By the time Pearl Harbor had ripped apart America's peacetime pretensions, the German blitzkrieg had already blasted the Red Army back to the gates of Moscow. Yet, less than four years later, the Soviet hammer-and-sickle flew above the ruins of Berlin, stark symbol of a miraculous comeback that destroyed the German army and shattered Hitler's imperial designs.
Told in swift stirring prose, When Titans Clashed provides the first full account of this epic struggle from the Soviet perspective. David Glantz, one of the world's foremost authorities on the Soviet military, and Jonathan House present a fundamentally new interpretation of what the Russians called the "Great Patriotic War." Based on unprecedented access to formerly classified Soviet sources, they counter the German perspective that has dominated previous accounts and radically revise our understanding of the Soviet experience during World War II.
Placing the war within its wider political, economic, and social contexts, the authors recount how the determined Soviets overcame their initial disasters to defeat the most powerful army ever assembled. As they vividly show, this truly was war waged on a titanic scale, sweeping across a half-million square miles from Moscow to Berlin, featuring monumental offensives and counteroffensives, and ultimately costing both sides combined a staggering forty million casualties.
Their work offers new revelations on Soviet strategy and tactics, Stalin's role as supreme commander of the Red Army, the emergence of innovative and courageous commanders in the crucible of combat, numerous previously concealed or neglected military operations, German miscalculations on the road to the Red capital, the effect of D-Day and the "second front" on the Soviet effort, and the war's devastating impact on the Soviet economy and civilian population.
An essential volume for anyone interested in World War II or Soviet history, When Titans Clashed will change forever how we look at one of the greatest military confrontations in world history.
David M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Questo è un libro parecchio tecnico (non immagino quanto lo siano i tre volumi sulla sola battaglia di Stalingrado di Glanz) che dà per scontato che uno abbia un buon senso storico della contemporaneità e delle buone conoscenze geografiche. Consiglio vivamente di tenere sotto mano una sorta di "bugiardino" sul lessico militare (squadre, brigate, battaglioni, divisioni e il rispettivo numero di personale per ciascuna) e delle cartine.
Detto ciò, qui House e Glanz cercano di entrare nella testa dello Stavka (prima o poi dovrò leggere anche i libri di Ciminover che fa la stessa cosa sull'OKH) per capire come l'Armata Rossa, dopo le devastanti epurazioni staliniane, sia diventata la forza terrestre più devastante alla fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. In breve, si potrebbe dire che gli alti comandi hanno imparato dagli errori dell'invasione della Finlandia del '40 e dalle sconfitte del '41-'42, a cui si aggiunge soprattutto la capacità di Stalin di dare fiducia ai suoi esperti militari. Le concezioni di guerra di movimento, difesa in profondità e "guerra di mascheramento" (maskirovka) sono concetti sviluppati già durante la guerra civile del '19-'22, su cui molti generali russi sono stati decisamente all'avanguardia (prima dei tedeschi!), tra cui ricordo Tuchačevskij (vittima delle purghe). Con il passare della guerra i russi hanno capito che è anche molto utile concedere una certa autonomia "tattica" ai propri ufficiali (si potrebbe ironizzare su quanto la competizione Žukov-Konev sia servita a velocizzare la disfatta della Wehrmacht).
I tedeschi, dal canto loro, hanno fatto il contrario: con l'avanzare di Barbarossa e il conseguente allungamento delle linee di rifornimento, hanno subito le prime sconfitte dai russi (che avrebbero sofferto dello stesso problema se non avessero avuto alle spalle il gigante industriale americano a fornire tutti i materiali "grezzi"... Gli Alleati hanno vinto la WW2 con il sangue sovietico e le scatolette americane...). Con le prime battute d'arresto, Hitler ha accentrato il suo ruolo all'interno dell'OKH concedendo sempre meno autonomia ai propri generali. Molti generali tedeschi nelle loro memorie (in primis Guderian) hanno incolpato il Führer della sconfitta in Russia. Bisogna però tenere a mente che molti dei "Von" dell'esercito sono sempre stati ostili a questo "rozzo caporale austriaco" e che il fatto che alcune sue intuizioni strategiche siano state buone (resistere a Mosca nel '41 o l'operazione Blau nel '42) lo ha portato alla megalomania. Questo, unito alla decisione di favorire (specialmente dopo l'attentato dell'estate del '44) le Waffen-SS, che hanno sempre performato piuttosto male pur lottando ferocemente, e al pretendere la resistenza fino all'ultimo uomo, ha contribuito a rendere l'Est Europa un mattatoio mai visto prima.
Un testo asciutto e senza fronzoli, che permette al lettore di comprendere appieno il contributo della Unione Sovietica alla sconfitta della macchina militare nazista. Non troverete testimonianze dei protagonisti, bensì un racconto pacato del conflitto e delle sue varie vicissitudini strategiche, dove la carte geografiche allegate guidano il lettore nella comprensione della operazioni militari condotte dall'Armata Rossa e dalle forze dell'Asse. L'autore analizza con particolare attenzione l'evoluzione della dottrina militare sovietica dalla seconda metà degli anni trenta alla fine del conflitto mondiale (compressa l'appendice della guerra in Manciuria), sottolineando la "capacità di apprendere" degli ufficiali e dei vertici militari sovietici, sia dalle sconfitte sia dalle modalità di condurre la guerra degli stessi avversari.