Kamal Salibi’s A House of Many Mansions is a comprehensive history of the geographic area now referred to as “Lebanon”. It aims to dispel the misinformation about the region’s past that has arisen since it became a nation in 1920. Salibi’s central idea is that violent conflict in Lebanon will not stop until its inhabitants come to consensus on the nation’s past, but he is optimistic because, despite the decade-long Civil War (at the time), “there has not been a time when the Muslims and Christians of Lebanon have exhibited, on the whole, a keener consciousness of common identity”. His objective, therefore, is to determine why this is.
A large portion of Salibi’s work is devoted to reviewing the history of “Lebanon” and sorting out the historicity of both Christian and Muslim claims. An expert in his subject matter, Salibi is able to provide the reader with a vast array of information. From the evidence, he argues that it is anachronistic for Arab nationalists to claim that Lebanon was ever part of Syria prior to 1920. Instead, the Lebanese region should be seen as having developed somewhat independently of Greater Syria. Two major communities, Muslim Druze and Maronite Christians, grew powerful in the region, with the former dominating for many years, particularly under the rule of the Maan family. The Maronites, however, “at every stage in their history, managed to accommodate to the prevailing political conditions in a manner which secured for them a privileged position”, and soon they were able to leverage their connections (among other things) to gain the upper hand under the Shihabi dynasty.
With that said, however, Salibi rejects Henri Lammens’ famous conception of Lebanon as having a historical identity as a refuge for persecuted Syrians, a notion that was used by the French during the mandatory period to justify their creation of an independent state. He also discredits the idea of Phoenicianism (Lebanon as having had a distinct, continual historical identity since the time of the Phoenicians), demonstrating that “between ancient Phoenicia and the Lebanon of medieval and modern times, there is no demonstrable historical connection” and “[n]ot a single institution or tradition of medieval or modern Lebanon can be legitimately traced back to ancient Phoenicia”. Throughout his book he makes an effort to dispel many others myths, old and new, about the history of the region. He denies, for example, that two of the most important figures, Fakhir-al-din Maan and Bashir Shihab II, could be considered founders of a modern Lebanon, arguing that both were strongmen and functionaries of the Ottoman Empire, and that their autonomy and feudal organization has been exaggerated.
Salibi argues that, since the founding of the Lebanese state, the locus of conflict has been the ideological (and, often, physical) battle between Arab nationalism and Lebanism. Lebanese citizens and leaders alike were more concerned with the “game” of Lebanese politics than national interests, while government representatives ignored constituents to cater to the demands of capitalist investors. In a system fractured by tribalism, these representatives then blamed hostility from other sects for the dearth of progress in their own constituencies. A lack of a common vision of the past has hindered the development of a sense of political community, but Salibi concludes that, based on an honest examination of the region’s past, there exists a foundation for a unified national history. With the realization that neither side can force their version of the past on the other, plus Arab concessions to Lebanon existing in the form it does today, “one need not invent a special history for Lebanon”. Christian Arabs, he argues, have more in common with Muslim Arabs than Western Christians, with a history that cannot be understood outside of the Islamic context, and this relationship is what forms the base of the Lebanese state. It is this understanding, he argues, that is necessary for the nation to move forward and put a final stop to its internal conflicts.
Salibi is well-versed in his subject matter and presents large amounts of information in quick succession, which can make it difficult to retain without careful note taking. Unlike other information-heavy texts, however, such as Albert Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, Salibi’s work has easily identifiable underlying arguments and themes that aid in comprehension, and the general narrative is accessible and easy to pick up. There is also a helpful, although arguably not sufficient, amount of repetition and signposting throughout the book, and his concluding chapter does an excellent job of summarizing his main points. Overall, Salibi’s style is easy to digest, making this a rare example of a complex, detailed work that is not overwhelming. While it has been argued that the author reduces the issues in Lebanon to a level that is oversimplified, those unfamiliar with the history of the region will find A House of Many Mansions to be a balanced and intelligible perspective on Lebanon, its civil war, and its history, even if the amount of detail can seem, at times, daunting.