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Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science
The question, "What is Cognitive Science?" is often asked but seldom answered to anyone's satisfaction. Until now, most of the answers have come from the new breed of philosophers of mind. This book, however, is written by a distinguished psychologist and computer scientist who is well-known for his work on the conceptual foundations of cognitive science, and especially for his research on mental imagery, representation, and perception. In Computation and Cognition, Pylyshyn argues that computation must not be viewed as just a convenient metaphor for mental activity, but as a literal empirical hypothesis. Such a view must face a number of serious challenges. For example, it must address the question of "strong equivalents" of processes, and must empirically distinguish between phenomena which reveal what knowledge the organism has, phenomena which reveal properties of the biologically determined "functional architecture" of the mind. The principles and ideas Pylyshyn develops are applied to a number of contentious areas of cognitive science, including theories of vision and mental imagery. In illuminating such timely theoretical problems, he draws on insights from psychology, theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and psychology of mind. A Bradford Book
320 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1984
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February 27, 2016
Zenon Pylshyn presents a strong foundation for how cognition should be literally thought in terms of: computation. He provides a functional approach to understanding how humans can be generic thought machines. We seem to have the ability to parrot the functioning of processes themself. His later chapters in which he provides evidence in cognitive studies as to how people seem to follow a process oriented algorithm is the strongest push for this.
Having said that, looking back, it's apparent that most of his book was simply describing the inner workings of computation and arguing that cognition needed to work on a symbolic level anyway; that the physical materialism was only the vehicle for the functionality that the functionality is what we want. In some ways I am reminded of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's attempt at providing a mechanical notion of rationality. Zenon doesn't go as far, but he wants to provide us a coherent and discrete value system upon which to weigh cognition. This isn't a bad idea, but it appears that people don't often make decisions on purely discrete values. We are capable of doing so, but whether or not we do so, especially outside of scientific tests, which always tests for discrete values if possible, is another matter entirely.
This is my second time reading the book. The first time was about ten years ago, and I am not sure I understood the latter parts of it. In a way, Zenon should have probably reversed the order of some of his chapters. He should have provided the cases arguing for cognition as computation with an emphasis on how cognition is process oriented based on functional equivalence, and then provided the chapters on functional architecture's inner workings. I understand however that he was most likely providing the functional architecture first as a theoretical basis, so that we can understand what we see later on in terms of the theory...but since his book was geared towards arguing for functional architecture as the mode of consideration, it may make more sense to work towards the argument first, rather than having some cognitive proof later on as a BTW, this stuff can be explained by cognition.
In a way, what's missing about this work is the null state of cognition. That is to say, once we get the system going with equivalences, that's fine and good. But what mark do we make in order to start it going, where we come to identify as a self? This is perhaps troubling theory but Pylshyn does not get into this. He also seems to think that computation is the literal process of cognition. I would rather consider, in the spirit of functional architecture, that we can't ever know what the literal process is, we can only denote equivalency in functionality. I guess that makes me fallibilist. It's suprising that Pylshyn isn't a fallibist, since he takes some of the question as to how memory works exactly or how processing works exactly as not being important since equivalency trumps actuality when it comes to trying to make sense of how this could work. It doesn't matter how it works specifically, what matters is that it does in these kinds of algorithmic steps. Perhaps in this sense, this book isn't that radical after all as this can be construed as hiding behind the analogy of functionalities instead of getting at what the object of study actually is doing. After all isn't that what science is supposed to be about?
Still, it's an interesting and impressive work.
Having said that, looking back, it's apparent that most of his book was simply describing the inner workings of computation and arguing that cognition needed to work on a symbolic level anyway; that the physical materialism was only the vehicle for the functionality that the functionality is what we want. In some ways I am reminded of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell's attempt at providing a mechanical notion of rationality. Zenon doesn't go as far, but he wants to provide us a coherent and discrete value system upon which to weigh cognition. This isn't a bad idea, but it appears that people don't often make decisions on purely discrete values. We are capable of doing so, but whether or not we do so, especially outside of scientific tests, which always tests for discrete values if possible, is another matter entirely.
This is my second time reading the book. The first time was about ten years ago, and I am not sure I understood the latter parts of it. In a way, Zenon should have probably reversed the order of some of his chapters. He should have provided the cases arguing for cognition as computation with an emphasis on how cognition is process oriented based on functional equivalence, and then provided the chapters on functional architecture's inner workings. I understand however that he was most likely providing the functional architecture first as a theoretical basis, so that we can understand what we see later on in terms of the theory...but since his book was geared towards arguing for functional architecture as the mode of consideration, it may make more sense to work towards the argument first, rather than having some cognitive proof later on as a BTW, this stuff can be explained by cognition.
In a way, what's missing about this work is the null state of cognition. That is to say, once we get the system going with equivalences, that's fine and good. But what mark do we make in order to start it going, where we come to identify as a self? This is perhaps troubling theory but Pylshyn does not get into this. He also seems to think that computation is the literal process of cognition. I would rather consider, in the spirit of functional architecture, that we can't ever know what the literal process is, we can only denote equivalency in functionality. I guess that makes me fallibilist. It's suprising that Pylshyn isn't a fallibist, since he takes some of the question as to how memory works exactly or how processing works exactly as not being important since equivalency trumps actuality when it comes to trying to make sense of how this could work. It doesn't matter how it works specifically, what matters is that it does in these kinds of algorithmic steps. Perhaps in this sense, this book isn't that radical after all as this can be construed as hiding behind the analogy of functionalities instead of getting at what the object of study actually is doing. After all isn't that what science is supposed to be about?
Still, it's an interesting and impressive work.
June 18, 2022
Important and engrossing subject, but this book is lifeless and terribly written. Pylyshyn alleges that cognition is nothing more than computation, and that the brain is essentially a biological computer. This is a view I am sympathetic towards, but haven't been exposed to rigorous explorations of the argument. But the writing here is so extravagant and round-about it's hard to keep focus and track the arguments. The treatment is a muddled mixture of popular-level discussion and academic hairsplitting that doesn't seem to target any particular audience. I consider Pylyshyn a good example of a successful researcher who is entirely unable to communicate his important findings to anyone outside the field.
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