Science as Social Knowledge

by Helen E. Longino

Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, Feminism, Sociology, Technology, Gender and Sexuality

280 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1990

Reviews

[T · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found this work to be very illuminating in certain respects, and yet intractably problematic in others. The first few chapters are mostly great, but it begins a slow dissent from there into some questionable assertions.

To begin, Longino's emphasis on the importance of background assumptions is vital and cannot be ignored. She successfully demonstrates their necessity to the framing of evidence and provides a precise account of the relation between hypothesis and evidence. Moreover, her distinction between constitutive and contextual values, which provides a foundation for the work as a whole, provides a nice balance between the influence of the internal epistemic values of science and the external social values of society at large. Finally, the weight she attaches to the social character of science (a debt to Popper, among others) continues the trend of "socializing" knowledge, and it is, indeed, important that science be recognized as a social activity and practice.

However, as I read on, little things here and there would pop up that were clearly wrong, and those little things led into bigger things that I couldn't bring myself to agree with Longino on. For instance, she falsely groups Popper with the logical positivists, and then she makes the error of claiming his demarcation criterion as one differentiating significance and non-significance, rather than marking the difference between science and non-science. Around the same time, out of nowhere she claims that values can have no place in scientific realism (a claim defended weakly, if even at all). It's also interesting to note that she stresses the individualistic character of "positivism" (a term she uses vaguely and liberally throughout the work) when Popper himself (one of the arch-positivists to her, no doubt) repeatedly stressed the social character of science.

What else did I find inaccurate or misleading? Well, in discussing the contextual values that may influence science, she never considers the way contextual values may influence her own criticisms of certain forms of science, which seems oddly lacking when such an examination presumably must follow from her entire argument (contextual values must be able to affect philosophy as well as science). And, furthermore, in writing of a possible influence from profit-interests to scientific findings, she's never clear about how to distinguish between an incidental link from a causal one, so as a reader I'm left wondering how we can tell when, for example, a pharmaceutical company's scientists are being unduly influenced by profit motives rather than epistemic considerations. Also, Longino fails to consider the possibility of any objective, lasting ways to characterize objects of inquiry within science. Or rather she may have considered it, but she doesn't write anything about it, or she dismissed the notion as impossible, which seems premature to me.

When discussing actual research programs, it gets worse. She says that she's not out to dismiss any research, but of course that's exactly what she tries to do, so she’s disingenuous in that regard. And she also says that she isn't out to characterize any of it as "bad science," but of course that's the strongly implicit message. Another problem is that she continually confuses sex-appropriate/inappropriate traits with sex-typical/atypical ones. Her discussion of man-the-hunter and women-the-gatherer theories of intelligence, moreover, assumes mutual exclusivity. About the two theories she says, "As long as both frameworks offer coherent and comprehensive accounts of the data, neither can displace the other." But that misses the point, because that's precisely what's at issue--followers of one theory argue that the other doesn't completely account for the data in some way, or that the other theory is conceptually mistaken in some regard. On a different note, she dismisses what she calls the "linear-hormonal" model of behavior for appealing to animal studies, among other considerations. But then, ironically, she directly appeals to an animal study to support her "selectionist" model! I should, however, interject here and say that I do appreciate her account of "strong interactionism," and agree completely with it. But another crude confusion she makes quite often is between biologically influenced behavior and biologically determined behavior. It may have saved her some critical remarks if she had heeded that difference.

I also want to say something of her notion of objectivity: She claims that objectivity in science is a function of community practices rather than any kind of accurate representation of reality independent of mere opinion. So, she goes on, scientific objectivity is no different than the sort of objectivity found in literary theory or art criticism. I don't know how someone can sincerely make such a claim, but it wholly undervalues the successes that the sciences have reaped and the progress they have demonstrated in comparison to something like literary theory.

Lastly, for the kicker. She says, "When faced with a conflict between these [political] commitments and a particular model of brain-behavior relationships we allow the political commitments to guide the choice." Wow. That's exactly what's wrong with the heart of her views about science. Rather than guiding our decision by explanatory scope, empirical content, or predictive success, for example, we just, instead, let our politics dictate the choice for us if we must make a hard decision.

So why did I give this work 3 stars? Well, like I mentioned in the first paragraph, I really did find the stuff on background assumptions, contextual/constitutive values, and the social character of science to be well argued and important. I also think it's worthy of commendation for the attempt to bridge the gap between extreme relativism and naive scientism. But her conclusions and case studies? Not so hot.

[Zina]

Way underappreciated in (general, not feminist) philosophy of science.

[Pavlogreen]

Excelente repaso a algunos de los cambios más intensos que tuvieron lugar en la filosofía de la ciencia durante los años 80, sobre todo en materia de "reconversión social" de la disciplina. Longino ofrece pautas de interpretación ya alternativas para no tener que decantarnos ni por el positivismo lógico ni oor ninguna forma de relativismo que vuelva superflua la evidencia empírica. Su propuesta de empirismo contextual es uno de los grandes hallazgos de la filosofía de la ciencia de las últimas tres décadas y conviene seguir dándole vueltas sin dejar de dialogar con otras epistemólogas feministas.

[Kinzie Gamaleldin · Rating 4 out of 5]

tbh much more accessible than kuhn but got lost in the feminist sauce and forgot about the epistemological consequences of inquiry but maybe that’s just my bad

[Alex · Rating 5 out of 5]

Longino è riuscita a tradurre istanze femministe sull'androcentrismo scientifico nelle categorie classiche della filosofia della scienza, portando quindi la filosofia della scienza a dover ascoltare queste istanze, farne i conti e aggiornarsi di conseguenza. Tipicamente ci aspettiamo che ciò che distingua l'oggettività, la scienza da ciò che non è scienza, sia il seguire determinati metodi: se li segui hai un risultato scientifico, oggettivo, altrimenti no. Ecco, Longino dimostra in modo serrato che quando svolgiamo ragionamenti le premesse devono sempre poggiare su premesse ulteriori, di sfondo, quasi mai esplicitate, e che non esiste alcun algoritmo, alcun metodo neanche scientifico che possa eliminare questa cosa. Per cui sviluppa una interessantissima analisi in cui 'oggettività' smette di essere una proprietà che può avere una data teoria o una singola persona, e cerca di ricostruire una nozione di oggettività da cui emerge quanto sia fondamentale che nelle pratiche scientifiche, che sono collettive e situate, vi sia diversità di posizionamenti e di vedute: più la pratica scientifica è fatta da persone omogenee per posizionamento sociale, più è facile che le loro premesse nascoste combacino tra di loro (vedi androcentrismo), al punto che nessuno se ne accorge dato che le condividono tutti. Quindi, in un ribaltamento del tipico paradigma di oggettività, Longino mostra come avere scienziate femministe che portino in campo i loro valori e posizionamento sociale e politico comporti una MAGGIORE oggettività, e non minore, dato che possono contribuire a criticare le premesse androcentriche che sono rimaste nascoste fino a quel momento. Il suo lavoro è particolarmente importante perché appunto è riuscita a sviluppare questo discorso con le categorie della filosofia della scienza (e senza annacquarne la carica politica), per cui non lo si è potuto liquidare o ignorare come roba militante; e inoltre ha studiato in dettaglio specifiche branche scientifiche mostrandone le concrete premesse androcentriche, il fatto che non potevano essere individuate ed eliminate da alcun metodo automatico seguibile passo-passo (è il discorso per cui non c'è alcun algoritmo che garantisca oggettività e che possa eliminare le premesse nascoste), e il modo in cui scienziate femministe abbiano portato a capovolgimenti e progressi in queste branche scientifiche.

Lascio giusto una citazione di cui ho apprezzato l'incisività: 'a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge'.

[Nick Geiser · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a fantastic defense of a social conception of scientific inquiry. Longino shows how to think about the relationship between values and scientific reasoning in a way that retains the possibility of objective knowledge and scientific progress while recognizing the impact of contextual values on research. The book's key contribution is to identify the logical role "background assumptions" play in scientific reasoning by mediating between evidence and hypotheses. Background assumptions include values. It then illustrates the role of background assumptions through careful engagement with (then) contemporary work of sex differences in anthropology and neurobiology and the explanatory models employed by researchers. Longino clearly situates her own views in relation to other positions in the philosophy of science.

One of the most useful distinctions in the book is what Longino calls the "conflicting aims of inquiry." She identifies two: on the one hand, scientific inquiry involves the construction and extension of unified theoretical frameworks, and on the other hand, it involves discovering truth. One of the problems with ignoring the role of values in science is that it makes these two aims of inquiry look like one. But they're not, and the way to understand someone like Popper or Feyerabend is that they emphasized truth rather than method. What Longino adds is that ideological and normative criticism of research program is not philosophically different from any other methodological debate within science. By broadening the concept of inquiry Longino gives us a useful vocabulary for the science-values issue.

[Roger Neyman · Rating 4 out of 5]

This important work, somewhat diminished on occasion by its style of exposition, argues that values are an intrinsic part of the business of conducting science and that science is only strengthened by recognizing and acting upon that fact. A corollary of this insight is that the diversity of the community conducting science, to a certain extent, varies directly with the robustness of the findings of the process.

Longino makes her case, but fails to do so concisely. Even as I regret the lack of concision in one respect, in another respect I wanted more.

I wish she had included a description of the process characteristics of "transformative interrogation" instead of leaving those processes as understood. That is because I believe a critical assessment of the culture and processes around science are in need of critical review and Longino's notion of "transformative interrogation" might be a useful tool in conducting that review. It would be more useful if its author had articulated, even just a little, on how she sees the term's potential application working out.

So I urge anyone with an interest in the philosophy of science, and the important topic of science's relevance to the wider world, to go to the trouble (and it is sometimes trouble) of giving this book a careful read.

[Michael]

Useful for threading the needle of relativism v. objectivism; a useful lens for the current political moment for those of us trying to reconcile pluralities of knowledge and values without pulling the rug out from our ability to formulate positive arguments and critique ideas based on their truth or factuality.

[JosephTheBald]

Chapters 1-4, 10.

Against logical empiricist positivism because values are involved in the scientific process of investigation, but counter to what Longino thinks is the possible situation of naked rampant historicist relativism because objectivity is actually intersubjective relationships with language and an actual *real* world.

I like her but I don’t believe her.

[Cana McGhee · Rating 3 out of 5]

just don’t think i understood the book? i felt like she dealt her cards too late, and i stumbled through all of the repeated assertions for the social nature of knowledge as being the key to achieving “better” or “more” objectivity. feels like im missing something??

[Karim Kadry · Rating 4 out of 5]

First half five stars
Second half three stars

[Lauren Wigod · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rip the pursuit of truth and certainty

[Rodrigo Medel · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Longino criticizes the value-neutrality thesis according to which science should be value-free. To Longino, objective values in science vary with time, across cultures, and even from one scientist to another, which questions the validity of the neutral approach in the science practice. Longino`s perspective emphasizes the fact that science is a product of a community of scientists, and as such, shared standards and criticisms (e.g., scientific meetings and peer reviews) is what maintains the objectivity of science in spite of the pervasive introduction of personal contextual values in different steps of the scientific process.

[Austin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some chapters are unnecessarily dense and complex (i.e. too much biological detail), but overall, I recommend this book to those interested in philosophy and/or science and/or gender. She makes a compelling case that science is value-laden, and it's exciting to see a feminist critique of science which actually may win the argument! The implications of her work for public policy, particularly (but not exclusively) LGBT rights, is quite relevant.