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Science, Faith and Society
In its concern with science as an essentially human enterprise, Science, Faith and Society makes an original and challenging contribution to the philosophy of science. On its appearance in 1946 the book quickly became the focus of controversy.
Polanyi aims to show that science must be understood as a community of inquirers held together by a common faith; science, he argues, is not the use of "scientific method" but rather consists in a discipline imposed by scientists on themselves in the interests of discovering an objective, impersonal truth. That such truth exists and can be found is part of the scientists' faith. Polanyi maintains that both authoritarianism and scepticism, attacking this faith, are attacking science itself.
Polanyi aims to show that science must be understood as a community of inquirers held together by a common faith; science, he argues, is not the use of "scientific method" but rather consists in a discipline imposed by scientists on themselves in the interests of discovering an objective, impersonal truth. That such truth exists and can be found is part of the scientists' faith. Polanyi maintains that both authoritarianism and scepticism, attacking this faith, are attacking science itself.
96 pages, Paperback
First published August 15, 1964
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About the author
Michael Polanyi
33 books113 followersMichael Polanyi was a Hungarian-British polymath, who made important theoretical contributions to physical chemistry, economics, and philosophy.
His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases.
He argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which if taken seriously undermines humanity's highest achievements.
He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.
His wide-ranging research in physical science included chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction, and adsorption of gases.
He argued that positivism supplies a false account of knowing, which if taken seriously undermines humanity's highest achievements.
He pioneered the theory of fibre diffraction analysis in 1921, and the dislocation theory of plastic deformation of ductile metals and other materials in 1934. He emigrated to Germany, in 1926 becoming a chemistry professor at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, and then in 1933 to England, becoming first a chemistry professor, and then a social sciences professor at the University of Manchester. In 1944 Polanyi was elected to the Royal Society.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
July 19, 2011
As a lead text in the contemporary view on the philosophy of science, this is likely the most succicnt and elegant. This slim volume is divided into three lectures with an introduction that contextualizes the arugment for this reprint. Polanyi, a celebrated physical chemist, was also a startingly insightful philsopher on many different subject. For chemists, it seems the necessarily theoretical aspect of the physical discipline produces some interesting characters, which in some ways is a fact that supports the thesis.
This work is elucidated in three parts. Part one (Science) essentially defines the modern interpretation of science and scientists themselves in a fairly radical way essentially as an art that requires a unique skillset including most importantly an element of well-guided intuition. Science is not just a series of concrete laws or axioms that are systematically proven in some dogmatic fashion but instead is a continual process of examination with occasional lapses into dead ends and mistaken consensus. This view, proceeding the Kuhnian analysis of science by at least a decade, has been supported continually in other independent mediations.
Part two (Faith) is possibly the easiest to misunderstand. Here Polanyi attempts to show how through a historically honed process of master-apprentice teaching coupled with a non-hegemonic operational organization of scientists, the practice and development of science creates an order that on one-hand produces a highly egalitarian group that similarly produces and vettes quality information in a way no other collective has to date. Included in this discussion is a very sound argument for the resilence of science to stand up against psuedo-scientific perspectives such as astrology or creationism and that to deny these fantasies their day in court as it were was more of a threat to science then the fantsies themselves. We can see in this perspective the reason Polanyi describes this as faith; perhaps it is not intended in the religious-ideological sense.
Part three (Society) takes these two conditions of science and shows how in the context of many societies (although liberal democracies appear most-suited in his view) the function of scientific endeavor can bolster other social institutions as a exemplary ideal or even a stark counter-point when the institutions are in an existential crisis. Similarly, society can in turn present dangerous precendents. As the introduction provides a stark example, where the former Soviet Union at one time so redefined the idea of science to a merely dialectical tradition in the Marxist framework of social function that although not tainting the fruits of this work, inhibited the process for free investigation into natural phenomenon. Additional arguments are made against anti-semitic denial of Einsteinian theory by the Nazi regime.
Now approaching thee-quarters of a century later, as a post-modern world comes to past, how do these arguments stand? Frankly, I think this depiction of science if it somehow breaks a previously existing mold is sound indefinitely or at least as an inspirational case should. So the major point of difference would exist in the social connection with science. To be sure, science is never before more under attack then ever before by political and religious ideologues that seek to undermine a tradition of liberal investigation. But as Polanyi shows, that due to being utterly grounded in materialistic and naturalistic investigation and essentially rejecting the transcendental (except as Polanyi discusses in the sense of meaning of truth and its iterations), therefore insulated in practice by political critique, that the attempts to undermine science in the court of public opinion ("climategate") or in its educational foundations (forcing creationism into science textbooks) or interjection of pseudo-scientific ideas into the discourse (climate deniaiers) all of these endevaors will ultimatley fail due to the decentralized power of the scientific community.
The only contemporary threat to science as Polanyi describes in the introduction, as I see it, is the means to turn science into a competitive market dependent on economic resources such as funding or grants so as to define the course of scientific investigation. This currently is a political tool that is being used against scientific communities around the world. Ironically, it is the neoliberal institutions of the world who are attacking the liberal tradition of science in this situation. But even then social and operational organizations are forming to downplay this affront. Journals like PLoS and other schemes of non-restrictive intellectual property initiatives are underway mostly in developing nations. Also, counter-spin organizations such as Union of Concerned Scientists and others are specifically focused on exposing the blatant politicization of science underway in contemporary society.
At the end of the day, this little book made me more proud than any personal triumph or revelation in my own personal journey through science as to why I consider myself a scientist among all -isms I dabble in. This pamphlet should be required reading in any high school science class or at least definitely in any history of science type class at university.
This work is elucidated in three parts. Part one (Science) essentially defines the modern interpretation of science and scientists themselves in a fairly radical way essentially as an art that requires a unique skillset including most importantly an element of well-guided intuition. Science is not just a series of concrete laws or axioms that are systematically proven in some dogmatic fashion but instead is a continual process of examination with occasional lapses into dead ends and mistaken consensus. This view, proceeding the Kuhnian analysis of science by at least a decade, has been supported continually in other independent mediations.
Part two (Faith) is possibly the easiest to misunderstand. Here Polanyi attempts to show how through a historically honed process of master-apprentice teaching coupled with a non-hegemonic operational organization of scientists, the practice and development of science creates an order that on one-hand produces a highly egalitarian group that similarly produces and vettes quality information in a way no other collective has to date. Included in this discussion is a very sound argument for the resilence of science to stand up against psuedo-scientific perspectives such as astrology or creationism and that to deny these fantasies their day in court as it were was more of a threat to science then the fantsies themselves. We can see in this perspective the reason Polanyi describes this as faith; perhaps it is not intended in the religious-ideological sense.
Part three (Society) takes these two conditions of science and shows how in the context of many societies (although liberal democracies appear most-suited in his view) the function of scientific endeavor can bolster other social institutions as a exemplary ideal or even a stark counter-point when the institutions are in an existential crisis. Similarly, society can in turn present dangerous precendents. As the introduction provides a stark example, where the former Soviet Union at one time so redefined the idea of science to a merely dialectical tradition in the Marxist framework of social function that although not tainting the fruits of this work, inhibited the process for free investigation into natural phenomenon. Additional arguments are made against anti-semitic denial of Einsteinian theory by the Nazi regime.
Now approaching thee-quarters of a century later, as a post-modern world comes to past, how do these arguments stand? Frankly, I think this depiction of science if it somehow breaks a previously existing mold is sound indefinitely or at least as an inspirational case should. So the major point of difference would exist in the social connection with science. To be sure, science is never before more under attack then ever before by political and religious ideologues that seek to undermine a tradition of liberal investigation. But as Polanyi shows, that due to being utterly grounded in materialistic and naturalistic investigation and essentially rejecting the transcendental (except as Polanyi discusses in the sense of meaning of truth and its iterations), therefore insulated in practice by political critique, that the attempts to undermine science in the court of public opinion ("climategate") or in its educational foundations (forcing creationism into science textbooks) or interjection of pseudo-scientific ideas into the discourse (climate deniaiers) all of these endevaors will ultimatley fail due to the decentralized power of the scientific community.
The only contemporary threat to science as Polanyi describes in the introduction, as I see it, is the means to turn science into a competitive market dependent on economic resources such as funding or grants so as to define the course of scientific investigation. This currently is a political tool that is being used against scientific communities around the world. Ironically, it is the neoliberal institutions of the world who are attacking the liberal tradition of science in this situation. But even then social and operational organizations are forming to downplay this affront. Journals like PLoS and other schemes of non-restrictive intellectual property initiatives are underway mostly in developing nations. Also, counter-spin organizations such as Union of Concerned Scientists and others are specifically focused on exposing the blatant politicization of science underway in contemporary society.
At the end of the day, this little book made me more proud than any personal triumph or revelation in my own personal journey through science as to why I consider myself a scientist among all -isms I dabble in. This pamphlet should be required reading in any high school science class or at least definitely in any history of science type class at university.
November 3, 2014
First things first: Although Karl Popper had already published his idealised account of science in The Logic of Scientific Discovery some 9 years before these lectures, which ushered in something of a golden age in philosophy of science, Michael Polanyi doesn't seem to have been much affected by it - their Austro-Hungarian origins notwithstanding. Also, even though he shares many insights with Thomas S. Kuhn (who is said to have attended some of Polanyi's lectures anyway), this is not exactly a pre-The Structure of Scientific Revolutions either. Scientific change is not really the central theme of this book. Having said that, it's a very good read.
As a PhD student, I must admit Polanyi gave the best description I've ever seen from a philosopher about actual scientific practice. Science behaves almost exactly the way he says, and I can't help noticing it's in accordance with pragmatist epistemology (he does mention John Dewey at some point) with his anti-scepticism and the belief in social knowledge (two points Charles Sanders Peirce would find all too familiar). If he seems to reduce science to mob mentality, that's because there's some truth to it. We're all flawed anyway.
Now, I would've given this book 4 stars had he not let scientists off the hook so easily (there's hardly any criticism that isn't embedded in several layers of justification saying it could be worse). Also, I'd have given it 5 stars had he offered solutions and ideas to scientists' shortcomings - instead, he just shows freedom and love for truth (loosely defined) are needed to keep science going, which is most definitely correct... but as Paul Karl Feyerabend later pointed out, this shouldn't be taken lightly.
As a PhD student, I must admit Polanyi gave the best description I've ever seen from a philosopher about actual scientific practice. Science behaves almost exactly the way he says, and I can't help noticing it's in accordance with pragmatist epistemology (he does mention John Dewey at some point) with his anti-scepticism and the belief in social knowledge (two points Charles Sanders Peirce would find all too familiar). If he seems to reduce science to mob mentality, that's because there's some truth to it. We're all flawed anyway.
Now, I would've given this book 4 stars had he not let scientists off the hook so easily (there's hardly any criticism that isn't embedded in several layers of justification saying it could be worse). Also, I'd have given it 5 stars had he offered solutions and ideas to scientists' shortcomings - instead, he just shows freedom and love for truth (loosely defined) are needed to keep science going, which is most definitely correct... but as Paul Karl Feyerabend later pointed out, this shouldn't be taken lightly.
July 22, 2017
I picked up and held onto this slim volume from my university days. I took a course from Paul Feyerabend concerning Philosophy of Science. I never came to it until now.
This book treats, among other things, the reasons for denial of science and truth, as well as its effect on society as a whole and science in particular. Structured as three lectures, most of the material concerns how science proceeds with a certain faith in the pursuit of truth. The author posits a generall will to the truth - but not necessarily in all societies through the 'General' efforts of scientists who collectively provide a legitimacy through rigor, debate and verification. The alternatives (be they a belief in the supernatural or an 'official view' provided by an authoritarian state) stifle or outright prevent work in science. Another interesting topic touched: how to talk to and convince others (who due to ideology or irrational beliefs will not accept the findings of scientific research) to accept rational discourse (one needs tolerance and patience.) It bears remembering that depending on what beliefs one starts with, one can reason to different conclusions. Starting with the same premises helps to achieve agreement!
The central lecture concerns the way scientists learn and join that profession and how cranks (those with weird ideas), phoneys and idiots get separated from those with genuine contributions. I prefered the political and general portions of the book to this.
Written in 1946, in the wake of world war II and communist revolution, the particular world view of 'romantic individual excess' (leading to respect for achieving power through strength - and not much else) and 'dialectical materialism' (which only proceeded from premises that already concluded certain basic communist principles, even if these were in no way evident). I personally feel we see a different process today - one which has aspects in common with both fascism and communist anti-rationality. Of primary importance for some are the market outcomes that benefit their interests - truth (and more important general knowledge) takes second place to the power achieved by the specific interests of specific corporations or industrial sectors. The move to subvert discourse for example in the domains of climate research or the health effects of tobacco or glyphosat (round up) arose from clear interests in the industrial sector or more specifically individual corporations in those sectors.
I observe three things related to the book - not covered due to the brevity of the lectures and the desire of the author to make clear and strong points. First, it appears to me easy to subvert aspects (or specific domains) of scientific inquiry without disrupting all of it. Second, the relation of power appears to me now shared so it is not only 'society' and 'government' whose views and behaviors are relevant to the acceptance of rational discourse and respect for the results of scientific inquiry. Finally and most important, the general will towards a kind of social contract and more specifically a will to participate in a collective effort to respectfully discovery the truth (through science and public discourse in general) can and has to a large extent been challenged through casting doubt on institutions. This comes close to the fascist playbook approach of damaging the legitimacy and worth of certain sources by suggesting conspiracies and manipulation on a grand scale.
This book treats, among other things, the reasons for denial of science and truth, as well as its effect on society as a whole and science in particular. Structured as three lectures, most of the material concerns how science proceeds with a certain faith in the pursuit of truth. The author posits a generall will to the truth - but not necessarily in all societies through the 'General' efforts of scientists who collectively provide a legitimacy through rigor, debate and verification. The alternatives (be they a belief in the supernatural or an 'official view' provided by an authoritarian state) stifle or outright prevent work in science. Another interesting topic touched: how to talk to and convince others (who due to ideology or irrational beliefs will not accept the findings of scientific research) to accept rational discourse (one needs tolerance and patience.) It bears remembering that depending on what beliefs one starts with, one can reason to different conclusions. Starting with the same premises helps to achieve agreement!
The central lecture concerns the way scientists learn and join that profession and how cranks (those with weird ideas), phoneys and idiots get separated from those with genuine contributions. I prefered the political and general portions of the book to this.
Written in 1946, in the wake of world war II and communist revolution, the particular world view of 'romantic individual excess' (leading to respect for achieving power through strength - and not much else) and 'dialectical materialism' (which only proceeded from premises that already concluded certain basic communist principles, even if these were in no way evident). I personally feel we see a different process today - one which has aspects in common with both fascism and communist anti-rationality. Of primary importance for some are the market outcomes that benefit their interests - truth (and more important general knowledge) takes second place to the power achieved by the specific interests of specific corporations or industrial sectors. The move to subvert discourse for example in the domains of climate research or the health effects of tobacco or glyphosat (round up) arose from clear interests in the industrial sector or more specifically individual corporations in those sectors.
I observe three things related to the book - not covered due to the brevity of the lectures and the desire of the author to make clear and strong points. First, it appears to me easy to subvert aspects (or specific domains) of scientific inquiry without disrupting all of it. Second, the relation of power appears to me now shared so it is not only 'society' and 'government' whose views and behaviors are relevant to the acceptance of rational discourse and respect for the results of scientific inquiry. Finally and most important, the general will towards a kind of social contract and more specifically a will to participate in a collective effort to respectfully discovery the truth (through science and public discourse in general) can and has to a large extent been challenged through casting doubt on institutions. This comes close to the fascist playbook approach of damaging the legitimacy and worth of certain sources by suggesting conspiracies and manipulation on a grand scale.
May 29, 2025
In this book, philosopher of science and eminent chemist Michael Polanyi warns, scientific inquiry cannot exist without a society and a culture that supports it. That is, science’s light can be extinguished if society decides to stamp it out. The freedom to learn about nature requires not only economic supports but also cultural supports. Writing just after the conclusion of World War II, he argues that scientific progress in Europe needs the foundation of a democratic society. He’s pessimistic about the ability of communist science because it lacks freedom, and despite Sputnik, history proved him correct on that point.
Interestingly, in a sort of postmodern way 30-40 years before postmodern thought, he describes the foundations of science as residing in communities. Science does not progress based on one authority figure but instead from personal knowledge dispersed through dialogue with one’s colleagues. Science’s communal foundations are made clear.
Since community and society play a central role in scientific inquiry, we must also consider the transcendent ideals of religious faith. Polanyi sees theism as compatible with scientific inquiry, which he defines as the determined pursuit of truth. Nonetheless, he eschews religious fundamentalism on the one hand and totalitarian nationalism on the other. He observes that some humans pursue power instead of truth – a fact I realize again and again when I read the newspapers. Although he acknowledges that some historical periods involve shedding prior dogmas, he does not view this nature as central to science’s identity. Rather, the dogged but free pursuit of truth remains.
He does not investigate the economic aspects of science, a realm I’m all too aware of in 21st century America. The pursuit of truth relies on economic funding to accomplish a community’s good, and 75 years after Polanyi described science as “personal knowledge,” team science requires coordinating individuals across many disciplines. His ideals from prior decades can seem slightly out of place in this environment. Nonetheless, I found the book encouraging and thought-provoking. His brilliant insights extend science beyond mere pragmatism. It also underscores the necessity for science to continue to advocate for societies across the globe to be based on liberty for all.
Interestingly, in a sort of postmodern way 30-40 years before postmodern thought, he describes the foundations of science as residing in communities. Science does not progress based on one authority figure but instead from personal knowledge dispersed through dialogue with one’s colleagues. Science’s communal foundations are made clear.
Since community and society play a central role in scientific inquiry, we must also consider the transcendent ideals of religious faith. Polanyi sees theism as compatible with scientific inquiry, which he defines as the determined pursuit of truth. Nonetheless, he eschews religious fundamentalism on the one hand and totalitarian nationalism on the other. He observes that some humans pursue power instead of truth – a fact I realize again and again when I read the newspapers. Although he acknowledges that some historical periods involve shedding prior dogmas, he does not view this nature as central to science’s identity. Rather, the dogged but free pursuit of truth remains.
He does not investigate the economic aspects of science, a realm I’m all too aware of in 21st century America. The pursuit of truth relies on economic funding to accomplish a community’s good, and 75 years after Polanyi described science as “personal knowledge,” team science requires coordinating individuals across many disciplines. His ideals from prior decades can seem slightly out of place in this environment. Nonetheless, I found the book encouraging and thought-provoking. His brilliant insights extend science beyond mere pragmatism. It also underscores the necessity for science to continue to advocate for societies across the globe to be based on liberty for all.
July 22, 2018
We meet here with a new definition of reality. Real is that which is expected to reveal itself indeterminately in the future.
Every interpretation of nature, whether scientific, non-scientific or anti-scientific, is based on some intuitive conception of the general nature of things.
All the efforts of the discoverer are but preparations for the main event of discovery, which eventually takes place—if at all—by a process of spontaneous mental reorganization uncontrolled by conscious effort.
Only if scientists remain loyal to scientific ideals rather than try to achieve success with their fellow scientists can they form a community which will uphold these ideals.
A society refusing to be dedicated to transcendent ideals chooses to be subjected to servitude. Intolerance comes back full cycle. For sceptical empiricism which had once broken the fetters of medieval priestly authority, goes on now to destroy the authority of conscience.
I believe to have shown that the continued pursuit of a major intellectual process by men requires a state of social dedication and also that only in a dedicated society can men live an intellectually and morally acceptable life.
Such an interpretation of society would seem to call for an extension in the direction towards God. If the intellectual and moral tasks of society rest in the last resort on the free consciences of every generation, and these are continually making essentially new additions to our spiritual heritage, we may well assume that they are in continuous communication with the same source which first gave men their society-forming knowledge of abiding things. How near that source is to God I shall not try to conjecture. But I would express my belief that modern man will eventually return to God through the clarification of his cultural and social purposes. Knowledge of reality and the acceptance of obligations which guide our consciences, once firmly realized, will reveal to us God in man and society.
Every interpretation of nature, whether scientific, non-scientific or anti-scientific, is based on some intuitive conception of the general nature of things.
All the efforts of the discoverer are but preparations for the main event of discovery, which eventually takes place—if at all—by a process of spontaneous mental reorganization uncontrolled by conscious effort.
Only if scientists remain loyal to scientific ideals rather than try to achieve success with their fellow scientists can they form a community which will uphold these ideals.
A society refusing to be dedicated to transcendent ideals chooses to be subjected to servitude. Intolerance comes back full cycle. For sceptical empiricism which had once broken the fetters of medieval priestly authority, goes on now to destroy the authority of conscience.
I believe to have shown that the continued pursuit of a major intellectual process by men requires a state of social dedication and also that only in a dedicated society can men live an intellectually and morally acceptable life.
Such an interpretation of society would seem to call for an extension in the direction towards God. If the intellectual and moral tasks of society rest in the last resort on the free consciences of every generation, and these are continually making essentially new additions to our spiritual heritage, we may well assume that they are in continuous communication with the same source which first gave men their society-forming knowledge of abiding things. How near that source is to God I shall not try to conjecture. But I would express my belief that modern man will eventually return to God through the clarification of his cultural and social purposes. Knowledge of reality and the acceptance of obligations which guide our consciences, once firmly realized, will reveal to us God in man and society.
November 12, 2024
This is the type of book that is just not written any more. Polanyi had something to say. He was angry at any form of 'planning' touching the sciences. Concerned about how the Soviet Union was 'managing' fundamental science, he wrote a blistering short book. It is of its time. Yes, it is limited by its time.
But - wow - there are some cracking and profound sentences that slice through history.
“What do we know about the process of scientific intuition?”
Indeed.
Also, the deep separation between the fundamental and applied sciences was an absolute necessity for Polanyi. But - movingly - he saw great synergies between the arts and the sciences.
He was a complex man, writing in a complex time. Whenever I read books from the historic Polanyi - fighting against the Soviet Union - it is always a statement about what we have lost. There is no space for a Polanyi in our universities. That is our tragedy.
But - wow - there are some cracking and profound sentences that slice through history.
“What do we know about the process of scientific intuition?”
Indeed.
Also, the deep separation between the fundamental and applied sciences was an absolute necessity for Polanyi. But - movingly - he saw great synergies between the arts and the sciences.
He was a complex man, writing in a complex time. Whenever I read books from the historic Polanyi - fighting against the Soviet Union - it is always a statement about what we have lost. There is no space for a Polanyi in our universities. That is our tragedy.
October 9, 2022
I had to read it twice to understand it. It's not an easy read, but it gives a very interesting viewpoint on the philosophy of science, namely that all scientists have to rely on some kind of belief.
August 19, 2025
“A judicious public with a quick ear for insincerity of argument is therefore an essential partner in the practice of free controversy.”
And that’s why America is f***ed.
And that’s why America is f***ed.
January 4, 2026
An interesting series of lectures outlining the dependency of science on 'faith in the existence of truth' and how this combination has built modern society.
August 6, 2018
Having read this book I am a bit more sympathetic to some of the confused ideas displayed in Alan Chalmers’ What Is This Thing Called Science?, since here the same sort of confusion is being perpetrated by a very skilled practicing scientist.
Polanyi considers science as a distinct human activity carried out by a self-perpetuating group reminiscent of a Mediaeval guild bound by shared values and is concerned with the features of this group, rather than the more fundamental question of what it means to say we have scientific knowledge of something. This narrower question is an important one, but it is really a question about the sociology of science, rather than the philosophy of science (IMHO), and Polanyi is not convincing in arguing that science deserves to be taken seriously. With the absence of any clearly defined pragmatic criteria for evaluating outcomes, science as defined by Polanyi becomes a belief system like any other belief system grounded in faith and society, with no special claim to authority.
Polanyi claims that all children start out as superstitious followers of authority and need to be educated into scientists, whereas to me (a Peirce fanboy) it seems more likely that children start out inferring the features of their environment through experimentation and are educated to be superstitious followers of authority when they latch onto the fact that these beings sort of like them are valuable sources of information. He is also adamant throughout that science is something fragile that needs to be protected from infestation by cranks and faddists; whereas I am all for its radical democratisation, confident in my own faith that where models that don’t fit the behaviour of the universe butt up against the universe, the universe will win.
I was expecting to like this book, and to find in it a lucid exposition of the usually unverbalised faith in the essential rationality and comprehensibility of the universe that underlies the practice of science. It does have a lot of individual statements I agree with, and I have been happily mining it for quotes[1] - but in putting the ultimate authority in the human conscience instead of in the brutal fact that reality will kill us if the ideas we use to manipulate it are bad, Polanyi opens the door to a Feyerabendian chaos. YMMV...
EDIT: On re-reading I think it is clear that Polanyi adheres to a pre-post-modern view of conscience as a mediator of a Natural Law existing independently of humanity - something quite different from the 21st century individualist 'conscience'. This understanding does not quite throw the doors open wide to a Feyerabendian level of chaos, but appeal to the traditionally-understood conscience *did* give us inter alia the Thirty Years War, so it is almost as bad.
[1] F'rinstance:
“By tolerance I mean here the capacity to listen to an unfair and hostile statement by an opponent in order to discover his sound points as well as the reason for his errors. It is irritating to open our mind wide to a spate of specious argument on the off-chance of catching a grain of truth in it; which, when acknowledged, would strengthen our opponent’s position be even unfairly exploited by him against us. It requires great strength of tolerance to go through with this.”
“The moment, however, a community ceases to be dedicated through its members to transcendent ideals, it can continue to exist undisrupted only by submission to a single centre of unlimited secular power.”
Polanyi considers science as a distinct human activity carried out by a self-perpetuating group reminiscent of a Mediaeval guild bound by shared values and is concerned with the features of this group, rather than the more fundamental question of what it means to say we have scientific knowledge of something. This narrower question is an important one, but it is really a question about the sociology of science, rather than the philosophy of science (IMHO), and Polanyi is not convincing in arguing that science deserves to be taken seriously. With the absence of any clearly defined pragmatic criteria for evaluating outcomes, science as defined by Polanyi becomes a belief system like any other belief system grounded in faith and society, with no special claim to authority.
Polanyi claims that all children start out as superstitious followers of authority and need to be educated into scientists, whereas to me (a Peirce fanboy) it seems more likely that children start out inferring the features of their environment through experimentation and are educated to be superstitious followers of authority when they latch onto the fact that these beings sort of like them are valuable sources of information. He is also adamant throughout that science is something fragile that needs to be protected from infestation by cranks and faddists; whereas I am all for its radical democratisation, confident in my own faith that where models that don’t fit the behaviour of the universe butt up against the universe, the universe will win.
I was expecting to like this book, and to find in it a lucid exposition of the usually unverbalised faith in the essential rationality and comprehensibility of the universe that underlies the practice of science. It does have a lot of individual statements I agree with, and I have been happily mining it for quotes[1] - but in putting the ultimate authority in the human conscience instead of in the brutal fact that reality will kill us if the ideas we use to manipulate it are bad, Polanyi opens the door to a Feyerabendian chaos. YMMV...
EDIT: On re-reading I think it is clear that Polanyi adheres to a pre-post-modern view of conscience as a mediator of a Natural Law existing independently of humanity - something quite different from the 21st century individualist 'conscience'. This understanding does not quite throw the doors open wide to a Feyerabendian level of chaos, but appeal to the traditionally-understood conscience *did* give us inter alia the Thirty Years War, so it is almost as bad.
[1] F'rinstance:
“By tolerance I mean here the capacity to listen to an unfair and hostile statement by an opponent in order to discover his sound points as well as the reason for his errors. It is irritating to open our mind wide to a spate of specious argument on the off-chance of catching a grain of truth in it; which, when acknowledged, would strengthen our opponent’s position be even unfairly exploited by him against us. It requires great strength of tolerance to go through with this.”
“The moment, however, a community ceases to be dedicated through its members to transcendent ideals, it can continue to exist undisrupted only by submission to a single centre of unlimited secular power.”
March 25, 2025
Michael Polanyi’s Science, Faith, and Society may not be the first book people reach for when debating the role of science in modern society, but maybe it should be. In this slim yet profound work, Polanyi—a physical chemist turned philosopher, and one of the last great polymaths—challenges the dominant view of science as a purely objective, algorithmic process. He argues that scientific discovery is, at its core, an act of faith. Not blind faith, but faith in a deeper reality that scientists believe is out there, waiting to be understood.
https://domofutu.substack.com/p/scien...
https://domofutu.substack.com/p/scien...
January 7, 2013
This was good but too short. There's a nagging sense it's unproven, but it's not especially unproved for descriptive political science which is what it really is.
This is a combination of (1) basic political science (Who governs and how?) and (2) a strong reaction to Communist and fascist control of science (then novel.)
It takes a lot of focus to read but is not especially esoteric. There's a lot going on in each sentence.
Probably unfortunate I'm reading it at the same time as Against Method because it is garbling up who is who.
This read like a very simple rejoinder to Popper: "The method of disbelieving every proposition which cannot be verified by definitely prescribed operations would destroy all belief in natural science. And it would destroy, in fact, belief in truth and in the love of truth itself which is the condition of all free thought. The method leads to complete metaphysical nihilism and thus denies the basis for any universally significant manifestation of the human mind." p. 76
This is a combination of (1) basic political science (Who governs and how?) and (2) a strong reaction to Communist and fascist control of science (then novel.)
It takes a lot of focus to read but is not especially esoteric. There's a lot going on in each sentence.
Probably unfortunate I'm reading it at the same time as Against Method because it is garbling up who is who.
This read like a very simple rejoinder to Popper: "The method of disbelieving every proposition which cannot be verified by definitely prescribed operations would destroy all belief in natural science. And it would destroy, in fact, belief in truth and in the love of truth itself which is the condition of all free thought. The method leads to complete metaphysical nihilism and thus denies the basis for any universally significant manifestation of the human mind." p. 76
November 24, 2013
Brilliant analysis of the nature of science, the impossibility of "objective science", and the presuppositions that necessarily govern science, turning science into more of an art form than a rigid process. He argues for the necessity of tradition and the nature of scientific authority, and finally extends his analysis out into society as a whole and looks at how science interacts with other disciplines and society at large.
April 30, 2012
This is a short, but very rich book!
Polanyi makes the case that science is just one of many ways of "knowing" that should be described as "art."
Polanyi makes the case that science is just one of many ways of "knowing" that should be described as "art."
August 1, 2015
Intriguing philosophical theory about the ways in which science is an integral part of our spiritual and communal society
November 27, 2012
Great treatment of the subject matter. Helps one to "connect the dots" in this treatise.
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