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By James Graham Wilson The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold (1st First Edition) [Paperback]
In The Triumph of Improvisation, James Graham Wilson takes a long view of the end of the Cold War, from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to Operation Desert Storm in January 1991. Drawing on deep archival research and recently declassified papers, Wilson argues that adaptation, improvisation, and engagement by individuals in positions of power ended the specter of a nuclear holocaust. Amid ambivalence and uncertainty, Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, George H. W. Bush, and a host of other actors engaged with adversaries and adapted to a rapidly changing international environment and information age in which global capitalism recovered as command economies failed.Eschewing the notion of a coherent grand strategy to end the Cold War, Wilson paints a vivid portrait of how leaders made choices; some made poor choices while others reacted prudently, imaginatively, and courageously to events they did not foresee. A book about the burdens of responsibility, the obstacles of domestic politics, and the human qualities of leadership, The Triumph of Improvisation concludes with a chapter describing how George H. W. Bush oversaw the construction of a new configuration of power after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one that resolved the fundamental components of the Cold War on Washington's terms.
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First published January 1, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
February 19, 2014
Highly readable and illuminating, in The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War author James Graham Wilson (@jamesgramwilson) rejects current theories explaining the Cold War’s end and instead focuses on the actions of key individuals in both the U.S. and Soviet governments, primarily U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. In different ways, these men eschewed the unproductive rhetoric and actions that defined the relationship of the two superpowers for decades and by doing so changed the world.
Throughout, Mr. Wilson’s prose is crisp and his arguments lucid and quite compelling. The book is the product of deep and thorough research, but at no point does the narrative get bogged down. Before beginning I wondered how well a complex subject like the end of the Cold War could be covered in just seven chapters, but by the end I felt Mr. Wilson had more than met the task, enlightening without lecturing. For those who wish to delve deeper into specific events, the end notes provide a great starting point for further research.
Special emphasis is placed in The Triumph of Improvisation on illuminating the actions of Shultz, who should be remembered as one of this country’s greatest statesmen despite no formal training or prior interest in foreign policy. An economist by trade, Shultz believed the Soviet Union could change and he worked hard to mitigate the efforts of the hardliners surrounding Reagan by emphasizing a Four-Part Framework (bilateral relations, regional matters, arms control and human rights), not letting problems in one area derail the whole relationship.
Often heralded as the paragon of conservative values, Reagan is shown to be more complex. His deep-seated desire to eliminate nuclear weapons meant doing something counter to his beliefs: working with the communists running the Soviet Union and thereby implicitly acknowledging their legitimacy. He truly believed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called “Star Wars,” was the key to eliminating the nuclear threat. Most surprising, once functional Reagan was intent on sharing SDI with the Soviets and the world, something the hardliners around him vehemently opposed and the Soviets (somewhat naturally) did not believe.
By preference or political necessity, Reagan surrounded himself with many aides and appointees who did not share his lofty goals, and his lax management style and contradictory statements created turmoil and uncertainty within his staff. By contrast, George W. Bush’s team was cohesive and on message — which proved critical while navigating the turbulent events after the Berlin Wall came down — while their president lacked “the vision thing” his predecessor possessed in abundance. Bush’s prudence provoked criticism from some quarters but given the extraordinary and unprecedented issues he faced caution was more important than boldness.
Mikhail Gorbachev lost an empire and won the Nobel Peace Prize in the process. He was as determined as Reagan to see nuclear weapons eliminated — all the more so after the Chernobyl disaster — and he wanted to improve the lives of those in his charge. To do that meant changing the status quo, and after cleaning house of those with different views, Gorbachev set out to reform socialism through perestroika. Of all the players involved in the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev had the most to gain and most to lose. Some could argue he had no choice, that the Soviet system was so broken by the time he assumed the party chair that reform was the only viable option, but even if true he must be lauded for making the choice to move forward toward something hopefully better. It says much about the hollowness of the state he inherited that just a year after the Berlin Wall fell, and seven years after Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech, the Soviet Union was on the margin of world events with Gorbachev begging the U.S. for loans.
A few random thoughts:
• At the beginning of the period covered, each side thought (1) the other side possessed a distinct military advantage and (2) desired the their elimination. Conversely, neither side understood why their opposite numbers constantly insisted they were, in fact, the ones trailing behind.
• Many of the hardliners working for Reagan, notably Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, were unshakeable in their distrust of the Soviets and pursued agendas that were often counter to that of the president. Proven wrong by hindsight, at the time these men and women were so sure of their views that no opposing opinions were entertained and those who espoused such thoughts attacked. I couldn’t help but make a contemporary comparison to the U.S. Tea Party.
• After Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty in 1987, some hawks in this country said any treat the Soviets were willing to sign must be bad for the U.S. Conversely, any treaty good for us would be anathema to them. Such is the type of thinking that sustained the Cold War.
• For those who did not live through this period, having some context about the media and flow of information may be helpful. Although CNN was launched in 1980, the “24-hour news cycle” we live with today evolved over time, defined by saturation coverage of events such as the Challenger disaster (1986), Tiananmen Square protest (1989) and Gulf War (1991). One can’t help but wonder how competing cable news outlets, social media, and the Internet’s free flow of information would have affected — for good or bad — the events depicted in The Triumph of Improvisation.
This review is based on a copy of the book provided for that purpose. I must point out that although I am hardly an academic, I lived through the events depicted in The Triumph of Improvisation and was, for much of time covered in the book, serving in the U.S. Navy.
My first birthday was just a month after the Cuban Missile Crisis; I grew up, got married and started a family of my own during the Cold War. In grade school I crawled under my desk during Atomic Attack Drills and as an enlisted Sailor in the U.S. Navy I learned how to don a protective suit and decontaminate nuclear fallout. The Soviets were THEM, we were US. Nuclear war was never not a possibility, although admittedly it wasn’t often at the front of our minds. It was simply accepted as being so.
Then the Berlin Wall came down and suddenly the world was a very different place. A place where my own kids, who were born in that other time but did not experience it, have a hard time understanding what all the fuss was about when my wife and I share stories about growing up in the shadow of Nuclear Armageddon. Still, given the new realities of international terrorism, perhaps there is some benefit to knowing exactly who your adversary is.
Throughout, Mr. Wilson’s prose is crisp and his arguments lucid and quite compelling. The book is the product of deep and thorough research, but at no point does the narrative get bogged down. Before beginning I wondered how well a complex subject like the end of the Cold War could be covered in just seven chapters, but by the end I felt Mr. Wilson had more than met the task, enlightening without lecturing. For those who wish to delve deeper into specific events, the end notes provide a great starting point for further research.
Special emphasis is placed in The Triumph of Improvisation on illuminating the actions of Shultz, who should be remembered as one of this country’s greatest statesmen despite no formal training or prior interest in foreign policy. An economist by trade, Shultz believed the Soviet Union could change and he worked hard to mitigate the efforts of the hardliners surrounding Reagan by emphasizing a Four-Part Framework (bilateral relations, regional matters, arms control and human rights), not letting problems in one area derail the whole relationship.
Often heralded as the paragon of conservative values, Reagan is shown to be more complex. His deep-seated desire to eliminate nuclear weapons meant doing something counter to his beliefs: working with the communists running the Soviet Union and thereby implicitly acknowledging their legitimacy. He truly believed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called “Star Wars,” was the key to eliminating the nuclear threat. Most surprising, once functional Reagan was intent on sharing SDI with the Soviets and the world, something the hardliners around him vehemently opposed and the Soviets (somewhat naturally) did not believe.
By preference or political necessity, Reagan surrounded himself with many aides and appointees who did not share his lofty goals, and his lax management style and contradictory statements created turmoil and uncertainty within his staff. By contrast, George W. Bush’s team was cohesive and on message — which proved critical while navigating the turbulent events after the Berlin Wall came down — while their president lacked “the vision thing” his predecessor possessed in abundance. Bush’s prudence provoked criticism from some quarters but given the extraordinary and unprecedented issues he faced caution was more important than boldness.
Mikhail Gorbachev lost an empire and won the Nobel Peace Prize in the process. He was as determined as Reagan to see nuclear weapons eliminated — all the more so after the Chernobyl disaster — and he wanted to improve the lives of those in his charge. To do that meant changing the status quo, and after cleaning house of those with different views, Gorbachev set out to reform socialism through perestroika. Of all the players involved in the end of the Cold War, Gorbachev had the most to gain and most to lose. Some could argue he had no choice, that the Soviet system was so broken by the time he assumed the party chair that reform was the only viable option, but even if true he must be lauded for making the choice to move forward toward something hopefully better. It says much about the hollowness of the state he inherited that just a year after the Berlin Wall fell, and seven years after Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech, the Soviet Union was on the margin of world events with Gorbachev begging the U.S. for loans.
A few random thoughts:
• At the beginning of the period covered, each side thought (1) the other side possessed a distinct military advantage and (2) desired the their elimination. Conversely, neither side understood why their opposite numbers constantly insisted they were, in fact, the ones trailing behind.
• Many of the hardliners working for Reagan, notably Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, were unshakeable in their distrust of the Soviets and pursued agendas that were often counter to that of the president. Proven wrong by hindsight, at the time these men and women were so sure of their views that no opposing opinions were entertained and those who espoused such thoughts attacked. I couldn’t help but make a contemporary comparison to the U.S. Tea Party.
• After Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty in 1987, some hawks in this country said any treat the Soviets were willing to sign must be bad for the U.S. Conversely, any treaty good for us would be anathema to them. Such is the type of thinking that sustained the Cold War.
• For those who did not live through this period, having some context about the media and flow of information may be helpful. Although CNN was launched in 1980, the “24-hour news cycle” we live with today evolved over time, defined by saturation coverage of events such as the Challenger disaster (1986), Tiananmen Square protest (1989) and Gulf War (1991). One can’t help but wonder how competing cable news outlets, social media, and the Internet’s free flow of information would have affected — for good or bad — the events depicted in The Triumph of Improvisation.
This review is based on a copy of the book provided for that purpose. I must point out that although I am hardly an academic, I lived through the events depicted in The Triumph of Improvisation and was, for much of time covered in the book, serving in the U.S. Navy.
My first birthday was just a month after the Cuban Missile Crisis; I grew up, got married and started a family of my own during the Cold War. In grade school I crawled under my desk during Atomic Attack Drills and as an enlisted Sailor in the U.S. Navy I learned how to don a protective suit and decontaminate nuclear fallout. The Soviets were THEM, we were US. Nuclear war was never not a possibility, although admittedly it wasn’t often at the front of our minds. It was simply accepted as being so.
Then the Berlin Wall came down and suddenly the world was a very different place. A place where my own kids, who were born in that other time but did not experience it, have a hard time understanding what all the fuss was about when my wife and I share stories about growing up in the shadow of Nuclear Armageddon. Still, given the new realities of international terrorism, perhaps there is some benefit to knowing exactly who your adversary is.
February 27, 2014
I do this for a living and I'm very impressed by this little book! Like the author notes, the debate over the end of the Cold War is likely to continue for sometime. Dr. Wilson has made sure that he will be included in that debate. Bravo!
January 1, 2016
Great book! A must read for anyone interested in Cold War's end and Reagan's, Bush's (Sr) and Gorbachev's foreign policies.
June 29, 2014
Wilson has crafted a concise timeline of the events that led to the collapse of Communism, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and the end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. New scholarship has been brought to the story, notably, private correspondence, newly declassified documentation, and archival records.
The book was easy to read, and considering that this is a scholarly work, that is quite welcome, as scholarly works often tend to be a bit dry-this book was anything but dry. It also seemed to me to be devoid of much bias, which is a prerequisite for a successful historical work.
The major point being made here is that the events that ended the Cold War were not orchestrated, but took place rather serendipitously, as the title implies. In essence, the author makes a good case for his thesis, which utilizes diary entries (Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev etc), and archival documents to Illustrate how leaders of the U.S. and USSR compromised, and essentially took leaps of faith to get to the ultimate goal of ending the cold war, bringing the Soviets into the fold of the New World Order of economic, and political partnership, relying on a new found mutual trust in drastically cutting nuclear missile proliferation to all-time lows.
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Cold War, or Post-WWII European politics and social history. The new documents used offer an interesting viewpoint on the American and Soviet cooperation towards ending the Cold War, and the thawing of US-Soviet relations.
The book was easy to read, and considering that this is a scholarly work, that is quite welcome, as scholarly works often tend to be a bit dry-this book was anything but dry. It also seemed to me to be devoid of much bias, which is a prerequisite for a successful historical work.
The major point being made here is that the events that ended the Cold War were not orchestrated, but took place rather serendipitously, as the title implies. In essence, the author makes a good case for his thesis, which utilizes diary entries (Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev etc), and archival documents to Illustrate how leaders of the U.S. and USSR compromised, and essentially took leaps of faith to get to the ultimate goal of ending the cold war, bringing the Soviets into the fold of the New World Order of economic, and political partnership, relying on a new found mutual trust in drastically cutting nuclear missile proliferation to all-time lows.
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Cold War, or Post-WWII European politics and social history. The new documents used offer an interesting viewpoint on the American and Soviet cooperation towards ending the Cold War, and the thawing of US-Soviet relations.
April 23, 2015
For a Cold War history buff like myself, I thought this was an incredibly fascinating book. I think Wilson does a great job of looking at the end of the Cold War through the four most important leaders that allowed that end to happen. In addition, I appreciate the level of detail that Wilson offers in this book because it allows you to get a sense of the times and other events that contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union. I think this book should be read by anyone who has an interest in the end of the Cold War, but also in how diplomacy can be vital to ending potential conflict before it spirals out of control. Well done, Dr. Wilson!
September 8, 2016
I highly recommend this to anyone who is a fan of cold war politics. This book represents very well how people's decisions can affect the world even without meaning to have the full effect that they have. This book is also good for learning about the complex person that is Ronald Reagan and not the one dimensional person presented by politicians and pundits from both the right and the left.
*** I received this book for free through Goodreads First Reads ***
*** I received this book for free through Goodreads First Reads ***
November 15, 2015
Extremely engaging, clear, and compelling. This book revolutionized my understanding of the close of the Cold War and the actions of Gorbachev, the Reagan and Bush administrations, and those of the top western allies in the 1980s. Very worthwhile.
April 25, 2022
It may seem unfair to rate this book so low when it is ostensibly well researched and well written, but I cannot help but feel a deep revulsion to its triumphalism over how the Cold War ending in lieu of current events in Ukraine. Also one of its main conclusions being that the Cold War ended with Operation Desert Storm is weakly argued and filled with holes.
December 12, 2015
I won this book in a goodreads drawing.
An examination of the end of the cold war, from the perspective of the state department. There is a lot of information about Alexander Haig and George Schultz, I've not seen anywhere else. I found this volume a bit muddled. The point of the book was that nobody really planned the end of the Cold War, that it just sort of happened. However, the author seems unaware that Reagan had a plan to end the cold war in 1976, and more or less followed it. Gorbachev never meant for the collapse of the USSR to happen, either, unless one believes the theory that Russia actually faked the collapse to prepare for its rise today. No one but Reagan fully understood this plan, but somehow, it worked.
This book also reveals how little the political theory known as "realism" resembles reality. Kissinger always said that the US had a losing hand in the Cold War, but Reagan knew different. It seems the US state department either doesn't know what it is doing, or worse, isn't telling us what they're doing.
Unlike many similar books, this book also talks about George Bush's role in the end of the cold war. Bush didn't realize it was even ending until the last moment. He decided to be "gracious" instead of trying communists for various crimes against humanity. That's why we have to deal with Putin today.
This is how the state department sees things. That shows how much the state department needs reform.
An examination of the end of the cold war, from the perspective of the state department. There is a lot of information about Alexander Haig and George Schultz, I've not seen anywhere else. I found this volume a bit muddled. The point of the book was that nobody really planned the end of the Cold War, that it just sort of happened. However, the author seems unaware that Reagan had a plan to end the cold war in 1976, and more or less followed it. Gorbachev never meant for the collapse of the USSR to happen, either, unless one believes the theory that Russia actually faked the collapse to prepare for its rise today. No one but Reagan fully understood this plan, but somehow, it worked.
This book also reveals how little the political theory known as "realism" resembles reality. Kissinger always said that the US had a losing hand in the Cold War, but Reagan knew different. It seems the US state department either doesn't know what it is doing, or worse, isn't telling us what they're doing.
Unlike many similar books, this book also talks about George Bush's role in the end of the cold war. Bush didn't realize it was even ending until the last moment. He decided to be "gracious" instead of trying communists for various crimes against humanity. That's why we have to deal with Putin today.
This is how the state department sees things. That shows how much the state department needs reform.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews