Former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and co-founder of neoliberalism within international relations theory in 1977, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1937) is widely noted and highly acclaimed for his development of the field of political science. Nye gained particular significance for coining the term ‘soft power’ in his 1990 book The Power to Lead. The concept suited demands of the current global power system so remarkably well that it was quoted by political leaders as disparate as Barack Obama and Hu Jintao.
Combining knowledge on the classic notion of hard power and the newly coined soft variant, Nye in 2011 begun to explicitly advocate the strategic and target-specific combined utilization of the two according to a concept he baptized ‘smart power’. The following essay seeks to expound Nye’s ideas on the dimensions of hard, soft, and smart power. In the first place, a concise outline of the definition and elaboration of all three concepts will be provided. In the second place, a few points of criticism will be given in a review of both the applicability of the general theory to the global political system and the specificities of primarily soft power that Nye sometimes tends to ignore.
Power as influence
In an era in which global power becomes increasingly diffused and states are no longer the only primary actors on the global stage, defining the notion of power is both necessary and incredibly complex. Nye assumes the perspective that power constitutes “the ability to get what you want”, siding with mainstream social psychological approaches to the topic of power that view power as the influence one individual or a group of individuals is able to exert over another. At its core, power is contextual in nature: influence is always exerted within a specific scope – the actors within the power relationship –, and relates to certain topics – the domain of power. In global politics, Nye distinguishes two takes on power: the resource-based approach, based on an actor’s military and economic provisions; and the relational approach, entailing the ability to influence an actor’s behaviour.
Three relational strategies, or ‘faces’, are identified. The first face is based on the coercive functioning of threats and rewards to prompt an actor to perform a desired behaviour. Slightly more subtle in its workings, the second involves the ability to set an actor’s agenda, thereby limiting both the actor’s options and the scope of relevant topics. The third face is the manipulative: the ability to shape an actor’s beliefs, perceptions, and preferences; or, phrased differently, dominance over a certain discourse. These faces of power are loosely linked to the three dimensions in general power types: hard power, soft power, and smart power.
Hard power
Hard power is the first-face, resource-based approach central to realist political theories, and entails coercion and reward in its strategy to influence. Hence, hard power may be defined in terms of economic, military, and institutional resources. The power of many significant global actors, and primarily the US, hinges upon a superior military supported by steadily growing and high-level economic performance. With regard to conventional military power, American resources, and therefore potential for intervention and hard-power display are virtually unequaled throughout the world – a reason for a plethora of actors to attempt strategies that render conventional tactics close to defunct. Economically, however, the rise of the BRICS, and China in particular, may increase the need for the USA to assume a more co-optive stance in global relations, especially given the shift in power emphasis from military to economic global significance.
Soft power
Soft power approaches, depending on the appeal emanating from a specific actor, have recently increased in significance. Over the past decades, the wide dissemination of information and possibility of communication across the globe has spurred not only global trade, but international interaction in unprecedented ways. These developments led to a wide diversification of global actors, and hence the inclusion of NGOs, TNCs, global activist movements, and terrorist franchises like al-Qaeda in Nye’s power equation. Along the same lines, however, it increased the ability of states to exert mostly undetected influence in the form of soft power, divided in a direct and an indirect causal model. In the first model, states use resources to attract government elites, which in turn leads to favourable elite decisions. The second, somewhat more contentious, uses resources to attract or repel publics, influencing elite decision-making through influence of the environment.
Smart power
Smart power is the target-specific application of coercion and subliminal, often unnoticed attraction like the immersion in an attractive culture, and hence simply the combination of soft and hard power. Counter-insurgency stragegies like those developed by Petraeus and McCrystal in Iraq and Afghanistan, simultaneously featuring crackdowns on terrorists and winning the broad support of the general population, are one prominent recent example. Most state power, however, contains both building blocks and ensures careful exploitation of these options. The USSR targeted resistance with coercion, but devised a complicated system of Party rewards for the obedient, and its effective domestic propaganda added greatly to the government’s legitimacy. American soft power spreads through the world-wide consumption of Coca-Cola, through the USA’s dominance at the Olympics, and through Hollywood movies and detectives often depicting the benevolence of the FBI and CIA; but it also spreads through the use of the military for training or aid in case of humanitarian disasters. Typically a soft-power application of a hard-power resource, the latter once more depicts the distinction between hard and soft power to be merely the difference between two building blocks. Only when combined in a target-oriented manner can these lead to the effective exertion of power in interpersonal, domestic, and interstate relationships. In an era of diversification of situations, both the number and the type of targets grows, boosting the appeal of attractive narratives in the power approach to current global developments.
General criticism
Despite its thorough nature, Nye’s analysis fails to answer a couple of questions. With regard to his general theory, he partially disregards the danger that an increased soft-power approach may call for propagandic measures. These may undermine the US’s own ideals of liberty and democracy by limiting the number of perspectives available in its domestic discourse, as well as call for a redefinition of freedom which now seems mostly defined in terms of non-coercion. In addition, the US’s democratic narrative, prompting dissenting factions in other countries to elicit violence in an occupying government and hence implicitly forcing the USA to intervene, may prove dangerous to itself,. This already happened in Kosovo, and it is not unlikely that this partly accounts for the recent developments in Syria.
On the other hand, one could raise ethnic concerns about the ease with which Nye talks about military power and intervention. As soft power implies making people want what they do without either civilians losing their lives in the process or sowing the seed of discontent and preparing the ground for popular uprisings, one could argue that soft power approaches should always be favoured to the exertion of hard power.
In addition, although shortly touching upon it, Nye does not elaborate on the increasing dominance of other narratives besides the American, like the Chinese, the Brazilian, and the Indian. Will the development of other narratives lead to a clash of narratives akin to the clash of civilizations predicted by Huntington, or will growing economic interdependence cause integration of these types of discourse into a hybrid global narrative?
Specific criticisms
The following entails criticism of some of Nye’s specific ideas. Firstly, although briefly mentioning it, Nye does not translate the significance of domestic societal openness to policy recommendations.
Secondly, the role of the United Nations Security Council in establishing international law has almost become insurpassable even for the US, and the relatively less resourceful Russian Federation is given the possibility to exert a greater influence through the UN than might otherwise have been the case.
In addition, apart from a few remarks on colonialism, Nye fails to include Sub-Saharan Africa, with its great potential in both human resources and raw materials, in his power equation, seemingly assuming the African continent will, despite its incredible population growth and increasing search for affirmation of its global relevance, not be a force to be reckoned with within the coming half-century.
Lastly, Nye’s offhanded response to the potential risk the rise of China poses to American dominance may be a bit too premature. With markets for Chinese products rapidly growing in Africa and other developing regions as well as in China itself, the PRC may capitalize on these markets to support its economy . Having reached a point at which it is more than able to compete with the US, China may then decide to dump its dollars, causing the collapse of the American economy, thereby solidifying China’s leading economic role.
Conclusion
In The Future of Power, Joseph Nye gives an adequate account of current global developments and the types of power prompted by changing relationships. He correctly indicates that the lines between hard power and soft power are blurring now traditional hard power resources are utilized to enhance a state’s soft power. The distinction between the three types, however, is one of more theoretical than practical use. The integration of both types of power tailored to the needs of specified contexts is necessary to win the hearts of populations while simultaneously eliminating immediate risks; and co-optive stances may prove more beneficial than coercive. However, Nye’s America-centric approach causes him to disregard the rise of Africa, the threat China may pose, and the role of the UN in global power balances. Soft power, conceptually, also harbours several paradoxes to the American narrative. Despite the impossibility of predicting the future of power, Nye’s account needs to answer a few more questions before being truly balanced.