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Bismarck and the Development of Germany #1
Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume I: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871
The description for this book, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Volume I: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871, will be forthcoming.
518 pages, Hardcover
First published February 21, 1963
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
April 26, 2020
today we know otto von bismarck primarily for his chart-topping 1989 single, "just a friend." few know that he was also a strategic and tactical genius who united germany and upset the european balance of power. this book tells that story
March 24, 2019
Thorough but readable account
April 30, 2023
This is not an easy read. It is however extremely enlightening. It is the first of a series of 3 books about the life of Otto von Bismarck, and essentially spans the period from his early career to the end of the Franco-Prussian war and the unification of Germany.
Bismarck was a political colossus, whose fingerprints are all over the world we live in today. It is quite possible to draw a line connecting his behaviour in Prussia and subsequently Germany, right through to the world wars. The author discusses in great depth not just what Bismarck did over this period, but also his general political strategy. Here are some points which I found particularly interesting.
- Bismarck was an arch realist. He did not see himself as a great man, and was incredibly conscious of what he could and could not do. “The individual can create nothing - he can only wait until he hears god’s footsteps resounding through events and then spring forward to grasp the helm of his mantle - that is all”
- In this context, he latched on to the sweeping demands for German unification in order to use that political force as a tool for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the conservative cause. “Prussia should deliberately employ the sentiment for national unity to reinforce its foreign policy at the expense of Austria.’ In other words Prussia should appeal directly to German popular opinion and become the vehicle through which German unification could be achieved.
- He did not fool himself about his own skills, nor about other people and what they were up to. He also knew that no human being can know much about the world, and operated on that basis.
- In this context, he did not pay any attention to what other people were saying about him, because he was aware that their opinions would turn on a dime with circumstance.
- As a realist, Bismarck opposed completely the idea of ‘wars of principle’ - he believed that Prussia should go to war only in and for its own interest, and the wars that he did involve Germany in (with Austria in 1866 and with France in 1870/1) were waged in the interest of uniting, respectively, northern and southern Germany.
- From Napoleon I’s mistakes, he learned the idea of ‘wise moderation after great success.’ (ie. he kept former enemies on side with the idea of potentially allying with them later. From Napoleon III’s mistakes, he learned the idea of never spreading falsehoods - he spoke the truth in a deceptive manner, and in this way gained the trust of his contemporaries.
- He was a very patient man. In alignment with his idea of being merely an agent within history’s great sweep, he did not believe in forcing events before they were ripe - hence why he did not incorporate southern Germany until 1871, and even then only by negotiation rather than coercion.
- “In major domestic and foreign affairs… Bismarck likes to provide himself with an alternative in order to be able to decide the same in two opposed directions.” Ie. he knew he could not predict where history would go next, so he would put multiple irons in the fire so as to be able to act in any circumstance. He would also delay decisions until the last moment in order to increase his freedom of action. “The knowledge that his quiver had more than one arrow gave him a confidence that opponents lacked.”
- He did not bluff his opponents, but instead created actual threats which would force them to yield. For example, when the Crimean war broke out, Bismarck encouraged Prussia to station troops on the frontier with Austria and the frontier with Russia - this presented a credible threat to both and could be used as leverage.
- Similarly, with regard to Austria, Bismark set up two new options and behaved aggressively in order to achieve both. Either Austria would be threatened and concede some of her influence to Prussia within the German confederation, or else Prussia would go to war to throw Austria out of Germany and unite the remainder under her own leadership.
- In this context, Prussia is the ‘fulcrum’ of European affairs. By playing other countries and interests off against one another, he was able to increase the concessions obtained from both parties.
- He progressed in stages, attempting at any one stage, only what circumstances would allow, while leaving open the avenue towards the next (Ie. Bismarck designed the North German confederation with the aim that he would be at the centre of it with loads of power. But he concealed this while the southern states had not yet joined Germany, so as not to frighten them off.) ‘Each stage is a halting place if the next is unachievable.’
- In this context, he planned for the future, and concealed his aims while doing so. E.g. Bismarck negotiated peace treaties in 1866, and included a right for German states to abrogate the Zollverein (ie. supportive of localism and therefore likely to be approved). However he then used that right for Prussia to threaten the southern states with termination of the Zollverein, which forced them to make concessions several years later when they were negotiating the terms of unity with Germany.
So as you can see this book focussed as much on political strategy as on history. But the historical aspects are also fascinating, and I would therefore recommend this book to anyone interested in the period.
Bismarck was a political colossus, whose fingerprints are all over the world we live in today. It is quite possible to draw a line connecting his behaviour in Prussia and subsequently Germany, right through to the world wars. The author discusses in great depth not just what Bismarck did over this period, but also his general political strategy. Here are some points which I found particularly interesting.
- Bismarck was an arch realist. He did not see himself as a great man, and was incredibly conscious of what he could and could not do. “The individual can create nothing - he can only wait until he hears god’s footsteps resounding through events and then spring forward to grasp the helm of his mantle - that is all”
- In this context, he latched on to the sweeping demands for German unification in order to use that political force as a tool for the aggrandisement of Prussia and the conservative cause. “Prussia should deliberately employ the sentiment for national unity to reinforce its foreign policy at the expense of Austria.’ In other words Prussia should appeal directly to German popular opinion and become the vehicle through which German unification could be achieved.
- He did not fool himself about his own skills, nor about other people and what they were up to. He also knew that no human being can know much about the world, and operated on that basis.
- In this context, he did not pay any attention to what other people were saying about him, because he was aware that their opinions would turn on a dime with circumstance.
- As a realist, Bismarck opposed completely the idea of ‘wars of principle’ - he believed that Prussia should go to war only in and for its own interest, and the wars that he did involve Germany in (with Austria in 1866 and with France in 1870/1) were waged in the interest of uniting, respectively, northern and southern Germany.
- From Napoleon I’s mistakes, he learned the idea of ‘wise moderation after great success.’ (ie. he kept former enemies on side with the idea of potentially allying with them later. From Napoleon III’s mistakes, he learned the idea of never spreading falsehoods - he spoke the truth in a deceptive manner, and in this way gained the trust of his contemporaries.
- He was a very patient man. In alignment with his idea of being merely an agent within history’s great sweep, he did not believe in forcing events before they were ripe - hence why he did not incorporate southern Germany until 1871, and even then only by negotiation rather than coercion.
- “In major domestic and foreign affairs… Bismarck likes to provide himself with an alternative in order to be able to decide the same in two opposed directions.” Ie. he knew he could not predict where history would go next, so he would put multiple irons in the fire so as to be able to act in any circumstance. He would also delay decisions until the last moment in order to increase his freedom of action. “The knowledge that his quiver had more than one arrow gave him a confidence that opponents lacked.”
- He did not bluff his opponents, but instead created actual threats which would force them to yield. For example, when the Crimean war broke out, Bismarck encouraged Prussia to station troops on the frontier with Austria and the frontier with Russia - this presented a credible threat to both and could be used as leverage.
- Similarly, with regard to Austria, Bismark set up two new options and behaved aggressively in order to achieve both. Either Austria would be threatened and concede some of her influence to Prussia within the German confederation, or else Prussia would go to war to throw Austria out of Germany and unite the remainder under her own leadership.
- In this context, Prussia is the ‘fulcrum’ of European affairs. By playing other countries and interests off against one another, he was able to increase the concessions obtained from both parties.
- He progressed in stages, attempting at any one stage, only what circumstances would allow, while leaving open the avenue towards the next (Ie. Bismarck designed the North German confederation with the aim that he would be at the centre of it with loads of power. But he concealed this while the southern states had not yet joined Germany, so as not to frighten them off.) ‘Each stage is a halting place if the next is unachievable.’
- In this context, he planned for the future, and concealed his aims while doing so. E.g. Bismarck negotiated peace treaties in 1866, and included a right for German states to abrogate the Zollverein (ie. supportive of localism and therefore likely to be approved). However he then used that right for Prussia to threaten the southern states with termination of the Zollverein, which forced them to make concessions several years later when they were negotiating the terms of unity with Germany.
So as you can see this book focussed as much on political strategy as on history. But the historical aspects are also fascinating, and I would therefore recommend this book to anyone interested in the period.
April 27, 2025
Should be more widely known as a political classic. This book is like a tomahawk steak though, full of protein and a solid endeavour. Bismarck grows of greater relevance with each decade.
May 12, 2025
Complicated and not good introduction to topic, better as supplementary reading for greater political understanding. Rarely speaks outside of politics and diplomacy
November 13, 2012
This is a good fairly conventional biography of Bismarck's early career. The focus is on his philosophy and what shaped his political career and the various crises during the period. The book is rather dated and the referenced works are fairly old, from the 30s-60s.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews