Essence of Decision 2nd (second) edition Text Only

by Philip Zelikow Graham Allison

A penetrating study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis examines the workings of American decision-making and foreign policy.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, Political Science, International Relations, American History, Military Fiction

Unknown Binding

First published January 1, 1971

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most dangerous moments in history. In the thirteen days from October 16 to 28, 1962, as the Soviet Union installed nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy demanded publicly that Nikita Khrushchev dismantle and withdraw the missiles immediately. JFK also set up a naval "quaran­tine" that blockaded Soviet ships proceeding to the island. Ignoring the existence of U.S. missiles in Turkey, almost under the USSR's nose, Kennedy declared that the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba was "a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country."
The crisis occurred because, as Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, the Soviets were quite certain that the Bay of Pigs invasion was only the beginning and that the States would not leave Cuba alone. To defend his ally, the Soviet Premier had the idea to secretly install nuclear missiles in Cuba, so that the USA would find out only when it's too late. His strategy was twofold: ". . . the installation of our missiles in Cuba would . . . restrain the United States from pre­cipitous military action against Castro's government. . . . [In addition,] our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call 'the balance of power.' The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you."
There was, however, a big problem. Khrushchev's logic overlooked the frenzied mind of Cold War America. As Trappist monk Thomas Merton insightfully noted in a 1962 letter, "the first and greatest of all com­mandments is that America shall not and must not be beaten in the Cold War, and the second is like unto this, that if a hot war is necessary to prevent defeat in the Cold War, then a hot war must be fought even if civilization is to be destroyed." Thus, the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba placed President Kennedy in what Merton described as "a position so impossible as to be absurd." In a struggle between good and evil involving world­-destructive weapons, the installation of Soviet missiles ninety miles from Florida filled Washington with the temptation to strike first. As the construction of missile sites accelerated, the pressures on President Kennedy for a U.S. air strike on Cuba became over­whelming. However, JFK resisted his advisers' push toward a nuclear war that he told them would obviously be "the final failure."
Interestingly, he secretly taped the White House meetings during the crisis, and the tapes reveal how isolated the President was in choosing to blockade Soviet missile shipments rather than bomb a country much smaller and weaker than the States. In the October 19, 1962, meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who regarded their young Commander in Chief with great disdain, for example, Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay challenged the President, "This [blockade and political action] is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich . . . I just don't see any other solution except direct military intervention right now." In a characteristically Cold-War way of thinking, LeMay considered everything short of an all-out nuclear attack on the USSR to be appeasement. Thankfully, Kennedy did not take the bait. LeMay's words were met with silence.
The tapes further show Kennedy questioning and resisting the mounting pressure to bomb Cuba coming from both the Joint Chiefs and the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the National Security Council, especially convened to help JFK handle the crisis. One statement by Robert Kennedy that strengthened the President's resolve against a "prophylactic" strike is unheard on the tapes, but mentioned in RFK's memoir of the missile crisis, Thirteen Days: while listening to the proposals for attack, Bobby passed a note to the President – "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor."
One of the most terrible moments of the crisis was Wednesday, October 24, when a report came in that a Soviet submarine was about to be intercepted by U.S. helicopters, unless by some miracle, the two Soviet ships it was accompanying turned back from the U.S. "quarantine" line. The President feared he had lost all control of the situation and that nuclear war was imminent. Yet, the miracle happened – through the enemy, Nikita Khrushchev, who ordered the Soviet ships to stop dead in the water rather than challenge the U.S. quarantine. At that moment he saved John Kennedy and everyone else.
What moved Khrushchev to his decision? One reason, unmentioned in his memoirs, might be his secret correspondence with JFK. His first private letter to Kennedy was twenty-six pages long, and dealt passionately with politics, in particular Berlin (where the two lead­ers backed away from war but never reached agreement) and the civil war in Laos (where they agreed to recognize a neutral government). Unlike in Vienna, where he had stunned Kennedy with his harshness of heart toward a nuclear war, in the letter he emphasized the fundamental need for peace and underscored his and JFK's common ground with a biblical analogy, comparing their situation "with Noah's Ark where both the 'clean' and the 'unclean' found sanctuary. But regardless of who lists himself with the 'clean' and who is considered to be 'unclean,' they are all equally interested in one thing and that is that the Ark should successfully continue its cruise." In his response to the Soviet Premier, President Kennedy whole-heartedly agreed with the Noah's-Ark analogy, but after a year of private letters that included enough Cold War debate, Kennedy and Khrushchev had by October 1962 not resolved their most dangerous differences. The missile crisis was proof of that. In the weeks leading up to the crisis, Khrushchev felt "betrayed" by Kennedy's eventual plans for another Cuba invasion, whereas Kennedy thought Khrushchev was "betraying" him by sneaking nuclear missiles into Cuba. Both were again acting out Cold War beliefs that threatened everyone on earth. Nevertheless, thanks to their secret correspondence, each knew the other as a human being he could respect and remembered that they once had agreed both the 'clean' and the 'unclean' had to keep the Ark afloat. That's why Khrushchev stopped his ships dead in the water.
However, the crisis was not over. Work on the missile sites was in fact speeding up, and the Pentagon and ExComm advisers increased their pressures on the president for an air strike. On Friday night, October 26, Kennedy received a hopeful letter from Khrushchev in which the Soviet premier agreed to withdraw his missiles. In exchange, Kennedy would pledge not to invade Cuba. However, on Saturday morning, Kennedy received a second, more problematic letter from the Soviet leader, adding to those terms the demand for a U.S. commitment to remove its missiles from Turkey. In exchange, Khrushchev would pledge not to invade Turkey. JFK was perplexed. Khrushchev's second proposal was reasonable in its symmetry. Yet, Kennedy felt he could not suddenly surrender a NATO ally's defenses under a threat, failing to recognize for the moment that he was demanding Khrushchev do the equivalent with his ally Fidel Castro.
While the Joint Chiefs continued to demand an air strike, an urgent message arrived heightening those pressures. Early that Saturday morning, a Soviet surface-to-air missile had shot down a U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba, killing the Air Force pilot. The Joint Chiefs and ExComm had already recommended immediate retaliation in such a case; they now urged an attack early the next morning to destroy the missile sites. JFK, though, called off the Air Force reprisal for the U-2's downing and continued the search for a peaceful resolution. The Joint Chiefs were dismayed. Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen drafted a letter accepting Khrushchev's first proposal, while ignoring the later demand that the United States withdraw its missiles from Turkey.
What became the moving force for Khrushchev's dramatic announce­ment that he was withdrawing the missiles was Robert Kennedy's climactic meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. According to Khrushchev's memoirs, RFK told Dobrynin that the President was in a grave situation, that "[i]f the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power." When in a November 9, 1961 letter, the Soviet leader had hinted, regarding Berlin, that belligerent pressures in Moscow made compromise difficult from his own side, Kennedy had not pushed him. Now Khrushchev felt the urgency of the pressure on the President and was returning the favor – he withdrew his missiles. The crisis was over. Neither side revealed that, as part of the agreement, on the parallel issue of U.S. missiles in Turkey, Robert Kennedy had in fact prom­ised Anatoly Dobrynin that they, too, would be withdrawn, though not immediately. The promise was fulfilled. Six months later the United States took its missiles out of Turkey.

[Ana · Rating 5 out of 5]

A difficult read, but totally worth it. This book analyzes the steps which led to an almost nuclear war in 1962, between the Soviet Union and USA. It uses three models to express three different layers of analysis, making it easy for the reader to follow the reasoning behind them. Recommend it if you're interested in the subject.

[CJ · Rating 4 out of 5]

In a way, this is two parallel books. One book explains various theories (from political science/international relations) about how to understand and predict government decision making. It touches on the origin, use, misuse, critiques, and benefits of these models - the rational actor model, the organizational behaviorism model, and the political game model.


The other book explains the Cuban missile crisis through each of the above models. The book explains how those models explain different parts of the Cuban missile crisis differently (better?).

I liked the book but I haven't read much international relations so most of the book was new to me.

[Alex Hope · Rating 4 out of 5]

this is an amazing analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Everyone should read this if they want to understand the true essence of the conflict. Amazingly researched, amazingly written with a lot of explanations and fantastic secondary sources: this will really help me with my Cuban Missile Crisis project

[Knarik · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Use of a microscope, rather than a telescope, produces a different image of the same fundamental reality.”

“A Model I analyst can generate various hypotheses about why the Soviet Union decided to send nuclear missiles to Cuba: to defend Cuba, rectify the strategic nuclear balance, or provide an advantage in the confrontation over Berlin. With more details about the chronology of Soviet decisionmaking and the particular deployment, the Cuban defense hypothesis becomes less plausible and the missile power hypothesis more. But as the Model I analyst includes still more information about Khrushchev, his personal stakes and commitments, and what he said and thought at the time (much of it newly available), the story acquires a new shape, linking the missile power hypothesis to a strategy for success in Berlin. The explanation is reinforced by Khrushchev’s personal emphasis on Berlin prior to the missile crisis and his abandonment of it after the missiles in Cuba were withdrawn. This was the missing piece in the “rational actor” puzzle Thompson posed about Khrushchev’s Berlin policy in the summer of 1962.
The American decision to respond with a blockade reflects, for the Model I analyst, Kennedy’s reasoning, revealed for the first time by the secret tapes. He sees his choice as one between a nuclear crisis over Cuba in October or a nuclear crisis over Berlin—and under less advantageous circumstances—in November. An attack on Cuba could provoke a riposte against Berlin. A blockade (applied only to items not being transported to Berlin) seems a logical middle ground. The United States announces its demand, displays its resolve, leverages its local military superiority—all without a “a direct attack. The tapes and other newly declassified documents reveal a more complex set of options than previously understood, including two critically different variants of the blockade. For the Model I analyst the Soviet decision to yield follows logically from the United States’ combination of strategic and theater military superiority, once American resolve becomes evident.
Model II focuses attention on what the relevant government organizations could do, could not do, and would be disposed to do without magisterial direction. Many aspects of the Soviet deployment to Cuba could not be explained by Model I.

“For the Model II analyst, Kennedy’s choice of a blockade is a choice foreshadowed by the preexisting capacities of large organizations: an Air Force that cannot deliver the strike Kennedy wants and a Navy that can organize a blockade that achieves Kennedy’s goals. But this blockade creates new dangers, for example, conducting antisubmarine tactics against submarines that, unbeknownst to Washington, were nuclear-armed. Kennedy sets his military forces in motion to signal Khrushchev, but the Model II story again sets in motion vast organizational actions that interact with others in frightening ways that the president can barely imagine (try as he does, for example, in the case of the Emergency Defense Plan for Turkey). When Jupiter missiles in Turkey become a focal point in the crisis, new evidence reveals that Kennedy encountered a State Department that had plugged his concerns into its preexisting plans for a multilateral nuclear force, however irrelevant that plan was to the exigencies of a nuclear crisis.”

“Model III dissects Khrushchev’s decisionmaking under a powerful new light, revealing his appreciation of the situation to have been cloudy at best, his judgments bereft of any attribute of high-quality deliberations. Relying on haphazard and often incorrect information, and without any sustained analysis of the sort commonplace in the American process, he manages a sullen, sporadic group of advisors and rivals. Indeed, his most competent expert on American affairs is not even informed that the missiles are being deployed.
In Washington, discovery of the Soviet missiles is a story of a political tug of war between powerful officials.
“Model III also reinterprets the choice of the blockade. Days of deliberation pass before a blockade option can be formulated in a way that attracts Kennedy’s support, and the formulation comes from Republicans and a career diplomat. One of the president’s most valued advisors, Bundy, veers from advocating doing nothing one day (waiting for the coming confrontation in Berlin) to supporting an air strike the next.1 Another critical adviser, McNamara, is revealed to have been the leading “dove” in the first week’s deliberations, supporting the blockade/negotiate/trade approach. But in the second week he seems so resigned to military action that he sees new virtues and possibilities in trying a surprise attack against Cuba.
In the final resolution of the crisis, Model III helps us see new dynamics.”
“Model III uncovers subtle differences between perspectives shared by Kennedy and Khrushchev and views of their colleagues—differences that proved decisive in finally resolving the crisis.”
“For Model III, Kennedy and Khrushchev remain key characters in the story. But it is a story in which they are informed, misled, persuaded, or ignored by the officials around them, in some cases for better and in some for worse. Almost every day the choices the leaders must make are reshaped by the way information and circumstances are brought to them for action. Model III also sees the leaders as influenced by their place and peculiar responsibilities, the singular burden that falls on the one person with ultimate authority to order nuclear war. It is a lonely burden the president and the chairman share, and at the climax of the crisis a bond that helps them find a way out.
The need for all three lenses is evident when one considers the causal bottom line. The painful “but for which” test demands that one identify major factors, but for which the outcome would not have occurred, or would have been materially different.”
“To explain the blockade, the Model I analyst examines the U.S. strategic calculus: the problem posed by the Soviet missiles, relevant American interests, the relation to other commitments like the defense of Berlin and U.S. capabilities versus those of the Soviet Union. Explanation means placing the blockade in a pattern of purposive response to the strategic problem. For our Model II archetype, given the need for action, the particular “solution” is the by-product of organizational behavior. The analyst emphasizes organizational capacities and constraints both in choice and implementation. Organizational behavior explains identification of the problem on October 14 (rather than two weeks earlier or later); organizational routines defined the options; organizations implemented the blockade. Explanation starts with existing organizations and their repertory of routines at t-1 and attempts to account for what is going on at time t. The Model III analyst makes vivid the action of players in the relevant games that produced pieces of the collage that is the blockade. Bargaining among players who shared power but saw separate problems yielded: discovery of the missiles on a certain date in the context of a given policy debate; definition of the problem in a way that demanded action; emphasis on subsets of options from the menu of possibilities; and imagination in analyzing some issues and weakness in analyzing others. The blockade eventually emerges from the mix of these considerations. In the absence of a number of particular characteristics of players and games, the action chosen would have been materially different.”

Excerpt From: Allison, Graham.

[Mark Jacobsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Essence of Decision" is a classic for a reason. For anyone who cares about government decision-making, it is hard to find another single book as practical and useful. While the treatment of the Cuban Missile Crisis is fascinating, the book's greatest value is its presentation of multiple lenses for analyzing decisions: the rational actor model, the organizational model, and the political model. The book will be especially illuminating for those who have only ever been exposed to the rational actor model. It will also be helpful to those who can see organizational and political dynamics at work in decision-making, but who are searching for greater clarity in how these factors work.

[Linda · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best org behavior book i've read to date

[Alice · Rating 4 out of 5]

A work read, but I liked the frameworks outlined in a very accessible way.

[Kellsie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nothing like grad school that has you reading a sense 400 pg nonfiction in a week🥲

[Billy · Rating 2 out of 5]

In this update of the Ernest May original, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow’s Essence of Decision offers three different models through which to interpret the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first model, the Rational Actor Model (or RAM), provides a paradigm that describes rational actors’ methods to maximize political and diplomatic utility. The second model, the Organizational Behavior Model, accounts for the influence of organizations and institutions on decision making processes. The third and final model, which focuses on governmental politics, examines how separated institutions share power and the effects of group processes on decision making. Each of the book’s three sections begins by explaining a particular model and then finishes by applying that model to the events of October 1962. The result is a thought provoking but inconclusive look at the most dangerous thirteen days of the atomic era. Allison and Zelikow never take a firm stance on the correct method of analysis for the crisis. The end result is a book meant to inform and advise policymakers on how to read this historic event that never actually does so. What the book does make clear is the influence economic theory has had on IR theory and policy decisions. For example, the first chapter’s use of the Rational Actor Model is clearly based on the homo economus givens used in nearly all economic models. The connections that Allison and Zelikow fail to make, however, provide a more interesting analysis than the book’s contents. Put simply, the authors never explicitly recognize how their models are based in a western economic tradition. These models rely heavily on the maximization of utility and the minimization of threat or danger. The minimax theorem, as first formulated in 1944 by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, seems to have influenced all policy decisions of the Cold War. Keynesian economics of government intervention, combined with Chandler’s insights into the rise of the managerial class, combine with game theory to provide an almost fatal mistake of nuclear proportion. Von Neumann and General Curtis LeMay both endorsed a first strike against the Soviet Union at early points in the Cold War based on such logic.
The authors also never effectively show how both sides of a nuclear balance require equal information of the effects and repercussions resulting in a first or second strike. MAD establishes this balance. Put simply, they pronounce their biases of political and diplomatic theory by espousing models based in western economic logic. Yet these models are applied to a situation in which the other side, the USSR, based its political ideology in opposition to such western based economic theories. Why is this divide never examined? How stable was the balance between the nuclear superpowers if each side based their diplomacy on completely different ideologies? In all fairness, these critiques do not address the book on its own merits. Yet these comments reveal an unforeseen argument inherent in Essence of Decision: It is a work that offers no conclusive advice on how to approach policymaking, yet Allison and Zelikow have utilized modernity-based models and economics to endorse a sort of post-modern inconclusiveness. If nothing else, the book shows just how lucky the superpowers were in escaping nuclear war in October of 1962.

[C. Patrick · Rating 5 out of 5]

As [Theodore] Sorensen recalled: “our little group, seated around the Cabinet table in continuous session that Saturday [27 October 1962] felt nuclear war to be closer on that day than at any time in the nuclear age.” This book is an excellent analysis of the decisions that brought the two countries extraordinarily close to war. It approaches the analysis by framing through three conceptual models, which effectively broke the book into thirds. The three political/decision science chapters that elaborated on each of the study models could be tough sledding, but generally necessary to understand the analysis with each subsequent chapter that returned to the Cuban missile crisis case study. There is a lot here for the armchair historian, as well as the government and military practitioners in the foreign affairs arena.

[gaby · Rating 4 out of 5]

What a fun read on the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis! An engaging book about different models of government and leadership behavior, each told through the example of this strange and fascinating moment in diplomacy and chance. Recommended for students and citizens interested in organizational theory, game theory, bureaucratic theory, and yes, the Cuban missile crisis.

[Thor Hansson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating read and equally terrifying so. This book should be of both high interest and of high use to the lay person, the student, and the scholar!

The quality of Allison's and Zelikow's work is exquisite. They manage to both develop a pluralistic approach to examining international relations and foreign policy, AND manages to succesfully apply this approach to one of the 20th centuries most seminal moments I'm foreign affairs: the Cuban missile crisis.

They do this by presenting three different conceptual models of analysing foreign policy events (1. The Rational Choice model, 2. The Organizational Model, and 3. The Governmental Politics Model) and demonstrate (through rigorous research) why the results of these three models all are crucial in understanding why the crisis erupted, the crucial process of solving it, and ultimately how a very complicated array of factors (some decades in the making and some quite random) managed to save us from nuclear armaggedom.

A very important book that I highly recommend!

[Love · Rating 4 out of 5]

Minns inte riktigt. Den handlar om hur organisationer tänker. Finns tre analysmodeller.

1. Organisationer har ett mål. De gör vad de kan för nå sitt mål. De gör det som gynnar dem mest.

2. Ingen enhetlig stat alla organisationer och aktörer agerar utifrån egna rutiner och processer.

3. Beslutsfattande är resultat av konflikter och något med personer inom organisation. Kompromiss mellan mer aggressiv och en mer passiv aktion i Kubakrisen, exempelvis.

Något sånt. Minns inte mer och fattade nog inte mycket mer heller.

[Tom Allen · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book would be helpful for anyone in government, in industry, in any kind of relationship with other human beings in any context. It would be especially helpful for those seeking a better understanding of the dynamics of the current slaughter of people by the Moscow Monster.

[Seth Benzell · Rating 3 out of 5]

I picked up Essence of Decision (second edition) being discarded at MIT Sloan.

Despite only rating this book at 3 stars, I do not regret picking it up. While quite dry, the book takes a unique approach, mixing day-by-day detailed history with abstract theory.

I went into this book knowing about the Cuban Missile Crisis in only a vague sketchy way. I felt more comfortable with IR theory, having minored in it at Tulane. I could only take the book's claims about the missile crisis at face value. I definitely disagreed with, or found unhelpful, with a bunch of the theory

The book alternates theory chapters with analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis through the lens of the previous chapter's theory. The book considers three models of international politics, which it calls: the 'Rational Actor' model, the 'Organizational Behavior' model, and the 'Governmental Politics' model. All of these models, especially the first because it is the simplest, come in different flavors.

IMHO, the book's strongest section was the analysis of the Missile Crisis under the first mode. In the first section, the book makes a compelling case that Khrushchev's decision to place missiles in Cuba had nothing to do with protecting Cuba. Rather it was an attempt to change the balance of missile power (despite having run on the idea of a 'Missile Gap', the US actually had a tremendous nuclear advantage over the USSR at this point) and ultimately strengthen Khrushchev's hand when a conflict was anticipated to emerge over Berlin later in the year. Had the missiles been secretly installed and revealed as a fait accomplis, Khrushchev would have been seen as a strategic genius. As it was, the missiles were discovered. The US response of a blockade was optimal -- it leveraged the strong US tactical advantages (e.g. in naval power in the Carribean) without escalating to outright war. Khrushchev's capitulation was inevitable.

The other historical sections fill in some missing details. The organizational behavior section, while an absolute dumpster fire in terms of theoretical content (as far as I can tell it just argues that organizations should be modeled predictively, and then proceeds to make a list of things that 'might go wrong' in the transmission of leaders' intent) lists how some of the most important events in the missile crisis were not the result of high-level decision making. The American delay in detecting the missile installation, the preposterous Russian decision to barely attempt to hide their installations, the sequence of blunders that almost led to a conflict between US ships and a nuclear armed submarine, US diplomats' failure to prepare Turkey for a request for missiles to be removed. These are indeed important examples of events that happen to leaders rather than vice versa. The governmental politics section fleshes out the personalities and behaviors of the leaderships. Notably, while Kennedy surrounded himself with foreign policy and military experts, Kr tended to make decisions solo or with political advisers. Also fascinating is the fact that Kennedy's offer to trade the missiles in Turkey for the ones in Cuba was made without the knowledge of most of his advisers.

This book has several failings that prevent me from rating it more highly. Most importantly, while the flavors of realism are well articulated and distinguished, the other two models were not. The organizational behavior theory section comes off as a long list of 'shit that organizations do sometimes' (the governmental politics section also has one of these long ass lists). The governmental politics section (referred to as 'rational choice' in passing -- a political economy paradigm I am pretty familiar with) does little to clarify itself beyond 'governments are made of individuals'. This third category combines elements that I would have called 'realism' in undergrad IR (such as the idea that leaders have goals other than national power), elements that I would have called 'liberalism' (such as the idea that 'where you sit determines where you stand' -- e.g. we should be unsurprising that the Air Force general suggests a bombing campaign will solve the problem) and elements I would call 'constructivism' (the idea that how a problem is solved owes much to how the problem is framed and the ideologies of the people solving the problem). So to me the third and second models didn't feel particularly unified. Also: did I mention the book gets super dry for something about WW3? As for the first third of the book, one element of the strategic interaction that was left out was the role of brinksmanship. This is the idea that any nuclear showdown is a game of chicken, in which the side with the least to lose will refuse to back down. Based on my previous knowledge of the Cuban Missile Crisis (especially the discussion of brinksmanship in Games of Strategy) this is a glaring ommission. (Brinksmanship appears only once in the index).

Some additional more specific observations:

>McNamara comes off as a fucking hero. He is one of the smartest guys in the room, talks the hawks out of a hasty bombing campaign, and is one of the early proponents of more blackhawk oversights and the blockade. It's really sad how bad he failed in Vietnam -- he had potential.

>I love the Bobby-JFK dynamic that emerges. Dynamic bro-duo.

>The book has much less to say about the Soviet side of decision making. Understandable given data limitations, but a real disappointment.

>The book could have really used a detailed timeline

>The book is full of crazy, mostly unhelpful, figures like these. It was theoretical messiness like this that led me into econ and away from pol sci:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_Mz...

Recommended, but not urgently recommended.

[Richard · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book illustrates how decisions can be analyzed retrospectively, including a taste of how different theories of decision making will change what one concludes about what the actors involved must have believed and wanted.

When I went back to college after leaving my first career, my fascination with this book was one of the principle reasons I choose International Relations as my subject matter. In retrospect, I should have tracked down a program in Decision Theory instead, but hindsight is 20-20.

[Mike Edwards · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well-written and incredibly clever, this is a creative and intriguing work. It is somewhat flawed, unfortunately: the history is at times cherry-picked to prove the points they are trying to make, and our knowledge of how small groups operate has moved well beyond these theories. Still, this should be applauded as an early work in political psychology and group decision making, and as a fascinating (if imperfect) example of applying political models to a set of historical facts.

[Nate Huston · Rating 5 out of 5]

Loved it. Nerded out. Explains that to truly analyze, explain and predict decisions in a foreign relations setting, more than the standard Rational Actor Model is necessary. One must also look at decisions through the prisms of organizational behavior and (again, separately) political actions. Looks at the Cuban Missile Crisis through each lens and attempts to illustrate how each model can provide explanation that the other either misinterpreted or got wrong altogether.

[Ben · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best analyses of bureaucratic crisis politics ever written.

[Andy · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great book on leadership, decision making, and the Cuban missile crisis

[Nate Hill · Rating 1 out of 5]

Overall, three workable systems of analysis, but the book is extremely hard to read.

[Chris S · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very worthwhile read, if a little dry and difficult at times. The main premise of the book is that there are multiple conceptual models that can be used to explain decisions in international affairs (or any other facet of life): the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM) and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM). The authors apply each model to walk through and explain the Cuban Missile Crisis crises through these different 'conceptual lenses'.

I particularly enjoyed the book because it overtly states some thoughts that usually linger around in my head when reading statements in the news etc. along the lines of "Country X did action Y because of reason Z". The implicit (Rational Actor) model, namely, that of a unitary rational actor pursuing a course of action for a single reason, seems unrealistic given that governments are collections of a variety of individuals - each with their own preferences, perceptions and interests - jostling for influence in the decision-making process (GPM), constrained and enabled by the capacities and routines of the various organizations that they have at their disposal (OBM). For instance, when reading a headline such as "Trump administration imposes sanctions on China for buying Russian fighter jets and missiles" (The Independent, 21/09/18), one always has to recognize that the 'Trump administration' is comprised of a variety of individuals, whose influence varies depending on their position and the issue at stake, and whose preferences probably depend on their life history and personal philosophies. Hence, even if all these individuals are unanimous in agreeing to the course of action (hardly guaranteed), it seems unlikely that they do so for the exact same reason.

The Organizational Behavior Model also makes explicit the fact that a course of action such as 'sanctions' may only be possible because the organizational capacities are available to pursue it (e.g. the capacity to monitor financial transactions, to ensure the imposition of the sanctions etc). The same characteristics of organizations that allow for these capacities (e.g. the following of standard operating procedures) may also lead to unintended or deleterious consequences - a situation familiar to anyone who has made a mistake by enacting a standard procedure in an inappropriate context.

These insights, I think, are familiar to all, but the authors do a good job making explicit and elaborating on the three modes of thinking. When paired with their detailed analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis, they make a strong case for the appreciation of all three models in the analysis of decision-making in general.

[Mark · Rating 3 out of 5]

Even as a trained career military officer, and DoD civilian, I'd never heard of this book, nor had I ever read a political science book. Allison and Zelikow's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis (I turned 5 just before the missiles were discovered by the U-2 flyover) shows how, despite all our data and attempts to understand the world around us, it's individuals (usually not the decision-maker) who usually matter. McCone's push for photographic flyovers and McNamera's reluctance for an invasion enabled the President and his team to first identify the issue and secondly slow impulsive reactions enough to eventually defuse the situation. The three models (national government, organizational actors, and "players of positions ) of bureaucracy and decision making illustrate well that complex (and even simpler) issues are not resolved (well) by the will of the leader, because organizations must implement the leader's will, and other socio-political players interact and perhaps interfere with the eventual outcome. Using examples such as space shuttle launches, the Persian Gulf War, and Israel show well that this study is useful outside 1960's Cold War scenarios. As I write we're in the throes of the coronavirus-19 crisis. With much discussion regarding the decision processes on how to and how not to react, the very (unfortunately) political circumstances, it would be interesting for a scholar to use the same model as Allison and Zelikow to assess this very civil but very threatening situation, especially given its world-wide, election year, economic, and life ending environment. Also, it would be good to see a less academic, more popular version of the same information, for the junior and middle level managers affecting model II and the players affecting model III. I'd score the book higher, but it's a difficult, academic, and recondite, read.

[Konstancja · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis" by Graham Allison is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the dynamics of the Cold War and the decision-making process that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book offers a detailed analysis of the events leading up to the crisis, as well as an in-depth examination of the decisions made by the key players involved, including President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

One of the book's strengths is its use of the "bureaucratic politics model," which examines how different government agencies and individuals can have a significant impact on decision-making. Allison uses this model to show how the actions of different government agencies, such as the CIA and the State Department, contributed to the crisis and how the decisions made by Kennedy and his advisors ultimately led to a peaceful resolution.

The book is also notable for its use of primary source materials, such as transcripts of meetings and government documents, which provide a detailed look into the thought process of the key players during the crisis.

Overall, "Essence of Decision" is a comprehensive and insightful examination of one of the most critical moments in American history. It offers a unique perspective on the Cuban Missile Crisis and provides valuable insight into the decision-making process of government leaders during times of crisis.

It is a classic of International Relations literature and political science, a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the complexities of the international system, crisis management and decision-making in the face of war and peace.

[Issak Flores · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for anyone who wants to work in anything foreign policy. The book looks at the Cuban missile crisis in depth, through the lens of 3 models to help the reader understand how foreign policy is actually driven throughout the world.

1. Rational Actor Model
This model claims that each nation has an actor that champions the countries interest, such as JFK being president of the U.S. and Nikita Kruchev with the U.S.S.R. The main point throughout this chapter was to look at the Cuban missile crisis from these 2 leader’s perspective. The authors are able to take the reader on a journey through the 12 days the world stood still and how each leader reacted and why things played out the way they did.

2. Organizational Model
The Organizational model provides the reader with a detailed overview of how organizational management like the FBI and CIA were able to identify missiles placed in Cuba, and what procedures they had for such a daunting task to investigate how these missiles arrived in Cuba. This chapter shows the reader the importance of organizations and how it affects foreign policy, by providing the Rational Actor Model with information.

3. Governmental and Politics model
This model makes the case that some of the most important factors in foreign policy at the heads of departments and agencies like the secretary of defense, national security advisor, and other officials. The authors are able to show the reader how JFK had to navigate through these alliances, and which organizational leaders called for actions that could’ve made the situation a lot worse.

Overall this book made me feel sorrow, that we will never have another president who successfully navigated the Cuban missile crisis, without the world ending up in flames.

[CTEP]

Though nominally about the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was really about how groups make decisions. The main premise of the book is that the information that people use when making and analysing decisions ultimately depends on what mental model they use to collect that information. Allison and Zelikow outline three models for how decisions are made, the rational actor model, the systems model, and the political model. The book presents some useful premises for how to think about decision making, particularly in groups. The most interesting theory is how organizations

Why should other corps members read/not read this book?

The example, the Cuban Missile Crisis, is fascinating. The book draws heavily upon historical accounts from both the American and Soviets to illustrate the three decision making models presented. I would recommend skimming through the theory parts and just getting straight to how the CMC illustrates the theory. It's also just a great historical account on how close we came to blowing the world up.

[Bas Rebel · Rating 5 out of 5]

For me the key take away from this book is that the angle you look at human interaction shapes your conclusion and verdict. Alison illustrates this by applying 3 approaches to the American presidency during the Cuban missile crisis.
The first approach is that of a conflict between the US and the USSR. The second approach looks at decision making as the result of rivalry between departments within the US government and the third as the result of interaction between key individuals within the US government. Each analysis highlights different aspects and reaches different conclusions as to why the event evolved the way they did. More importantly it also shows that the crisis could easily have turned out differently if other people had been at the helm as president, chief of staff, CIA etc....

[Art · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, the author uses three models as lenses in trying to best explain the U.S.’s response to the Soviet’s placing missiles in Cuba in 1962. The three models are the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model, and the Governmental Politics Model. I believe the RAM Model works best. However, the author seems to prefer the second and third models. I believe the second and third models, while helpful in fleshing out background information and adding meat to the bones, are more vague in explaining the events. Ideally, one should use all three models, and perhaps more, in examining the Cuban Missile Crisis and other foreign policy events.

[Pei-jean Lu · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is one of the most defining moments of the 20th century in which at the height of the Cold War, the world was at the precipice of a third world war only this time with two superpowers with access to nuclear weapons.
Although really hard to absorb, it is worth a read if you enjoy analysis into theories behind international diplomacy and political decisions during times of heightened tensions, but if you prefer overall historical accounts then this is definitely not one to read.