Principles of Maritime Strategy

by Julian Stafford Corbett

This brilliant exposition established British naval historian Julian Corbett (1854–1922) as one of the great maritime strategists. Corbett placed naval warfare within the larger framework of human conflict, proposing that the key to maritime dominance lies in effective use of sea lines for communications and in denying that use to the enemy. His concept — which regarded naval strategy not as an end in itself but as a means to an end, with that end defined by national strategy — makes this a work of enduring value.
Principles of Maritime Strategy emphasizes precise definitions of terminology and ideas as the antidote to loose and purposeless discussion and the direct path to the fundamental data on which all are agreed. As Corbett notes in the Introduction, "In this way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without such apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and isolate it for quiet solution."
Much quoted and referenced, this ever-relevant work is an indispensable resource for military professionals, historians, and students.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Nonfiction, War, Naval History, Military History, Classics

336 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1911

About the author

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was a prominent British naval historian and geostrategist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, whose works helped shape the Royal Navy's reforms of that era. One of his most famous works is Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, which remains a classic among students of naval warfare.

Reviews

[Doreen Petersen · Rating 1 out of 5]

I really tried hard but really didn't like this one.

[Roger Burk · Rating 4 out of 5]

Corbett wanted to establish a British, maritime theory of war to set against the Continental theory of Clausewitz (p. 38). He had the misfortune to write just as a number of technological changes were coming on. He has nothing to say about aircraft or Dreadnought battleships, and little about submarines. On the other hand, he is acutely aware of the new danger from mines and torpedoes. His primary point of reference is the Russo-Japanese War.

Within those limitations, he is a clear thinker. Corbett identifies three major differences of maritime from land strategy: (1) The weaker power can make itself invulnerable in a defended port, and retain a dangerous "fleet in being"; (2) There is wide freedom of movement, with no roads or natural obstacles, making forces harder to find; and (3) The fleet must disperse to protect commerce. It's interesting how much aviation has now changed (1) and (2).

Corbett identifies the object of naval warfare as controlling communications. This is done using cruisers (by which he meant long-range warships designed to go after enemy commerce). The battle line exists to protect the cruisers. The fundamental operational problem is that the fleet must disperse to attack or protect commerce, but concentrate to attack the enemy fleet. Corbett distinguishes operations to obtain command of the sea (by defeating or confining the enemy fleet), operations to dispute the command of the sea (as by raiding), and operations to exercise command of the sea (by landing forces). He says, "counter-attack is the soul of defense" (p. 29).

He has an interesting discussion of limited war. He says this consists of seizing a piece of territory, defending it from counterattack, and then annoying the enemy enough to make him accept the situation in a peace agreement. This describes the Russo-Japanese War well enough, but I wonder how general its application is.

He believes that the advent of wireless radio and the restricted range of steamships will make attack on trade more difficult. He ventures that convoys will probably no longer be necessary. He believes that commerce raiding is a most humane method of war, and that the civilized nations will never accept sinking merchant ships with their crews. No doubt he was horrified when unrestricted submarine warfare started in WWI.

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

Naval strategists always had an intuitive grasp of how to use a fleet. They may not have been able to codify what they knew or practiced, but had a good feel for what worked and what didn't.

Writing a century ago in the years leading up to WWI, Julian Corbett tried his hand at codifying what the admirals knew in his "Principles of Maritime Strategy." This was no easy challenge. True, Alfred Thayer Mahan gave voice to this knowledge in his "Influence of Sea Power Upon History," a book more often cited as the bible of naval warfare. Corbett looked for clues in the future direction of naval warfare in then contemporary conflicts like the Spanish-American War and the Russo-Japanese War. He tied his analysis of these wars, as well as British naval history, with the concept of limited war.

Limited war was a concept that was left undeveloped by Karl von Clausewitz in his seminal work "On War," as Corbett noted. Yet it was the use of limited war which allowed Great Britain unlimited utility to use its fleet and its army to strike anywhere opportunity afforded, Corbett contended. In the developed half of this theory, Clausewitz always stressed the concentration of force against the enemy's decisive point. Corbett argues against the massing for force, citing the utility of dispersed forces that can find the enemy, then allow for the concentration of friendly forces to defeat the enemy fleet.

The body of work devoted to naval strategy is not as great as land warfare. Corbett stands a bit taller in a smaller field as a result. Much like many philosophical analysts, Corbett spends a lot of time defining his terms and attaching them to a logical framework he has built through argument. The reader will find this a tad boring. But Corbett did write a short book, so the reader will not suffer for long until coming to the core of the volume where Corbett explains how theory is rendered into practice.

If there were more works on the theory of naval strategy, Corbett would probably sink into obscurity. But his work represents a pole in the naval strategy debate, the opposite of Clausewitz's view on strategy, and definitely the opposite of Mahan. Giving the contrarian his due is a requirement of deep reading in any subject, for one cannot understand the orthodox without reading the iconoclast. Corbett's work is an example of the exception that proves this rule.

[Al · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a surprisingly good book, and I think it's much better than Mahan. It's clear that Mahan is popular because he published first and advocated large navys and large fleet actions. Corbett places his emphasis on limited war for limited objectives. He obviously uses Britain's colonial wars as examples of isolating an objective in order to prosecute a limited objective with limited means. Other examples he uses are the Russo Japanese war which provides an almost textbook case of a limited war for a limited objective.

Another aspect of Corbett that I like is how he defines "sea control" and clearly explains how this is limited to only local control and interdiction of SLOCs. Corbett also is a proponent of combined action, or in the terminology of today, joint operations. He goes into considerable detail, with examples, on the uses of sea power to support the ground campaign and protect the SLOCs.

Corbett is heavily dependent on Clausewitz as the base of his theory, a debt which he clearly acknowledges in the beginning of the book. Corbett also explains how Book 8 of "On War" proves to be the most valuable for operational warfighters.

[Brendan Steinhauser · Rating 2 out of 5]

While a foundational text on naval strategy, this book is a bit dry. However, Corbett and Mahan were the leading naval strategists of their day, and still wield influence in their field. Although the technology of naval strategy and warfare has changed a lot since this book was published in 1911, many of the main ideas still apply. Luckily, this is a short book and it can be read quickly. Read it, absorb the lessons, and then read more modern authors whose ideas are a bit more applicable in the naval strategy of today, and of the future.

[Minerva]

Very well researched and explained, but somewhat tedious. Not as adaptable as Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power. If you’re only going to read one, read Mahan. If you’re doing a study on naval strategy, you should read it.

[yun with books · Rating 5 out of 5]

My boyfriend's kind of book.

Also, this was for my final paper.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Corbett postulates that naval deployment differs from the theory advanced by Carl von Clausewitz in On War but that naval strategy would benefit from a proper theory. He examines the definitions of conflicts and how navies assist land warfare and amphibious forces. The examples span British history for centuries and show the fads of war strategies and the trial and error nature of warfare. Corbett's era predated the extensive use of submarines and airplanes in naval combat, but his conclusions have a remarkable foresight to modern maritime strategy.

Why I started this book: Another Profession Reading title showed up on Audible, and I was thrilled to cross it off my list.

Why I finished it: First published in 1911, Corbett's examples deal with British fleet experiences and while many principles are still valid with change in technology... it was humorous to listen to him poo-poo the torpedo. On the other hand, this does go far to explain why the British and American Navies were so far behind the Japanese Navy in torpedo development and doctrine.

[Brad Russell · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed reading this dissertation on naval warfare. This was an extremely interesting book that had good answers for hard questions relating to naval strategy. I personally enjoyed learning about different terminologies and concepts. One of my favorites was about how crucially important communication is in modern naval war. I’d definitely recommend this book to any history buffs or people interested in learning more about what goes on inside the minds of top military leaders. One of the most interesting topics was the debate between the nature of offense and defense pertaining to the fleets. Definitely would recommend this book.

[Jared Bruh · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of my favorite things about Corbett’s most famous book is that with clarity and originality, he examines and interrogates Clausewitz’s main arguments. In fact, the first half of “Principles” is a far better introduction to the master himself than jumping into “On War” or any other summary one might come across.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some things don't change

Corbett wrote about naval strategy in 1911, using examples drawn from the preceding four centuries,but it's something of a revelation that many of his insights remain valid today, despite the changes in technology.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

While some of the specifics are dated, this remains an insightful study of maritime strategy, in many ways a more balanced corrective to Mahan's _Influence of Seapower upon History_.

[Allie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Because it’s a modern approach to sea principles, it’s easier to read. It’s also drawn from his RN War College lectures, so the material is simply presented and understandable.

[Nate Huston · Rating 4 out of 5]

Eminently more readable than Mahan. Perhaps not to the point of overwhelming enjoyment, but refreshing. Clearly a follower of Clausewitz's theoretical view of war as opposed to Mahan's more Jominian practical or principled approach.

Spends a good deal of time arguing that limited war is only permanently (emphasis on permanent) available to island powers or between powers separated by sea. This is due to the fact that in those cases where wars are between continental powers, there exists the possibility that a) the territory in dispute is of great value to one or the other and b) there is no way to absolutely prevent one or the other from escalating to an unlimited war - there is no way to isolate one's territory from invasion.

Also believes strongly in the value of limited warfare for limited objectives. There are many cases where the ends can be achieved without complete decimation of the enemy's armed forces and/or overthrow of his government.

After that, we're treated to a dissertation on the value of concentration (specifically as opposed to mass) and finally, to a methodical discussion of the methods of gaining command of the sea, disputing it, and controlling it.

I'm not sure I fully comprehend everything I just wrote, but suffice it to say there's some good stuff about sea power in this book.

[Howard Anders · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was first published in 1911, and was somewhat controversial. Julian Corbett was a British lawyer, who had no military experience of any kind. In one of Corbett's previous books, about the naval campaign of 1805, that ended in the battle of Trafalgar, the hero of Trafalgar, Admiral Nelson, doesn't come across as very heroic, or intelligent. Certain British Admirals, like Sir Jackie Fisher, liked Corbett's military philosophy because, in a way, it supported their naval building program that centered on the super battleship, or dreadnaught. Corbett's view of strategy is sound. He uses the writings of the godfather of war theory himself, Carl von Clausewitz, as a basis for his work. He then tailors it to fit Britain's geopolitical situation. Corbett was a staunch advocate of the "battle cruiser" and combined (multi-service)operations. "Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" is dry reading, but an interesting piece of history.

[Joe · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very insightful in applying the ideas of Clausewitz and Jomini to purely naval strategy. The first third or half of the book is quite excellent in that regard. After this point, Corbett's more in-depth analysis of specific regional strategies applying to the weapon systems of his day is significantly more limited, seeing as how he writes before naval aviation and the true implementation of the submarine and torpedo in conflict outside of confined waters. His views on the benefits and efficacy of commerce destroying are especially noteworthy in light of how significantly they were to prove wrong by the German campaigns of 1914-18 and 1939-45, as well as American operations in the eastern Pacific during the second World War. However, as an accompaniment to a historical analysis of fleet strategy and tactics from the 17th to 19th centuries, these later chapters do prove useful.

[Jimmie · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read this book for an assignment. For a nautical book that is filled with dry topics (sorry for the reverse pun), the book makes for a nice read. Corbett is a well known naval strategist and he provided some great insights with this book. Although reading this book, I sometimes felt I misplaced my Corbett decoder ring. If you enjoy nautical books, especially based on British insights, I highly recommend this book.

[Witek · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very well written and interesting account of the British perspective on maritime strategy. I didn't even realise that the book is ca. 100 years old until I started reading it. Some of the linguistic anachronisms are just awesome! WARNING: read only if you're interested in naval history and strategy!

[Rbolia · Rating 3 out of 5]

An application of Clausewitz to the maritime domain. Not a page-turner by any means, but Corbett has some good ideas, many of which remain relevant even though his analysis was based primarily on warfare in the age of sail.

[Alex · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for the serious naval professional.