Originally published in 1951, this classic work by one of America's foremost experts on Southern history presents an important new interpretation of the Compromise of 1877, forcing historians to revise previous attitudes towards the Reconstruction period, the history of the Republican party, and the realignment of forces that fought the Civil War. Because much of the negotiating occurred in secrecy, historians have known less about this Compromise than others before it. Now reissued with a new introduction by Woodward, "Reunion and Reaction" gives us the other half of the story.
This book by a distinguished American historian breaks down the compromises reached to resolve the presidential election of 1876 between Rutherford B. Hayes and Joseph Tilden. Three Southern states had disputed elections. Hayes needed all 3 states in his win column in order to win by 1 electoral vote. Most history books portray the compromise in simple terms that Hayes guaranteed that the Northern troops stationed in Louisiana and South Carolina would be removed and these 3 states would cast their votes for him. These were the last two states to have troops stationed there to support the state governments after the Civil War. Professor Woodward shows that the compromise was far more elaborate than this with many moving parts. It took months to work out the details and there were many roadblocks to getting it resolved. The book is very academic with a great deal of detail. It is well written and informative, but would be dry for many. However, if you want to learn about this event, this book will inform you how it all came to be and will do it in great detail.
This is not one of my favorite C Vann Woodward books, but it's pretty decent. He goes into the deal of 1877 that gave the presidency to Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. There was a lot of voting and electoral fraud back then that was used to give Hayes the electoral college even though he lost by a quarter of a million votes to Democratic Party New York Governor Ben Tilden. The Democrats (no bastions of electoral honesty themselves) had a way to stop the crime. However, rich Southern Democrats wanted a few things, like federal troops gone, federal subsidies for numerous projects, such as the Texas Pacific Railroad. These folks were willing to make a deal that would stop the Democratic Party from preventing the election of Hayes. So Hayes and his fellow Republicans made the deal, Hayes got his corrupted electoral votes, and became president of the United States.
An important, and little focused upon chapter in US history. Much more meaningful, as well as frightening, to read this now after the unsuccessful Trump coup attempt following the 2020 Presidential election. Unfortunately, the book often reads like a textbook. More importantly there was too much detail on the railroad deals and little to nothing in the book on what Tilden did to try to save his (most likely) actual election victory. I understand that the book was about the compromise, not the election per se. But, without knowing what Tilden and his supporters did or didn't do, we seem to be missing important information.
Not the easiest read for a non specialist like me, but filled with startling details about the machinations that ended the disputed election of 1876.
As we teeter closer to an electoral meltdown in 2020, this book is a sobering reminder that we have been here before, and the American electoral system allows for a lot of mischief.
Not among his best, but still thought provoking. I think Woodward is right: the political agreement that put Hayes in the White House was of minor importance compared to the other trends.
The topic is very narrow. As an AP teacher, this really helps me explain the Gilded Age complexity. Also, Hayes is a bit of a victim, though not fully. Railroads are the emphasis.
I don’t think the author of this history is totally honest, but his command of the details so far exceeds mine that I find it quite impossible to know when he’s blowing smoke or performing a bit of sleight-of-hand. As a writer, he’s quite talented when building the dramatic tension in this “detective novel”’ but sometimes it seems that the “plot” turns on unbelievable reversals that would get a Hollywood script writer fired. I learned a lot, but overall the book leaves me unsettled. Some of the pieces don’t fit together, but I’m not sure which ones. For example: “…at the time the Wormley Conference was held and the so-called Bargain struck, the Southerners were already committed to the course they pursued and Hayes was already committed to conciliating the South.” Woodward continues, “In effect, Hayes’s friends…were giving up something they no longer possessed (maintaining Carpetbagger control in two states) in exchange for something that had already been secured by other means” (the removal of federal troops from the chessboard.) Specifically, Woodward explains that “…a clause forbidding the use of troops to support the claims of any state government in the South until it should be recognized by Congress…was passed by the (Democrat-controlled) House and a penalty of hard labor and imprisonment provided for anyone found guilty of violating the act,” but, the bill was never passed by the Republican Senate! But the troops were still there maintaining Carpetbagger governments in two states, and their presence was still an issue (as Woodward develops later) in April 1877. Which is it? Not to mention the dubious Constitutionality of a bill tying the Commander-in-Chief’s hands by threatening him with forced labor for defying Congress. Another example: Woodward treats extensively and in excruciating detail the issue of potential subsidies for the Texas & Pacific Railroad. All the long-forgotten names and their conspiratorial associations with each other are given center stage for page after page, yet it’s all over on page 237. “…Scott was never able to get his bill through Congress. He gave up in 1880.” I get it that “internal improvements” for the South were a big issue, but it seems like Woodward was blowing a lot of smoke. “Padding” might be another word for it. Third example: In the chapter, “The End of the Crisis,” Woodward does a truly great job of building the dramatic tension inherent in an 18-hour session of Congress whose purpose is nothing less than deciding the winner of the election of 1876. Then, on page 201, “After hours of filibuster…William M. Levy of Louisiana rose and announced that he had …‘assurances’ from both Hayes’s friends and from Grant…” regarding “the abandonment of the use of troops.” Woodward continues, “Very quickly after Levy took his seat the uproar subsided and the strength of the filibuster dropped … to …57…The ritual of the count proceeded to the end.” And that’s it??? Moses himself couldn’t have had the impact of this Mr. Levy.
Forgive me if something doesn’t feel right about a lot that’s in the book. I don’t know what, but something’s missing. And the smoke-blowing doesn’t help. Is Woodward too much of a novelist and not enough of a historian?
Phenomenal analysis, utterly cogent and elegant writing. Now I need to go study up on U.S. history to have a hope of understanding the fine points, though I think (pray?) that I've gotten the basic outline. Professor Woodward is a superstar in the writing of narrative and analytical history.
Good for a detailed understanding of (a.) how internally split the 2 parties of the U.S. were at the latter part of the 19th century and (b.) the political games that went on in a very corrupt period in history. In the end, probably would have been better as an individual or series of academic articles rather than a full book.