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A Soldier Reports
General Westmoreland combines a career biography with a personal history of the American military involvement in Vietnam since 1964
446 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1976
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110 people want to read
About the author
William C. Westmoreland
31 books6 followersGeneral William Childs Westmoreland commanded American military operations in the Vietnam War at its peak (1964–68
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
May 2, 2022
General William Childs Westmoreland served as the commander of American forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. Handsome, impeccable in military appearance, pleasant if somewhat reserved in manner, Westmoreland seemed destined for leadership since his days as First Captain of Cadets at West Point. During the Second World War he distinguished himself as an artillery battalion commander and division chief of staff in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and Northwest Europe. Afterwards, he transferred to the airborne forces and performed effectively in a range of challenging assignments. He served as secretary of the Army General Staff, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, superintendent of the American Military Academy, and commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps – his final post before going to Saigon. Ambitious and politically smart, he associated himself with the military trends of the 1960s, embracing efficient, scientific management in the style of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and introducing counter-insurgency to the West Point curriculum.
If one considers Westmoreland's breadth and depth of experience, one may easily conclude that he was a man who knew what the Americans needed to achieve in Vietnam and how to do this. In practice, the events unfolded differently. Westmoreland came to Saigon to succeed General Paul D. Harkins, whose relationship with American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had turned sour. In the words of Major General Bruce Palmer, Jr. of the Army Staff, Westmoreland was expected to provide in Saigon “a senior experienced strong and tough leader to get behind the advisory effort while General Harkins can devote his main attention to the politico-military sphere.” In reality, instead of studying the complexities and specifics of the Vietnam conflict, Westmoreland spent the better part of his time acting as a mediator between the embassy and the military command, whom there was little love lost between. Whatever coordination there was between Lodge and Harkins happened only thanks to him.
After Harkins was recalled to Washington, Westmoreland took charge of the chaos that reigned in the military command in Saigon without having acquired any in-depth understanding of the specifics of the Vietnam conflict. In his book, he reports, in detail, on his experience as MACV commander in Vietnam, but the narrative is one of consistent glossing over of his mistakes and re-assigning blame to civilian officials in both Saigon and Washington.
Westmoreland is quick to complain that had the Joint Chiefs of Staff given him more freedom of decision-making, American military operations would have achieved better results. Westmoreland and his staff believed that they could prevail over the North Vietnamese through attrition – the higher their body count, the sooner the Viet Cong would surrender. However, because the main goal of the American Army in Vietnam was defensive – to prevent the North Vietnamese men from invading South Vietnam – the American troops were ill-prepared to go on search and destroy missions into the jungle, which was a terrain the enemy knew, but they did not. Furthermore, this tactic depended on engaging the Viet Cong men in battle. The North Vietnamese would not stand and fight, though. Their strategy was to hide and ambush, and when, once in a while, the Americans succeeded in finding them, the losses they inflicted on them impacted the North Vietnamese about as much as a knife cut would impact the surface of soup.
Westmoreland's fascination with General Douglas MacArthur also made me regard his views with suspicion. As is known to those who have read about the Korean conflict, Dugout Doug wanted to win on his own. He did not listen to the Joint Chiefs – or anyone else – and sought to be the supreme commander of the American military effort. Although Westmoreland does not allow himself to behave like MacArthur, similar patterns of thinking are recognizable in his narrative. For instance, he laments that the command of the air force was not in his jurisdiction. He also scorns the American policy-makers' conviction that, in the words of George Clemenceau, warfare is too serious a matter to be left to the generals. Many mistakes of the Vietnam conflict prove the accuracy of Clemenceau's observation, though. The generals, because they were military men and their expertise was fighting, did not give up their militant attitude. They were gung-ho and cruel – Westmoreland saw the usage of napalm as highly helpful for the American operations – and had the non-military officials not reigned them in from time to time, their demands for more men and more equipment would have been incessant.
Of course, Washington did not always give the best advice. I will have to give to Westmoreland that sometimes men completely ignorant of what was going on in Vietnam were put in charge of strategy-making. Westmoreland mentions suggestions that border on ridiculous. For instance, he received a suggestion to inject all Vietnamese in a certain area with phosphorus and order them to stay at home at night. Thus, the Viet Cong agents would be caught because they would sneak out and glow in the dark. I think that entrusting the generals with every aspect of the Vietnam conflict would have still been an unreasonable decision, though.
I also did not like the dismissive attitude towards anti-Vietnam protesters that Westmoreland adopts. It reveals that he could not come to terms with the brutality that the Americans on the home front were protesting against. It becomes obvious that he was angry with them because he could not deny that American soldiers were maiming and slaughtering the Viet Cong guerrillas; that they were receiving Bronze Stars for heroism when the enemies they killed were often girls and women, but he also could not acknowledge these facts.
A SOLDIER REPORTS is not to be taken at face value. This book can give the reader a good understanding of General Westmoreland's character and thinking, but it is ultimately an unconvincing attempt to justify the mistakes that he committed during his time as MACV commander in Vietnam.
If one considers Westmoreland's breadth and depth of experience, one may easily conclude that he was a man who knew what the Americans needed to achieve in Vietnam and how to do this. In practice, the events unfolded differently. Westmoreland came to Saigon to succeed General Paul D. Harkins, whose relationship with American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had turned sour. In the words of Major General Bruce Palmer, Jr. of the Army Staff, Westmoreland was expected to provide in Saigon “a senior experienced strong and tough leader to get behind the advisory effort while General Harkins can devote his main attention to the politico-military sphere.” In reality, instead of studying the complexities and specifics of the Vietnam conflict, Westmoreland spent the better part of his time acting as a mediator between the embassy and the military command, whom there was little love lost between. Whatever coordination there was between Lodge and Harkins happened only thanks to him.
After Harkins was recalled to Washington, Westmoreland took charge of the chaos that reigned in the military command in Saigon without having acquired any in-depth understanding of the specifics of the Vietnam conflict. In his book, he reports, in detail, on his experience as MACV commander in Vietnam, but the narrative is one of consistent glossing over of his mistakes and re-assigning blame to civilian officials in both Saigon and Washington.
Westmoreland is quick to complain that had the Joint Chiefs of Staff given him more freedom of decision-making, American military operations would have achieved better results. Westmoreland and his staff believed that they could prevail over the North Vietnamese through attrition – the higher their body count, the sooner the Viet Cong would surrender. However, because the main goal of the American Army in Vietnam was defensive – to prevent the North Vietnamese men from invading South Vietnam – the American troops were ill-prepared to go on search and destroy missions into the jungle, which was a terrain the enemy knew, but they did not. Furthermore, this tactic depended on engaging the Viet Cong men in battle. The North Vietnamese would not stand and fight, though. Their strategy was to hide and ambush, and when, once in a while, the Americans succeeded in finding them, the losses they inflicted on them impacted the North Vietnamese about as much as a knife cut would impact the surface of soup.
Westmoreland's fascination with General Douglas MacArthur also made me regard his views with suspicion. As is known to those who have read about the Korean conflict, Dugout Doug wanted to win on his own. He did not listen to the Joint Chiefs – or anyone else – and sought to be the supreme commander of the American military effort. Although Westmoreland does not allow himself to behave like MacArthur, similar patterns of thinking are recognizable in his narrative. For instance, he laments that the command of the air force was not in his jurisdiction. He also scorns the American policy-makers' conviction that, in the words of George Clemenceau, warfare is too serious a matter to be left to the generals. Many mistakes of the Vietnam conflict prove the accuracy of Clemenceau's observation, though. The generals, because they were military men and their expertise was fighting, did not give up their militant attitude. They were gung-ho and cruel – Westmoreland saw the usage of napalm as highly helpful for the American operations – and had the non-military officials not reigned them in from time to time, their demands for more men and more equipment would have been incessant.
Of course, Washington did not always give the best advice. I will have to give to Westmoreland that sometimes men completely ignorant of what was going on in Vietnam were put in charge of strategy-making. Westmoreland mentions suggestions that border on ridiculous. For instance, he received a suggestion to inject all Vietnamese in a certain area with phosphorus and order them to stay at home at night. Thus, the Viet Cong agents would be caught because they would sneak out and glow in the dark. I think that entrusting the generals with every aspect of the Vietnam conflict would have still been an unreasonable decision, though.
I also did not like the dismissive attitude towards anti-Vietnam protesters that Westmoreland adopts. It reveals that he could not come to terms with the brutality that the Americans on the home front were protesting against. It becomes obvious that he was angry with them because he could not deny that American soldiers were maiming and slaughtering the Viet Cong guerrillas; that they were receiving Bronze Stars for heroism when the enemies they killed were often girls and women, but he also could not acknowledge these facts.
A SOLDIER REPORTS is not to be taken at face value. This book can give the reader a good understanding of General Westmoreland's character and thinking, but it is ultimately an unconvincing attempt to justify the mistakes that he committed during his time as MACV commander in Vietnam.
May 29, 2017
This book was found in The Colony, Texas Public Library. The book is the memoir of one of America's most controversial military leaders. I found it refreshing to read of his background and upbringing. He briefly covers his days as a cadet at West Point where he graduated in 1936, the horse dawn artillery days, and his role in World War II where he fought with distinction in North Africa and Europe with the Ninth Division. We see his fast rise to a Brigadier General before thirty years of age and later (1952–53) in role in the Korean War. He served as superintendent of West Point (1960–64), attained (1964) the rank of general and commanded (1964–68) U.S. military forces in Vietnam. He then assumed the position of army chief of staff, which he held until his retirement in 1972.
I was saddened as I read Westmoreland’s comments on one of the early killed in action lists that crossed his desk. It included 2LT John J. Pershing III, grandson of World War I supreme commanding general "Blackjack" Pershing. The book looks at the Viet-Nam war from Westmoreland's point of view. It explains his decision making process. It is more than an after action report. It is worth reading if you are a political or military history junkie. His relationship with Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara are not covered in the detail I would have liked. This is the story of a decent man, giving his best to his country in difficult times. Read and reviewed by Jimmie A. Kepler.
I was saddened as I read Westmoreland’s comments on one of the early killed in action lists that crossed his desk. It included 2LT John J. Pershing III, grandson of World War I supreme commanding general "Blackjack" Pershing. The book looks at the Viet-Nam war from Westmoreland's point of view. It explains his decision making process. It is more than an after action report. It is worth reading if you are a political or military history junkie. His relationship with Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara are not covered in the detail I would have liked. This is the story of a decent man, giving his best to his country in difficult times. Read and reviewed by Jimmie A. Kepler.
November 27, 2023
One of the kindest men I have ever known. The greatest general and was a grandfather and mentor to me at a time when the country and I needed him the most. I have read some of the other comments. How sad. The misinformation that was spread for reasons beyond their knowledge. While freedom of speech (spewing propaganda) was one of the many rights we fought and some died for.
-Special Forces Gen.Robert J.Galasso
-Special Forces Gen.Robert J.Galasso
October 3, 2012
A good inside look at how the war was ran militarily / politically detailing Westmoreland’s frustrations with the U.S. administration e.g. not allowing earlier intervention in Cambodia and why he believed in holding onto Khe Sanh.
November 11, 2022
General Westmoreland thinks highly of himself.
Want to read
July 31, 2010Autographed by General Westmoreland.
April 3, 2014
Here I found two typical mistakes Gen.Westmoreland gave in the arguments, under his point of view: fallacy and omission of the war's nature.
December 26, 2009
The second book I read on Vietnam. Dry.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews