Dudziak presents a very thorough examination of the intertwining of legal scholarship, African-American history, and American diplomatic history. Through her narrative, Dudziak demonstrates why prominent figures in the American foreign service, including Ambassador Chester Bowles in India, expressed grave concern over the corrosive effect of domestic racial discrimination and violence on American diplomatic initiatives abroad. Dudziak quotes Bowles asking in 1952, “How much does all our talk of democracy mean, if we do not practice it at home? How can the colored peoples of Asia be sure we are sincere ... if we do not respect the equality of our colored people at home?” This question forms the frame for Dudziak’s examination of the influence domestic race relations exerted on American foreign relations.
In his famous “Long Telegram” to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan held that “Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. ... This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. ... If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit—Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.” Ambassador Kennan, the architect of the containment strategy, went so far as to draw out the implications of domestic affairs for success of the non-military aspects of containment. Writing as “Mr. X,” Kennan published an article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affairs 25. “It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the ideological currents of the time.”
Dudziak gives examples of reaction to American domestic failings from the Soviet press, namely from Trud and the wire service Tass. However, one of the most colorful examples of Soviet leverage of American racial discrimination for diplomatic advantage is Цирк (Circus), a Soviet musical released in 1936. The film tells the story of Marion Dixon, an American circus artist and mother of a mixed-race boy out of wedlock. Chased out of the United States by a mob seeking to lynch her, she finds a permanent home in the Soviet Union after she becomes a sensation performing with a Soviet circus. In one of the most famous scenes of the film, members of the circus audience pass around Dixon’s son, singing him a lullaby. The members of the audience represent some of the ethnic diversity of the Soviet Union – Ukrainian women, a Georgian man, an Uzbek sailor, a middle-aged Jewish couple, and the Russian circus ringleader. The baby, James Lloydovich Patterson, was even a mixed-race child of American ancestry whose father emigrated from the United States and eventually married a Russian woman. Despite the many dubious foreign policy assertions postulated in the Cold War era, Kennan and Bowles were correct in the rhetorical potency of pointing out American domestic failures.
The words of Bowles and Kennan were not lost on the Truman administration, as Dudziak, a legal scholar, quite thoroughly details. Saddled with a Congress partially under the thumb of the rump Confederacy (in the form of the Dixiecrats), Truman was left to exert his will with through the various channels and powers of the Executive Branch. Executive Order 9981, issued in the summer of 1948, explicitly directed the Secretary of Defense to ensure the prompt and orderly desegregation of the United States military. Truman acted in no small measure on the urging of A. Philip Randolph, head of the NAACP, who threatened civil disobedience in the form of draft resistance and non-compliance should Truman re-authorize the draft without desegregating the armed services.
Truman’s administration also filed amicus curiae briefs in landmark civil rights cases of the Cold War era, most significantly in the Brown v. Board of Education case, which emphasized to the justices the import of the case to the success of American foreign policy. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was quoted at length in an amicus brief filed by Truman’s Department of Justice in Shelley v. Kraemer. Acheson’s successor, John Foster Dulles, personally contacted Alabama Governor James Folsom, reminding Folsom of the significance of his state’s treatment of Jimmy Wilson. Dudziak cites example after example of State Department influence on domestic legal proceedings, as well as the impressions of Supreme Court justices who traveled abroad. In the second half of Cold War Civil Rights Dudziak expands her scope beyond the courtroom, but for me the impressive depth of scholarship surrounding the efforts of Secretaries of State serving in both Democratic and Republican administrations to influence judicial proceedings in a manner favorable to American foreign relations was particularly authoritative and compelling.