At the end of Volume I of Allan Nevins' 8-volume history on the Civil War era, we were already starting to see the cracks show in the short-lived peacefulness after the passage of the Compromise of 1850. Contrary to what Nevins seems to believe, slavery was an unavoidable issue that was not going to be solved by compromise. Volume II covers the bending and eventual break of whatever goodwill was left-over from 1850 while discussing the Franklin Pierce administration and the main domestic issue of the mid-1850s, the Kansas-Nebraska Act.
With Henry Clay and Daniel Webster both dying within the first 100 pages of this volume, the men who worked so hard to pass the Compromise of 1850 don't live to see how many concessions they had given to the South in exchange for very little going the North's way. To add fuel to the fire, Pierce, a Southerner in a Northerner's body, lucks his way into winning the Democratic nomination in 1852, and a Whig party that is quickly spiraling out of control counters by nominating a faceless, elderly general in Winfield Scott, who is roundly defeated. Although Pierce is genial and well-liked, Nevins' depiction of him is negative, as a man who lacked true principles and simply went at the will of his cabinet (which included future Confederate President Jefferson Davis) while also catering to the wants of his Southern allies at every step. This came to a head during the crisis in Kansas.
The strengthening of the Fugitive Slave Act had already flared up Northern tensions, but the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act ended any facade of friendliness between the two sections. The Act attempted to establish territorial governments for Kansas and Nebraska, while in the process nullifying the Missouri Compromise's ban on slavery north of the 36'30" parallel at the insistence of Senator Stephen A. Douglas. Douglas, who saw slavery purely from an economic standpoint, insisted that it should be up to the settlers of the territory to decide whether or not to allow slavery, and for whatever variety of reasons (in my view: he mainly wanted a signature legislative accomplishment ahead of the 1856 election) failed to predict the extremely obvious tensions that were to rise once the act pushed through Congress. After the act was passed, various illegitimate territorial governments went into effect in Kansas, and fights over the future of slavery in the territory quickly turned deadly.
Nevins provides copious evidence that it was, in fact, almost entirely the fault of pro-slavery Missourians and their allies that poured into Kansas and commenced violence and madness amongst anti-slavery men that had settled in the territory. From well-known events like the sacking of Lawrence to numerous smaller anecdotes about men attacked and newspapers burned by followers of David Atchison, it is clear as day that the violence in Kansas was begun by pro-slavery men. John Brown's unfortunate and unnecessary slaughter of pro-slavery men in 1856 was brutal and inexcusable, but Nevins is correct in asserting that it has distorted the historical view of which side was the aggressor in the Kansas crisis. Pierce, who had already angered Northerners early in his terms by capitulating to Southern demands and vetoing bills on internal improvements, took the side of Atchison and the border ruffians, calling the anti-slavery men the aggressors, which only further enraged the North.
One of the saddest notes to this whole crisis, as Nevins neatly points out, is that most settlers of the Kansas area were not immigrants with a dog in the fight - they were simply farmers who were anti-slavery in principle because of the (racist) idea that it hurt white free labor. Penetrating chapters in the middle of this volume on agriculture and industry help support the evidence that the 1850s were truly a period of economic boom for the north, and certainly could have been for the South if they were not stuck in their ways about sticking to a clearly failing economic system in slavery. Kansas may have very well pushed forward the agricultural economy in numerous ways given its fertile lands and wide prairies, but the violence of pro-slavery men (many of whom, as Nevins details, were skeptical on slavery prospects in Kansas!) rendered that impossible.
As with the first volume, given the length of this series Nevins is given plenty of space to dive deep into other topics outside of the political realm. Beyond the fascinating chapter on agriculture, we also learn about the production of railroads and other forms on transport throughout the decade, as well as the origins of immigration in the 50s and the quickly dividing cultural gap between the North and the South. Another chapter covers foreign affairs of the period, which was largely attempts by Southerners to extend slave area by capturing Cuba and Central America. As much as William Marcy, the calming New Yorker Secretary of State in the Pierce administration, tried, all of these attempts ended in bumbling disaster that led to both no increase in slave area and further anger from the North (the Ostend Manifesto, one of James Buchanan's few notable appearances in this volume, is covered in-depth). At times this volume, given its breadth, can get excessively detailed, but these times are few and far between.
The main issue I had with Volume I was Nevins' antiquated views on slavery and African-Americans. Luckily in this volume he avoids those pitfalls by mostly avoiding the slaves' role in the conflict at all. Given the time this book was written, his inability to consider them in the equation is understandable, but if he had been more enlightened perhaps it would have made an already fascinating book even more interesting. His conclusion that the ineptitude of the Pierce administration harmed the sectional compromise has some merit to it, but I still find it hard to believe, given the evidence that Nevins provides, that *any* president could have successfully avoided the Civil War. Onto Volume III!