bring down a war effort. He is generally even-handed in describing the personalities which contributed to or detracted from successful command relationships. McClelland was not without his positive attributes and Lee was not flawless. Sherman readily apologized for his slights of colleagues and Porter sidelined his suspicions of the army with evidence of true collaborative intentions. None of the men were perfect and all were complicated. Glatthaar’s intention is to have the reader understand that overcoming personality differences for the greater good of the war is essential for success. He achieves that goal by demonstrating that more often than not, Union commanders cooperated with each other and Confederate commanders did not. Cooperation led to maximizing resources which led to victory. Petty arguments led to inflexibility which led to lost battlefield opportunities. Glatthaar’s point to the reader: play nice! Or else.
Glatthaar does veer off the well-worn path in Chapter Six in which he includes Rear Admiral Porter’s relationships with Grant and Sherman. The successful collaborations of these men do not receive the attention they should from scholars who frequently leave Porter out of relationship analyses in examinations of leadership in the Western Theater. The Union strategy depended upon an Army-Navy collaboration. In bringing the Union Navy into context with Grant’s army, Glatthaar piques the reader’s interest to discover more about Porter and the Navy’s roles in implementing General Scott’s Anaconda Plan. But again, his insights are not new. Sherman biographers John S.D. Eisenhower and Robert O’Connell both describe Sherman’s first meeting with Porter in essentially the same way Glatthaar describes in this book.
Unlike his first book, this effort received no awards, with good reason. It reads more as a book of opportunity rather than an extensively researched and well argued text like his first book, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers. Unlike the book’s dust jacket praise, it is not “highly original” or “trail blazing.” It is the path more taken, not less taken. Nonetheless, aside from the ridiculous Appendix on McClellan’s “tragic flaws” as explained by a non-psychologist, Glatthaar’s Partners in Command does provide a good entry level narrative on key leaders in the Civil War. For the history enthusiast beginning a study of command relationships in Union and Confederate militaries, this book is an appropriate starting point. Its value, however, diminishes for the well read Civil War historian. It is not derivative, but it is also not original. It is more of a remake of a classic hit, which is never as good as the original.
August 15, 2009
Joseph Glatthaars's book is a useful addition to the body of work on Civil War leadership. His thesis is straightforward (Page vii): "Political and military leaders had to collaborate, to establish effective partnerships that could translate strategic vision into battlefield execution. . . . This book is about those command relationships. It focuses on how commanders in chief interact with top field generals and how those officers work with critical subordinates."
In a sense, this book is about the good, the bad, and the ugly. Some very positive relationships (the good): Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson; Ulysses Grant and William Sherman; Grant, Sherman, and David Porter; Grant and Abraham Lincoln. Some bad and ugly relationships: Lincoln and George McClellan; Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston.
The partnerships that worked appear to have facilitated success. Jackson's bizarre behaviors worked well under Lee's leadership. Grant and Sherman worked well together, as they had gown together under adversity. Sherman and Grant were able to collaborate with Porter's navy, to good effect, such as at Vicksburg. Lincoln gave Grant slack when Grant came east that he often did not provide other generals--because of Grant's proven winning record in the west.
On the other hand, the dreadful relationship of Davis and Johnston created serious problems in the west and McClellan's's war of attrition against Lincoln certainly did not help the Union cause in the East.
This represents a useful volume on the subject of command relationships. Not a great deal is new here, but the volume addresses an important issue.
In a sense, this book is about the good, the bad, and the ugly. Some very positive relationships (the good): Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson; Ulysses Grant and William Sherman; Grant, Sherman, and David Porter; Grant and Abraham Lincoln. Some bad and ugly relationships: Lincoln and George McClellan; Jefferson Davis and Joseph Johnston.
The partnerships that worked appear to have facilitated success. Jackson's bizarre behaviors worked well under Lee's leadership. Grant and Sherman worked well together, as they had gown together under adversity. Sherman and Grant were able to collaborate with Porter's navy, to good effect, such as at Vicksburg. Lincoln gave Grant slack when Grant came east that he often did not provide other generals--because of Grant's proven winning record in the west.
On the other hand, the dreadful relationship of Davis and Johnston created serious problems in the west and McClellan's's war of attrition against Lincoln certainly did not help the Union cause in the East.
This represents a useful volume on the subject of command relationships. Not a great deal is new here, but the volume addresses an important issue.
June 21, 2016
The book has an interesting premise, and what there is of it is well written, but because of the structure, there is a lot of repetition. For instance, the story of the fall of Vicksburg is told three times, from different viewpoints but still repetitive. The same is true of some other segments, as we see the fighting in Virginia late in the war from different perspectives, as well as the fighting between Sherman and Johnston in Georgia.
This book would be a good introductory work on command decisions and interactions, but readers who have already read a lot about the relationship between Jefferson Davis and his generals, or Lincoln and his, will have less to learn from this book.
This book would be a good introductory work on command decisions and interactions, but readers who have already read a lot about the relationship between Jefferson Davis and his generals, or Lincoln and his, will have less to learn from this book.
July 24, 2007
Interesting when I first read it, less so if you have already read a lot about the American Civil War. Describes how military commanders and the politicians at the highest levels (lincoln and Jefferson Davis) cooperated or failed to do so, and how those relationships affected the war. The theme is important, but this book doesn't go too deep into the complexities in these relationships. Written for the general reader.
June 25, 2012
Well-written book on the relationships of the Civil War generals. Would recommend this book to any Civil War enthusiast to help them understand the relationships that developed between Lincoln and his generals as well as between Davis and his generals. There is also chapters on the relationships between some of the generals themselves.
December 30, 2020
Partners In Command is a naive and weak piece of work.
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September 1, 2016Nice well read book on the long relationship between two of the giants of World War Two.
September 6, 2015
Great detail. Very well written. Provided great insights.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews