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Anarquía, Estado y utopía
Tratado acerca de la función del Estado moderno, en el que se exponen algunas tesis para la posible creación de un nuevo Estado mínimo, así como una propuesta de integración entre la ética, la filosofía moral y la teoría económica, junto con una posición unificada en materia política.
335 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1974
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18974 people want to read
About the author
Robert Nozick
32 books296 followersRobert Nozick was an American philosopher and professor at Harvard University. He was educated at Columbia (A.B. 1959, summa cum laude), where he studied with Sidney Morgenbesser, at Princeton (Ph.D. 1963), and Oxford as a Fulbright Scholar. He was a prominent American political philosopher in the 1970s and 1980s. He did additional but less influential work in such subjects as decision theory and epistemology. His Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) was a libertarian answer to John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. He was born in Brooklyn, the son of a Jewish entrepreneur from Russia, and married the American poet Gjertrud Schnackenberg. Nozick died in 2002 after a prolonged struggle with cancer. His remains are interred at Mount Auburn Cemetery in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 352 reviews
December 11, 2020
Robert Nozick is a promising young philosophical illusionist whose act at the exclusive Harvard club wows the crowd every night. He can pull a synthetic a priori proposition out of a hat and then juggle six syllogisms while making it all look easy. His patter is excellent and ladies swoon over his boyish good looks. The "Sawing the Rawls in Half" number has already become legendary. The audience knows in advance what's going to happen, but you still hear them gasp when he triumphantly concludes by proving that the best way to make poor people free is to lower rich people's taxes. How did he do that?
It would be churlish to reveal the secrets behind Nozick's tricks. But I do not think I will be expelled from the Philosophical Magic Circle if I tell you to watch the Invisible Hand closely.
It would be churlish to reveal the secrets behind Nozick's tricks. But I do not think I will be expelled from the Philosophical Magic Circle if I tell you to watch the Invisible Hand closely.
March 9, 2019
Absolutely atrocious. Logical flaws, conceptual circles, as well as just completely unaware of how ridiculous it sounds. For example, taxation is equal to slavery because you're being forced into something, but being forced to work in a sweatshop or starve is not a violation of freedom, in fact it's voluntary.
September 26, 2012
This book had a huge impact on me when I read it at the age of 22 as a post-grad student of political philosophy. It is really only know, at the age of 44, that I realise quite how much Bob Nozick's master-work has shaped my thinking on the state, politics and society over the past 22 years.
I came to the book with preconceptions - Nozick was neo-liberal and Hayekian. I was neither. I was a committed socialist with anarchist leanings (a huge dichotomy there which I didn't see at the time!) and deeply in thrall to Marx, Marxism, Marxists and Marxians. So I wanted to hate it, rubbish it, show it up as the propaganda of the 'running dogs of capitalism'!
Well... I couldn't! I got my hands on a pristine copy from the university bookshop ( I still have it, though it's now well-thumbed!) and I spent a week reading it, taking notes and desperately trying to think of counter-arguments. The book was beautifully written, incredibly accessible to the lay-reader ( a big plus for me, have you ever tried reading Jurgen Haabermas?!?), cogently and tightly argued. I didn't want to agree with his arguments but I couldn't help but admire them!
I did write a 'counter-blast' essay based on the premiss that Marx could not be criticised within the paradigm of 'liberal thinking' - ie. that 'the rule of law' , "contracts", and indeed the whole edifice of "liberal democracy" meant nothing to him because they were the means by which the 'ruling class' legitimised their rule and maintained their power. To put it bluntly Marx saw 'Justice' as a bourgeois concept and indeed as a con.
My essay was quite well received but it made me feel queasy, and the more I thought about it the queasier I felt.
So, thanks to Bob Nozick I've abandoned Marx, gone pretty much cool on socialism and come close to embracing the minimal state - it has taken me 22 years to get there mind!
I came to the book with preconceptions - Nozick was neo-liberal and Hayekian. I was neither. I was a committed socialist with anarchist leanings (a huge dichotomy there which I didn't see at the time!) and deeply in thrall to Marx, Marxism, Marxists and Marxians. So I wanted to hate it, rubbish it, show it up as the propaganda of the 'running dogs of capitalism'!
Well... I couldn't! I got my hands on a pristine copy from the university bookshop ( I still have it, though it's now well-thumbed!) and I spent a week reading it, taking notes and desperately trying to think of counter-arguments. The book was beautifully written, incredibly accessible to the lay-reader ( a big plus for me, have you ever tried reading Jurgen Haabermas?!?), cogently and tightly argued. I didn't want to agree with his arguments but I couldn't help but admire them!
I did write a 'counter-blast' essay based on the premiss that Marx could not be criticised within the paradigm of 'liberal thinking' - ie. that 'the rule of law' , "contracts", and indeed the whole edifice of "liberal democracy" meant nothing to him because they were the means by which the 'ruling class' legitimised their rule and maintained their power. To put it bluntly Marx saw 'Justice' as a bourgeois concept and indeed as a con.
My essay was quite well received but it made me feel queasy, and the more I thought about it the queasier I felt.
So, thanks to Bob Nozick I've abandoned Marx, gone pretty much cool on socialism and come close to embracing the minimal state - it has taken me 22 years to get there mind!
October 19, 2014
Most of the negative reviews of this book boil down to "I don't like his conclusions," which is a sure sign of a mediocre thinker. Even if one doesn't like Nozick's assumptions, his argument is logically rigorous, interesting, and warrants your attention (especially if you've read TOJ.) Further, readers should give section three more love. Most people read the anarchy/state sections and stop, but Nozick's theory of utopia might just be the coolest part of this book.
August 2, 2010
ASU is a classic work of political philosophy and is widely considered to be the definitive text defending libertarian political theory, which claims that the only justifiable form of political society is one with minimal government and laissez-faire economic system. The proper role of the state is only to protect the basic (negative) rights of life, liberty, and property. Any other goods or services should be provided by private actions (business or donations), and any redistribution of wealth is a violation of property rights. Robert Nozick is a brilliant philosopher. The book is clearly written and contains many brilliant arguments and insightful challenges to opponents. Nevertheless, the overall view is highly implausible and supported by very weak arguments.
Nozick begins with a thought experiment involving a Lockean state of nature—one composed of morally decent people who recognize and (for the most part) respect absolute natural rights of life, liberty, and property. Each person also has the right to defend himself in any way necessary and to punish anyone who violates her rights. With no state, problems will arise. First, people will not always have the strength or resources to protect themselves. Secondly, the right to punish is likely to lead to problems. Since each person would be judge in her own case, punishments might be excessive, which could lead to retaliation escalating into blood-feuds. So far this is all straight out of Locke’s Second Treaties of Civil Government. The problem is how to enter into political society without violating one’s rights to punish others or rights to property (through taxation).
Nozick speculates that people in this state would agree to band together for their own protection. But such associations would be weak and unreliable. His solution? Private businesses will offer protective services for a fee. People are free to purchase or not purchase protective policies, and the protective agencies will only protect clients and will punish any who violate the rights of their clients. Eventually one protective agency will come to dominate and form a natural monopoly. This will evolve into a de facto state. All of the members of this state will join freely and voluntarily pay for the services. (So there will be fees instead of taxes.)
Nozick defends a laissez-faire form of distribution and argues that any form of redistribution, through taxation and entitlement programs, violates an absolute right to property and amounts to forced labor. Rightful ownership can only come from 1) original acquisition by appropriating previously un-owned objects, 2) free transfer, including trade and gifts, and 3) rectification, whereby we compensate those whose rights have been violated.
Here are just a few of the many problems with Nozick’s theory and the arguments he gives for it. First, in his hypothetical state of nature, where are these private businesses supposed to come from? And what is to keep these protective agencies from becoming private goon squads?
Then there are the obvious general problems with libertarianism and minimal government that Nozick ignores. Though he seems to know a great deal about economics, he avoids familiar criticisms such as that in a minimal state there would be no public goods—no public schools, no fire department, no libraries, and no infrastructure. At one point he even asks, "May the majority voters in a small village pass an ordinance against things that they find offensive being done on the public streets?” An interesting question, but what I want to know is where would these “public streets” come from?! They could only exist if some kind soul spent his personal wealth on building and maintaining the streets and then kindly let everyone use them for free. Also, according to Nozick’s strict laissez-faire theory of distribution, desperate exchanges would be perfectly just. So, for example, if I happen across a stranded motorist out in the desert who will likely die of thirst without assistance, I could give her a ride to town in exchange for her agreeing to be my slave for ten years. Such an exchange would be fair according to Nozick.
Nozick’s criticisms against redistribution also suffer serious flaws. He argues against the idea of any “end state” ideal distribution such as equality or maximum aggregate happiness (utilitarianism). He starts with the now famous Wilt Chamberlain argument. Suppose we achieve whatever (end-state) distribution we consider ideal. Then a bunch of sports fans voluntarily pay to see Wilt Chamberlain play. As a result, each of these fans has a little less money, and Mr. Chamberlain has a lot more. If the distribution was ideal before the game, then this new distribution would be less than ideal. Ultimately, the only way to maintain ideal distribution would be to prevent any exchanges, even voluntary ones. However, there are many ideal (end-state) distributions that are flexible enough to allow for voluntary exchanges. Consider for example a loose equality according to which the richest person has no more than five times the wealth of the poorest person. This would allow for every voluntary exchange except for those that increase the wealth of the richest or decrease the wealth of the poorest.
Nozick argues that the rich do not owe anything to the poor since the poor are not harmed by the wealth of the rich. But this would only be true in a condition of no scarcity. Given a finite amount of wealth, if some have more then others must have less.
Nozick borrows liberally from Locke in framing the arguments for his theory. But he never addresses Rousseau’s criticism of Locke. Rousseau argued that the notion of “property rights” is just a scam that the rich have perpetrated in order to convince others to let them keep what they, or their ancestors, stole. This is especially pertinent when we realize that a curious implication of Nozick’s “entitlement” theory of property is that, in the real world we actually inhabit, no one rightfully owns anything! Rightful ownership must begin by appropriating something not already owned, and can only be transferred by voluntary gift or exchange. But the fact is that virtually every square inch of inhabitable land on the Earth has been stolen by some people at sometime and never returned (and some lands have been stolen many times over). Once property is illegitimately held no amount of time or free transfer can make it legit.
Nozick begins with a thought experiment involving a Lockean state of nature—one composed of morally decent people who recognize and (for the most part) respect absolute natural rights of life, liberty, and property. Each person also has the right to defend himself in any way necessary and to punish anyone who violates her rights. With no state, problems will arise. First, people will not always have the strength or resources to protect themselves. Secondly, the right to punish is likely to lead to problems. Since each person would be judge in her own case, punishments might be excessive, which could lead to retaliation escalating into blood-feuds. So far this is all straight out of Locke’s Second Treaties of Civil Government. The problem is how to enter into political society without violating one’s rights to punish others or rights to property (through taxation).
Nozick speculates that people in this state would agree to band together for their own protection. But such associations would be weak and unreliable. His solution? Private businesses will offer protective services for a fee. People are free to purchase or not purchase protective policies, and the protective agencies will only protect clients and will punish any who violate the rights of their clients. Eventually one protective agency will come to dominate and form a natural monopoly. This will evolve into a de facto state. All of the members of this state will join freely and voluntarily pay for the services. (So there will be fees instead of taxes.)
Nozick defends a laissez-faire form of distribution and argues that any form of redistribution, through taxation and entitlement programs, violates an absolute right to property and amounts to forced labor. Rightful ownership can only come from 1) original acquisition by appropriating previously un-owned objects, 2) free transfer, including trade and gifts, and 3) rectification, whereby we compensate those whose rights have been violated.
Here are just a few of the many problems with Nozick’s theory and the arguments he gives for it. First, in his hypothetical state of nature, where are these private businesses supposed to come from? And what is to keep these protective agencies from becoming private goon squads?
Then there are the obvious general problems with libertarianism and minimal government that Nozick ignores. Though he seems to know a great deal about economics, he avoids familiar criticisms such as that in a minimal state there would be no public goods—no public schools, no fire department, no libraries, and no infrastructure. At one point he even asks, "May the majority voters in a small village pass an ordinance against things that they find offensive being done on the public streets?” An interesting question, but what I want to know is where would these “public streets” come from?! They could only exist if some kind soul spent his personal wealth on building and maintaining the streets and then kindly let everyone use them for free. Also, according to Nozick’s strict laissez-faire theory of distribution, desperate exchanges would be perfectly just. So, for example, if I happen across a stranded motorist out in the desert who will likely die of thirst without assistance, I could give her a ride to town in exchange for her agreeing to be my slave for ten years. Such an exchange would be fair according to Nozick.
Nozick’s criticisms against redistribution also suffer serious flaws. He argues against the idea of any “end state” ideal distribution such as equality or maximum aggregate happiness (utilitarianism). He starts with the now famous Wilt Chamberlain argument. Suppose we achieve whatever (end-state) distribution we consider ideal. Then a bunch of sports fans voluntarily pay to see Wilt Chamberlain play. As a result, each of these fans has a little less money, and Mr. Chamberlain has a lot more. If the distribution was ideal before the game, then this new distribution would be less than ideal. Ultimately, the only way to maintain ideal distribution would be to prevent any exchanges, even voluntary ones. However, there are many ideal (end-state) distributions that are flexible enough to allow for voluntary exchanges. Consider for example a loose equality according to which the richest person has no more than five times the wealth of the poorest person. This would allow for every voluntary exchange except for those that increase the wealth of the richest or decrease the wealth of the poorest.
Nozick argues that the rich do not owe anything to the poor since the poor are not harmed by the wealth of the rich. But this would only be true in a condition of no scarcity. Given a finite amount of wealth, if some have more then others must have less.
Nozick borrows liberally from Locke in framing the arguments for his theory. But he never addresses Rousseau’s criticism of Locke. Rousseau argued that the notion of “property rights” is just a scam that the rich have perpetrated in order to convince others to let them keep what they, or their ancestors, stole. This is especially pertinent when we realize that a curious implication of Nozick’s “entitlement” theory of property is that, in the real world we actually inhabit, no one rightfully owns anything! Rightful ownership must begin by appropriating something not already owned, and can only be transferred by voluntary gift or exchange. But the fact is that virtually every square inch of inhabitable land on the Earth has been stolen by some people at sometime and never returned (and some lands have been stolen many times over). Once property is illegitimately held no amount of time or free transfer can make it legit.
October 10, 2012
This is a work of political philosophy arguing for minimal government, the libertarian counterpart and answer to the liberal John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. This is as far from a popular treatment of the subject (such as say Ayn Rand or the like) as you can get. In other words, yes, this is the work of a professional academic, a Harvard professor of philosophy who wrote the kind of rigorous book used in graduate studies--it even won the National Book Award. It's respectable. But dear God, it made my head hurt. I've decided that now that I'm FREE, FREE, FREE of higher educational study, I can give myself permission not to like this book--despite being sympathetic to its conclusions. It was impenetrable, made far, far too much use of the question mark, and sported passages such as this on page 63:
One may, in defending oneself, draw against the punishment the attacker deserves (which is r X H). So the upper limit of what one may use in self-defense against a doer of harm H is f(H) + r X H. When an amount A in addition to f(H) is expended in self-defense, the punishment which later may be inflicted is reduced by that amount and becomes r X H - A. When r = o, f(H) + r X H reduces to f(H). Finally, there will be some specification of a rule of necessity which requires one not to use more in self-defense than is necessary to repel the attack. If what is necessary is more than f(H) + r X H, there will be a duty to retreat.
It may be once upon a time I could understand this with ease, even stay awake. (And yes, reading this over a few times in isolation, I do get more than a glimmer, but it's not as if the 300 plus pages this goes with is much more engaging.) Hey, I was a political science major and I took a course in (even did well in) symbolic logic. But I guess it takes less than a decade after graduating from university to turn your brain back to mush. This may be a powerful argument for the best form of government. But if one star on Goodreads means "I don't like it," than that's the rating it must get. And believe me, I did want to like this book. But don't mind me, I didn't get Einstein's Theory of Relativity either.
One may, in defending oneself, draw against the punishment the attacker deserves (which is r X H). So the upper limit of what one may use in self-defense against a doer of harm H is f(H) + r X H. When an amount A in addition to f(H) is expended in self-defense, the punishment which later may be inflicted is reduced by that amount and becomes r X H - A. When r = o, f(H) + r X H reduces to f(H). Finally, there will be some specification of a rule of necessity which requires one not to use more in self-defense than is necessary to repel the attack. If what is necessary is more than f(H) + r X H, there will be a duty to retreat.
It may be once upon a time I could understand this with ease, even stay awake. (And yes, reading this over a few times in isolation, I do get more than a glimmer, but it's not as if the 300 plus pages this goes with is much more engaging.) Hey, I was a political science major and I took a course in (even did well in) symbolic logic. But I guess it takes less than a decade after graduating from university to turn your brain back to mush. This may be a powerful argument for the best form of government. But if one star on Goodreads means "I don't like it," than that's the rating it must get. And believe me, I did want to like this book. But don't mind me, I didn't get Einstein's Theory of Relativity either.
June 7, 2022
The book starts with Locke's state of nature and the anarchist's claim that any state is illegitimate, abusive, and immoral. Then assumes a working and perfect economy along with rational, self-interested, free, and perfectly informed economic agents. The main claim is that given only such assumptions along with an Invisible-Hand explanation, the politics and structures of a minimal state will emerge from economics. The additional claim is that such an explanation (i.e., purely from economics and not intended or designed by anyone) also provides legitimacy to this minimalist state. Further, by opposing Rawls' “A Theory of Justice”, Nozick claims that any state more than this minimal state cannot be justified. In the end, Nozick defends the minimal state against the Utopians' dreams of “complicated, but perfect” future states. In fact, Nozick claims that this minimal state is the playground for Utopians to test their projects.
This hyper-rational, hyper-economic, a-historical, self-emergent, and so on explanation of a legitimate minimal state only convinces Harvard-trained economic professors. An old-fashioned anarchist argument against the regular and traditional state seems more convincing to me than this one. I also cannot help thinking “what Hegel or other German theoreticians of the state would say” when reading such purely economic and decision-theory explanations of their Divine State? There is also another doubt lingering while reading this book – is not this the argument that all capitalists want us to believe and the state they want to build in all our societies?
This hyper-rational, hyper-economic, a-historical, self-emergent, and so on explanation of a legitimate minimal state only convinces Harvard-trained economic professors. An old-fashioned anarchist argument against the regular and traditional state seems more convincing to me than this one. I also cannot help thinking “what Hegel or other German theoreticians of the state would say” when reading such purely economic and decision-theory explanations of their Divine State? There is also another doubt lingering while reading this book – is not this the argument that all capitalists want us to believe and the state they want to build in all our societies?
March 3, 2013
The first 40-50 pages were almost unreadable. A few clear statements surrounded by almost impossible to understand or follow statements that just did not seem well connected or to logically prove anything.
I was actually very disappointed, since I had heard so many positive things about the book for over 35 years. I even had some positive memories of when I read some of it about 30 years ago.
Our South Bay Libertarian Book Club discussed the first part last Sunday and almost everyone had similar comments about how disappointing the book was.
One positive: around pages 50-60, he started getting much clearer and more logically connected. But I essentially ran out of time and interest and am not sure I will ever get back to it.
I was actually very disappointed, since I had heard so many positive things about the book for over 35 years. I even had some positive memories of when I read some of it about 30 years ago.
Our South Bay Libertarian Book Club discussed the first part last Sunday and almost everyone had similar comments about how disappointing the book was.
One positive: around pages 50-60, he started getting much clearer and more logically connected. But I essentially ran out of time and interest and am not sure I will ever get back to it.
July 13, 2016
Five stars. Nozick's style is great. He just loves to fool around with various ideas. Most of his conclusions are more like "it seems like logic is suggestive of X" statements. Yet he is also a very formal and dense writer (I don't see these as negatives, especially in this case). He also puts in so many caveats that even his offensive conclusions are not so offensive.
November 25, 2020
who convinced nozick he was a philosopher? seriously, what the fuck is this 😭
there’s just so much stupidity here and needless to say i skimmed through a big chunk of it. i threw up in my mouth at quite a few paragraphs and in others i just laughed because what else could i do??
this stinks... that’s all i have to say
there’s just so much stupidity here and needless to say i skimmed through a big chunk of it. i threw up in my mouth at quite a few paragraphs and in others i just laughed because what else could i do??
this stinks... that’s all i have to say
March 8, 2013
Nozick was a philosopher-for-rent. His theories were built on demand to provide justification for an increasingly unequal society where the richest few control all decisions and accumulate more and more wealth, and the poor wither. The reader is expected to believe that this is how it should be.
If Nozick was smart, he was not honest. If he was honest, he certainly was not smart.
If Nozick was smart, he was not honest. If he was honest, he certainly was not smart.
May 20, 2018
This book is a must-read in order to sharpen your thought.
Philosophy is all about debating in which you have to understand both sides to be able to ‘deconstruct’ whatever you want to deconstruct (under the rule that you must respect both sides!). I think Nozick’s idea is very important as well as Rawls’s idea, both of them really contributed some good ideas to the world of political philosophy.
I like Nozick’s idea (which is radical, but really straight-forward - it draws clear), and I think it can be develop further. It is clear that this book is a rough sketches of what he was thinking... there were some ideas that he didn’t linger on them. T_T I want to read more.
Philosophy is all about debating in which you have to understand both sides to be able to ‘deconstruct’ whatever you want to deconstruct (under the rule that you must respect both sides!). I think Nozick’s idea is very important as well as Rawls’s idea, both of them really contributed some good ideas to the world of political philosophy.
I like Nozick’s idea (which is radical, but really straight-forward - it draws clear), and I think it can be develop further. It is clear that this book is a rough sketches of what he was thinking... there were some ideas that he didn’t linger on them. T_T I want to read more.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 22, 2018
Anarchy, State, and Utopia is supposed to be the single greatest libertarian treatise yet written. That's how I have seen it advertised several times - funnily, never by libertarians. They were introduced to the movement by Ayn Rand, Ron Paul, Murray Rothbard, or Stefan Molyneux, but none that I talked to was introduced to it by Nozick. His reception in the libertarian movement was at best lukewarm. Nor did he start it. He wasn't active in it for long, he didn't have as big a popular or political impact as Milton Friedman, and all the organizations and think tanks were started by others. He himself even wrote his book after a serious of discourses with Rothbard. It's right there on the very first pages.
But surely, Nozick was the only truly intellectual and academic libertarian, right? No, not really. Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek worked on economic theories that won the Nobel Prize. Rothbard was a polymath and received a university education. Hans-Hermann Hoppe learned his ethical methods under Jürgen Habermas and received a degree in philosophy. There are plenty of genuine libertarian intellectuals. Singling out Nozick as the only one is not just dishonest, it's delusional.
What, then, makes him so important? Was his philosophy that great? Again, no. To be sure, he was skillful at deconstructing the arguments of others. He was well read. He could handle extremely abstract concepts. The problem is that he couldn't couldn't construct anything worthwhile, judging by this book, which is after all his most popular one. He suffered from the same problem as John Rawls, in that his ethics have no ontological grounding. His book is by no means terrible, but it was a major disappointment to me.
So much for the abstract, let's look at some concrete problems of this.
The prime one would be the compensation-principle. With it, Nozick demonstrates that a minimal state is compatible with libertarian principles, that you don't have to go all the way towards anarchism like Rothbard did. The idea is that you can violate the freedom of others to reduce a risk they pose, if you fairly compensate them for it.
There is a lot wrong with this principle. For one, how do you figure out the fair price of a coerced exchange? The theory of the fair price is hard enough for voluntary exchanges, and there, you at least have the custom with regards to that price and the production costs of the producer as guidelines. In a coerced exchange, the only custom can be established by the one who does the coercing, and his own costs are only his problem and obviously shouldn't factor into the I think I remember that Nozick did find some solutions to this, but they weren't convincing, just as the solutions to the problem of finding the fair price ultimately all aren't convincing. I know one could possibly object that my argument proves too much, that I would have to reject all compensation for crimes or damages, but here's the thing: Forcing a criminal to restore the state of affairs that existed before his crime is not the same thing as allowing crime if the criminal pays a compensation to his victim. In the former case, the lawful order of things is already broken and must be mended as well as possible, and if that isn't possible, so be it. In the latter case, allowing the criminal to "do his best" isn't acceptable. If you allowed his victim to set the price, on the other hand, they could break the system by charging too high, and then you can just as well abandon your project. If we charge criminals too high in a tort system, so that they refuse to commit any more crime, we will not have broken the system, we will have perfected it. Make of that what you will.
Another huge problem is that Nozick cannot draw any limits that his state may not pass in the pursuit of security. Why not introduce random strip searches, if that significantly increases your security from bomb threats, and you just compensate people for the humiliating experience by paying them well? This was one of the main gripes that Rothbard had with Nozick.
The worst problem, of course, the one I already touched upon at the beginning, is that Nozick made his compensation-principle up. I was confused when he brought it up, waited the rest of the book for him to justify it, but that never happened. He introduced a first principle out of nowhere. Then why should I take this first principle serious? Why should anyone? You can't write a good ethical philosophy without an underlying ontology. You don't have to write a metaphysical treatise first, of course, but at the very least you could not abandon metaphysics. This was also my main point of critique for A Theory of Justice, and is the reason why I will avoid analytical philosophy in the future.
It was also a bad choice by Nozick not to include any section of economics, or any talk about libertarianism from a utilitarian perspective. I have seen a review on here that were little more than collections of photos from the Gilded Age. (On a sidenote, I don't think that same user dismissed Capital by posting photos of dead Kulaks.) The main concerns that most people have with libertarian ideas are utilitarian ones. The day after a tax increase, everyone will accept that taxation is theft and the state a gang of thieves writ large, but tell them the logical implications of this and they will be shocked. Pictures of child workers, poor hospital patients lying outdoors because they can't afford a bed, and workers dying because of unsafe working environments will flood their brains. I can sometimes blame them for their ignorance, when they dress themselves as intellectuals but don't bother to actually read the books outlining the theories they are criticizing. What I cannot blame them for is not accepting libertarian principles because of these images. An ethical system that goes against human nature by turning us either into slaves or heartless slavemasters can be rejected on that ground. Same with one that strives to create freedom, but instead leads straight into slavery. These are weighty, even decisive considerations, and the only way to refute them is by doing the ungrateful job of showing through a proper economic and sociological analysis that things won't be that bad. It's what Rothbard did, Michael Huemer, and what David Friedman primarily focused on. Even Stefan Molyneux took great care to show that the anarchocapitalist vision does not conflict with the laws of reality. Moving away from anarchocapitalists, Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and Ron Paul all talked about the economic aspect of libertarianism, and put a main emphasis on it. Nozick and Ayn Rand are the only ones I know who didn't seem to care much about educating their readers on economics, despite the fact that both seem to have read a lot on the subject. At least Ayn Rand acknowledged the economic side, however. Nozick was just silent on the topic.
I advise the chapter that Rothbard has on Nozicks philosophy in The Ethics of Liberty, as well as the foreword of that same book, in which Hans-Hermann Hoppe compares the impact of both Rothbard and Nozick on the libertarian movement and explains why it was different. I wouldn't recommend Anarchy, State, and Utopia, except maybe for when you want to get random ideas for brainstorming, or need to find a critique on a specific concept. Like I said, it's a mediocre book, not a terrible one, but with so many great books among the competition, why would you pick this one up?
But surely, Nozick was the only truly intellectual and academic libertarian, right? No, not really. Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek worked on economic theories that won the Nobel Prize. Rothbard was a polymath and received a university education. Hans-Hermann Hoppe learned his ethical methods under Jürgen Habermas and received a degree in philosophy. There are plenty of genuine libertarian intellectuals. Singling out Nozick as the only one is not just dishonest, it's delusional.
What, then, makes him so important? Was his philosophy that great? Again, no. To be sure, he was skillful at deconstructing the arguments of others. He was well read. He could handle extremely abstract concepts. The problem is that he couldn't couldn't construct anything worthwhile, judging by this book, which is after all his most popular one. He suffered from the same problem as John Rawls, in that his ethics have no ontological grounding. His book is by no means terrible, but it was a major disappointment to me.
So much for the abstract, let's look at some concrete problems of this.
The prime one would be the compensation-principle. With it, Nozick demonstrates that a minimal state is compatible with libertarian principles, that you don't have to go all the way towards anarchism like Rothbard did. The idea is that you can violate the freedom of others to reduce a risk they pose, if you fairly compensate them for it.
There is a lot wrong with this principle. For one, how do you figure out the fair price of a coerced exchange? The theory of the fair price is hard enough for voluntary exchanges, and there, you at least have the custom with regards to that price and the production costs of the producer as guidelines. In a coerced exchange, the only custom can be established by the one who does the coercing, and his own costs are only his problem and obviously shouldn't factor into the I think I remember that Nozick did find some solutions to this, but they weren't convincing, just as the solutions to the problem of finding the fair price ultimately all aren't convincing. I know one could possibly object that my argument proves too much, that I would have to reject all compensation for crimes or damages, but here's the thing: Forcing a criminal to restore the state of affairs that existed before his crime is not the same thing as allowing crime if the criminal pays a compensation to his victim. In the former case, the lawful order of things is already broken and must be mended as well as possible, and if that isn't possible, so be it. In the latter case, allowing the criminal to "do his best" isn't acceptable. If you allowed his victim to set the price, on the other hand, they could break the system by charging too high, and then you can just as well abandon your project. If we charge criminals too high in a tort system, so that they refuse to commit any more crime, we will not have broken the system, we will have perfected it. Make of that what you will.
Another huge problem is that Nozick cannot draw any limits that his state may not pass in the pursuit of security. Why not introduce random strip searches, if that significantly increases your security from bomb threats, and you just compensate people for the humiliating experience by paying them well? This was one of the main gripes that Rothbard had with Nozick.
The worst problem, of course, the one I already touched upon at the beginning, is that Nozick made his compensation-principle up. I was confused when he brought it up, waited the rest of the book for him to justify it, but that never happened. He introduced a first principle out of nowhere. Then why should I take this first principle serious? Why should anyone? You can't write a good ethical philosophy without an underlying ontology. You don't have to write a metaphysical treatise first, of course, but at the very least you could not abandon metaphysics. This was also my main point of critique for A Theory of Justice, and is the reason why I will avoid analytical philosophy in the future.
It was also a bad choice by Nozick not to include any section of economics, or any talk about libertarianism from a utilitarian perspective. I have seen a review on here that were little more than collections of photos from the Gilded Age. (On a sidenote, I don't think that same user dismissed Capital by posting photos of dead Kulaks.) The main concerns that most people have with libertarian ideas are utilitarian ones. The day after a tax increase, everyone will accept that taxation is theft and the state a gang of thieves writ large, but tell them the logical implications of this and they will be shocked. Pictures of child workers, poor hospital patients lying outdoors because they can't afford a bed, and workers dying because of unsafe working environments will flood their brains. I can sometimes blame them for their ignorance, when they dress themselves as intellectuals but don't bother to actually read the books outlining the theories they are criticizing. What I cannot blame them for is not accepting libertarian principles because of these images. An ethical system that goes against human nature by turning us either into slaves or heartless slavemasters can be rejected on that ground. Same with one that strives to create freedom, but instead leads straight into slavery. These are weighty, even decisive considerations, and the only way to refute them is by doing the ungrateful job of showing through a proper economic and sociological analysis that things won't be that bad. It's what Rothbard did, Michael Huemer, and what David Friedman primarily focused on. Even Stefan Molyneux took great care to show that the anarchocapitalist vision does not conflict with the laws of reality. Moving away from anarchocapitalists, Ludwig von Mises, Milton Friedman and Ron Paul all talked about the economic aspect of libertarianism, and put a main emphasis on it. Nozick and Ayn Rand are the only ones I know who didn't seem to care much about educating their readers on economics, despite the fact that both seem to have read a lot on the subject. At least Ayn Rand acknowledged the economic side, however. Nozick was just silent on the topic.
I advise the chapter that Rothbard has on Nozicks philosophy in The Ethics of Liberty, as well as the foreword of that same book, in which Hans-Hermann Hoppe compares the impact of both Rothbard and Nozick on the libertarian movement and explains why it was different. I wouldn't recommend Anarchy, State, and Utopia, except maybe for when you want to get random ideas for brainstorming, or need to find a critique on a specific concept. Like I said, it's a mediocre book, not a terrible one, but with so many great books among the competition, why would you pick this one up?
April 10, 2008
I wish more libertarians would actually read this book and acknowledge that this is not a road map for policy making or even directly transferable to a non-hypothetical world. Nozick makes a powerful case against re-distribution, but even he points out that his theory only works where distribution has not been unjustly accomplished in the first place. I don't fault him for failing to propose a solution to this conundrum, because he doesn't purport to do so and correctly states that it is for each individual society to address.
Nozick also (justifiably) criticizes Rawls for making assumptions about first principles that are not self-evident; but Nozick does some of this as well and ultimately his step-by-step account of how justice is constituted is far simpler but no more persuasive than Rawls's. It's just a lot more fun to read!
Nozick also (justifiably) criticizes Rawls for making assumptions about first principles that are not self-evident; but Nozick does some of this as well and ultimately his step-by-step account of how justice is constituted is far simpler but no more persuasive than Rawls's. It's just a lot more fun to read!
February 6, 2020
برام دریچهی جدید و حتی غریبی از فلسفهی سیاسی باز کرد.
August 6, 2021
Ormai un grande classico del pensiero occidentale moderno, un lavoro tanto controverso quanto affascinante e difficile da cogliere appieno. La teoria libertaria di Nozick cerca di mettere in crisi e scardinare le basi, sia del comune sentire, che soprattutto, delle piu' consolidate prassi socio-politiche occidentali (sia di sinistra che di destra). Si afferma che lo Stato minimo sia lo Stato piu' esteso che possa essere giustificato (anche moralmente) e che quindi non e', ne' legittimo ne' giustificabile, uno Stato con potere piu' ampio, dove per minimo si intende grosso modo uno stato che deve solo proteggere e tutelare il diritto alla vita, alla proprieta', le liberta' di scelta e di autodeterminazione, avendo il monopolio della forza. La critica al surplus statuale viene portata in totale, e oserei dire, sfrenata difesa della liberta' individuale. Qualsiasi stato piu' esteso di quello minimo violerebbe quindi, secondo Nozick, i diritti delle persone. Persino la concezione della giustizia distributiva e' sotto attacco, e, in ragione della difesa delle singole volonta' (seguendo l'iperativo categorico kantiano), cerca di dimostrarne la non neutralita' e in definitiva la non moralita' (un cascame diretto sarebbe la non liceita' ad esempio della tassazione, tanto meno di quella progressiva). Eretiche o estremistiche quanto si vuole, d'accordo o meno (lo stesso Nozick arrivo' in seguito a rivedere in parte la sua teoria), queste riflessioni hanno il merito di costringere a ragionare su diritti, doveri, benefici, istituzioni che lungi dall'essere scontati, sono storicamente e quotidianamente in divenire, mettendo anche in crisi molti luoghi comuni.
December 5, 2025
This book can feel like a wild ride. Nozick provides an entertaining array of arguments and thought experiments in critique of anarchism, distributive justice, and other political proposals. However, although I myself have a lot of sympathy towards Nozick’s political philosophy, I have doubts the arguments and structure of this book will likely convince many others. Nevertheless, there are undeniably important insights in ASU that I think remain under-appreciated by both leftists and libertarians.
May 11, 2025
There’s a particular kind of philosophical text that manages to sound both reasonable and wildly optimistic at the same time. This is one of them. Written in 1974, it’s now often treated like scripture in libertarian circles, and still taken very seriously in political and legal theory courses. But revisiting it from the present moment makes the whole project feel less like a daring thought experiment and more like a cautionary tale. A very eloquent one, but still.
Nozick’s central argument is famously simple: a minimal night-watchman state, limited to the protection of individual rights, is the only justifiable form of government. Anything more, such as welfare, redistribution, public goods, is a violation of personal liberty. If you acquire something through just means (his entitlement theory), then it’s yours, full stop. Taxation, in this framework, is morally on par with forced labour.
There’s plenty to critique in that on its own terms, but what’s more revealing is how these ideas didn’t just stay on the page- i suspect they have slipped into the real world wearing the hoodie of crypto and quietly began collapsing under their own weight. Cryptocurrency, especially in its early days, was marketed as a libertarian dream: decentralised, antistate, regulation-proof, reliant on voluntary exchange and protected by code, not law. It was Nozick’s minimal state without the state. And what happened?
It cannibalised itself.
If Nozick imagines a society where everyone freely enters into transactions and no one interferes, the crypto world made that literal. Smart contracts, DAOs, decentralised exchanges. And yet rather than producing anything resembling utopia, it produced speculative bubbles, massive fraud, and deeply unequal outcomes, some of which mirrored the very coercive structures libertarianism claimed to escape. The strong didn’t just survive, they consolidated. In practice, decentralisation meant the most technically skilled or well-resourced players took over. Voluntarism? Sure, if you ignore the rampant manipulation, lack of transparency, and the way scams flourished in regulatory vacuums.
That’s not just a failure of implementation. It’s a flaw in the model. The idea that “just acquisition” can be left unexamined, that we don’t need to interrogate the conditions that shape people’s choices or capacity to contract freely, is wishful thinking at best. In crypto, as in Nozick’s theory, there’s no serious account of how power operates beneath the surface of a market. There’s no protection against asymmetry, manipulation, or monopolisation, as long as it happens “consensually.” Consent becomes a hollow word when one side controls the system’s design.
Nozick does anticipate objections, to his credit. He’s aware his theory is vulnerable to historical injustice and makes gestures toward how his framework might incorporate rectification. But it’s all mostly underplayed, left underdeveloped, because to dwell on it would unravel the whole project. You can’t say property is sacred if you admit that the conditions under which it was acquired are tainted. And in the crypto world, it turns out that foundational inequality isn’t a bug, it’s a feature.
Nozick is clever and precise, and the book’s structure is tight. I think there’s something important in taking a theory like this seriously, not just to dismiss it, but to watch what happens when people try to build it into reality. I might have given it three if I hadn’t watched that reality unfold in real time, and fail. Cryptocurrency was a genuine chance for libertarian ideas to operate legally, at scale, and without state interference. It didn’t get sabotaged by external forces. It collapsed under its own logic.
So no, I don’t think we can say libertarianism “hasn’t been tried.” It was. It was coded, deployed, and minted into coins. And if this is what happens when the state backs off and lets voluntary exchanges rule, then Anarchy, State, and Utopia isn’t a blueprint. It’s a warning.
Nozick’s central argument is famously simple: a minimal night-watchman state, limited to the protection of individual rights, is the only justifiable form of government. Anything more, such as welfare, redistribution, public goods, is a violation of personal liberty. If you acquire something through just means (his entitlement theory), then it’s yours, full stop. Taxation, in this framework, is morally on par with forced labour.
There’s plenty to critique in that on its own terms, but what’s more revealing is how these ideas didn’t just stay on the page- i suspect they have slipped into the real world wearing the hoodie of crypto and quietly began collapsing under their own weight. Cryptocurrency, especially in its early days, was marketed as a libertarian dream: decentralised, antistate, regulation-proof, reliant on voluntary exchange and protected by code, not law. It was Nozick’s minimal state without the state. And what happened?
It cannibalised itself.
If Nozick imagines a society where everyone freely enters into transactions and no one interferes, the crypto world made that literal. Smart contracts, DAOs, decentralised exchanges. And yet rather than producing anything resembling utopia, it produced speculative bubbles, massive fraud, and deeply unequal outcomes, some of which mirrored the very coercive structures libertarianism claimed to escape. The strong didn’t just survive, they consolidated. In practice, decentralisation meant the most technically skilled or well-resourced players took over. Voluntarism? Sure, if you ignore the rampant manipulation, lack of transparency, and the way scams flourished in regulatory vacuums.
That’s not just a failure of implementation. It’s a flaw in the model. The idea that “just acquisition” can be left unexamined, that we don’t need to interrogate the conditions that shape people’s choices or capacity to contract freely, is wishful thinking at best. In crypto, as in Nozick’s theory, there’s no serious account of how power operates beneath the surface of a market. There’s no protection against asymmetry, manipulation, or monopolisation, as long as it happens “consensually.” Consent becomes a hollow word when one side controls the system’s design.
Nozick does anticipate objections, to his credit. He’s aware his theory is vulnerable to historical injustice and makes gestures toward how his framework might incorporate rectification. But it’s all mostly underplayed, left underdeveloped, because to dwell on it would unravel the whole project. You can’t say property is sacred if you admit that the conditions under which it was acquired are tainted. And in the crypto world, it turns out that foundational inequality isn’t a bug, it’s a feature.
Nozick is clever and precise, and the book’s structure is tight. I think there’s something important in taking a theory like this seriously, not just to dismiss it, but to watch what happens when people try to build it into reality. I might have given it three if I hadn’t watched that reality unfold in real time, and fail. Cryptocurrency was a genuine chance for libertarian ideas to operate legally, at scale, and without state interference. It didn’t get sabotaged by external forces. It collapsed under its own logic.
So no, I don’t think we can say libertarianism “hasn’t been tried.” It was. It was coded, deployed, and minted into coins. And if this is what happens when the state backs off and lets voluntary exchanges rule, then Anarchy, State, and Utopia isn’t a blueprint. It’s a warning.
April 20, 2020
Por onde começar? Pela afirmação que não tenho o aparato científico (conhecimento) para poder fazer uma avaliação rigorosa do presente.
Tendo afirmado isto e enfatizando o meu estatuto de leiga curiosa, duas notas:
A) a escrita é difícil, as explicações complexas, pouco esclarecedoras, a exigirem releituras várias- -atrevo-me a dizer que a tradução não ajuda;
B) resumindo e concluindo, distribuindo e baralhando, o próprio Nozick é um utópico: entender que neste mundo complexo, um Estado Mínimo que pressupõe cidadãos absolutamente iguais em dignidade, direitos e responsabilidades, com o idêntico peso social e, portanto, susceptíveis de influir no todo e estabelecer as bases do convívio social em igual medida-motivo pelo qual nada mais será preciso ou mesmo desejável para além do referido Estado mínimo, única superação admissível do estado da natureza ou da anarquia -, pode ser muito apelativa mas não corresponde de todo à realidade.
Esta leiga achou difícil ler esta obra, está convencida de não a ter percebido na íntegra mas aprendeu alguma coisa. E só por isso valeu a pena a frustração que foi sentindo e a estupefacção ante alguns exemplos oferecidos ... mas que interpretou, provavelmente com uma boa dose de benevolência, como o sendo para efeitos de ponderação das conclusões em que determinadas linhas de pensamento poderiam desembocar - argumento ad absurdum- e não como propostas que o autor estivesse a fazer como reais hipóteses a solicitar implementação.
Tendo afirmado isto e enfatizando o meu estatuto de leiga curiosa, duas notas:
A) a escrita é difícil, as explicações complexas, pouco esclarecedoras, a exigirem releituras várias- -atrevo-me a dizer que a tradução não ajuda;
B) resumindo e concluindo, distribuindo e baralhando, o próprio Nozick é um utópico: entender que neste mundo complexo, um Estado Mínimo que pressupõe cidadãos absolutamente iguais em dignidade, direitos e responsabilidades, com o idêntico peso social e, portanto, susceptíveis de influir no todo e estabelecer as bases do convívio social em igual medida-motivo pelo qual nada mais será preciso ou mesmo desejável para além do referido Estado mínimo, única superação admissível do estado da natureza ou da anarquia -, pode ser muito apelativa mas não corresponde de todo à realidade.
Esta leiga achou difícil ler esta obra, está convencida de não a ter percebido na íntegra mas aprendeu alguma coisa. E só por isso valeu a pena a frustração que foi sentindo e a estupefacção ante alguns exemplos oferecidos ... mas que interpretou, provavelmente com uma boa dose de benevolência, como o sendo para efeitos de ponderação das conclusões em que determinadas linhas de pensamento poderiam desembocar - argumento ad absurdum- e não como propostas que o autor estivesse a fazer como reais hipóteses a solicitar implementação.
April 27, 2022
This book is divided into three parts. Part I argues that from a state of nature, a minimal state would arise via permissible actions (a minimal state being one that only enforces rights such as property and nonviolence). Part II argues that nothing beyond a minimal state could be morally justified. e.g. redistribution could not be morally justified because it would violate the rights of those taxed to find the redistribution. Part III presents a vision of a utopia where many different communities compete for members, and each person can choose which community to join.
Part I was very interesting. At first I had a lot of trouble figuring out the relevance of what people "may" do in a state of nature, and whether/how it is related to what Nozick thinks would actually happen. Once I understood the main point - if a minimal state would arise via permissible actions, that's an argument in favor of a minimal state - it made a lot more sense. I do wonder exactly how relevant that is to a state that arose in a very different way, especially given Nozick's heavy reliance on how an outcome came to be in determining whether it is just.
Part II didn't really convince me at all, although it was still interesting to think about. It was very unclear to me what Nozick's entitlement theory of justice would say about how we could transition to a just state in the real world. He thinks intial aquisitions of property are only just if they leave enough public property that no one else would miss the acquired property, which seems clearly false in our world. I think that would require a really huge amount of public property that is being put to much less efficient use than it would be if it was all owned by someone? I really don't get it at all, so I'm probably missing something big. Also the retributive principle to right past wrongs was completely underspecified for how we would proceed today given all the huge injustices in humanity's history. (Nozick admits his theory is underspecified. But I'm having trouble evaluating it given that.)
But more fundamentallu, if many people have more than enough for themselves, and others live in complete poverty, isn't it morally required for those who have more than enough to help those who don't? Nozick calls this compassion, and says it should be done by choice, not enforced by the guns of the state. But it seems reasonable to me to enforce morally required actions with the guns of the state.
Nozick also (as far as I can tell) completely missed a major reason why people might support mandatory redistribution without voluntarily donating the same amount on their own. He gives a hypothetical where government enforces redistribution by requiring each "rich person" to mail a check to a specific "poor person" each month. One day, the requirement is abruptly removed. Would any rich person who supported the policy stop sending his check? If so, why? To me the answer is obvious. Each rich person might prefer that every other rich person help the poor, while preferring not to help personally. Each rich person might view the personal cost as worth it to get everyone else to help (which does a lot more total good while costing that rich person nothing) and thus support the policy, but immediately stop sending checks when the requirement ends. Nozick lists some reasons the rich people might stop sending checks, but this is not on his list. His ultimate response is that if the rich people really did unanimously support the policy, they could form a private contract with each other, so I think the real sticking point is what happens if a few rich people don't support the policy. I think if the policy is genuinely helping people who need it, they're being asses and it's okay to force them. Nozick thinks that would violate their rights.
Part III was just way too abstract for me to wrap my head around. My main question is, what makes the world's current nations any different than Nozick's utopian communities? Nozick makes it clear that he thinks his communities could permissibly enforce policies that would be impermissible coming from current nations, but he really doesn't clearly define what the difference would be. Most countries heavily restrict immigration, but Nozick says his communities could also restrict who is allowed to join. Many countries today also restrict emigration, which would be impermissible to Nozick, but many do not. For those that don't, why can't we say that all their laws are permissible because anyone who doesn't like it can leave (provided they can find somewhere to go)? Obviously that's a huge cost, but Nozick mentions that leaving a community in his utopia could be a big cost too. Nozick didn't even discuss how having children would work in his utopia, except to mention it as a tricky problem. I would have liked to see a much more involved discussion of the distinction between a voluntarily formed community and a rights-violating nation.
Part I was very interesting. At first I had a lot of trouble figuring out the relevance of what people "may" do in a state of nature, and whether/how it is related to what Nozick thinks would actually happen. Once I understood the main point - if a minimal state would arise via permissible actions, that's an argument in favor of a minimal state - it made a lot more sense. I do wonder exactly how relevant that is to a state that arose in a very different way, especially given Nozick's heavy reliance on how an outcome came to be in determining whether it is just.
Part II didn't really convince me at all, although it was still interesting to think about. It was very unclear to me what Nozick's entitlement theory of justice would say about how we could transition to a just state in the real world. He thinks intial aquisitions of property are only just if they leave enough public property that no one else would miss the acquired property, which seems clearly false in our world. I think that would require a really huge amount of public property that is being put to much less efficient use than it would be if it was all owned by someone? I really don't get it at all, so I'm probably missing something big. Also the retributive principle to right past wrongs was completely underspecified for how we would proceed today given all the huge injustices in humanity's history. (Nozick admits his theory is underspecified. But I'm having trouble evaluating it given that.)
But more fundamentallu, if many people have more than enough for themselves, and others live in complete poverty, isn't it morally required for those who have more than enough to help those who don't? Nozick calls this compassion, and says it should be done by choice, not enforced by the guns of the state. But it seems reasonable to me to enforce morally required actions with the guns of the state.
Nozick also (as far as I can tell) completely missed a major reason why people might support mandatory redistribution without voluntarily donating the same amount on their own. He gives a hypothetical where government enforces redistribution by requiring each "rich person" to mail a check to a specific "poor person" each month. One day, the requirement is abruptly removed. Would any rich person who supported the policy stop sending his check? If so, why? To me the answer is obvious. Each rich person might prefer that every other rich person help the poor, while preferring not to help personally. Each rich person might view the personal cost as worth it to get everyone else to help (which does a lot more total good while costing that rich person nothing) and thus support the policy, but immediately stop sending checks when the requirement ends. Nozick lists some reasons the rich people might stop sending checks, but this is not on his list. His ultimate response is that if the rich people really did unanimously support the policy, they could form a private contract with each other, so I think the real sticking point is what happens if a few rich people don't support the policy. I think if the policy is genuinely helping people who need it, they're being asses and it's okay to force them. Nozick thinks that would violate their rights.
Part III was just way too abstract for me to wrap my head around. My main question is, what makes the world's current nations any different than Nozick's utopian communities? Nozick makes it clear that he thinks his communities could permissibly enforce policies that would be impermissible coming from current nations, but he really doesn't clearly define what the difference would be. Most countries heavily restrict immigration, but Nozick says his communities could also restrict who is allowed to join. Many countries today also restrict emigration, which would be impermissible to Nozick, but many do not. For those that don't, why can't we say that all their laws are permissible because anyone who doesn't like it can leave (provided they can find somewhere to go)? Obviously that's a huge cost, but Nozick mentions that leaving a community in his utopia could be a big cost too. Nozick didn't even discuss how having children would work in his utopia, except to mention it as a tricky problem. I would have liked to see a much more involved discussion of the distinction between a voluntarily formed community and a rights-violating nation.
September 12, 2023
In many ways this particular book is a fascinating look into the mind of someone who is consciously addressing various contemporary political theories relating to justice and the just state and seeking to provide as solid a defense as possible for a minimal state that preserves the highest degree of liberty possible for people while also addressing the question of utopian states that are common in leftist/liberal ideas for the way the world should be. This is by no means a new debate. Utopia itself (a neologism meaning "no place") is a term that was apparently coined by Sir Thomas More in the 16th century and state of nature debates about the ideal state were part of the general intellectual culture of European and American writings during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, as examples by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others have been immensely popular and influential over the past few hundred years. While it is clear that this book is a contemporary effort that addresses contemporary concerns, this is a book that can go toe to toe with that historical tradition of writings in defense of liberty that address the complex and even contradictory meaning of the freedoms that we seek to attain and maintain.
This book is almost 350 pages long and is divided into three parts and ten chapters. The book begins with a preface and some touching acknowledgments and then moves on to discuss the author's thoughts on the state-of-nature debate and how to find a state without really trying (I), which includes chapters on state-of-nature theory (I), the qualities of the author's view of the state of nature (2), and the issue of moral constraints and the state (3), as well as the problems of prohibition, compensation, and risk (4), the state (5), and some further arguments for the state and what kind of place the state should stop at (6). After that the author discusses the lack of desirability of a state that goes beyond the minimal state (II), including the problem of distributive justice dealing with entitlement theory as well as Rawls' theory (7), the problems of equality, envy, and exploitation (8), and a derivation of hypothetical histories of more than minimal states (9), after which the book ends with a framework for Utopia (III, 10), as well as notes, a bibliography, and an index.
That does not mean that this book is perfect. At times the author is far too obviously motivated by a desire to promote a particular idea and at times the conversation becomes very abstract in the nature of the author's logic. That said, this book does a great job at pointing out that the desire of the state (and those who seek to control or steer the state) to provide for the well-being of the people frequently overestimate their ability to shape others and the legitimacy of so doing. If this book is not quite as pleasant to read as the classic works by writers like Bastiat are, that is because a contemporary reader finds it necessary to address more contemporary arguments that are frequently less pleasant and enjoyable to work their way through because of the problems of contradictory language and deliberate hostility to tradition and violently hostile ideals of the well-being of humanity. In short, this book is one that will greatly inform the reader about the genuine disputes that exist over the ideal state to this day, and a wake-up call to those who thought that such questions have been answered forever in the sort of systems that we now have or those that are pushed by the fashionable idiots of the left.
This book is almost 350 pages long and is divided into three parts and ten chapters. The book begins with a preface and some touching acknowledgments and then moves on to discuss the author's thoughts on the state-of-nature debate and how to find a state without really trying (I), which includes chapters on state-of-nature theory (I), the qualities of the author's view of the state of nature (2), and the issue of moral constraints and the state (3), as well as the problems of prohibition, compensation, and risk (4), the state (5), and some further arguments for the state and what kind of place the state should stop at (6). After that the author discusses the lack of desirability of a state that goes beyond the minimal state (II), including the problem of distributive justice dealing with entitlement theory as well as Rawls' theory (7), the problems of equality, envy, and exploitation (8), and a derivation of hypothetical histories of more than minimal states (9), after which the book ends with a framework for Utopia (III, 10), as well as notes, a bibliography, and an index.
That does not mean that this book is perfect. At times the author is far too obviously motivated by a desire to promote a particular idea and at times the conversation becomes very abstract in the nature of the author's logic. That said, this book does a great job at pointing out that the desire of the state (and those who seek to control or steer the state) to provide for the well-being of the people frequently overestimate their ability to shape others and the legitimacy of so doing. If this book is not quite as pleasant to read as the classic works by writers like Bastiat are, that is because a contemporary reader finds it necessary to address more contemporary arguments that are frequently less pleasant and enjoyable to work their way through because of the problems of contradictory language and deliberate hostility to tradition and violently hostile ideals of the well-being of humanity. In short, this book is one that will greatly inform the reader about the genuine disputes that exist over the ideal state to this day, and a wake-up call to those who thought that such questions have been answered forever in the sort of systems that we now have or those that are pushed by the fashionable idiots of the left.
September 27, 2023
tldr: read chapter 3 Moral Constraints and the State and nothing else
I thought this book would be a classic philosophy book having discovered it through reading about the experience machine (this is part of chapter 3), but realized quickly that the book was more about global politics and the authors attempts at game theory and logical implications than philosophy and morality.
I found some of his claims interesting and agreeable but a lot of them just seemed to be him trying to confuse the reader into agreeing with him and trying to force the reader to believe in low taxes and freedom (GO MURICA). i truly believe that most of his arguments can be refuted if one considers utilitarianism even slightly. Like he literally claims that taxes are bad because you can’t opt out and acknowledges that people are born in good vs bad circumstances but does not see how that means that taxes may be good because rich people can afford to pay and poor people may depend on the social welfare system to live decent lives and have some of the same opportunities provided to those born into rich families.
Finally, I found his comparisons of taxes to slavery contemptible as his argument was that you can’t opt out of either and someone is “stealing” some or most of your profits for their gain. And he talked about how sweat shops and by extension cobalt mining and all those other issues are not the same and they are completely voluntary because there is a possibility to opt out, which sure there may be but many are picking between starving to death and working in sweat shops where they are exploited beyond belief.
I thought this book would be a classic philosophy book having discovered it through reading about the experience machine (this is part of chapter 3), but realized quickly that the book was more about global politics and the authors attempts at game theory and logical implications than philosophy and morality.
I found some of his claims interesting and agreeable but a lot of them just seemed to be him trying to confuse the reader into agreeing with him and trying to force the reader to believe in low taxes and freedom (GO MURICA). i truly believe that most of his arguments can be refuted if one considers utilitarianism even slightly. Like he literally claims that taxes are bad because you can’t opt out and acknowledges that people are born in good vs bad circumstances but does not see how that means that taxes may be good because rich people can afford to pay and poor people may depend on the social welfare system to live decent lives and have some of the same opportunities provided to those born into rich families.
Finally, I found his comparisons of taxes to slavery contemptible as his argument was that you can’t opt out of either and someone is “stealing” some or most of your profits for their gain. And he talked about how sweat shops and by extension cobalt mining and all those other issues are not the same and they are completely voluntary because there is a possibility to opt out, which sure there may be but many are picking between starving to death and working in sweat shops where they are exploited beyond belief.
July 8, 2020
Nozick's work is pornography for the critical thinker, a real meaty treat concerning political philosophy. Largely viewed as a response to John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in fact Nozick responds to or extends any number of theories, though Rawls and his Theory of Justice do form a prominent part. Nozick lays out an argument that a minimal state (more than an ultraminimal state) is both moral and the limit of what could be considered an overarching moral state. That said, he spends part three of his book focused on a Utopian framework, which he describes as a minimal state permitting other subordinate experiments, to include those that are more intrusive, paternalistic, etc.
The first two parts of the book are dense and thorough. Nozick does some heavy thinking and works through problems to their natural outcomes, often to a degree beyond that of other more average authors. For the most part, these two parts are really excellent and spur the reader to do some real thinking of his or her own. There are some minor flaws, though. Nozick tends to reduce situations to a finite series of choices (often three), even though the reader might be able to think of not only additional possibilities, but even conceiving the problem in completely different frameworks and categories. The apparent arbitrariness of some of his arguments derived from choice multiple choice arrangements cause skepticism about their final validity.
The third part is a little disappointing after the strength of the first two. It almost feels like Nozick got tired and said, "To heck with it, that's close enough, they'll get the point," or some such. Not that there aren't some good points in there, but if he had stuck with his method in the first two parts, it would have both carried more weight and provoked deeper thoughts in the reader.
Nozick's assault on Anarchy and Anarchism is pretty brutal; having read at least some of those he mentions, i.e., Murray Rothbard, David Friedman, etc., none of their arguments hold up against Nozick's. Nozick's indictment of more statist solutions is not as comprehensive--that is, he really does not address it at every point it could be, and perhaps no one can really address both the vast number of possibilities in structure as well as the intentions and motivations behind them. However, he conclusively shows that any predetermined "just" final patterned distribution of goods/wealth is untenable; as soon as anyone attempted to spend, consume, use, give away, lose, etc., any of the distributed wealth, the pattern would be broken and would require a still further redistribution to correct again.
Nozick admits the potential problem of past injustices being committed in the original acquisition or in the transfer of assets, but does not focus specifically on it, which is a serious weakness given how ubiquitous the problem is. As Ludwig von Mises correctly realized in his Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis:
All ownership derives from occupation and violence...That all rights derive from violence, all ownership from appropriation or robbery, we may freely admit to those who oppose ownership on considerations of natural law...This the doctrine of natural law has called the war of all against all. The war ends when the actual relation is recognized as one worthy to be maintained. Out of violence emerges law. (pp 42-43)
Given that Nozick admits that "past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them," (p 231) and that Rawls and others are focusing on present situations as arising out of past injustices and requiring correction, this is a genuine weakness in Nozick's overall argument. That the redistribution of wealth is untenable remains, but leaves the moral issue festering.
Nozick confounds "risky" with intentionally malicious, i.e., talks about stealing property as a "risky" behavior, when in fact the risks are getting caught or failing to succeed in the larceny. A theft deliberately carried out isn't some risk like a person driving too fast in traffic who feels himself to be adequately in control--until he isn't. This slippery use of the language tends to undermine otherwise very thoughtfully and thoroughly constructed arguments. Nozick also largely dodges questions of restitution in cases where full restitution is not really possible--i.e., murder. He leaves Libertarian arguments about such things largely unexplored and unchallenged, though he cites some interesting works in his end notes. He casts a generally pessimistic view on deterrence, though he does not thoroughly explore if some level of deterrence is not a benefit worth some cost, even if most would agree no deterrence will be 100 percent effective in all cases--in any event, not all crimes are thoroughly thought through before commission.
Nozick's thinking and arguments jump around a lot and become a lot thinner in the Utopia part of the book (part three). He makes a lot of unsupported assumptions that seem counterfactual in the fact of real world history, probably engaging in the error of mirror-imaging:
No one will choose to be a queen bee...each person prefers being surrounded by a galaxy of persons of diverse excellence and talent equal to his own to the alternative of being the only shining light in a pool of relative mediocrity. All admire each other's individuality, basking in the full development in others of aspects and potentialities of themselves left relatively undeveloped. (p 306)
Like most Libertarians, Nozick skirts around the problem of children. If everything is by consent, what happens to any arrangement when children are brought into it, not through any initiative of their own, and not being asked nor agreeing to specific terms at birth or any time up until the age of majority?
Nozick places a lot of stock in the idea of a filter process, wherein trial-and-error leads to a superior outcome, even if the final goal, destination, or outcome is not known in advance. He shares this optimism with Frédéric Bastiat who explained in Harmonies of Political Economy:
evil has its explanation and its mission, that it checks and limits itself, that it destroys itself by its own action, and that each suffering prevents a greater suffering by repressing the cause of suffering...since man is free, he may choose,--since he may choose, he may be mistaken,--since he may be mistaken, he may suffer...either suffering reacts upon the man who errs, and then it brings Responsibility into play,--or, if it affects others who are free from error, it set in motion the marvelous reactionary machinery of Solidarity. (loc 806)
Contrast this with real history. Refugees from poor, backward, repressed countries flee to more prosperous countries with greater freedom and bring with them the intolerance, corruption, and other evils they flee from. Babies are dying in hospitals in Venezuela today because the people there freely and fairly voted for Hugo Chavez (at least the first time) and got exactly what they asked for. Or, in the words of Robert L. Schuettinger in Forty Centuries Of Wage And Price Controls: How Not To Fight Inflation:
If an historian were to sum up what we have learned from the long history of wage and price controls in this country and in many other around the world, he would have to conclude that the only thing we learn fro history is that we do not learn from history. (p 150)
In other words, filters quite frequently fail in the real world to pass along improvements and weed out the failures. Humans have egos, limited and biased perceptions, carry with them unexamined assumptions, and are quite willing to insist on a conclusion contrary to all available empirical evidence. Add to this the number of psychopaths and sociopaths seeking power over others and quite adept at manipulating even great masses of people, and we see that merely relying on passive filtration is nowhere near adequate in the real world.
It is a great read and borders on a full five-star rating. I only hesitate to add it to my list of "must reads" for almost everyone because both the subject matter and the style are certain to be outside the interest of a great many readers. But for those interested in politics, philosophy, ethics, or a better life, it really is a must read. And for those who enjoy exercising their gray matter for its own sake, this will be a pleasure to read. Nozick no doubt made important and lasting contributions to his field. As for the flaws in his work, it is from these that the next generation of thinkers will have to proceed.
The first two parts of the book are dense and thorough. Nozick does some heavy thinking and works through problems to their natural outcomes, often to a degree beyond that of other more average authors. For the most part, these two parts are really excellent and spur the reader to do some real thinking of his or her own. There are some minor flaws, though. Nozick tends to reduce situations to a finite series of choices (often three), even though the reader might be able to think of not only additional possibilities, but even conceiving the problem in completely different frameworks and categories. The apparent arbitrariness of some of his arguments derived from choice multiple choice arrangements cause skepticism about their final validity.
The third part is a little disappointing after the strength of the first two. It almost feels like Nozick got tired and said, "To heck with it, that's close enough, they'll get the point," or some such. Not that there aren't some good points in there, but if he had stuck with his method in the first two parts, it would have both carried more weight and provoked deeper thoughts in the reader.
Nozick's assault on Anarchy and Anarchism is pretty brutal; having read at least some of those he mentions, i.e., Murray Rothbard, David Friedman, etc., none of their arguments hold up against Nozick's. Nozick's indictment of more statist solutions is not as comprehensive--that is, he really does not address it at every point it could be, and perhaps no one can really address both the vast number of possibilities in structure as well as the intentions and motivations behind them. However, he conclusively shows that any predetermined "just" final patterned distribution of goods/wealth is untenable; as soon as anyone attempted to spend, consume, use, give away, lose, etc., any of the distributed wealth, the pattern would be broken and would require a still further redistribution to correct again.
Nozick admits the potential problem of past injustices being committed in the original acquisition or in the transfer of assets, but does not focus specifically on it, which is a serious weakness given how ubiquitous the problem is. As Ludwig von Mises correctly realized in his Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis:
All ownership derives from occupation and violence...That all rights derive from violence, all ownership from appropriation or robbery, we may freely admit to those who oppose ownership on considerations of natural law...This the doctrine of natural law has called the war of all against all. The war ends when the actual relation is recognized as one worthy to be maintained. Out of violence emerges law. (pp 42-43)
Given that Nozick admits that "past injustices might be so great as to make necessary in the short run a more extensive state in order to rectify them," (p 231) and that Rawls and others are focusing on present situations as arising out of past injustices and requiring correction, this is a genuine weakness in Nozick's overall argument. That the redistribution of wealth is untenable remains, but leaves the moral issue festering.
Nozick confounds "risky" with intentionally malicious, i.e., talks about stealing property as a "risky" behavior, when in fact the risks are getting caught or failing to succeed in the larceny. A theft deliberately carried out isn't some risk like a person driving too fast in traffic who feels himself to be adequately in control--until he isn't. This slippery use of the language tends to undermine otherwise very thoughtfully and thoroughly constructed arguments. Nozick also largely dodges questions of restitution in cases where full restitution is not really possible--i.e., murder. He leaves Libertarian arguments about such things largely unexplored and unchallenged, though he cites some interesting works in his end notes. He casts a generally pessimistic view on deterrence, though he does not thoroughly explore if some level of deterrence is not a benefit worth some cost, even if most would agree no deterrence will be 100 percent effective in all cases--in any event, not all crimes are thoroughly thought through before commission.
Nozick's thinking and arguments jump around a lot and become a lot thinner in the Utopia part of the book (part three). He makes a lot of unsupported assumptions that seem counterfactual in the fact of real world history, probably engaging in the error of mirror-imaging:
No one will choose to be a queen bee...each person prefers being surrounded by a galaxy of persons of diverse excellence and talent equal to his own to the alternative of being the only shining light in a pool of relative mediocrity. All admire each other's individuality, basking in the full development in others of aspects and potentialities of themselves left relatively undeveloped. (p 306)
Like most Libertarians, Nozick skirts around the problem of children. If everything is by consent, what happens to any arrangement when children are brought into it, not through any initiative of their own, and not being asked nor agreeing to specific terms at birth or any time up until the age of majority?
Nozick places a lot of stock in the idea of a filter process, wherein trial-and-error leads to a superior outcome, even if the final goal, destination, or outcome is not known in advance. He shares this optimism with Frédéric Bastiat who explained in Harmonies of Political Economy:
evil has its explanation and its mission, that it checks and limits itself, that it destroys itself by its own action, and that each suffering prevents a greater suffering by repressing the cause of suffering...since man is free, he may choose,--since he may choose, he may be mistaken,--since he may be mistaken, he may suffer...either suffering reacts upon the man who errs, and then it brings Responsibility into play,--or, if it affects others who are free from error, it set in motion the marvelous reactionary machinery of Solidarity. (loc 806)
Contrast this with real history. Refugees from poor, backward, repressed countries flee to more prosperous countries with greater freedom and bring with them the intolerance, corruption, and other evils they flee from. Babies are dying in hospitals in Venezuela today because the people there freely and fairly voted for Hugo Chavez (at least the first time) and got exactly what they asked for. Or, in the words of Robert L. Schuettinger in Forty Centuries Of Wage And Price Controls: How Not To Fight Inflation:
If an historian were to sum up what we have learned from the long history of wage and price controls in this country and in many other around the world, he would have to conclude that the only thing we learn fro history is that we do not learn from history. (p 150)
In other words, filters quite frequently fail in the real world to pass along improvements and weed out the failures. Humans have egos, limited and biased perceptions, carry with them unexamined assumptions, and are quite willing to insist on a conclusion contrary to all available empirical evidence. Add to this the number of psychopaths and sociopaths seeking power over others and quite adept at manipulating even great masses of people, and we see that merely relying on passive filtration is nowhere near adequate in the real world.
It is a great read and borders on a full five-star rating. I only hesitate to add it to my list of "must reads" for almost everyone because both the subject matter and the style are certain to be outside the interest of a great many readers. But for those interested in politics, philosophy, ethics, or a better life, it really is a must read. And for those who enjoy exercising their gray matter for its own sake, this will be a pleasure to read. Nozick no doubt made important and lasting contributions to his field. As for the flaws in his work, it is from these that the next generation of thinkers will have to proceed.
November 11, 2016
This is NOT light reading. Then again, it's a philosophy book, and nobody obliged me to read it. I kept reminding myself of this every time I had to re-read a paragraph for the third time before giving up on understanding it.
So there you have it, I fully admit that whole sections of this book went over my head. But I'm glad I read it. Well, I'm not glad I read Chapter 1, which is entitled "Why State-of-Nature Theory?" I would have understood exactly as much of it if it had been written in Sanskrit. And very often this reads like the rantings of a madman. But a fun madman. A humble, honest madman with some amazing moments of clarity.
Executive summary:
1. Nozick sketches how a protection agency that guarantees its members' safety and/or property within a particular locale, while striving to compensate non-members for potential transgressions by its members, not only is morally justifiable, but also isn't a million miles away from what we call a state. So if you are some type of anarchist who does not like it, you don't have to join (and you and your fellow anarchists obviously can't expect it to look after you) but if you're just some guy who does not have hangups like that and there's a choice of protection agencies you will naturally go for the one that's most effective in the area where you live. So it's a bit of a natural monopoly locally and it's not something too distasteful. And it's a de facto minimal state. So a multitude of such contiguous minimal states can arise without violating anybody's natural rights. Takes him more than 100 pages to prove the statements I'm repeating (potentially mangling) here, but that's the gist of it.
2. There's a couple ways to decide if property is justly distributed: the "historical" and the "patterned." Historical breaks down as follows: justice in acquisition of said property and justice in its transfer. E basta. Patterned comes in as many flavors as you like. Egalitarian is an example of a pattern. Everybody gets the same. Another famous one that Nozick spends some 100 pages refuting is "Rawlsian," namely a distribution that leaves everything alone, except that the guys at the bottom get given a leg up. Nozick goes to town on this one, attacking the concept of the "veil of ignorance" which allegedly generates the Rawlsian distribution. Under this thought experiment, you don't know upfront if you'll be the guy who gets given the good deal or the crappy deal, so you take it easy on the guys at the bottom of the distribution. Nozick argues (convincingly AFAIC) that you can't judge from behind the veil. You'll always look at it from the angle from which you reckon you'll be placed in. Deeply philosophical stuff comes in, such as what your allocation really is. Are your brains part of your allocation? If you're a smart guy how can you think for the stupid guy? That type of deal. I was sold. But the best argument against "patterned" allocations Nozick makes is a lot better than that. Suppose we run the math, we maximise "utility" or "happiness" or whatever, according to our favorite pattern. And then suppose a couple fellows do a deal between them that they both feel is a good deal. Who are we to stop them? It can only be stuff like envy and jealousy driving us, since our allocations are unaffected. In summary, we cannot improve on the "historical" allocation, at least not from the perspective of justice. Much as we can look at the "historical" allocation and say it stinks, it's the one way of doing things that does not contain philosophical inconsistencies.
3. What does the perfect world look like, if there is no "pattern" toward which we need to strive? His answer is a bit of a cop-out. It depends on who you are, Nozick says. "Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russel, Thomas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg, Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner, Socrates, Henry Ford, Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Dass, Gandhi, Sir Edmund Hillary, Raymond Lubitz, Budda, Frank Sinatra, Columbus, Freud, Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you and your parents" might be your idea of the best crowd to hang out with, but they all may have different ideas of who they want to spend time with, what the social contract should be, whether private or public concerns are more important, if art matters, how to raise children etc. etc. So let a thousand flowers bloom, basically.
So here's why I'm glad I read the book. Most importantly, now I know what it does not say. Nozick claims, for example, that he set out to disprove point #1 and that he surprised himself when he couldn't. He does not claim anywhere in the book that things take care of themselves and reach a natural order, he does not say that some type of natural law will impose itself. He just says that the emergence of a minimal state does not violate anybody's rights. Also, while he states in the second part of the book that tax is theft, it's not some type of central tenet of the book. It's something that follows very naturally from proving that there is no such thing as a universally acceptable "pattern" for distribution. But he's almost unhappy that this flows from his arguments. You get the feeling that he wants to come back and look at this. I did, at any rate.
Also, the book is full of little gems. Like a footnote on page 239 that lists eight feelings about property, including the following:
ENVY is to prefer that your neighbor don't have something good if you can't have it
JEALOUSY is to want something you're normally indifferent to if your neighbor has it
GRUDGE is to prefer your neighbor does not have something good you happen to have
SPITE is to be prepared to miss out on something good if this means your neighbor misses out on it as well
Would not want to make it sound like I found this to be a masterpiece. The author claims in the closing pages that he had a pattern in mind all along, but the book is more of a mind-dump than anything else. And very few of the "proofs" offered are airtight and conclusive. It's for the most part proof by enumeration of cases. Except the author himself freely admits that his lists of special cases are almost never exhaustive. And at least half of them are there not to illustrate, but mainly to entertain. To entertain Robert Nozick first, and you the reader if you have the intelligence / patience / spare time to stay with him and have a chuckle. The book could have been a lot more parsimonious in the enumeration of special cases, counterfactuals, thought experiments etc. without losing any of its power. A lot of the time, reading "Anarchy, State and Utopia" feels like needing to hang up on a call from a lonely old relative, but not having the heart to do so.
So this book does not flow in a straight line. Euclid it ain't. It's more like the four color theorem, with half the proofs missing and the professor coming to class reeking of marijuana. I'm nevertheless glad I read it. It was instructive, it was at times entertaining and it made me think.
So there you have it, I fully admit that whole sections of this book went over my head. But I'm glad I read it. Well, I'm not glad I read Chapter 1, which is entitled "Why State-of-Nature Theory?" I would have understood exactly as much of it if it had been written in Sanskrit. And very often this reads like the rantings of a madman. But a fun madman. A humble, honest madman with some amazing moments of clarity.
Executive summary:
1. Nozick sketches how a protection agency that guarantees its members' safety and/or property within a particular locale, while striving to compensate non-members for potential transgressions by its members, not only is morally justifiable, but also isn't a million miles away from what we call a state. So if you are some type of anarchist who does not like it, you don't have to join (and you and your fellow anarchists obviously can't expect it to look after you) but if you're just some guy who does not have hangups like that and there's a choice of protection agencies you will naturally go for the one that's most effective in the area where you live. So it's a bit of a natural monopoly locally and it's not something too distasteful. And it's a de facto minimal state. So a multitude of such contiguous minimal states can arise without violating anybody's natural rights. Takes him more than 100 pages to prove the statements I'm repeating (potentially mangling) here, but that's the gist of it.
2. There's a couple ways to decide if property is justly distributed: the "historical" and the "patterned." Historical breaks down as follows: justice in acquisition of said property and justice in its transfer. E basta. Patterned comes in as many flavors as you like. Egalitarian is an example of a pattern. Everybody gets the same. Another famous one that Nozick spends some 100 pages refuting is "Rawlsian," namely a distribution that leaves everything alone, except that the guys at the bottom get given a leg up. Nozick goes to town on this one, attacking the concept of the "veil of ignorance" which allegedly generates the Rawlsian distribution. Under this thought experiment, you don't know upfront if you'll be the guy who gets given the good deal or the crappy deal, so you take it easy on the guys at the bottom of the distribution. Nozick argues (convincingly AFAIC) that you can't judge from behind the veil. You'll always look at it from the angle from which you reckon you'll be placed in. Deeply philosophical stuff comes in, such as what your allocation really is. Are your brains part of your allocation? If you're a smart guy how can you think for the stupid guy? That type of deal. I was sold. But the best argument against "patterned" allocations Nozick makes is a lot better than that. Suppose we run the math, we maximise "utility" or "happiness" or whatever, according to our favorite pattern. And then suppose a couple fellows do a deal between them that they both feel is a good deal. Who are we to stop them? It can only be stuff like envy and jealousy driving us, since our allocations are unaffected. In summary, we cannot improve on the "historical" allocation, at least not from the perspective of justice. Much as we can look at the "historical" allocation and say it stinks, it's the one way of doing things that does not contain philosophical inconsistencies.
3. What does the perfect world look like, if there is no "pattern" toward which we need to strive? His answer is a bit of a cop-out. It depends on who you are, Nozick says. "Wittgenstein, Elizabeth Taylor, Bertrand Russel, Thomas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsburg, Harry Wolfson, Thoreau, Casey Stengel, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Heffner, Socrates, Henry Ford, Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Dass, Gandhi, Sir Edmund Hillary, Raymond Lubitz, Budda, Frank Sinatra, Columbus, Freud, Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you and your parents" might be your idea of the best crowd to hang out with, but they all may have different ideas of who they want to spend time with, what the social contract should be, whether private or public concerns are more important, if art matters, how to raise children etc. etc. So let a thousand flowers bloom, basically.
So here's why I'm glad I read the book. Most importantly, now I know what it does not say. Nozick claims, for example, that he set out to disprove point #1 and that he surprised himself when he couldn't. He does not claim anywhere in the book that things take care of themselves and reach a natural order, he does not say that some type of natural law will impose itself. He just says that the emergence of a minimal state does not violate anybody's rights. Also, while he states in the second part of the book that tax is theft, it's not some type of central tenet of the book. It's something that follows very naturally from proving that there is no such thing as a universally acceptable "pattern" for distribution. But he's almost unhappy that this flows from his arguments. You get the feeling that he wants to come back and look at this. I did, at any rate.
Also, the book is full of little gems. Like a footnote on page 239 that lists eight feelings about property, including the following:
ENVY is to prefer that your neighbor don't have something good if you can't have it
JEALOUSY is to want something you're normally indifferent to if your neighbor has it
GRUDGE is to prefer your neighbor does not have something good you happen to have
SPITE is to be prepared to miss out on something good if this means your neighbor misses out on it as well
Would not want to make it sound like I found this to be a masterpiece. The author claims in the closing pages that he had a pattern in mind all along, but the book is more of a mind-dump than anything else. And very few of the "proofs" offered are airtight and conclusive. It's for the most part proof by enumeration of cases. Except the author himself freely admits that his lists of special cases are almost never exhaustive. And at least half of them are there not to illustrate, but mainly to entertain. To entertain Robert Nozick first, and you the reader if you have the intelligence / patience / spare time to stay with him and have a chuckle. The book could have been a lot more parsimonious in the enumeration of special cases, counterfactuals, thought experiments etc. without losing any of its power. A lot of the time, reading "Anarchy, State and Utopia" feels like needing to hang up on a call from a lonely old relative, but not having the heart to do so.
So this book does not flow in a straight line. Euclid it ain't. It's more like the four color theorem, with half the proofs missing and the professor coming to class reeking of marijuana. I'm nevertheless glad I read it. It was instructive, it was at times entertaining and it made me think.
January 6, 2016
This book is one of the most unusual in the history of political philosophy, and perhaps one of most brilliant. The author's ideas are thought-provoking and highly original, and he asks the reader to consider arguments, rather than engaging in a "diatribe to convince" (my words here). The author creates a reading atmosphere of intellectual honesty, and this helps to soften the possible uneasiness that some readers might feel in encountering these kinds of arguments for the first time. Some may seem radical and unpalatable for readers of other political persuasions, but any reader who is open to new ideas should find the reading highly interesting. The political philosophy of libertarianism finds its best apology here, but the contents of the book, and the method of presentation will and has found application to other political philosophies, and to legal philosophy.
In the first chapter, the author asks the reader to consider what he calls the "state-of-nature theory". This (Lockean) notion, although archaic in the author's view, allows one to answer whether a state would have to be invented if it did not exist, this being a classical question in liberal political philosophy. The chapter is a detailed justification for pursuing the state-of-nature theory. He holds to the premise that one can only understand the political realm by explaining it in terms of the nonpolitical. He thus begins with the Lockean state of nature concept and uses it to build a justification for the state in the rest of the book.
Most of the discussion in part 1 of the book revolves around the "dominant protective association" in a given geographical area. The author then builds on this in an attempt to justify from a moral perspective "the minimal state". Along the way, one reads about the "ultraminimal state", which has a monopoly over the use of force except that necessary for immediate self-defense, but will not provide protection to those who do not purchase it. The author discusses the tension that arises between the ultraminimal state and those who decide not to participate in it. The game-theoretic, optimization-theoretic approach that the author takes, although not advanced and rigorous from a mathematical standpoint, is very straightforward to follow for those not familiar with the more analytical and formal aspects of many modern treatments of political science.
In part 2 the author attempts to deal with alternatives to the minimal state, such as those proposed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and incorporating the doctrine of "distributive justice". The entitlement-welfare state dialog has not abated in modern political debate, and those who desire an in-depth analysis of these debates will find it in this book. And again, game-theoretic analysis comes into play, although not from a rigorous mathematical standpoint. One of the more interesting discussions in this part concerns the right of individuals to leave a state that they find too compulsory. If a compulsory distribution scheme is the most important, why would a state permit this emigration? Would such an overidding principle of compulsory distribution also permit forced immigration? These are the kinds of questions that the author addresses in the book, and some are left solely for consideration by the reader.
Reader who desire a list of platitudes and endless arguments supporting libertarianism will not find them in this book. Readers though who are not concerned with their political and cognitive equilibrium disturbed will enjoy immensely this book. If it can assist in more careful individual consideration of accepted political doctrine and moral cliches, it has done its job ...and indeed it has.
In the first chapter, the author asks the reader to consider what he calls the "state-of-nature theory". This (Lockean) notion, although archaic in the author's view, allows one to answer whether a state would have to be invented if it did not exist, this being a classical question in liberal political philosophy. The chapter is a detailed justification for pursuing the state-of-nature theory. He holds to the premise that one can only understand the political realm by explaining it in terms of the nonpolitical. He thus begins with the Lockean state of nature concept and uses it to build a justification for the state in the rest of the book.
Most of the discussion in part 1 of the book revolves around the "dominant protective association" in a given geographical area. The author then builds on this in an attempt to justify from a moral perspective "the minimal state". Along the way, one reads about the "ultraminimal state", which has a monopoly over the use of force except that necessary for immediate self-defense, but will not provide protection to those who do not purchase it. The author discusses the tension that arises between the ultraminimal state and those who decide not to participate in it. The game-theoretic, optimization-theoretic approach that the author takes, although not advanced and rigorous from a mathematical standpoint, is very straightforward to follow for those not familiar with the more analytical and formal aspects of many modern treatments of political science.
In part 2 the author attempts to deal with alternatives to the minimal state, such as those proposed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and incorporating the doctrine of "distributive justice". The entitlement-welfare state dialog has not abated in modern political debate, and those who desire an in-depth analysis of these debates will find it in this book. And again, game-theoretic analysis comes into play, although not from a rigorous mathematical standpoint. One of the more interesting discussions in this part concerns the right of individuals to leave a state that they find too compulsory. If a compulsory distribution scheme is the most important, why would a state permit this emigration? Would such an overidding principle of compulsory distribution also permit forced immigration? These are the kinds of questions that the author addresses in the book, and some are left solely for consideration by the reader.
Reader who desire a list of platitudes and endless arguments supporting libertarianism will not find them in this book. Readers though who are not concerned with their political and cognitive equilibrium disturbed will enjoy immensely this book. If it can assist in more careful individual consideration of accepted political doctrine and moral cliches, it has done its job ...and indeed it has.
January 24, 2016
I can't believe this absurd book is the bible of the libertarian right. Honestly, it's intellectually embarrassing—a collection of ridiculous thought experiments built atop absurd assumptions. Nonsense on stilts, as Bentham used to say. One "assume a can-opener" theoretical discussion after another. Assume there's no history! Assume that differing-minded people can just geographically separate from one another! Assume that people possess individual rights for which there can be no exceptions! Assume that people all start with equal endowments of money, etc! Even the famous Wilt Chamberlin passage turns out to be, I think, some kind of elaborate joke. I sort of wonder whether the whole book is a kind of trolling exercise, an insincere set of political provocations from someone happily (free!) riding on the liberal utopia of a Harvard professorship.
October 6, 2024
The reason I keep rereading this book is because I enjoy how Nozick frames and develops his arguments. He sets up supposedly generous straw-men... let's call them flawed steel-men and then proceeds to tear them down in a friendly and encouraging fashion. I enjoy his responses to Rawls. I don't agree with either of them, but they are both pleasurable to spend time with and an antidote to the sloppy unserious mess that generally passes for political thought. Altogether an enjoyable reread.
Recommended for those who don't have to agree to enjoy
Recommended for those who don't have to agree to enjoy
January 25, 2022
حين تقارن حواراتنا حول الهوية والقومية.. بالحوارات حول الحرية، المساواة في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية.. تفهم جزءا من إشكاليتنا.
June 5, 2024
This book was on a beeline for 3 stars until a strong second half pushed it up to 4 stars. Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a very philosophical work, and my inexperience here definitely showed. But the libertarian context was helpful and possibly the life preserver I needed to pull through.
I'm sympathetic to Nozick's points that identify how state action violates peoples rights in most cases. That being said, I'm doubtful the theoretical world he constructs is realistic where a state emerges from the dominant "night watchman" market position and becomes a de facto state given the current dominance of the nation state. In theory, this seems plausible and maybe even the most just method for the emergence of a state, but I struggle to imagine a place in this world where that is possible.
Overall this was a pretty dense work. It felt like it would be best as part of a philosophy, political economy, or even a libertarian philosophy course (if that isn't too specific) at university. However, given my libertarian sympathies, I am glad to have read it nonetheless.
I'm sympathetic to Nozick's points that identify how state action violates peoples rights in most cases. That being said, I'm doubtful the theoretical world he constructs is realistic where a state emerges from the dominant "night watchman" market position and becomes a de facto state given the current dominance of the nation state. In theory, this seems plausible and maybe even the most just method for the emergence of a state, but I struggle to imagine a place in this world where that is possible.
Overall this was a pretty dense work. It felt like it would be best as part of a philosophy, political economy, or even a libertarian philosophy course (if that isn't too specific) at university. However, given my libertarian sympathies, I am glad to have read it nonetheless.
June 9, 2021
Pretty interesting but strange book. Nozick discusses a very wide range of topics, and while it's not always clear why he's talking about certain things, or the philosophical legitimacy of certain claims, the book is quite consistently engaging.
I think if you buy his view of rights as absolutely inviolable, it will be difficult to show why his proposal is false. If you don't buy that view of rights, it is quite easy to show why his proposal is false (our rights may be infringed for the benefit of others).
I think if you buy his view of rights as absolutely inviolable, it will be difficult to show why his proposal is false. If you don't buy that view of rights, it is quite easy to show why his proposal is false (our rights may be infringed for the benefit of others).
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