The Secret War for the Falklands: SAS, MI6 & the War Whitehall Nearly Lost

by Nigel West

First published on the 15th anniversary of the Falklands War in 1982, THE SECRET WAR FOR THE FALKLANDS is nothing less than the secret history of the conflict, the first time the Royal Navy had been engaged by an enemy since 1945. In terms of hardware it was a test of the world's latest air and defence systems and a unique opportunity to push competing fighters to their limits in an environment that stretched men and aircraft alike. This book focuses on OPERATION CORPORATE, the task force assigned to retake the Falklands, and on the clandestine efforts to deny General Galtieri the one weapon that could have turned Corporate into a humilating defeat for Britain - the French-manufactured Exocet missile.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, Espionage, British Literature, War, Military History

Paperback

First published January 1, 1997

Reviews

[Derek McCabrey]

One of the major difficulties in writing about historical events, and particularly recent military operations, is that the Government will always have more information hidden than the author can reveal. Furthermore, In the current social and political climate, where few baulk at terrorist atrocities, trying to get anyone interested in a conflict so long ago and so far away, would be a monumental struggle. Having said that, Nigel West makes a fair stab at filling in some blanks of the Falklands War narrative. It is a compact account, but thoroughly researched nonetheless and is one of the better factual accounts of the retaking of the Falklands. Even so, I feel that this book would have been of value and interest perhaps to those who were actually involved and maybe a select few historians but it is a book that had to be written and Nigel West has done a good job in doing so.

[Stian]

My (temporary?) impression is one of a book filled with a lot of background, especially about individuals in the intelligence community, details on such things as illegal arms deals to IRA, proposed counter-coups against Gaddafi and disgraced Italian banks, but not so much, really, about the Falklands conflict and the failure of anticipating the invasion. Its there of course, but there's a LOT of background on individuals and their exploits prior to 1982.
The meat of the issue is not, IMO, tackled in a meaningful way.

One almost suspect it to be there to pad the book, but if this is this authors style, relaying heavily on mini-biographies in this manner, then I won't be seeking out any more of his books.

There's interesting parts too, but the parts about the SAS, the proposed Operation Mikado...I'm fairly certain its been done better elsewhere, and its better to read a more "specialized" book on that particular topic.
To be fair, when this was first published, certain details and sources was still classified, and that of course has a ruling on what the author was able to write about.
So, its just an OK book, a rather quick read, but not recommended.

[Rick Brindle]

An amazing book, really exploding some of the myths about the Falklands war, and also illustrating that there were lesser known incidents in the 1970's that were dealt with before war became a necessity. For me, it highlights how such an impressive tool as the British military is so underserving as to be (mis)used (time and again) by an institution as undeserving as the British government.
Some of the narrative could be chopped, though, I found myself skim-reading over the endless histories of every player involved, a bit like Game of Thrones.

[Kevin]

Not much new here.
It's written as pretty stand-alone chapters covering different clandestine aspects of the war. It felt padded with potted resumes of some of the participants which didn't really serve to add anything to the Falklands story.

[Karun]

This was a war ,according to the author , Britain nearly lost.

Because when Argentine garrison in Port Stanley surrendered , ammunition stocks of British forces depleted to an extent with no prospect for immediate replenishment. Had Argentines managed to prolong the war or succeeded in interdicting Royal Navy's maritime supply routes British Task force would have been forced to withdraw.

Very important lesson that can be learned from Falklands experience is not frame a course of action based on assumptions.Human nature is at times capricious. British assumed Argentines will not invade would keep negotiating to settle the status of disputed isles.But Galtieri regime suddenly shifted gears and jumped.London was unable to deter aggression.

Had Britain been defeated, it would have seen ouster of Margaret Thatcher from power. Tory government already plumbed into depths of electoral unpopularity.