TikTokkery and meme-speak will glady attempt to ‘educate’ you about complex nuanced geopolitics and regional conflict, but I still maintain that nothing beats going deep and detailed to bypass the superficial emotionality of fast takes and simplified sanctimony.
Karl Ernest Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac’s “Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia” is an immensely readable and rewarding primer in over two hundred years of imperial power struggle in central Asia, a region once thought to be the key to world dominion. The British and Russian Empires competed with each other, and to lesser degrees with the Chinese, German, and Americans, attempting to gain control of states and regions that had their own ideas and stake in the game. While not a complete and comprehensive history, tending to illustrate larger historical trends by focusing heavily on the biographies of key explorers, statesmen and military men, “Tournament of Shadows” nonetheless has an expansive sweep and touches on many of the key themes of the age, some of which remain entirely relevant today.
In the age of empires, it was commonly held orthodoxy that states must expand or die. Explorers, as much as military expeditions, formed the vanguard of imperial intrusions into new territory, often acting under the banner of geographical surveying or simple adventurism, but paving the way for deeper economic and military ties that followed. As the president of the French Société de Géographie said in 1877, “A country has no lasting value except by its force of expansion and … the study of geographical sciences is one of the most active elements of this expansion.” Once the explorers had mapped routes into regions previously unexplored by their countrymen, trade could follow. Once trade was established, armed protection for that trade could be justified, and so followed the establishment of official trading posts, ports of call, then colonies. The public interest in the age of exploration certainly softened any mass introspection into topics like colonialism and expansion. “The average Victorian knew little of the mountains of Tibet or the deserts of Central Asia,” and various geographical societies sprang up, claiming “public education” as their central goal – “improving the teaching of geography, inspiring the next generation of explorers.” Granted, it can be somewhat wistful to lament a time when geographical journals were seen as “the fountain-head, the source from which information subsequently filtered down, via word of mouth, via libraries, via other journals and societies, via books, magic lantern lectures, photographs, newspapers and finally via schools, to a public who the more information they were given the more they wanted.” One can hardly describe our current societies in this way – “the more information they were given the more they wanted.” Quite the opposite – they often want one story, repeated in soundbites, to reassure them of a safely unassailable one-track moral high ground, a sort of monotheism of political worldview. And who could fault the eager readers of the age, breathlessly consuming reports of far-flung inaccessible places beyond their own reach, tales of high adventure and risk, and the inspiring stories of heroic men facing great odds in the name of knowledge and science. And empire, of course. The blasé presumption of the time was that western powers, by virtue of their military might, had the right to determine the fate of foreign nations and continents:
“China’s devastating defeat in the war with Japan (1894-95) exposed the feebleness of the Manchu Empire, the powers vied to carve out fresh leaseholds and spheres of influence. The heady craze of imperialism was at its peak. A much-discussed best-seller, ‘The Breakup of China’ (1899) by Lord Charles Beresford, plausibly contended that China was soon to be parceled out, in the fashion of Africa.”
The Great Game examines this “objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion,” citing contemporary objections such as economist Joseph Schumpeter, “for whom imperialism was atavistic in character, a throwback to feudalism and the warrior state.”
Speaking of throwbacks, recent events including the nearly decade and a half of Russia’s intrusions into Ukraine make it clear that the Great Game is perhaps not entirely played out, making this nearly 600 page review of 1812 to the early 2000s sadly relevant today, given the long history of Russian’s imperialism in the region. It’s worth noting also that Russia’s use of Western imperialism as a cover and a precedent is not a new thing, but is in fact entirely predictable. Russia’s Minister of War in the mid-late 1800s, Miliutin, put it succinctly when he point out to the Foreign Ministry that “it is not necessary to apologize to the English Minister for our advance [towards Central Asia and the borderlands of China]” because the English did not “stand on ceremonies with us, conquering whole Kingdoms, occupying alien cities and islands […] and we do not ask them why they do it.” Indeed, one nation deciding to go it alone and treat all allies as burdensome expensive inconveniences, as Trump has done with America’s global network of allies, makes it extremely hard to expect other nations to respect any sort of precedent of international order. Any American administration keen on ripping up formerly signed deals and treaties and proving American word meaningless, or international institutions aimed at maintaining global peace, such as the UN or NATO, will surely continue to observe other nations also saying they can ignore treaties, deals, agreements, NATO, the UN. Appeals to China to not invade Taiwan may be as unheeded as were appeals to Russia to pull back from Ukraine.
China, for its part, has its own memory of the arrogance of imperial exploration’s disregard for national sovereignty and autonomy, as can be seen in this 1930 protestation from China’s National Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities at the “ruse at Dunhuang” of Sir Aurel Stein, perhaps the most preeminent Western scholar, explorer, and excavator of innermost Asia from the 1890’s until his death in 1943.
“‘Sir Aurel Stein, taking advantage of the ignorance and cupidity of the priest in charge, persuaded the latter to sell to him at a pittance what he considered the pick of the collection which, needless to say, did not in any way belong to the seller. It would be the same if some Chinese traveler pretending to be merely a student of religious history went to Canterbury and bought valuable relics from the cathedral caretaker. But Sir Aurel Stein, not knowing a word of Chinese, took away what he considered the most valuable, separating many manuscripts which really belonged together, thus destroying the value of the manuscripts themselves. Soon afterwards French and Japanese travelers followed his trail with the result that the unique collection is now divided up and scattered in London, Paris, and Tokyo. In the first two cities at least, the manuscripts lie unstudied for the last twenty years, and their rightful owners, the Chinese, who are the most competent scholars for their study, are deprived of their opportunity as well as their ownership.’”
And this was one of the milder examples of the morally questionable underbelly of empire, and the discovery and exploration that often preceded its fuller intrusions. As “The Great Game” puts it, “ours has not been an auspicious era for schoolboy ideals,” as it examines the impact of empire on the empires themselves, as they wore themselves out against intractable locals who committed the indignity of refusing to accept permanent occupation. From central Asia to Africa to Ireland, the imperial model was beginning to break down. The Boer War in South Africa “persuaded the German Kaiser that the British Lion was overrated and decrepit,” was described by the English writer Kipling as “no end of a lesson,” and “and prompted a prescient diary comment by the anti-imperialist poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt: ‘I look upon the war as perhaps the first nail driven into the coffin of the British Empire.’”
“For Britain, the initial shock was the Boer War, which began on October 11, 1899, and was meant to be over by Christmas. It lasted for nearly three years, and it took 365,693 Imperial and 82,742 colonial soldiers to prevail over 88,000 whiskered farmers, at the expense of GBP200 million. The conflict also featured trench warfare, barbed wire (an American invention), and the first use of concentration camps.”
The war “presaged the ghastly slaughter of World War I, whose toll defeated the optimism of even the heartiest Newboltian.”
“When the Cenotaph, the Imperial war memorial [to WWI], was dedicated in Whitehall in 1920, it was reckoned that if all the war dead from the Empire were to march four abreast past the monument, the cortége would require three and a half days. To be sure, the British were victors, and after 1918 the Empire attained its greatest amplitude. But its rulers lost their swagger and certainty. Even the outsize figures dwindled on the postwar stage – as evidenced by Lord Curzon. Named Foreign Secretary in 1919, four years later he faded away, his high hopes (as Harold Nicolson writes) ‘gradually clouded by disillusion, mortification and defeat.’ Faced with the radical Bolshevik threat, shaken by an explosion of nationalism, resentful of upstart Americans, the governing elite seemed to veer fro paralysis to impulsive use of force.”
Meanwhile, in Amritsar, India, “a rattled British general massacred hundreds of civilians during the anti-colonial ferment of 1919,” while “Royal Air Force warplanes blasted Kabul in the Third Afghan War.” H.G.Wells’ label for WWI, the “War to End All Wars,” seemed inaccurate as “British forces were nevertheless fighting across half the world – battling nationalists and Communists in the Caucasus, bombing Kurdish villages in Iraq, embroiled in the Greek-Turkish struggle in Smyrna, machine-gunning demonstrators in Cairo.” In a note that touches a more personal nerve for me, “British security forces [operating in Ireland] – the notorious Black and Tans – helped give birth to partition [of the island into Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland], civil war, and the avenging Irish Republican Army,” whose “retribution reached into the fashionable heart of London in 1922 when IRA gunmen killed Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, an Ulsterman, as he stepped from his doorway on Eaton Place.”
The heady days of fearless explorers at the vanguard of empire were petering out in monstrous global bloodshed, and perhaps nowhere was has been more symbolic of the ruin of imperial ambition that that graveyard of empires, Afghanistan, which has been the rock upon which the British, Russian and American empires have each experienced their own version of foundering. And a 20 year occupation ending in a collapsed nation at the cost of nearly 2,500 military deaths and two trillion dollars – it’s hard to argue that this was not some manner of serious foundering. That barren place has a long history of proving impossible to govern. Sir John Lawrence of the British India Council in the 1860s described Afghanistan as “a country too poor to support an occupying army; too fractious to be controlled by a smaller force.”
“‘We have men, and we have rocks in plenty,’ he remembered Dost Mohammed once telling him, ‘but we have nothing else.’ To attempt domination of such a people, Lawrence felt, was to court misfortune and calamity. ‘The Afghan will bear poverty, insecurity of life; but he will not tolerate foreign rule. The moment he has a chance, he will rebel.’ Nor would it make any difference if the British attempted to enter Afghanistan as friend: ‘The Afghans do not want us; they dread our appearance in the country. The circumstances connected with the last Afghan War have created in their hearts a deadly hatred to us as a people.”
American involvement, to be truthful, has been longer than 20 years – given that in 1838 “on the highest pass, that of Khazar, some 12,500 feet above sea level, [American adventurer Josiah] Harlan unfurled the American flag, and his troops fired a twenty-six gun salute.”
I’ve heard it said by seemingly intelligent people that you have to look at current events, and political players in those events, through the lens of what’s uniquely happening today. I utterly reject this notion, clear in the knowledge that history’s lessons remain valid and deafening for those who seek them. The ruin of empires that crashed upon each other in central Asia between 1800 and 2000 bears much relevance for us today, just as does the period in the late 1930s which “The Great Game” refers to Democracy’s “collective loss of nerve,” in which “in Asia as in Europe, the initiative seemed to lie with the dictators.” Are we entering yet another Great Game, which, as the last one proved, will not in fact make any nation Great? Or can those with eyes to view the lessons of the past have sufficient voting power to steer us away from the abyss into which perhaps half of the population is hurtling us?