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Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence In World War II
A German patrol wiggles through Russian lines to return with details of Soviet defenses. An expert Luftwaffe interrogator teases secret information from downed Allied airmen. Two spies steal ashore in Maine and make their way into New York City. Filled with episodes of intrigue and adventure, Hitler's Spies reveals the workings of German intelligence—the famed Abwehr, the dreaded SD, the codebreakers, the spies, and the intelligence gatherers of the Foreign Office—and explains its failure to best the Allies. Draws on original documents and extensive interviews.
671 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1978
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About the author
David Kahn
68 books70 followersA specialist on the history of cryptography and military intelligence, David Kahn worked as a reporter and op-ed editor for Newsday until his retirement in 1998, and was selected in 1995 as scholar-in-residence at the National Security Agency. Kahn earned a D.Phil in modern German history from Oxford University in 1974 under the supervision of the then-Regius professor of modern history, Hugh Trevor-Roper.
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Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name. See this thread for more information.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
May 29, 2016
A well written overview of the organization, inner workings and people behind the German intelligence during World War II
In this book, David Kahn offers a detailed overview of the inner workings and apparatus of the Third Reich's intelligence during World War II. The book starts with a much needed overview of all the intelligence departments within the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, but also the NSDAP own departments and that of the SD.
The book is roughly divided in two parts. The first part deals with a description of the various branches, its history and the people behind it. It also explains how with the daily dealings with the enemy the Germans were able to extract much needed intelligence from the Allies. For example, the Eastern armies collected chassis numbers of Russian T34's, and were able to deduce due to the Russian habit of issuing sequential serial numbers the total amount of production and the most important production plants.
The second parts pieces together the reason why the German intelligence wasn't able to predict the Allied landings in North-Africa ("The Biggest Surprise"), completely miss and underestimate the Russian firepower and production at the start of operation Barbarossa ("The Greatest Mistake") and why it was fooled into believing the Allied landings in Normandy were just a diversion and the main landings would take place in the Pas de Calais ("The Ultimate Failure").
In the end the author sums up the main reasons for the failure of the German intelligence: the unjustified German arrogance, which caused Germany to lose touch with reality; the aggression, which led to a neglect of intelligence; the internal power struggle between the different intelligence departments, which led to inefficiency and the autoritarian character of the Nazi state which impaired the intelligence.
All in all, David Kahn delivers a great overview, with a large amount of anecdotes and succeeds in delivering in a solid 4 star read.
In this book, David Kahn offers a detailed overview of the inner workings and apparatus of the Third Reich's intelligence during World War II. The book starts with a much needed overview of all the intelligence departments within the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, but also the NSDAP own departments and that of the SD.
The book is roughly divided in two parts. The first part deals with a description of the various branches, its history and the people behind it. It also explains how with the daily dealings with the enemy the Germans were able to extract much needed intelligence from the Allies. For example, the Eastern armies collected chassis numbers of Russian T34's, and were able to deduce due to the Russian habit of issuing sequential serial numbers the total amount of production and the most important production plants.
The second parts pieces together the reason why the German intelligence wasn't able to predict the Allied landings in North-Africa ("The Biggest Surprise"), completely miss and underestimate the Russian firepower and production at the start of operation Barbarossa ("The Greatest Mistake") and why it was fooled into believing the Allied landings in Normandy were just a diversion and the main landings would take place in the Pas de Calais ("The Ultimate Failure").
In the end the author sums up the main reasons for the failure of the German intelligence: the unjustified German arrogance, which caused Germany to lose touch with reality; the aggression, which led to a neglect of intelligence; the internal power struggle between the different intelligence departments, which led to inefficiency and the autoritarian character of the Nazi state which impaired the intelligence.
All in all, David Kahn delivers a great overview, with a large amount of anecdotes and succeeds in delivering in a solid 4 star read.
May 8, 2019
'Hitler's Spies' details the complex organizational history of what amounted to the German intelligence apparati of 1914-45, their tactical achievements, their strategic failures (USA/USSR underestimation, African/Normandy invasions) and how and why their performance differed so from that of the Allied Powers. The detailing of organizational structures appears thorough--too thorough for the general reader but likely appealing to serious students. The history breaks off after Normandy for no apparent reason. I, for one, would have been interested in role of intelligence in the Battle of the Bulge. Still, this is an intelligent account of what is covered, sufficient to the points perspicatiously elaborated in the author's concluding Epilogue.
August 6, 2016
Gems from the Evil Dictator's Handbook:
1) Surround yourself with people who have everything to lose if it all goes wrong.
2) Set them at each others' throats so they're too busy fighting each other to plot against you.
3) Ensure, on pain of death, that no bad news reaches you. That way you can relax in the knowledge that it's all going swimmingly right up to the moment when everything implodes.
OK, that's a bit flippant but to me it sums up the self-destructive tensions built into a personality-cult governance model and which helped ensure that with intelligence - as in so many other walks of life - the Third Reich's occasional pools of brilliance (for example the B-Dienst radio intercept service) was dissipated, squandered and ignored. Then there was the cultural blend of arrogance and aggression which saw no pressing need for knowledge of the enemy. You don't enquire too deeply about the bug you're about to step on - until it turns out to be a scorpion.
And so to the book. David Kahn's 670-odd meticulously-researched pages work methodically through the German organisations involved in gathering intelligence ('The Finders'), in reviewing and evaluating it ('The Weighers'), then look at three case studies of conspicuous failure (Barbarossa, Torch and Overlord) and conclude with an epilogue which provoked some of the thoughts at the start of this review.
Inevitably it's quite heavy going in places because of the Byzantine organisations he describes and the warped ideology underwriting them. Organisational duplication also means that he has to repeat himself occasionally when he arrives back at the same place from a different direction. Nonetheless it's a valuable reference and will be staying on my shelf.
1) Surround yourself with people who have everything to lose if it all goes wrong.
2) Set them at each others' throats so they're too busy fighting each other to plot against you.
3) Ensure, on pain of death, that no bad news reaches you. That way you can relax in the knowledge that it's all going swimmingly right up to the moment when everything implodes.
OK, that's a bit flippant but to me it sums up the self-destructive tensions built into a personality-cult governance model and which helped ensure that with intelligence - as in so many other walks of life - the Third Reich's occasional pools of brilliance (for example the B-Dienst radio intercept service) was dissipated, squandered and ignored. Then there was the cultural blend of arrogance and aggression which saw no pressing need for knowledge of the enemy. You don't enquire too deeply about the bug you're about to step on - until it turns out to be a scorpion.
And so to the book. David Kahn's 670-odd meticulously-researched pages work methodically through the German organisations involved in gathering intelligence ('The Finders'), in reviewing and evaluating it ('The Weighers'), then look at three case studies of conspicuous failure (Barbarossa, Torch and Overlord) and conclude with an epilogue which provoked some of the thoughts at the start of this review.
Inevitably it's quite heavy going in places because of the Byzantine organisations he describes and the warped ideology underwriting them. Organisational duplication also means that he has to repeat himself occasionally when he arrives back at the same place from a different direction. Nonetheless it's a valuable reference and will be staying on my shelf.
October 30, 2012
A very good look at the German side of the intelligence picture. Goes in depth on the varied organizations, their structures and contributions to the intelligence picture. Kahn does not cover counterintelligence or other intelligence services, but this is stated early on so it's not an oversight. My only complaint is with the last chapter. Kahn breaks down his view of why the German intelligence apparatus failed and draws on the psychology of the Prussian character and the difference between charismatic dictatorships and more bureaucratic liberal democracies among other things. It's speculative and counterproductive, the previous 500 pages make the case perfectly clear, his editorializing is unnecessary. Still, the rest of the book more than compensates for the last chapter.
March 3, 2014
German military intelligence in WWII was a really oxymoronic term. The author did a great job in pointing that out, though the book did get bogged down in details from time to time (I really didn't care what Strasse such-and-such military installation operated out of in Berlin). Overall though, it was a pretty good read, especially the stories of the actual agents.
December 8, 2013
Excellent. A well written overview of German military intelligence in the Second World War.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews