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Napoleon's Wars: An International History
A glorious and conclusive chronicle of the wars waged by one of the most polarizing figures in military historyAcclaimed on both sides of the Atlantic as a new standard on the subject, this sweeping, boldly written history of the Napoleonic era reveals its central protagonist as a man driven by an insatiable desire for fame, and determined to push matters to extremes. More than a myth-busting portrait of Napoleon, however, it offers a panoramic view of the armed conflicts that spread so quickly out of revolutionary France to countries as remote as Sweden and Egypt. As it expertly moves through conflicts from Russia to Spain, Napoleon's Wars proves to be history writing equal to its subject—grand and ambitious—that will reframe the way this tumultuous era is understood.
654 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 27, 2007
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September 26, 2021
“[B]y the time that the French finally broke into [the Duke of] Wellington’s center at around six o’clock in the evening, large numbers of Prussians were assailing their right flank. In desperation, [Napoleon Bonaparte] now committed part of the infantry of the Imperial Guard. Hitting some of the best troops in Wellington’s army, they were shot to pieces and thrown back in disorder. It was the end. Utterly exhausted, under heavy fire, and unsettled by rumors of treason, the French army disintegrated and Wellington ordered a general advance. With the Prussians pressing in on their flank and rear and killing all who stood in their path, Napoleon’s forces were soon jammed together in a panic-stricken flight along the main road. Pursued for miles by allied cavalry, they left behind them 25,000 casualties, though at 21,000 allied losses numbered only slightly fewer. ‘I had never yet heard of a battle in which everybody was killed,’ wrote one participant, ‘but this seemed likely as all were going by turns…’”
- Charles Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History
Occurring over the course of twelve years, the Napoleonic Wars are a big chunk of history. Though its overall impact on the course of events may be exaggerated, it can’t be ignored. In Europe, the wars killed tens of thousands of people, and ordered, reordered, and re-reordered the map. Furthermore, as Charles Esdaile points out in Napoleon’s Wars, there were repercussions in every corner of the globe. In South America, for instance, Spain’s colonies used the distraction caused by the Peninsular War to lunge for independence. Meanwhile, in North America, the fledgling United States found itself in a second war with Great Britain due to the impressment of American sailors by a British Navy starved for manpower from fighting France.
By structuring this as an “international history,” Esdaile takes on the ambitious task of not only trying to tell this vast story, but to tell it from multitudinous perspectives. While I don’t fault the attempt, I had quite a few issues with the execution.
Ultimately, a large factor in determining what you get out of this book is how much prior knowledge you bring in. Esdaile is a well-regarded historian and professor who has spent his professional career – it’s good work if you can get it – thinking about and studying the Napoleonic Era, especially as it regards Spain. As is often the trouble with authors who are super-smart, their books can feel like a private club that doesn’t really want you as a member. Napoleon’s Wars is brimming with assumptions about what you – the reader – already know. For instance, when it comes to the Peninsular War, Esdaile essentially says I already wrote a book on this so you should refer to that. (I should note that he does not literally say this).
This is the opposite of user-friendly. When it comes to historical figures, they are introduced once, and then you need to remember them for the rest of the book. When it comes to Napoleon’s campaigns, Esdaile often just ticks off the battles in a cursory fashion, without really explaining how things unfolded.
That’s not to say that every issue I had with Napoleon’s Wars was solely my fault. Good history is a happy, balanced marriage between scholarship and readability. While I am in no position to critique Esdaile’s research, that is not the case when it comes to literary merit. In short, this has very little. At best, the prose is workmanlike; at worst, Esdaile engages in some very British sentence structuring. In general, the writing was exceedingly bland.
The wars of Napoleon are some of the most dramatic events in recorded history. There are titanic battles, massive reversals of fortune, tragically flawed characters, and an insane climax at Waterloo – Wellington’s “near run thing” – where the fates danced on a knife’s edge. One would almost have to try to make this material dry. Esdaile accomplishes this dubious feat.
With the exception of Napoleon – who Esdaile is more than happy to psychoanalyze, even while admitting that historians don’t typically psychoanalyze – none of the hundreds of actors on this enormous stage are given any humanity. There are no thumbnail sketches or illuminating biographical details to help you remember who each person is, or to give you some indication as to why you should care about them in the first place. Also missing is any inclination to describe a scene. Austerlitz, Borodino, the retreat from Moscow, Napoleon’s flight from Elba are all inherently cinematic moments. In Esdaile’s hands, they are just points on a timeline. Heck, Esdaile barely deigns to provide a description of Waterloo. It’s almost as though he feels that being entertaining would somehow be unserious.
Napoleon’s Wars is concerned mainly with the diplomatic and the political. Despite having “war” in its title, this is not a military history by any stretch. As to tactical descriptions of the battles, there are none. There is an entire chapter called “Austerlitz,” but the titular battle itself gets only one paragraph. Beyond that, Esdaile does not even care much about the strategic overview. Instead, he stays relentlessly focused on how the other countries of Europe reacted to Napoleon, only gradually – very gradually – setting aside local concerns to forge a grand alliance to bring Bonaparte down once and for all. In this, Esdaile sees a certain foreshadowing to both World War I and World War II.
Tonally, Napoleon’s Wars has a bit of a polemical edge. Esdaile really despises Napoleon, and that seeps into every page. As I mentioned above, he cares very little for biographical details, but one of the few exceptions to this general rule is a digression on Napoleon’s weight gain. Now, I have not read nearly enough about Napoleon to say whether or not Esdaile’s conclusions are factually supported. Nevertheless, I know the rudiments of logic, and there are times when Esdaile’s personal views seem to cloud his deductive reasoning. Whenever Napoleon does something bad or mistaken, Esdaile chalks this up to the Emperor’s rotten core. On the other hand, whenever Napoleon does something right or even good, Esdaile finds a way to disparage it, often deciding – as though he could know – that Napoleon wasn’t doing the right thing for the right reasons, as though virtue could only be virtue if Napoleon’s soul was pure. This wasn’t a huge deal for me. Having read Andrew Roberts’s near-hagiographic biography, it was nice to have a balancing perspective. Still, when I finished this, I couldn’t help but wonder how – if Napoleon was as deluded, talentless, and megalomaniacal as Esdaile described – he could have risen so far and so high.
At this point, I’ve done a lot of complaining, so I hasten to add that I didn’t hate this book or even dislike it. Had I felt those powerful emotions, I would have set this tome down, and went in search of another, since I’m getting too old to simply gut through 565-pages of text.
Although Napoleon’s Wars is dense, I was able to follow the flow of events, and Esdaile does a credible job of showing how one thing – whether that was a decision, a battle, a victory or a defeat – flowed into another. The skewering of Napoleon – as I mentioned above – gets a bit one-sided, but Esdaile ably supports his overall propositions. Moreover, I appreciated the clarity of the arguments, even if I did not always think he proved them. Finally, certain sections were extremely well done, which convinced me to keep reading, despite sometimes feeling that I was about to get hopelessly bogged down. Napoleon’s Russian campaign, for example, is well told.
With that said, there is no shortage of books on Napoleon. Quite the opposite. If you want to read about this short man, his long shadow, and the storms that surrounded him, the real trouble is finding the right title among numerous options. Undoubtedly, there is value in Esdaile’s judgments, his interpretation of events, and in his pan-European rather than Franco-centric outlook. Yet in a book of this length, on a subject this fascinating, the experience should be a lot more enjoyable.
- Charles Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars: An International History
Occurring over the course of twelve years, the Napoleonic Wars are a big chunk of history. Though its overall impact on the course of events may be exaggerated, it can’t be ignored. In Europe, the wars killed tens of thousands of people, and ordered, reordered, and re-reordered the map. Furthermore, as Charles Esdaile points out in Napoleon’s Wars, there were repercussions in every corner of the globe. In South America, for instance, Spain’s colonies used the distraction caused by the Peninsular War to lunge for independence. Meanwhile, in North America, the fledgling United States found itself in a second war with Great Britain due to the impressment of American sailors by a British Navy starved for manpower from fighting France.
By structuring this as an “international history,” Esdaile takes on the ambitious task of not only trying to tell this vast story, but to tell it from multitudinous perspectives. While I don’t fault the attempt, I had quite a few issues with the execution.
Ultimately, a large factor in determining what you get out of this book is how much prior knowledge you bring in. Esdaile is a well-regarded historian and professor who has spent his professional career – it’s good work if you can get it – thinking about and studying the Napoleonic Era, especially as it regards Spain. As is often the trouble with authors who are super-smart, their books can feel like a private club that doesn’t really want you as a member. Napoleon’s Wars is brimming with assumptions about what you – the reader – already know. For instance, when it comes to the Peninsular War, Esdaile essentially says I already wrote a book on this so you should refer to that. (I should note that he does not literally say this).
This is the opposite of user-friendly. When it comes to historical figures, they are introduced once, and then you need to remember them for the rest of the book. When it comes to Napoleon’s campaigns, Esdaile often just ticks off the battles in a cursory fashion, without really explaining how things unfolded.
That’s not to say that every issue I had with Napoleon’s Wars was solely my fault. Good history is a happy, balanced marriage between scholarship and readability. While I am in no position to critique Esdaile’s research, that is not the case when it comes to literary merit. In short, this has very little. At best, the prose is workmanlike; at worst, Esdaile engages in some very British sentence structuring. In general, the writing was exceedingly bland.
The wars of Napoleon are some of the most dramatic events in recorded history. There are titanic battles, massive reversals of fortune, tragically flawed characters, and an insane climax at Waterloo – Wellington’s “near run thing” – where the fates danced on a knife’s edge. One would almost have to try to make this material dry. Esdaile accomplishes this dubious feat.
With the exception of Napoleon – who Esdaile is more than happy to psychoanalyze, even while admitting that historians don’t typically psychoanalyze – none of the hundreds of actors on this enormous stage are given any humanity. There are no thumbnail sketches or illuminating biographical details to help you remember who each person is, or to give you some indication as to why you should care about them in the first place. Also missing is any inclination to describe a scene. Austerlitz, Borodino, the retreat from Moscow, Napoleon’s flight from Elba are all inherently cinematic moments. In Esdaile’s hands, they are just points on a timeline. Heck, Esdaile barely deigns to provide a description of Waterloo. It’s almost as though he feels that being entertaining would somehow be unserious.
Napoleon’s Wars is concerned mainly with the diplomatic and the political. Despite having “war” in its title, this is not a military history by any stretch. As to tactical descriptions of the battles, there are none. There is an entire chapter called “Austerlitz,” but the titular battle itself gets only one paragraph. Beyond that, Esdaile does not even care much about the strategic overview. Instead, he stays relentlessly focused on how the other countries of Europe reacted to Napoleon, only gradually – very gradually – setting aside local concerns to forge a grand alliance to bring Bonaparte down once and for all. In this, Esdaile sees a certain foreshadowing to both World War I and World War II.
Tonally, Napoleon’s Wars has a bit of a polemical edge. Esdaile really despises Napoleon, and that seeps into every page. As I mentioned above, he cares very little for biographical details, but one of the few exceptions to this general rule is a digression on Napoleon’s weight gain. Now, I have not read nearly enough about Napoleon to say whether or not Esdaile’s conclusions are factually supported. Nevertheless, I know the rudiments of logic, and there are times when Esdaile’s personal views seem to cloud his deductive reasoning. Whenever Napoleon does something bad or mistaken, Esdaile chalks this up to the Emperor’s rotten core. On the other hand, whenever Napoleon does something right or even good, Esdaile finds a way to disparage it, often deciding – as though he could know – that Napoleon wasn’t doing the right thing for the right reasons, as though virtue could only be virtue if Napoleon’s soul was pure. This wasn’t a huge deal for me. Having read Andrew Roberts’s near-hagiographic biography, it was nice to have a balancing perspective. Still, when I finished this, I couldn’t help but wonder how – if Napoleon was as deluded, talentless, and megalomaniacal as Esdaile described – he could have risen so far and so high.
At this point, I’ve done a lot of complaining, so I hasten to add that I didn’t hate this book or even dislike it. Had I felt those powerful emotions, I would have set this tome down, and went in search of another, since I’m getting too old to simply gut through 565-pages of text.
Although Napoleon’s Wars is dense, I was able to follow the flow of events, and Esdaile does a credible job of showing how one thing – whether that was a decision, a battle, a victory or a defeat – flowed into another. The skewering of Napoleon – as I mentioned above – gets a bit one-sided, but Esdaile ably supports his overall propositions. Moreover, I appreciated the clarity of the arguments, even if I did not always think he proved them. Finally, certain sections were extremely well done, which convinced me to keep reading, despite sometimes feeling that I was about to get hopelessly bogged down. Napoleon’s Russian campaign, for example, is well told.
With that said, there is no shortage of books on Napoleon. Quite the opposite. If you want to read about this short man, his long shadow, and the storms that surrounded him, the real trouble is finding the right title among numerous options. Undoubtedly, there is value in Esdaile’s judgments, his interpretation of events, and in his pan-European rather than Franco-centric outlook. Yet in a book of this length, on a subject this fascinating, the experience should be a lot more enjoyable.
October 30, 2025
Hey Megalomaniac, You’re No Angel
Charles J. Esdaile is a historian that I respect. He is unwavering in his opinions on Napoleon Bonaparte. The premise of this book is that the history of Napoleon between 1803 and 1815 is neither the history of Europe or the world. What he means by that is there were plenty of other things going on, which were wholly unrelated to the Emperor of the French (as he was known for most of the period of this book). Secondly, Esdaile believes that Napoleon was not a great man, but a warmonger who needed conflict to stay in power. Straying away from the military genius (Esdaile does believe that the Napoleon of 1805-7 definitely was this) and great reformer trope. Instead, Esdaile presents a refreshingly balanced account, emphasising the broader European and global dimensions of the conflict, and highlighting the devastating costs of Napoleon's ambitions on the continent.
Esdaile's approach is to frame the wars as a European-wide phenomenon, rather than merely a French-centered saga. He meticulously details the responses of various nations; Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Britain, shedding light on their motivations, strategies, and the internal and external pressures that shaped their actions. By focusing on the complex diplomatic, political, and economic factors behind the wars, Esdaile ensures that readers appreciate the broader international context, underscoring that Napoleon’s rise was not inevitable, nor was his fall.
Esdaile’s portrayal of Napoleon himself is both respectful and critical. While acknowledging Napoleon's undeniable brilliance as a military commander and his ability to inspire loyalty and fear, Esdaile avoids idolizing him. Instead, the book emphasizes Napoleon’s flaws, particularly his relentless ambition, which often led to unnecessary wars, immense suffering, and ultimately, his downfall. Esdaile argues that Napoleon’s greatest enemy may have been his own hubris, which led him to overreach and make fatal strategic errors, such as the disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812.
One of the most sobering parts of Napoleon’s Wars is Esdaile’s focus on the human cost of the conflicts. Rather than concentrating solely on battles and military tactics, Esdaile gives considerable attention to the civilians who bore the brunt of the wars’ devastation. He discusses the economic hardships, famines, and political upheavals that afflicted ordinary people across Europe, painting a poignant picture of the wars’ societal impact. This approach enriches the book, grounding it in the harsh realities of the era rather than solely focusing on the glory or tragedy of battlefield outcomes.
Esdaile’s research is meticulous, drawing on an impressive range of sources. He uses primary documents, diplomatic correspondences, and military reports to support his arguments, providing a rich and detailed account of events. You would expect this from one of the UK’s premier Napoleonic historians, and despite the scholarly depth of the material, the book remains highly accessible. Esdaile’s prose is clear and engaging, making complex diplomatic maneuvers and military strategies easy to follow without oversimplifying the narrative. For readers who may not be deeply familiar with Napoleonic history, this balance between depth and readability is one of the book’s great strengths.
Napoleon’s Wars’s detailed, comprehensive approach can, at times, feel overwhelming, particularly for readers looking for a more concise overview of the Napoleonic Wars. I found whilst reading this, that as I know something about the subject, I was able to keep up, whereas the newcomer may struggle. Esdaile’s focus on the international dimensions of the conflict means that some chapters dive deeply into diplomatic history, which may not appeal to readers primarily interested in battlefield tactics or Napoleon's personal life. Additionally, while the book provides a broad picture of the wars' impact, it does not delve deeply into the experiences of non-European nations or colonies that were affected by Napoleonic policies, which would have enriched the global perspective. Alexander Mikaberidze’s book covers this ground and presents a truly global conflict.
Overall, Charles Esdaile’s Napoleon’s Wars is an essential read for anyone interested in understanding the Napoleonic era in its full complexity. By providing a balanced, international perspective on the wars and highlighting their far-reaching consequences, Esdaile challenges the conventional heroic narrative surrounding Napoleon. The book is a thorough, thought-provoking examination of a tumultuous period in European history, and it successfully bridges the gap between academic rigor and general accessibility. While it may not be the most battlefield-focused account, it excels in showing how Napoleon's wars were as much a product of the European system as they were a testament to his personal ambition. I must accept this I toyed between 4 and 5 stars for this one, but in the end I couldn’t put it down, so I think it deserves the latter.
Charles J. Esdaile is a historian that I respect. He is unwavering in his opinions on Napoleon Bonaparte. The premise of this book is that the history of Napoleon between 1803 and 1815 is neither the history of Europe or the world. What he means by that is there were plenty of other things going on, which were wholly unrelated to the Emperor of the French (as he was known for most of the period of this book). Secondly, Esdaile believes that Napoleon was not a great man, but a warmonger who needed conflict to stay in power. Straying away from the military genius (Esdaile does believe that the Napoleon of 1805-7 definitely was this) and great reformer trope. Instead, Esdaile presents a refreshingly balanced account, emphasising the broader European and global dimensions of the conflict, and highlighting the devastating costs of Napoleon's ambitions on the continent.
Esdaile's approach is to frame the wars as a European-wide phenomenon, rather than merely a French-centered saga. He meticulously details the responses of various nations; Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Britain, shedding light on their motivations, strategies, and the internal and external pressures that shaped their actions. By focusing on the complex diplomatic, political, and economic factors behind the wars, Esdaile ensures that readers appreciate the broader international context, underscoring that Napoleon’s rise was not inevitable, nor was his fall.
Esdaile’s portrayal of Napoleon himself is both respectful and critical. While acknowledging Napoleon's undeniable brilliance as a military commander and his ability to inspire loyalty and fear, Esdaile avoids idolizing him. Instead, the book emphasizes Napoleon’s flaws, particularly his relentless ambition, which often led to unnecessary wars, immense suffering, and ultimately, his downfall. Esdaile argues that Napoleon’s greatest enemy may have been his own hubris, which led him to overreach and make fatal strategic errors, such as the disastrous invasion of Russia in 1812.
One of the most sobering parts of Napoleon’s Wars is Esdaile’s focus on the human cost of the conflicts. Rather than concentrating solely on battles and military tactics, Esdaile gives considerable attention to the civilians who bore the brunt of the wars’ devastation. He discusses the economic hardships, famines, and political upheavals that afflicted ordinary people across Europe, painting a poignant picture of the wars’ societal impact. This approach enriches the book, grounding it in the harsh realities of the era rather than solely focusing on the glory or tragedy of battlefield outcomes.
Esdaile’s research is meticulous, drawing on an impressive range of sources. He uses primary documents, diplomatic correspondences, and military reports to support his arguments, providing a rich and detailed account of events. You would expect this from one of the UK’s premier Napoleonic historians, and despite the scholarly depth of the material, the book remains highly accessible. Esdaile’s prose is clear and engaging, making complex diplomatic maneuvers and military strategies easy to follow without oversimplifying the narrative. For readers who may not be deeply familiar with Napoleonic history, this balance between depth and readability is one of the book’s great strengths.
Napoleon’s Wars’s detailed, comprehensive approach can, at times, feel overwhelming, particularly for readers looking for a more concise overview of the Napoleonic Wars. I found whilst reading this, that as I know something about the subject, I was able to keep up, whereas the newcomer may struggle. Esdaile’s focus on the international dimensions of the conflict means that some chapters dive deeply into diplomatic history, which may not appeal to readers primarily interested in battlefield tactics or Napoleon's personal life. Additionally, while the book provides a broad picture of the wars' impact, it does not delve deeply into the experiences of non-European nations or colonies that were affected by Napoleonic policies, which would have enriched the global perspective. Alexander Mikaberidze’s book covers this ground and presents a truly global conflict.
Overall, Charles Esdaile’s Napoleon’s Wars is an essential read for anyone interested in understanding the Napoleonic era in its full complexity. By providing a balanced, international perspective on the wars and highlighting their far-reaching consequences, Esdaile challenges the conventional heroic narrative surrounding Napoleon. The book is a thorough, thought-provoking examination of a tumultuous period in European history, and it successfully bridges the gap between academic rigor and general accessibility. While it may not be the most battlefield-focused account, it excels in showing how Napoleon's wars were as much a product of the European system as they were a testament to his personal ambition. I must accept this I toyed between 4 and 5 stars for this one, but in the end I couldn’t put it down, so I think it deserves the latter.
March 14, 2017
A history of the Napoleonic period in the Clausewitzian manner. It is a tale of politics and diplomacy where the romantic thunder of guns roars in the distance. This is not to say that pure analysis is neglected, indeed Esdaile distils as much observation into a paragraph as many battle monographies in a few hundred pages, but he doesn't offer a clear military timeline for the unitiated.
He isn't devoid of surprises, either, when held against the light of traditional Boney-bashing historiography. As a specialist of the Peninsular War, he sees the possibility of French victory at the outset, both sides being roughly equal. It's repeatedly stressed that the Coalitions of Napoleonic wars weren not ideological in nature. Rather than reactionist monoliths, all participants continued to pursue the long-term territorial interests that had guided the continuous dynastic warfare of the 18th century. They were perfectly willing to let a Republican France exist, if the peace treaty satisfied said interests. This attitude was extended at the various treaties of the day (most importantly Amiens (1803) and the raft at Tilsit (1807).which would have left France in possession of the Low Countries as well as its satellite states in Italy and Germany.
This leads the book to the conclusion that each renewal of coalition warfare be traced back to Napoleon's insatiable ambitions. Can it ? Apologists maintain that Napoleon's campaigns were at heart defensive in nature. Either way, this is one point where the monster of British folklore rears its head and it costs the book a star. There is also a disproportionate amount of attention for British cabinet politics, where other states' foreign policy is often limited to the standpoint of their rulers.
The global reach of the wars is looked at in detail, from the naval wrestling in Master and Commander over the back-and-forth conquests of Carribean colonies to 'sideshow wars' between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
Bloody "hurrah!"s echo across the Balkan & the Caucasus as the Continental Blockade tightens its grip... but this insightful exposition on the causalities of 1810-1811 fades inevitably into an impatient countdown towards that Barbarossa of the Napoleonic period, the War of 1812.
The pace picks up again at the conference of Vienna, with the "100 Days" delegated to a lost cause. A curious parallel is drawn between Metternich's Cold War-esque design and the power balance as it existed in Europe at the zenith of 1809: an equally strong France and Russia could preserve the peace, with their respective dependencies (the German states, the partitioned lands of Poland) acting as buffers.
He isn't devoid of surprises, either, when held against the light of traditional Boney-bashing historiography. As a specialist of the Peninsular War, he sees the possibility of French victory at the outset, both sides being roughly equal. It's repeatedly stressed that the Coalitions of Napoleonic wars weren not ideological in nature. Rather than reactionist monoliths, all participants continued to pursue the long-term territorial interests that had guided the continuous dynastic warfare of the 18th century. They were perfectly willing to let a Republican France exist, if the peace treaty satisfied said interests. This attitude was extended at the various treaties of the day (most importantly Amiens (1803) and the raft at Tilsit (1807).which would have left France in possession of the Low Countries as well as its satellite states in Italy and Germany.
This leads the book to the conclusion that each renewal of coalition warfare be traced back to Napoleon's insatiable ambitions. Can it ? Apologists maintain that Napoleon's campaigns were at heart defensive in nature. Either way, this is one point where the monster of British folklore rears its head and it costs the book a star. There is also a disproportionate amount of attention for British cabinet politics, where other states' foreign policy is often limited to the standpoint of their rulers.
The global reach of the wars is looked at in detail, from the naval wrestling in Master and Commander over the back-and-forth conquests of Carribean colonies to 'sideshow wars' between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
Bloody "hurrah!"s echo across the Balkan & the Caucasus as the Continental Blockade tightens its grip... but this insightful exposition on the causalities of 1810-1811 fades inevitably into an impatient countdown towards that Barbarossa of the Napoleonic period, the War of 1812.
The pace picks up again at the conference of Vienna, with the "100 Days" delegated to a lost cause. A curious parallel is drawn between Metternich's Cold War-esque design and the power balance as it existed in Europe at the zenith of 1809: an equally strong France and Russia could preserve the peace, with their respective dependencies (the German states, the partitioned lands of Poland) acting as buffers.
January 27, 2014
One of the most biased and one-sided books I have ever read in my life. This diatribe is as balanced as a one-legged stool. Esdaile starts with the arbitrary date of 1803 - as if France and Britain had not been fighting each other for decades. It was French support for American Independence from an Imperial, dominating and arrogant British government, that helped bankrupt France and bring on the Revolution of 1789. There was a British fleet under Admiral Hood actually in Toulon harbour in 1793 aiding Royalist rebels - interfering in a conflict that was no business of the British. And it was a young Napoleon who responded to this British aggression by siting his cannon so that the Royal Navy had no option but to evacuate the French town. One wonders what the corrupt aristocratic and oligarchic British government of the day would have said about French vessels suddenly appearing at Portsmouth or the Pool of London and sticking their oar into British internal affairs?
Esdaile quotes copiously from the likes of Fouche, Talleyrand, Bourrienne and Remusat - all hostile witnesses, despite himself saying their views are open to question. General John Elting in his masterly book Swords Around a Throne (1988) refused to use Bourrienne and Remusat at all because their 'memoirs' are so notoriously unreliable. He stated that: 'In preparing this book I have used original sources whenever possible but have ignored the alleged memoirs of Louis Bourrienne, Paul Barras, Clare de Remusat, Laure Permon, and Miot de Melito, which are mendacious and worthless' (P. 735) Indeed, most of them were written for a Bourbon and royalist audience.
Fouche and Talleyrand were serial traitors who betrayed Napoleon and France on innumerable occasions. No wonder a contemporary called them 'vice' and 'crime'. Bourrienne was caught with his hand in the till, Napoleon forgave him and he was given another lucrative post until he repeated his crime. Are we to trust the words of a criminal against the man who forgave him and gave him a second chance?
Esdaile is constantly contradicting himself and every thing he mentions is given a hostile spin. He evens endeavours to blame Napoleon for the worst Russian winter in 100 years in 1812. Esdaile obviously knows nothing about the spate of volcanic eruptions that affected the weather of the period. The decade 1810-1820 was the coldest decade of the C19th due to those eruptions filling the atmosphere with dust - leading to widespread climate change - an El Nino event which affected world temperatures, and a low sunspot count which is also indicative of low temperatures.
According to Esdaile, Napoleon repeatedly 'forced' other countries to attack him. Everything was his fault and his fault alone. Esdaile's Napoleon is like a James Bond villain who gets up every morning with the thought of dominating the world before he has had his breakfast. It would be amusing if it wasn't so pathetic. And of course, he quotes British politicians who decry Napoleon for wanting world domination, when the British Navy was dominating the seas and forcing every other nation to bow to their will. And as for England being the 'land of the free", yes it did abolish slavery in 1807 but this did not stop it impressing seamen from other nations and refusing thereafter to ever give them shore leave in case they 'deserted' . This insufferable arrogance led to America declaring war on Britain in 1812. No doubt, that was all Napoleon's fault too?
This isn't history - it's propaganda!
Esdaile quotes copiously from the likes of Fouche, Talleyrand, Bourrienne and Remusat - all hostile witnesses, despite himself saying their views are open to question. General John Elting in his masterly book Swords Around a Throne (1988) refused to use Bourrienne and Remusat at all because their 'memoirs' are so notoriously unreliable. He stated that: 'In preparing this book I have used original sources whenever possible but have ignored the alleged memoirs of Louis Bourrienne, Paul Barras, Clare de Remusat, Laure Permon, and Miot de Melito, which are mendacious and worthless' (P. 735) Indeed, most of them were written for a Bourbon and royalist audience.
Fouche and Talleyrand were serial traitors who betrayed Napoleon and France on innumerable occasions. No wonder a contemporary called them 'vice' and 'crime'. Bourrienne was caught with his hand in the till, Napoleon forgave him and he was given another lucrative post until he repeated his crime. Are we to trust the words of a criminal against the man who forgave him and gave him a second chance?
Esdaile is constantly contradicting himself and every thing he mentions is given a hostile spin. He evens endeavours to blame Napoleon for the worst Russian winter in 100 years in 1812. Esdaile obviously knows nothing about the spate of volcanic eruptions that affected the weather of the period. The decade 1810-1820 was the coldest decade of the C19th due to those eruptions filling the atmosphere with dust - leading to widespread climate change - an El Nino event which affected world temperatures, and a low sunspot count which is also indicative of low temperatures.
According to Esdaile, Napoleon repeatedly 'forced' other countries to attack him. Everything was his fault and his fault alone. Esdaile's Napoleon is like a James Bond villain who gets up every morning with the thought of dominating the world before he has had his breakfast. It would be amusing if it wasn't so pathetic. And of course, he quotes British politicians who decry Napoleon for wanting world domination, when the British Navy was dominating the seas and forcing every other nation to bow to their will. And as for England being the 'land of the free", yes it did abolish slavery in 1807 but this did not stop it impressing seamen from other nations and refusing thereafter to ever give them shore leave in case they 'deserted' . This insufferable arrogance led to America declaring war on Britain in 1812. No doubt, that was all Napoleon's fault too?
This isn't history - it's propaganda!
January 3, 2016
Napoleon's Wars prevents a interestingly contrasting viewpoint to the last book I read that involved the Napoleonic Wars, War and Peace. For Tolstoy, history is a impersonal and indifferent force that selfishly dominates the determination of fate, leaving little room for the individual, even where the individual is a great leaders, leaving them to ride the wave of events with the ordinary mass of humanity. Esdaile's history doesn't directly refute this viewpoint. He doesn't believe that since one man willed something, thus it was so. He also rejects the notion that one figure completely dominated the making of history in the early 19th century. However, he does argue that many events of the Napoleonic Wars played out the way they did due almost entirely to the whims and caprices of Napoleon Bonaparte
.Esdaile's main argument that however modern or revolutionary the Napoleonic Wars were, they should be viewed through the lens of the almost full-century of European War the preceded it. Napoleon wasn't so much trying to spread revolutionary zeal throughout the continent or create in himself a new Alexander as he was trying to accomplish the foreign policy goals of Louis XIV. Additionally, the allied powers weren't old regime autocrats who relentlessly struggled to crush revolutionary France and restore the Bourbons. Instead, their motives in fighting the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars coincided with their foreign policy objectives in the 18th century. Indeed, kingdom's concerns about Napoleon often were overshadowed by their concerns in respect to other states, including other Allied powers. Esdaile argues that the European states were incapable of resisting France until they resolved to put other concerns aside and act resolutely in a unified manner. According to Esdaile, this wasn't because Napoleon was a particular genius but because of the inherent demographic advantages of France itself. Similar resolution was required to defeat Louis XIV in the Wars of Spanish Sucession. However, getting several 19th century monarchs to agree to put their immediate interests aside to sacrifice for the good of the whole is not as easy as you might think.
So much of what this book is about is how this resolution to act for 'the greater good' was finally made. This is where the particular personality of Napoleon Bonaparte comes into play. Esdaile's Napoleon is a vainglorious warlord with a crippling addiction to glory. Several times Napoleon could have settled, but his own ambition made this impossible. Whether this was the case or not we'll never know. The facts of history tends to support the notion that Napoleon could not be satisfied with a general peace, but there is room for contrary arguments. We'll never know how Napoleon would have operated under a lasting peace with Britain.
Esdaile's argument is that Napoleon was almost wholly responsible for the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens and the start of the War of the Third Coalition in 1803. While it's true that Napoleon didn't act like a man dedicated to upholding the peace, neither did Britain, and a fair share of the blame should be given to their belligerency, which Esdaile is reluctant to do. This led to an interesting situation because while Britain controlled the seas, especially after Trafalger, France was by far the most powerful state on the continent of Europe, and all British intervention on the continent was limited and mostly ineffective until around 1812. Therefore, Britain had to rely on proxies to fight France on the continent while all of Napoleon's act of agressions in Europe for the rest of his career can be justified as means to support France in this war. Unfortunately for Britain, the other powers of Europe, Austria, Prussia and Russia, could not put aside grievances with each other and their own separate foreign policy goals to focus on Napoleon.
The result of this is that by the end of the first decade of the 19th century Napoleon completely dominated almost all of Continental Europe. Austria and Prussia had been repeatedly humiliated, Russia was an ally, steps were taken toward a unified Germany and Italy, and Napoleon's brothers were sovereigns of Holland, Naples, Westphalia and Spain. Not bad for a man whose chief goal a mere twenty years before had been to lead his native home of Corsica to independence from France.
Napoleon's rise to power is breathtaking when you think about it, but might be overshadowed by how quickly he fell. Napoleon simply overextended himself. He was stuck in a mire in Spain and then he made the fateful decision to invade Russia. The Russian invasion is a tragedy arising directly from Napoleon's hubris. The Russian's refusal to engage the French in battle turned Napoleon into his own nemesis. His thirst for one more decisive act of glory forced him to push his army well beyond what he knew was prudent. This, rather than a traditional defeat, is what caused the eventual collapse of Napolon's Grande Armée.
Once Russia made the determination to push beyond their own borders Napoleon was transformed into a bleeding swimmer in shark infested waters. Napoleon was excessive in his punishments and territorial acquisitions in his last years in power. His enemies were determined to restore the balance of power. However, it didn't have to end in invasion of France, abdication and Bourbon restoration. But Napoleon's vainglorious nature rejected the notion that terms should be dictated to him. He continued to seek one last glory that would allow him to be master of his own fate. While he fought an often masterful struggle against much larger armies France was weary of war, and in the end he was forced to abdicate.
It should be noted, and Esdaile makes this clear within the first few pages, what the goals of this book are. Like the tile suggests, the book is an account of the foreign policies of the European states during the Napoleonic Wars. There are a plethora of books out there about the more conventional subjects, and Esdaile keeps this in mind. For instance, he isn't really concerned in giving the reader a military history of the Wars. He will spend pages on the lead-up to an event like the Battle of Austerlitz, and then a paragraph to the event itself, followed by more pages dealing with the effects of the event.
The book isn't a biography of Napoleon. While necessary biographic details are provided Esdaile isn't trying to give the reader a better understanding of Napoleon the man. In a way, as Esdaile argues this would be an impossible tact. While Napoleon has many devoted admirers, he was able to inspire even more fervent enemies. The man himself spent a large portion of his post-Waterloo exile marshaling his forces for the inevitable battle of how he would be remembered by history. Many contemporary sources read like the source is screaming "I have an agenda" between every sentence. In fact, the text makes it apparent that Esdaile is not a huge fan of Napoleon, and heaps a lot of scorn on so-called "apologists." I'm not an expert in this area, or even particularly well-read in it, so Esdaile might be accurate in his assessments, and of his course he is entitled to his in-fact expert opinion. However, I think he lets his prejudices and viewpoint creep into the text. This usually drives me crazy, I like my historical prose to be neutral in tone and somewhat omnipotent seeming. But this doesn't really derail the book.
I've seen some reviews that have said that this book is dry, too dense, or not for the casual reader of history. I have to somewhat disagree. Esdaile assumes some prior knowledge, but not much. Any gaps in knowledge can easily be fulfilled by a few quick trips to wikapedia. The prose is not fantastic, but it's not unreadable either. Esdaile writes in long, information dense paragraphs but there's nothing there beyond the grasp of a general reader. While the book is not popular fiction, anybody who thinks this is too academic has not read much scholarly work. Of course this isn't meant to be a beginners course on the Napoleonic Era. But it is what its title says it is.
Esdaile and Tolstoy theories aren't completely incompatible. While much of history is on a root level impersonal and inexplicable the actions of specific individuals can cause tiny ripples in the great wave. While Napoleon was far from the single engine of history in the years of his reign, his personal characteristics played a substantial part in the determination of events. While it is inappropriate to give Napoleon sole liability for the rise and fall of the Napoleonic Empire, it is equally inappropriate to excuse him from any blame or credit as an agent of a faceless greater force. I think Tolstoy and Esdaile would agree that the answer lies somewhere in the spaces between.
January 16, 2019
Solid account of... Napoleon's Wars. Only three stars because the Anglocentric perspective started to grate on me. If only the title had been "Napoleon's Wars and How They Affected the U.K. and Its Overseas Territories", that would have been more accurate. The author's inability to see other perspectives also showed in annoying phrases like "He then left Italy for the Peninsula" (as if Italy is not a peninsula) and "When Napoleon and Alexander of Russia met, the emperor..." (both were emperors, so who does the author mean). I would think that there must be better-quality histories of this fascinating period.
May 23, 2015
-¿Refutación o crítica? Decidan ustedes.-
Género. Ensayo.
Lo que nos cuenta. Análisis de los orígenes y devenires políticos (y casi ideológicos por momentos) de las Guerras Napoleónicas, usando las fuentes históricas disponibles con el objeto de desmontar una supuesta teoría (sigan leyendo para más aclaraciones) de la unificación de Europa como sustento de las actividades de Napoleón.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
Género. Ensayo.
Lo que nos cuenta. Análisis de los orígenes y devenires políticos (y casi ideológicos por momentos) de las Guerras Napoleónicas, usando las fuentes históricas disponibles con el objeto de desmontar una supuesta teoría (sigan leyendo para más aclaraciones) de la unificación de Europa como sustento de las actividades de Napoleón.
¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:
http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...
May 22, 2015
Usual British anti-Napoleon drivel. Ignores the fact that most countries declared war on Napoleon. While not a hero, Bonaparte was hardly the proto-Hitler of recent imagination.
November 25, 2012
The title of this book is misleading. It should be called Napoleon's Diplomacy. I bought it thinking it was a discussion of Napoleon's battles, his tactics, strategy, etc. Instead, it is a discourse on Napoleon's political machinations with allies and enemies, domestic and foreign. Battles are barely mentioned.
Nevertheless, this book is a great resource. Esdaile's scholarly work is painstakingly detailed about the ever-changing alliances between European countries during Napoleon's rein -- so ever-changing it was hard to keep track of who was what at any given time. It's a good addition to the library of any military historian.
Nevertheless, this book is a great resource. Esdaile's scholarly work is painstakingly detailed about the ever-changing alliances between European countries during Napoleon's rein -- so ever-changing it was hard to keep track of who was what at any given time. It's a good addition to the library of any military historian.
October 26, 2013
There's not much on offer here in the way of original scholarship. The author's hectoring tone and pejorative-filled diatribes (however much they might be merited) on the subject of First Consul/Emperor Napoleon are unproductive and tiring. Furthermore, the stated aim of the book (as elaborated in its introduction)--to provide an international context for the Napoleonic Wars, rather than focusing on the person and career of Napoleon--hits wide of the mark, and generally recapitulates a diplomatic history of the First Empire that is of course already well-worn territory for historians of the period.
Perhaps useful for a lay reader who is untutored in the period, but fairly pointless for anyone else.
Perhaps useful for a lay reader who is untutored in the period, but fairly pointless for anyone else.
September 29, 2024
Del historiador británico Charles J. Esdaile llega a mi manos esta obra titulada "Las Guerras de Napoleón: Una Historia Internacional" De entrada, el título resulta engañoso. Lejos estamos de un libro que nos relate con precisión y detalle los conflictos bélicos en los que se vio envuelta Europa entre el llamado "Primer Imperio Francés" bajo el mando del emperador Napoleón Bonaparte y las diversas coaliciones de imperios europeos en los 12 años comprendidos entre 1803 y 1815 (Batallas como Austerlitz, Jena, Borodino o Waterloo no ocupan cada una más de 3 páginas). Por el contrario, el enfoque de este texto es otro. El autor busca a través del libro hacer una exposición de las causas y consecuencias de las guerras napoleónicas en Europa pero desde una perspectiva amplia, que involucre aspectos políticos, económicos, sociales y sobre todo, diplomáticos y de relaciones internacionales. Y digamos que hasta aquí todo iría bien. Sin embargo, el libro y su autor cometen varios pecadillos que impiden ver a este texto como una obra objetiva de historia, los cuales resulta pertinente enumerar a continuación:
1. Charles J. Esdaile es un reconocido historiador. Pero además de ello, resulta ser un señor inglés supremamente francófobo y con una posición histórica absolutamente antinapoleónica. El libro está plagado de ataques personales, no sólo contra el emperador corso, también caen arremetidas contra historiadores con una posición mucho más favorable hacia Napoleón. Si se busca una exposición objetiva, aquí no es.
2. Derivado de lo anterior, tenemos el aspecto de las fuentes. Como lo han señalado otras personas que han reseñado este libro, Esdaile hace un uso bastante amplio de numerosas fuentes primarias. Sin embargo, si se analizan con detenimiento, se trata en su mayoría de cartas, diarios y documentos de personajes que fueron en su momento antinapoleónicos velados, o que al final de sus días, terminaron traicionándolo. Personajes como Joseph Fouché, Talleyrand o Bernadotte no son propiamente -visto en retrospectiva- las mejores fuentes para apoyar alguna tesis sobre Napoleón, Incluso el propio autor manifiesta - sin ningún rubor - lo poco confiable que puede ser la correspondencia de un traidor como Fouché: "Fouché no es una de las fuentes más fiables" (p. 511).
3. El libro es básicamente una oda a la grandeza de Inglaterra y una justificación a sus ataques, conquistas a sangre y fuego y agresiones, haciendo siempre hincapié en la culpabilidad de Napoleón en todos los problemas mundiales de la época, salvando la responsabilidad de una pobre y agredida Inglaterra (quienes para principios del siglo XIX ya habían depredado territorio en los 5 continentes). Es esta posición histórica e ideológica la que hace que el texto esté plagado de gazapos históricos absolutamente sorprendentes. Marqué por lo menos unos 30, pero aquí traigo una selección de los más absurdos:
"Las hostilidades se iniciaron en mayo de 1803, cuando Gran Bretaña, no pudiendo soportar por más tiempo las agresiones continuas, declaró la guerra a Francia" Aquí Esdaile curiosamente olvida que las hostilidades de Gran Bretaña datan desde 1792, pero para no ir más lejos, olvida deliberadamente los ataques de la flota británica a la marina francesa desde la invasión a Egipto en 1798... pobres ingleses!!!
"La principal causa de las guerras en Europa fue la actitud belicosa de Napoléon, su egolatría y su obsesión por el poder" Supongo que el afán expansionista de ingleses, rusos, austriacos y prusianos, o el ingente nacionalismo alemán no tuvieron nada que ver....
"Se ha citado a menudo el Código Civil como un ejemplo de las bondades del primer cónsul. Lo que más sorprende al observador moderno es, primero, la profunda injusticia social de ese corpus legislativo, y segundo, hasta qué punto esta injusticia fue obra de Napoleón" Aquí la pifia de Esdaile es monumental, porque no sólo ignora el enorme avance legislativo que supuso en Código de Napoleón frente a leyes anacrónicas feudales a lo largo de Europa, tanto así que el corpus legislativo napoleónico, 220 años después sigue siendo la columna vertebral de la legislación civil en el 90% de países en América Latina, así como en Portugal, España, Bélgica, Italia o Países Bajos. Aunque supongo que para Esdaile resulta mucho mejor el -verdaderamente injusto- sistema de Comon Law de su amada britania (que sólo usan ex-colonias).
"Pocas de las acciones de Napoléon realmente llegaron a infringir la letra del tratado de Amiens aunque, ciertamente, infringieron lo que los británicos consideraban su espíritu" Aquí Esdaile patina terriblemente, pues culpa a Napoleón de haber causado la infracción al tratado de paz de Amiens de 1802 firmando entre Gran Bretaña, Francia, España y los Países Bajos; a través de una infracción al espíritu del tratado (?), olvidando por completo (y no exponiéndole al lector) que dicho tratado se rompió por la negativa de gran Bretaña de evacuar la isla de Malta y territorio Egipcio. Inglaterra, la pobre viejecilla.......
Los generales austriacos y prusianos no eran, en su mayoría, ni ancianos achacosos ni aristócratas inexpertos" Con este argumento, Esdaile pretende desvirtuar el genio militar de Napoleón en batallas como la de Ulm y Austerlitz, exponiendo la teoría contraria al pensamiento general consistente en que, para 1805 la mayoría de comandantes austriacos y prusianos eran carcamales sin inventiva o bisoños amigos de los emperadores, que aún luchaban con tácticas estáticas del Siglo XVII. Sin embargo, el autor no expone más pruebas que sus propios dichos, por lo que me quedo con las posiciones de otros autores más reconocidos como Andrew Roberts o Alexander Mikaberidze
Tal vez lo más destacable de este libro y lo que impida darle un absoluto desaprobado, sea la exposición pormenorizada de la campaña napoleónica en Portugal y España (de la que el autor tiene escrito un libro completo); así como la dramática narración de la desastrosa campaña rusa (donde el autor puede regodearse y exponer a gusto las desventuras de Napoléon y su ejército). También me parece importante leer un relato sobre la época napoleónica desde una orilla completamente hostil a su genio, figura y obras. Aún así, es un libro al cual resulta imposible acercarse si el lector no tiene un conocimiento previo de las guerras revolucionarias francesas o de la época napoleónica. Para una mejor comprensión de la época, el aspecto militar y la figura de Napoleón, buenos, recomendables (y objetivos) son Napoleon de Emil Ludwig; The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History de Alexander Mikaberidze y el majestuoso Napoleón: una vida de Andrew Roberts
1. Charles J. Esdaile es un reconocido historiador. Pero además de ello, resulta ser un señor inglés supremamente francófobo y con una posición histórica absolutamente antinapoleónica. El libro está plagado de ataques personales, no sólo contra el emperador corso, también caen arremetidas contra historiadores con una posición mucho más favorable hacia Napoleón. Si se busca una exposición objetiva, aquí no es.
2. Derivado de lo anterior, tenemos el aspecto de las fuentes. Como lo han señalado otras personas que han reseñado este libro, Esdaile hace un uso bastante amplio de numerosas fuentes primarias. Sin embargo, si se analizan con detenimiento, se trata en su mayoría de cartas, diarios y documentos de personajes que fueron en su momento antinapoleónicos velados, o que al final de sus días, terminaron traicionándolo. Personajes como Joseph Fouché, Talleyrand o Bernadotte no son propiamente -visto en retrospectiva- las mejores fuentes para apoyar alguna tesis sobre Napoleón, Incluso el propio autor manifiesta - sin ningún rubor - lo poco confiable que puede ser la correspondencia de un traidor como Fouché: "Fouché no es una de las fuentes más fiables" (p. 511).
3. El libro es básicamente una oda a la grandeza de Inglaterra y una justificación a sus ataques, conquistas a sangre y fuego y agresiones, haciendo siempre hincapié en la culpabilidad de Napoleón en todos los problemas mundiales de la época, salvando la responsabilidad de una pobre y agredida Inglaterra (quienes para principios del siglo XIX ya habían depredado territorio en los 5 continentes). Es esta posición histórica e ideológica la que hace que el texto esté plagado de gazapos históricos absolutamente sorprendentes. Marqué por lo menos unos 30, pero aquí traigo una selección de los más absurdos:
"Las hostilidades se iniciaron en mayo de 1803, cuando Gran Bretaña, no pudiendo soportar por más tiempo las agresiones continuas, declaró la guerra a Francia" Aquí Esdaile curiosamente olvida que las hostilidades de Gran Bretaña datan desde 1792, pero para no ir más lejos, olvida deliberadamente los ataques de la flota británica a la marina francesa desde la invasión a Egipto en 1798... pobres ingleses!!!
"La principal causa de las guerras en Europa fue la actitud belicosa de Napoléon, su egolatría y su obsesión por el poder" Supongo que el afán expansionista de ingleses, rusos, austriacos y prusianos, o el ingente nacionalismo alemán no tuvieron nada que ver....
"Se ha citado a menudo el Código Civil como un ejemplo de las bondades del primer cónsul. Lo que más sorprende al observador moderno es, primero, la profunda injusticia social de ese corpus legislativo, y segundo, hasta qué punto esta injusticia fue obra de Napoleón" Aquí la pifia de Esdaile es monumental, porque no sólo ignora el enorme avance legislativo que supuso en Código de Napoleón frente a leyes anacrónicas feudales a lo largo de Europa, tanto así que el corpus legislativo napoleónico, 220 años después sigue siendo la columna vertebral de la legislación civil en el 90% de países en América Latina, así como en Portugal, España, Bélgica, Italia o Países Bajos. Aunque supongo que para Esdaile resulta mucho mejor el -verdaderamente injusto- sistema de Comon Law de su amada britania (que sólo usan ex-colonias).
"Pocas de las acciones de Napoléon realmente llegaron a infringir la letra del tratado de Amiens aunque, ciertamente, infringieron lo que los británicos consideraban su espíritu" Aquí Esdaile patina terriblemente, pues culpa a Napoleón de haber causado la infracción al tratado de paz de Amiens de 1802 firmando entre Gran Bretaña, Francia, España y los Países Bajos; a través de una infracción al espíritu del tratado (?), olvidando por completo (y no exponiéndole al lector) que dicho tratado se rompió por la negativa de gran Bretaña de evacuar la isla de Malta y territorio Egipcio. Inglaterra, la pobre viejecilla.......
Los generales austriacos y prusianos no eran, en su mayoría, ni ancianos achacosos ni aristócratas inexpertos" Con este argumento, Esdaile pretende desvirtuar el genio militar de Napoleón en batallas como la de Ulm y Austerlitz, exponiendo la teoría contraria al pensamiento general consistente en que, para 1805 la mayoría de comandantes austriacos y prusianos eran carcamales sin inventiva o bisoños amigos de los emperadores, que aún luchaban con tácticas estáticas del Siglo XVII. Sin embargo, el autor no expone más pruebas que sus propios dichos, por lo que me quedo con las posiciones de otros autores más reconocidos como Andrew Roberts o Alexander Mikaberidze
Tal vez lo más destacable de este libro y lo que impida darle un absoluto desaprobado, sea la exposición pormenorizada de la campaña napoleónica en Portugal y España (de la que el autor tiene escrito un libro completo); así como la dramática narración de la desastrosa campaña rusa (donde el autor puede regodearse y exponer a gusto las desventuras de Napoléon y su ejército). También me parece importante leer un relato sobre la época napoleónica desde una orilla completamente hostil a su genio, figura y obras. Aún así, es un libro al cual resulta imposible acercarse si el lector no tiene un conocimiento previo de las guerras revolucionarias francesas o de la época napoleónica. Para una mejor comprensión de la época, el aspecto militar y la figura de Napoleón, buenos, recomendables (y objetivos) son Napoleon de Emil Ludwig; The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History de Alexander Mikaberidze y el majestuoso Napoleón: una vida de Andrew Roberts
October 13, 2021
What a nice book! but dont be fooled by the name, "An international History" stand for a kind on "international relations" focus, dont expect to learn about every battle and tactical decision, this is not the book for that, instead this work its about all the aspects of Napoleons choices and their diplomatic and political consequences.
The author points Napoleon as the one to blame for all the wars during that period and gives enough evidence in the form of correspondency of the main characters and their analysis that (at least for me) sounds pretty right. It's a book that cant be overlooked by all the people who like this era.
The author points Napoleon as the one to blame for all the wars during that period and gives enough evidence in the form of correspondency of the main characters and their analysis that (at least for me) sounds pretty right. It's a book that cant be overlooked by all the people who like this era.
June 20, 2018
In his book ‘Napoleon’s Wars’, Charles Esdaile has given himself the herculean task of disproving the ‘Great Man’ theory of history with regard to Napoleon Bonaparte. This is no simple feat, as Napoleon is arguably the “greatest” man in modern history, being a master on the battlefield, a great mover in European diplomacy and a visionary in revising French law and regulations. Thus, I was very interested in how Esdaile would argue against the significant role Napoleon played in shaping history single-handedly. Unfortunately, Esdaile utterly fails in his attempt. While providing great insight into the political situations of the era, Esdaile goes on to blame essentially all the conflicts from 1805 onwards solely on Napoleon’s own vanity and ego and to praise British policy at every turn. An objective, balanced history this is not. To quote:
“Hostilities began six days later when a British frigate opened fire on a French convoy in the Channel. In a sense the symbolism was very fitting: just as it had been the British who initiated the crisis, so it was the British who fired the first shots in the war. However, neither this, nor the incontestable fact that Britain’s retention of Malta constituted a prima facie of the Treaty of Amiens, makes the collapse of the peace settlement her responsibility. On the contrary, in the last resort Napoleon in effect willed the fresh conflict. To have avoided hostilities, he would have had to make serious concessions, but to have backed down would have been to damage the prestige that was in the end the only basis of his power.”
Every time I read the above statement (and there are plenty more in the same vein), I am left utterly speechless. Statements like these make one seriously question the objectivity of Esdaile. Not only does Esdaile justify and defend nearly every decision made by the British government during this period, he neglects to ever give the French the same treatment. As a piece of analysis, ‘Napoleon’s Wars’ is at best lacking, at worst mere propaganda and hero-worship of the British regime.
Esdaile seemingly hates Napoleon and goes into (as he himself states) “dubious” biographical psycho-analysis of Napoleon’s motivations. Esdaile’s “conclusions” say more about Esdaile than they do about Napoleon, as Napoleon is made out to be essentially a sociopath hell-bent on building up personal power and glory. Somewhat ironically, all of this character analysis further works against Esdaile’s own thesis that the “Great Man” theory of history is invalid. In this regard, Andrew Roberts provides a far more believable (and better sourced) picture of Napoleon as a person.
So why the 3 stars? Well, unlike many other books I’ve read about Napoleon, Esdaile provides a fantastic overview of the political situations which evolved in Europe at this time. He gives great insight into the motivations of the various big players and provides context for the dissolution of politics into war. Where Esdaile fails in his analysis of the situation, he makes up for with his detailed descriptions.
A word of warning, Esdaile assumes a deep understanding of the events of the Napoleonic period: This should not be your first book on the Napoleonic Wars. I would recommend this book primarily as a companion piece to a more traditional book on this era, such as Robert Andrews’ Napoleon the Great. While Andrews gives an excellent narrative of Napoleon’s life, Esdaile gives much more context to the political situation of Europe as a whole and provides much more information on the other “side” of the story.
In the end, I feel that half of ‘Napoleon’s Wars’ consists of crazed ramblings, while the other half presents clear and concise descriptions of the political intrigues of the Napoleonic Era. In conclusion, taken with a large grain of salt and ignoring Esdaile’s prejudices, this book does provide excellent context for the motivations of the nations involved in the Napoleonic Wars. Just don’t get too caught up in Edaile’s so-called analysis of the situations described.
“Hostilities began six days later when a British frigate opened fire on a French convoy in the Channel. In a sense the symbolism was very fitting: just as it had been the British who initiated the crisis, so it was the British who fired the first shots in the war. However, neither this, nor the incontestable fact that Britain’s retention of Malta constituted a prima facie of the Treaty of Amiens, makes the collapse of the peace settlement her responsibility. On the contrary, in the last resort Napoleon in effect willed the fresh conflict. To have avoided hostilities, he would have had to make serious concessions, but to have backed down would have been to damage the prestige that was in the end the only basis of his power.”
Every time I read the above statement (and there are plenty more in the same vein), I am left utterly speechless. Statements like these make one seriously question the objectivity of Esdaile. Not only does Esdaile justify and defend nearly every decision made by the British government during this period, he neglects to ever give the French the same treatment. As a piece of analysis, ‘Napoleon’s Wars’ is at best lacking, at worst mere propaganda and hero-worship of the British regime.
Esdaile seemingly hates Napoleon and goes into (as he himself states) “dubious” biographical psycho-analysis of Napoleon’s motivations. Esdaile’s “conclusions” say more about Esdaile than they do about Napoleon, as Napoleon is made out to be essentially a sociopath hell-bent on building up personal power and glory. Somewhat ironically, all of this character analysis further works against Esdaile’s own thesis that the “Great Man” theory of history is invalid. In this regard, Andrew Roberts provides a far more believable (and better sourced) picture of Napoleon as a person.
So why the 3 stars? Well, unlike many other books I’ve read about Napoleon, Esdaile provides a fantastic overview of the political situations which evolved in Europe at this time. He gives great insight into the motivations of the various big players and provides context for the dissolution of politics into war. Where Esdaile fails in his analysis of the situation, he makes up for with his detailed descriptions.
A word of warning, Esdaile assumes a deep understanding of the events of the Napoleonic period: This should not be your first book on the Napoleonic Wars. I would recommend this book primarily as a companion piece to a more traditional book on this era, such as Robert Andrews’ Napoleon the Great. While Andrews gives an excellent narrative of Napoleon’s life, Esdaile gives much more context to the political situation of Europe as a whole and provides much more information on the other “side” of the story.
In the end, I feel that half of ‘Napoleon’s Wars’ consists of crazed ramblings, while the other half presents clear and concise descriptions of the political intrigues of the Napoleonic Era. In conclusion, taken with a large grain of salt and ignoring Esdaile’s prejudices, this book does provide excellent context for the motivations of the nations involved in the Napoleonic Wars. Just don’t get too caught up in Edaile’s so-called analysis of the situations described.
October 17, 2014
Superb! A Masterpiece! This book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the diplomatic relations behind the Napoleonic War. Nay, this book is essential to understand the Napoleonic Wars. Full Stop.
Esdaile examines not just the actions each major power took during the period, but the options that were open to them at each juncture. By doing so he lays bare their motives and challenges popular assumptions about their conduct. He takes great care to avoid the liberal use of hindsight most historians of this period employ.
Apologists for Napoleon will not agree with Esdaile's version of the Emperor, but I note that this book is recommended by The International Napoleonic Society. This suggests that even if he apportions Napoleon a significant amount of blame for the wars, he does not spare the other belligerents from criticism when it is due.
Some readers seem to find the text to heavy for their liking, and if you want a romantic biography of Napoleon this is not for you. However, if you truly want to understand why the Napoleonc Wars played out like they did you will not find a better book than this. Guaranteed.
Esdaile examines not just the actions each major power took during the period, but the options that were open to them at each juncture. By doing so he lays bare their motives and challenges popular assumptions about their conduct. He takes great care to avoid the liberal use of hindsight most historians of this period employ.
Apologists for Napoleon will not agree with Esdaile's version of the Emperor, but I note that this book is recommended by The International Napoleonic Society. This suggests that even if he apportions Napoleon a significant amount of blame for the wars, he does not spare the other belligerents from criticism when it is due.
Some readers seem to find the text to heavy for their liking, and if you want a romantic biography of Napoleon this is not for you. However, if you truly want to understand why the Napoleonc Wars played out like they did you will not find a better book than this. Guaranteed.
June 9, 2012
Esdaile sets out to reframe the way Napoleon's legacy is viewed- a tall order, but he gives it quite a go as he skillfully lays the blame for "the violent conflicts that set Europe ablaze between 1803 and 1815" squarely on Napoleon. I was actually prepared to dislike this book since his anti-Napoleon slant is evident right out of the gate, but Esdaile actually makes some valid and thought-provoking observations concerning Napoleon's wars. He also sheds welcome light on some of the lesser known theaters where the international conflict raged. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in a well-written, scholarly study of this period of history.
August 19, 2014
Somehow I think that I know remarkably little about Napoleon and his wars. Then I pick up a book to correct my woeful lack of knowledge and I remember how many books I've read about him, that podcast I listened to for MONTHS about him, and I think "oh that's why all this sounds familiar."
With Napoleon, his character tends to bleed into mythos. It's hard to see him as a real person, as he is so much larger (shortness aside) than life. I believe that he felt this way about himself as well. He was so much beyond the normal that he felt infallible. And just like calling a ship unsinkable gives you the Titanic, calling a man infallible gives you the collapse of the Grande Armee in Russia.
This book does an admirable job of walking you through every campaign of Napoleon, with almost excruciating detail. Trust me, you're going to know Napoleon. You're also going to know all about the interweaving alliances and the politics in Europe at the time that allowed France to do what it did.
It should be noted that the author is not a fan of Napoleon. I'm going to paraphrase, but I swear to you that the following occurred in the book:
Britain did this this and this, but it was still all Napoleon's fault that there was ever a war.
I honestly laughed out loud at that. The author seemed very intent on assigning blame for the wars, which honestly...I don't think anyone gets 100% of that. Over and over again, the author stressed that Napoleon started it...MOMMMMM, NAPOLEON INVADED PRUSSIA...MOOMMMMMM.
I probably should read more about Napoleon, because he's fascinating. And this book filled maybe not holes, but divots in my Napoleonic knowledge.
With Napoleon, his character tends to bleed into mythos. It's hard to see him as a real person, as he is so much larger (shortness aside) than life. I believe that he felt this way about himself as well. He was so much beyond the normal that he felt infallible. And just like calling a ship unsinkable gives you the Titanic, calling a man infallible gives you the collapse of the Grande Armee in Russia.
This book does an admirable job of walking you through every campaign of Napoleon, with almost excruciating detail. Trust me, you're going to know Napoleon. You're also going to know all about the interweaving alliances and the politics in Europe at the time that allowed France to do what it did.
It should be noted that the author is not a fan of Napoleon. I'm going to paraphrase, but I swear to you that the following occurred in the book:
Britain did this this and this, but it was still all Napoleon's fault that there was ever a war.
I honestly laughed out loud at that. The author seemed very intent on assigning blame for the wars, which honestly...I don't think anyone gets 100% of that. Over and over again, the author stressed that Napoleon started it...MOMMMMM, NAPOLEON INVADED PRUSSIA...MOOMMMMMM.
I probably should read more about Napoleon, because he's fascinating. And this book filled maybe not holes, but divots in my Napoleonic knowledge.
December 21, 2014
An excellent, panoramic history of the Napoleonic Wars, although with a bit more focus on the diplomacy than the military campaigns. If this subject is new to you, this book is certainly a great place to start. Esdaile is a gifted writer and does a good job putting together modern scholarship on the subject.
Along with describing the actual fighting, Esdaile does a great job putting the Napoleonic Wars into their international context, and shows them from the perspective of all sides. He describes the motives and objectives of all of Europe’s players, and how they were interpreted by friend and foe. Esdaile even gives coverage to the Ottoman empire during this time period, which actually played a significant role. Esdaile makes sense of the complicated diplomacy of the time period, where the only consistent enemies where Britain and France. Esdaile does not, however devote much ink to relevant matters such as public finance and economics, but this is not a major issue.
Esdaile is critical of Napoleon, so critical that it sometimes comes off as a personal dislike, but this is never really a major issue either. One of Esdaile’s more interesting arguments is that Napoleon had many opportunities for a sort of peaceful co-existence with the European powers, but his ambition and his unwillingness to recognize the limits of power prevented this again and again. Napoleon was not defeated until Europe recognized that he simply didn’t give much of a damn about such niceties as treaties and national sovereignty.
Along with describing the actual fighting, Esdaile does a great job putting the Napoleonic Wars into their international context, and shows them from the perspective of all sides. He describes the motives and objectives of all of Europe’s players, and how they were interpreted by friend and foe. Esdaile even gives coverage to the Ottoman empire during this time period, which actually played a significant role. Esdaile makes sense of the complicated diplomacy of the time period, where the only consistent enemies where Britain and France. Esdaile does not, however devote much ink to relevant matters such as public finance and economics, but this is not a major issue.
Esdaile is critical of Napoleon, so critical that it sometimes comes off as a personal dislike, but this is never really a major issue either. One of Esdaile’s more interesting arguments is that Napoleon had many opportunities for a sort of peaceful co-existence with the European powers, but his ambition and his unwillingness to recognize the limits of power prevented this again and again. Napoleon was not defeated until Europe recognized that he simply didn’t give much of a damn about such niceties as treaties and national sovereignty.
April 17, 2024
This book is not centered around specific military actions/campaigns of Napoleon and more centered on the geopolitics of Europe during this time period. That doesn’t necessarily make the book bad but the author continuously states one contradiction after another. Author also is a major Anglophile… Vive la France! Vive l’empereur!
June 28, 2023
A generally comprehensive look at the Napoleonic wars that alternates between the life and decisions of Bonaparte himself, and the actions taken by other nations at the time. While I would have preferred if Esdaile took more time to directly support his thesis, this was still an interesting read. I will no doubt be picking up his other books on the subject matter.
August 7, 2022
If warmongering was Napoleon's chief strength, it was also his downfall. If thoroughness is Esdaile's... Well, read on - and read the book of course - and make your own mind up!
I have to confess to finding this book somewhat disappointing. First of all, it doesn't live up to the hype on the cover. Admittedly the reviewers in question - Andrew Roberts and Dominic Sandbrook - are professional authors/academics. Perhaps that's why they ostensibly find this book more useful and rewarding than many an amateur reader might?
As another reviewer of this book (Mr Hanna, over on the Amazon UK webiste) observes 'International relations, rather than military developments, are the focus of the work'. I suspect this will therefore be more popular with historians than wargamers or military 'buffs'? There were definitely stretches when I read with avid interest, but there were also times when I found myself slogging doggedly on, in an 1812 frame of mind (1812 Russia, that is, not 1812 U.S.), so to speak.
In many respects this is undoubtedly a very good book, Esdaile compiling and synthesizing huge amounts of Napoleonic scholarship and, if we take him at his own word, resolutely following his own line (particularly in asking whether Napoleon's character was a primary cause and motivating force in relation to this age of conflict), nevertheless at times it's the very all-embracing thoroughness of the book that's the problem; casting his net as wide as possible, Esdaile's scale and scope are huge and wide.
Given the emphasis here on diplomacy rather than campaigning this approach renders his account, relative to many others I've read, fragmented and rather dry. However, Esdaile certainly succeeds in compressing a lot of information on numerous more obscure theatres (e.g. the Balkans, the Near East and Ottoman Empire, and the Americas, including the oft-overlooked Caribbean and South America), as well as the more commonly covered Euro-centric stuff, into a single volume.
At times, busy discussing one thing, Esdaile darts off to cover something else, happening around the same time but in another theatre. Sometimes, but not always, the two are clearly related, with developments in one theatre affecting possibilities in another, and the way this bigger picture emerges is amongst the books definite strengths, but this jumping around does also disrupt narrative flow.
Another problem arising from Esdaile's lofty overview (Speaking of which, he quotes Napoleon: 'I strike from too great a height.' Fuel for the comedic view of Napoleon's wars as the working out of a height-related inferiority complex?) is the loss of engaging ground level detail, battles for example, frequently becoming no more than names. This book, at least in the edition I have, also differs from many on the Napoleonic era in eschewing maps of battles altogether.
I imagine many readers of Napoleonic history, whether scholarly or just generally interested, relish the details of the often epic campaigns and battles. As Esdaile points out, there's plenty of that kind of material out there already. In preferring to trace the broader arcs of grand politics, he sacrifices this Holy Cow, and I have to say that for this reader the book's the poorer for it.
It's now standard practice for books such as this to draw heavily on primary sources, and Esdaile is no slouch in this respect. But his protagonists are almost exclusively bigwigs from the upper echelons, with their eyes on posterity. Very little detail comes from the groundlings, or has the simple candour such accounts often have. This is in keeping with his grand overview approach, but it does make for a drier - and sometimes more pompous (Esdaile's sources, that is, not the author) - reading experience.
Personally speaking, I think books like this benefit from broader social representation. A good example of a book that not only manages this, but adds the oft-overlooked voice of womankind is Amanda Foreman's excellent A World on Fire (on the ACW). Okay, that's about a different era/conflict, etc. But nevertheless, it shows how vivid such history can be.
To convey what I'm trying to get at, I hope an artistic analogy won't be deemed too fanciful? Esdaile's book is, perhaps, a little like a Vermeer painting that's missing its central character. The contextual information, the rugs, maps, walls, furniture, etc, is immaculately (if coolly) recorded, but some of the personal detail and human interest, literally and metaphorically (e.g. this can be considered to include details of individual battles as well as details of individual characters) is missing.
Possibly admirable (depending on your view of the subject) for putting Napoleon back in his 'proper' contextual place in history, Esdaile is perhaps slightly too bent on debunking the mythic/heroic Napoleon he characterises as the 'bogeyman' of modern Europe. In this he seems to belong to the school of historians, mostly in the Anglo-American tradition, who feel that Napoleon is overly revered.
Certainly amongst most people I know (including French folk) Napoleon's still seen primarily as a warmongering imperialist despot, and therefore not altogether to be admired! But equally, one has to concede that advancement via merit through the ranks of Napoleon's army, and in the secular French society of his time, was a more common thing than it was in the ranks of Ancien Regime powers, such as England or Austria (read Jack Gill's excellent three volume Thunder On The Danube series to learn how hamstrung Austria was in the 1809 campaign, on account of the dynastic and gentrified modus operandi that hamstrung the command level), and clearly - to my mind at least [1] Napoleon's character cannot be simply written out as an interchangeable cog in the machine of the history of the world at this particular time.
The French introduced the levée en masse, to defend the revolution, and Napoleon introduced annual conscription, which ultimately become know as the blood tax. This area of evolving warfare is not simple: the term blood tax tell us how unpopular conscription would become, but one can argue that from the levée en masse onwards, in the parlance of modern Europe, French troops were 'stakeholders', in a potentially more liberal state.
In England we avoided overt conscription, but not from magnanimity, but rather because introducing it might perhaps have fomented the kind of rebellion and change in the social order that the nobs here dreaded, especially having seen what'd happened in France. Against all this Esdaile quite rightly points out that, ultimately, 'Boney was a warrior' (as the old song had it), and only by acting collectively did Europe eventually defeat him and end the bloodshed. From this viewpoint Napoleon ends up in the odious company of Hitler, as destroyer of the peace.
The theme of Napoleonic character analysis, which by the end of the book feels more like character assasination, in seeking to answer a fundamental question at the core of the book - 'Was Napoleonic Europe...proof of the 'great-man' theory of history?' - finds Esdaile in difficult territory. Seemingly irritated by traditions of pro-Napoleonic history and biography, his recurring criticisms of Napoleon eventually sound almost personal!
Rather like Napoleon himself, whose contradictions - 'I have always commanded' and 'I have never really been my own master; I have always been governed by circumstances' - and whose alleged 'ruinous quest for glory' dominate this book, Esdaile tries to have it both ways: Yes Napoleon was a singular man, whose almost primeval force of character shaped events: 'it was the emperor's determination to eschew compromise... that made them [the Napoleonic wars] what they were'. But no, 'the history of Naploeon did not constitute the history of the world, or indeed, even Europe'! Hmm?
Esdaile himself says 'academic historians rarely attract the audience they deserve', and, whilst he succeeds in conveying what he terms the 'pan-European dimension' of these wars, with a locus more centred around Poland and the crumbling Ottoman empire than is normal in Napoleonic histories (indeed, at one point Esdaile states that Russo-Persian altercations, at the time a considered a 'sideshow', may retrospectively be deemed to have 'had greater long-term geopolitical effect than anything that happened in Western Europe'), his book, alas, probably won't change that state of affairs.
Nothing if not polemic and thought provoking, this is a very informative, well researched, and detailed book, and one can see it potentially occupying a well-earned place in current Napoleonic scholarship. But for the generally intrigued non-specialist reader, Esdaile's very thoroughness and concern with the broader historical picture might make this a bit on the drily academic side.
I read military history (well, history generally, and Napoleonic history in particular) like some people read novels, and my favourites are the books most like a novel in their characterisations and 'plot' momentum, etc. Ideally, one hopes, a history book can have this level vivacity without sacrificing objectivity. Some good examples include Barbero's The Battle and Zamoyski's 1812, but these are admittedly focussed on particular campaigns and battles, whereas Esdaile seeks to tell us about the whole period.
Last of all, there is even something in that most fundamental of things about this book, that I'm beginning to question, the title and the assumptions it suggests. As Andrew Roberts is keen to frequently point out, only the Russian and Spanish campaigns were instigated by Napoleon (and how ironic, given that those were to be the two to hasten his ultimate downfall!). Almost all the others, including the Italian campaigns that raised him to power, were started by the 'legitimate' or Ancien Regime powers, who feared the spreading of Enlightenment values would undermine their rule (as it indeed it would, and has done), usually with England acting as banker. It's real a case of the winner writing history, and using their dominance for propaganda purposes, to say that these were simply Napoleon's Wars.
My head might give this a four star review, but my heart would only make it two. Indeed, I'd struggle to go with four, meaning 'I like it': it was too much like hard work. So I'll settle for three stars.
I have to confess to finding this book somewhat disappointing. First of all, it doesn't live up to the hype on the cover. Admittedly the reviewers in question - Andrew Roberts and Dominic Sandbrook - are professional authors/academics. Perhaps that's why they ostensibly find this book more useful and rewarding than many an amateur reader might?
As another reviewer of this book (Mr Hanna, over on the Amazon UK webiste) observes 'International relations, rather than military developments, are the focus of the work'. I suspect this will therefore be more popular with historians than wargamers or military 'buffs'? There were definitely stretches when I read with avid interest, but there were also times when I found myself slogging doggedly on, in an 1812 frame of mind (1812 Russia, that is, not 1812 U.S.), so to speak.
In many respects this is undoubtedly a very good book, Esdaile compiling and synthesizing huge amounts of Napoleonic scholarship and, if we take him at his own word, resolutely following his own line (particularly in asking whether Napoleon's character was a primary cause and motivating force in relation to this age of conflict), nevertheless at times it's the very all-embracing thoroughness of the book that's the problem; casting his net as wide as possible, Esdaile's scale and scope are huge and wide.
Given the emphasis here on diplomacy rather than campaigning this approach renders his account, relative to many others I've read, fragmented and rather dry. However, Esdaile certainly succeeds in compressing a lot of information on numerous more obscure theatres (e.g. the Balkans, the Near East and Ottoman Empire, and the Americas, including the oft-overlooked Caribbean and South America), as well as the more commonly covered Euro-centric stuff, into a single volume.
At times, busy discussing one thing, Esdaile darts off to cover something else, happening around the same time but in another theatre. Sometimes, but not always, the two are clearly related, with developments in one theatre affecting possibilities in another, and the way this bigger picture emerges is amongst the books definite strengths, but this jumping around does also disrupt narrative flow.
Another problem arising from Esdaile's lofty overview (Speaking of which, he quotes Napoleon: 'I strike from too great a height.' Fuel for the comedic view of Napoleon's wars as the working out of a height-related inferiority complex?) is the loss of engaging ground level detail, battles for example, frequently becoming no more than names. This book, at least in the edition I have, also differs from many on the Napoleonic era in eschewing maps of battles altogether.
I imagine many readers of Napoleonic history, whether scholarly or just generally interested, relish the details of the often epic campaigns and battles. As Esdaile points out, there's plenty of that kind of material out there already. In preferring to trace the broader arcs of grand politics, he sacrifices this Holy Cow, and I have to say that for this reader the book's the poorer for it.
It's now standard practice for books such as this to draw heavily on primary sources, and Esdaile is no slouch in this respect. But his protagonists are almost exclusively bigwigs from the upper echelons, with their eyes on posterity. Very little detail comes from the groundlings, or has the simple candour such accounts often have. This is in keeping with his grand overview approach, but it does make for a drier - and sometimes more pompous (Esdaile's sources, that is, not the author) - reading experience.
Personally speaking, I think books like this benefit from broader social representation. A good example of a book that not only manages this, but adds the oft-overlooked voice of womankind is Amanda Foreman's excellent A World on Fire (on the ACW). Okay, that's about a different era/conflict, etc. But nevertheless, it shows how vivid such history can be.
To convey what I'm trying to get at, I hope an artistic analogy won't be deemed too fanciful? Esdaile's book is, perhaps, a little like a Vermeer painting that's missing its central character. The contextual information, the rugs, maps, walls, furniture, etc, is immaculately (if coolly) recorded, but some of the personal detail and human interest, literally and metaphorically (e.g. this can be considered to include details of individual battles as well as details of individual characters) is missing.
Possibly admirable (depending on your view of the subject) for putting Napoleon back in his 'proper' contextual place in history, Esdaile is perhaps slightly too bent on debunking the mythic/heroic Napoleon he characterises as the 'bogeyman' of modern Europe. In this he seems to belong to the school of historians, mostly in the Anglo-American tradition, who feel that Napoleon is overly revered.
Certainly amongst most people I know (including French folk) Napoleon's still seen primarily as a warmongering imperialist despot, and therefore not altogether to be admired! But equally, one has to concede that advancement via merit through the ranks of Napoleon's army, and in the secular French society of his time, was a more common thing than it was in the ranks of Ancien Regime powers, such as England or Austria (read Jack Gill's excellent three volume Thunder On The Danube series to learn how hamstrung Austria was in the 1809 campaign, on account of the dynastic and gentrified modus operandi that hamstrung the command level), and clearly - to my mind at least [1] Napoleon's character cannot be simply written out as an interchangeable cog in the machine of the history of the world at this particular time.
The French introduced the levée en masse, to defend the revolution, and Napoleon introduced annual conscription, which ultimately become know as the blood tax. This area of evolving warfare is not simple: the term blood tax tell us how unpopular conscription would become, but one can argue that from the levée en masse onwards, in the parlance of modern Europe, French troops were 'stakeholders', in a potentially more liberal state.
In England we avoided overt conscription, but not from magnanimity, but rather because introducing it might perhaps have fomented the kind of rebellion and change in the social order that the nobs here dreaded, especially having seen what'd happened in France. Against all this Esdaile quite rightly points out that, ultimately, 'Boney was a warrior' (as the old song had it), and only by acting collectively did Europe eventually defeat him and end the bloodshed. From this viewpoint Napoleon ends up in the odious company of Hitler, as destroyer of the peace.
The theme of Napoleonic character analysis, which by the end of the book feels more like character assasination, in seeking to answer a fundamental question at the core of the book - 'Was Napoleonic Europe...proof of the 'great-man' theory of history?' - finds Esdaile in difficult territory. Seemingly irritated by traditions of pro-Napoleonic history and biography, his recurring criticisms of Napoleon eventually sound almost personal!
Rather like Napoleon himself, whose contradictions - 'I have always commanded' and 'I have never really been my own master; I have always been governed by circumstances' - and whose alleged 'ruinous quest for glory' dominate this book, Esdaile tries to have it both ways: Yes Napoleon was a singular man, whose almost primeval force of character shaped events: 'it was the emperor's determination to eschew compromise... that made them [the Napoleonic wars] what they were'. But no, 'the history of Naploeon did not constitute the history of the world, or indeed, even Europe'! Hmm?
Esdaile himself says 'academic historians rarely attract the audience they deserve', and, whilst he succeeds in conveying what he terms the 'pan-European dimension' of these wars, with a locus more centred around Poland and the crumbling Ottoman empire than is normal in Napoleonic histories (indeed, at one point Esdaile states that Russo-Persian altercations, at the time a considered a 'sideshow', may retrospectively be deemed to have 'had greater long-term geopolitical effect than anything that happened in Western Europe'), his book, alas, probably won't change that state of affairs.
Nothing if not polemic and thought provoking, this is a very informative, well researched, and detailed book, and one can see it potentially occupying a well-earned place in current Napoleonic scholarship. But for the generally intrigued non-specialist reader, Esdaile's very thoroughness and concern with the broader historical picture might make this a bit on the drily academic side.
I read military history (well, history generally, and Napoleonic history in particular) like some people read novels, and my favourites are the books most like a novel in their characterisations and 'plot' momentum, etc. Ideally, one hopes, a history book can have this level vivacity without sacrificing objectivity. Some good examples include Barbero's The Battle and Zamoyski's 1812, but these are admittedly focussed on particular campaigns and battles, whereas Esdaile seeks to tell us about the whole period.
Last of all, there is even something in that most fundamental of things about this book, that I'm beginning to question, the title and the assumptions it suggests. As Andrew Roberts is keen to frequently point out, only the Russian and Spanish campaigns were instigated by Napoleon (and how ironic, given that those were to be the two to hasten his ultimate downfall!). Almost all the others, including the Italian campaigns that raised him to power, were started by the 'legitimate' or Ancien Regime powers, who feared the spreading of Enlightenment values would undermine their rule (as it indeed it would, and has done), usually with England acting as banker. It's real a case of the winner writing history, and using their dominance for propaganda purposes, to say that these were simply Napoleon's Wars.
My head might give this a four star review, but my heart would only make it two. Indeed, I'd struggle to go with four, meaning 'I like it': it was too much like hard work. So I'll settle for three stars.
June 16, 2017
A useful and interesting high level view marred by attributing too much weight to the psychology of Napoleon's character.
This book is engagingly written and flows well over the whole scope of the period. The focus is more on the diplomacy and international relations than on the military detail. The scope is very broad and therefore provides a much wider sense of the context in which Napoleon was operating - ranging from Denmark, Sweden and Finland to the Ottoman empire, Persia, Afghanistan and India. This wide range makes for a genuinely interesting analysis placing the diplomacy of western Europe in a deeper context than is normal for histories of this period.
Esdaile also brings into focus how the foreign policies of the various allied powers were constructed, and the similarities that remained to their concerns of the eighteenth century. He makes the case for each state having a rational policy which he claims almost to the end not including the removal of Napoleon as a precondition of peace.
Useful as this is, Esdaile's approach is marred by his emphasis on the psychology of Napoleon himself. While Napoleon's arrogance and narcissism were plainly factors Esdaile seems to believe that Napoleon could have had peace at almost any time. This reaches almost comical proportions on occasion when the worst possible construction is put on Napoleon's actions while British policy is always interpreted as benevolent. This is self-evidently not true, and shows Esdaile overplaying his hand. In seeking to place a focus on the flaws in Napoleon's character which led him continue to pursue aggrandisement he makes this the sole reason and so despite having brought out the complexity of the relations between the various European states he ends up essentially ignoring them in his analysis.
All that said, this is an interesting modern analysis which brings out the context of the wars and covers a broad sweep of history in a single and very readable volume.
This book is engagingly written and flows well over the whole scope of the period. The focus is more on the diplomacy and international relations than on the military detail. The scope is very broad and therefore provides a much wider sense of the context in which Napoleon was operating - ranging from Denmark, Sweden and Finland to the Ottoman empire, Persia, Afghanistan and India. This wide range makes for a genuinely interesting analysis placing the diplomacy of western Europe in a deeper context than is normal for histories of this period.
Esdaile also brings into focus how the foreign policies of the various allied powers were constructed, and the similarities that remained to their concerns of the eighteenth century. He makes the case for each state having a rational policy which he claims almost to the end not including the removal of Napoleon as a precondition of peace.
Useful as this is, Esdaile's approach is marred by his emphasis on the psychology of Napoleon himself. While Napoleon's arrogance and narcissism were plainly factors Esdaile seems to believe that Napoleon could have had peace at almost any time. This reaches almost comical proportions on occasion when the worst possible construction is put on Napoleon's actions while British policy is always interpreted as benevolent. This is self-evidently not true, and shows Esdaile overplaying his hand. In seeking to place a focus on the flaws in Napoleon's character which led him continue to pursue aggrandisement he makes this the sole reason and so despite having brought out the complexity of the relations between the various European states he ends up essentially ignoring them in his analysis.
All that said, this is an interesting modern analysis which brings out the context of the wars and covers a broad sweep of history in a single and very readable volume.
July 19, 2015
It is important to understand what this book is and what it is not, as the reader may have certain (reasonable) expectations. It is not a military history of Napoleon’s Wars, rather an account of international relations centred on Europe (though not excluding colonies/former colonies) at the time of the Napoleonic wars. A vast amount of material is covered, providing a foundation for further, detailed, reading on specific subjects.
The book walks a fine line between clarity and confusion in attempting to provide a continuous holistic view from the main powers of the time while progressing the main narrative, but overall this is achieved with lucidity. The subject of Napoleon himself is treated somewhat strangely, as the impression given by the introduction contrasts with the rest of the book.
An excellent account for those wanting an overview of the period. It manages to sustain interest in subject matter that might otherwise appear very dry – dates, treaties, political details, etc.
The book walks a fine line between clarity and confusion in attempting to provide a continuous holistic view from the main powers of the time while progressing the main narrative, but overall this is achieved with lucidity. The subject of Napoleon himself is treated somewhat strangely, as the impression given by the introduction contrasts with the rest of the book.
An excellent account for those wanting an overview of the period. It manages to sustain interest in subject matter that might otherwise appear very dry – dates, treaties, political details, etc.
February 21, 2013
Napoleon was a dick. That is the first thing one takes away from this superlative history of that short fuck's wacky wars. Second, it wasn't just about Le Boner and his thirst for glory and the blood of thousands. Rather, Esdaile adeptly weaves a global, yes, global, history around the events of '03-'15. Russians, Serbs, Poles, the Ottoman Empire, The U S of A, everything is here in all its splendor. Esdaile is an excellent writer, too, and despite its 600 page length it never feels like a slog. The only negative part for me is his tendency to get bogged down in details of battles and skirmishes, which he says in the beginning that he won't do. One can't blame him: the sheer immensity of the scale of Napoleon's idiocy and recalcitrance only really come to the fore in the actual military engagements. Other things of note: the "coalitions" were often anything but because of the cutthroat, fuck-yo-mama relations between the major European powers. Very recommendable.
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September 19, 2013Completely to much psychoanalytics of Napoleon in this book. It is all completely impossible to know for sure and doesn't help the book esp as the author makes a point of saying it is not a biography...he also says his aim is to remain neutral but paints a very bad picture that one can not help but think is biased
February 20, 2009
The perfect companion while reading the Sharpe books.
October 8, 2021
Veddy British. I got interested through Cornwell's Sharpe novels; we'll see.
May 6, 2023
The historiography here is vast, the scope massive. Rather than just a synapsis of battle details or military tactics — though there is some of that too — this book endeavors to envelop all of the political, social, economic, trade, revolutionary, and military issues going on around the world in areas directly affected by the wars across the European continent; the Americas, Central Asia/India, North Africa, and the Middle East are all taken into account here. The Napoleonic Wars were more than just the battles themselves. This book sets out to present the international scene at the time of Napoleon’s rise and fall, and Esdaile succeeds in this, relating the incredibly complex political realities and individual personalities present at the time.
Some reviewers have criticized the author for harping too much on Napoleon’s personality and arrogance as playing too much a role, and for taking a “British” perspective in the book, bringing up how much Napoleon’s actions affected British trade or supremacy of the seas. Esdaille is, after all, a British historian and a well-known critic of Napoleon and the assertions are not without merit. But Esdaile makes a solid case that Napoleon was an arrogant megalomaniac prone to overreaching and it would have been bad historiography NOT to take that personal element into account. It is by no means the only factor here though, not by a long shot. The second assertion is simply a red herring. The whole point of the book is to present a global perspective to these wars, and Esdail expertly does so, detailing how all the nations and areas were impacted. These reviewers seem to have missed the fact that Esdaille’s narrative encompasses the impacts to all the countries and regions, not just Britain.
Esdaile’s prose and erudition are masterful. You will be drawn in by the flow of his narrative and how he ties everything together. This is a fantastic read for anyone seeking better understanding of Napoleon, the place he has in the tumultuous events after the French Revolution, and the impact his rise and fall had on the subsequent nineteenth century.
Some reviewers have criticized the author for harping too much on Napoleon’s personality and arrogance as playing too much a role, and for taking a “British” perspective in the book, bringing up how much Napoleon’s actions affected British trade or supremacy of the seas. Esdaille is, after all, a British historian and a well-known critic of Napoleon and the assertions are not without merit. But Esdaile makes a solid case that Napoleon was an arrogant megalomaniac prone to overreaching and it would have been bad historiography NOT to take that personal element into account. It is by no means the only factor here though, not by a long shot. The second assertion is simply a red herring. The whole point of the book is to present a global perspective to these wars, and Esdail expertly does so, detailing how all the nations and areas were impacted. These reviewers seem to have missed the fact that Esdaille’s narrative encompasses the impacts to all the countries and regions, not just Britain.
Esdaile’s prose and erudition are masterful. You will be drawn in by the flow of his narrative and how he ties everything together. This is a fantastic read for anyone seeking better understanding of Napoleon, the place he has in the tumultuous events after the French Revolution, and the impact his rise and fall had on the subsequent nineteenth century.
September 10, 2022
If you are looking for a book on Napoleon’s military strategies and their outcomes, this is not the book for you. Instead, this is a detailed account of Napoleon’s wars and the impact on Europe, most notably France and the personal impact on Napoleon himself. While Charles Esdaile provides much detail about the battles, there is little discussion of the strategies Napoleon employed.
The book starts in 1803, when Napoleon gained total control over France first as First Consul and then in 1804 as Emperor. The book goes into depth about the many wars and Napoleon’s success and how this transforms Europe. Napoleon’s annexation of countries, placing them under French rule and the age of tactic of installing family or trusted loyal supporters as the puppet rulers of these countries created a huge empire, and changed the structure of Europe. This was, perhaps, unintentionally the catalyst for both the break up of the Austrian Empire and the unification of Germany (both events in the future).
Charles Esdaile has captured the complex figure of Napoleon: his brilliant mind; his tenacity; his charisma (especially to his troops); his vanity; and his arrogance which led him to think he was always right, despite evidence to the contrary. The details provided about: the heavy casualties; the fighting conditions; the staggering amounts of money; and the political consequences of these wars is intense and dramatic. The discussion that Charles Esdaile provides of Napoleon’s attempts to steamroll his Napoleonic Code across occupied territories (but with very little success) is a good example of his arrogance and blindness to the laws and customs of these countries,.
This is an intense read of a very complex man, and the changed Europe he left behind.
The book starts in 1803, when Napoleon gained total control over France first as First Consul and then in 1804 as Emperor. The book goes into depth about the many wars and Napoleon’s success and how this transforms Europe. Napoleon’s annexation of countries, placing them under French rule and the age of tactic of installing family or trusted loyal supporters as the puppet rulers of these countries created a huge empire, and changed the structure of Europe. This was, perhaps, unintentionally the catalyst for both the break up of the Austrian Empire and the unification of Germany (both events in the future).
Charles Esdaile has captured the complex figure of Napoleon: his brilliant mind; his tenacity; his charisma (especially to his troops); his vanity; and his arrogance which led him to think he was always right, despite evidence to the contrary. The details provided about: the heavy casualties; the fighting conditions; the staggering amounts of money; and the political consequences of these wars is intense and dramatic. The discussion that Charles Esdaile provides of Napoleon’s attempts to steamroll his Napoleonic Code across occupied territories (but with very little success) is a good example of his arrogance and blindness to the laws and customs of these countries,.
This is an intense read of a very complex man, and the changed Europe he left behind.
March 25, 2019
The pull quote on the cover states “…makes the familiar story fresh” and that is not to be taken lightly. I picked this up because the Napoleonic era is a bit of a blind spot for me, I had not previously read much about it and reading Cornwell’s Sharpe series piqued my interest. I was looking for a one volume history and this one seemed like a good one. Well let me tell you that it is indeed a good history with a few caveats. The first is that it presumes the reader is bringing in a healthy knowledge of the 7 Years war, the French Revolution and the Terror. If you aren’t, be prepared to hit up Wikipedia for some back ground to get you through the first 100 pages or so. It was a struggle at first but once you get past the early part of Napoleans rise to power the story is much more self-contained. It will still send you to Wikipedia from time to time but mostly because he drops asides relating to other historical events that you just have to explore a bit more. (Have you heard of the The Deluge? When Russia and Sweden essentially wiped Poland off the map in the mid-17th century? Wild stuff…)
The second is that this is a political history, not a military one. Austerlitz, Borodino, and Waterloo are covered in a page or two each. If you are looking for deep breakdowns of tactics and battles, this book isn’t it. Esdaile is much more concerned with the geopolitics of the era, and understandably so, this is a one volume history, you can’t cover everything and each of the battles and campaigns all have multiple books dedicated to them. Esdaile covers the politics of each country, the alliances, power grabs, how their colonies and trade deals and land ambitions played a part in the grand scope of the period. He touches on the issues in the Baltic, the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans (a vicious war that I had no idea about), and the Americas as they relate to the major combatants.
I enjoyed it quite a bit even if it was tough to get into at the beginning. The knock on it seems to be that it’s anti-Napoleon, and he certainly doesn’t come off too well, especially in the later years starting before the Russian campaign, but it seems fair based on the evidence put forth here. Maybe I need to read a more pro-Napoleon take to get a balanced view.
The second is that this is a political history, not a military one. Austerlitz, Borodino, and Waterloo are covered in a page or two each. If you are looking for deep breakdowns of tactics and battles, this book isn’t it. Esdaile is much more concerned with the geopolitics of the era, and understandably so, this is a one volume history, you can’t cover everything and each of the battles and campaigns all have multiple books dedicated to them. Esdaile covers the politics of each country, the alliances, power grabs, how their colonies and trade deals and land ambitions played a part in the grand scope of the period. He touches on the issues in the Baltic, the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans (a vicious war that I had no idea about), and the Americas as they relate to the major combatants.
I enjoyed it quite a bit even if it was tough to get into at the beginning. The knock on it seems to be that it’s anti-Napoleon, and he certainly doesn’t come off too well, especially in the later years starting before the Russian campaign, but it seems fair based on the evidence put forth here. Maybe I need to read a more pro-Napoleon take to get a balanced view.
October 3, 2018
Having only a brief understanding of the Napoleonic Wars and being fascinated by international relations, I was looking for a book that provided both. In Charles Esdaile's Napoleon's War, I found it. Escdaile provides an excellent account of the wars foughts between 1803 to 1815 which is well-paced, supported by a variety of primary sources and explains the international relations aspect of the conflict excellent whilst still providing insight into the personalities involved and the domestic considerations. Esdaile also provides some wider discussion about relations with countries outside of Europe where appropriate such as the US and Persia in order to look at the interests of Britain, France, Spain and Russia respectively.
Esdaile does not get bogged down in military history so if you are looking for in-depth discussions of key battles like Austerlitz or Jena or Leipzig (to name only a few) this probably isn't the bookfor you. But if like me, you are interested in getting a comprehensive insight and understanding of the Napoleonic Wars and the relations between the various states involved before going into the detail of specific campaigns then I would recommend this book highly.
Esdaile does not get bogged down in military history so if you are looking for in-depth discussions of key battles like Austerlitz or Jena or Leipzig (to name only a few) this probably isn't the bookfor you. But if like me, you are interested in getting a comprehensive insight and understanding of the Napoleonic Wars and the relations between the various states involved before going into the detail of specific campaigns then I would recommend this book highly.
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