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Germany and the Second World War
Germany and the Second World War: Volume III: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa, 1939-1941, From Italy's Declaration of Non-Belligerence to the Entry of the US into the War
This is the third in the comprehensive ten-volume Germany and the Second World War. The volumes so far published have achieved international acclaim as a major contribution to historical study. Under the auspices of the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History), a team of renowned historians has combined a full synthesis of existing material with the latest research to produce what will be the definitive history of the Second World War.
Volume 3 explores the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean region and examines the dramatic military events of this period. It shows how German policy in this area was largely determined by the attitude of the German leadership, especially Hitler, towards Mussolini's Italy, and the volume thus sheds important new light on the alliance policy of theThird Reich. The comprehensive analysis, based on detailed scholarly research, is underpinned by a full apparatus of maps, diagrams, and tables.
Intensively researched and documented, Germany and the Second World War is an undertaking of unparalleled scope and authority. It will prove indispensable to all historians of the twentieth century.
Volume 3 explores the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean region and examines the dramatic military events of this period. It shows how German policy in this area was largely determined by the attitude of the German leadership, especially Hitler, towards Mussolini's Italy, and the volume thus sheds important new light on the alliance policy of theThird Reich. The comprehensive analysis, based on detailed scholarly research, is underpinned by a full apparatus of maps, diagrams, and tables.
Intensively researched and documented, Germany and the Second World War is an undertaking of unparalleled scope and authority. It will prove indispensable to all historians of the twentieth century.
848 pages, Hardcover
First published November 23, 1995
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
July 2, 2018
This is the first of this series that I have read and it is as good as it's reputation. It covers the German involvement in the Mediterranean from Southern Europe to North Africa. One of the best features is that is covers the conflict broadly and not just as a combat history. So it gets into the political motives and decisions by all the countries involved from Spain to Iraq. It also digs deeply into the German-Italian relationship with it shortcomings and mismatched objectives.
Additionally it covers the aviation, naval and army activities collectively from a combat, logistics and political aspect. With this it delves into the production requirements and conflicts between the branches as well as their activities. In summary it covers all aspects of Germany's involvement in it southern flank in 1939 to 1941.
Note that the books in this series seem to be able to be read independently and not in order and still make sense, at least if you have a basic understanding of WWII. It is not a casual read as you can tell from the page count but if you have a strong interest it is well worth the time invested.
Additionally it covers the aviation, naval and army activities collectively from a combat, logistics and political aspect. With this it delves into the production requirements and conflicts between the branches as well as their activities. In summary it covers all aspects of Germany's involvement in it southern flank in 1939 to 1941.
Note that the books in this series seem to be able to be read independently and not in order and still make sense, at least if you have a basic understanding of WWII. It is not a casual read as you can tell from the page count but if you have a strong interest it is well worth the time invested.
January 20, 2022
With all the books that have been written on the Mediterranean campaign in World War 2, most are predominantly focused on the Allies’ experience. Many primarily use English languages sources, supplemented by extracts from Liddell-Hart’s edited version of Rommel’s diary.
Schreiber and the historians from the Research Institute for Military History (Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt) have set out to produce a history of the Mediterranean campaign from 1939 to 1941 which focuses on the Axis perspective, and that of the Germans in particular. It is refreshing and informative to read a book which extensively uses German and Italian sources.
Part 1 explores the political and military developments in the Mediterranean from 19396 to 1940, including Italy’s political, economic and military preparedness for war and its role as a partner in the Axis.
The six months following the conquest of France was a critical period which was dominated by political manoeuvring as Hitler sought to tempt Britain into peace, and engage Vichy France and Spain as allies of the Axis.
In Part 2 the authors explore the escalation from political and economic pressure on the Balkans to military conflict. This section highlights the historical events and rivalries among and within these countries which added to the political challenges and led inexorably to the Balkan countries being drawn into the war.
Part 3 focuses on the conflict in the Balkans which erupted in 1941 as Germany came to the help of its ally after Italy’s disastrous and ill-prepared invasion of Greece.
Part 4 considers separately the impact of the Anglo-American alliance on British strategy in 1941 and the impact of Hitler’s decision to prioritise the attack on the Soviet Union on the Axis’ Mediterranean strategy.
Finally in Part 5 the focus returns to North Africa with Germany’s intervention, Rommel’s re-conquest of Cyrenaica, and British attempts to reverse this with Operations Brevity, Battleaxe and Crusader.
Schreiber et al have made ‘a conscious effort’ to highlight the interaction between the Axis partners.
When Italy joined the war on 10 June 1940 ‘neither the German nor the Italian leaders had analysed and thought out, within the framework of their respective political ambitions, the implications of the joint conduct of the war, the need for which had been under discussion since 1937-8.’
This ‘found its clearest expression at the outset in Mussolini’s phrase about the ‘parallel war’ which Italy conducted at Germany’s side but for her own purposes.’ The nature of the Axis partners’ relationship is captured in Ciano’s comment that “Germany was dangerous as an enemy, difficult as a friend”.
Throughout the war Germany and Italy had a loose tactical alliance but never converted this to a war coalition with an ‘agreed common strategy.
The authors explore the effect of this complete lack of joint strategic planning and highlight how the conflicting aims of the two Axis partners limited their strategic choices and impeded the effective implementation of their war aims.
Italy was unprepared when it opportunistically entered the war, with armoured divisions in Italy rather than North Africa and merchant shipping scattered around the world.
Italy’s desire for a parallel war saw them reject offers of German assistance when it could have had a decisive impact on the battles in North Africa in late 1940.
Mussolini’s pique when Hitler entered Romania, resulted in him sending an unprepared, ill-equipped and inadequate army into Greece in October 1940 winter. Schreiber highlights that in October 1940 Italy invaded and the Allies defended a regime in Greece that desired “to establish a fascist state on a permanent basis, and had ‘forged increasingly close links with Nazi Germany…’.
In 1941 Italy’s desire for a colonial empire in Africa conflicted with Germany’s desire to recruit Vichy France as an Axis ally and to foment an Arab rebellion. Scheiber provides informative insights on Germany’s interaction and relationship with Arab countries: Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia as well as Iraq and Palestine. But Hitler’s deference to Mussolini’s imperial ambitions meant a strategic opportunity to create an Axis partner in Iraq was missed.
Schreiber shines a light on the actions of Rommel. Rather than the almost legendary Desert Fox, Schreiber highlights how Rommel’s impetuosity saw him defy orders and attack too soon in February 1941. Although there had never been am aligned strategic plan for the offensives in the Balkans and North Africa, a delay of even a week or two in Rommel’s offensive in Libya, would have seen more Allied forces shipped to Greece and most likely into captivity. Rommel also underestimated his enemy, ignored supply constraints and broke his own principles on the use of tanks, when he launched under-strength units at Tobruk in Easter 1941 only to see them defeated.
Schreiber’s observes that Mussolini had a habit ‘of reserving to himself, more or less at random, both major and some decidedly minor decisions, was marked by inconsistencies and by his ceaseless interference in all spheres’.
These observations could equally have been made about Churchill. Schreiber shines on spotlight on Churchill’s repeated interference and strategic naivety.
It was Churchill that had put pressure on Wavell and Eden to send a force on a Quixotic campaign in Greece, blamed them for doing this when he started having misgivings, and deceived the Australian and New Zealand governments whose forces comprised the majority of the Allied troops on the ground. It was Churchill who persisted, despite evidence to the contrary, in believing that Yugoslavia would join the Allies and whose ill-equipped and ethnically based infantry be able to offer an effective resistance to Germany’s well-honed armoured divisions; who sought to coerce Turkey into joining the Allies and promised non-existent air unit in return. It was Churchill who, in February 1941, insisted on three landing strips being built in Crete, despite the lack of adequate planes in the Middle East air force, and by so doing, sowed the seeds of the Allis defeat in May 1941. It was Churchill who insisted that Wavell send his newly arrived tanks straight into battle despite the fact that they needed significant maintenance, resulting in their defeat in Operations Brevity and Battleaxe; and it was Churchill who insisted on sending an under-strength force, again mainly Australian, into Syria on the naïve expectation that the Vichy French would simply surrender, a decision which resulted in the Allies incurring about the same level of casualties as they had in Greece.
Surprisingly, for such a well researched book, a few factual errors have crept. Schreiber notes (p264) that 2052 Italians were killed in the Italian invasion of British Somaliland. In fact the total Italian casualties, including wounded and missing, were 2052 of which only about 500 were killed.
Stegemann notes (p644) that “Wavell flew to London on 8 August 1940”. While Wavell met with Eden and Churchill in London on 8 August 1940, he actually arrived in London on 7 August 1940, having departed Egypt on 4 August 1940. However these minor errors are unlikely to be noticed by most readers
The international acclaim which the series, that this volume forms part of, has achieved is well-deserved.
At 820 pages, this will not be a book for those with only a casual interest in the Mediterranean campaign. However for those interested in this era of military history it is essential reading.
Schreiber and the historians from the Research Institute for Military History (Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt) have set out to produce a history of the Mediterranean campaign from 1939 to 1941 which focuses on the Axis perspective, and that of the Germans in particular. It is refreshing and informative to read a book which extensively uses German and Italian sources.
Part 1 explores the political and military developments in the Mediterranean from 19396 to 1940, including Italy’s political, economic and military preparedness for war and its role as a partner in the Axis.
The six months following the conquest of France was a critical period which was dominated by political manoeuvring as Hitler sought to tempt Britain into peace, and engage Vichy France and Spain as allies of the Axis.
In Part 2 the authors explore the escalation from political and economic pressure on the Balkans to military conflict. This section highlights the historical events and rivalries among and within these countries which added to the political challenges and led inexorably to the Balkan countries being drawn into the war.
Part 3 focuses on the conflict in the Balkans which erupted in 1941 as Germany came to the help of its ally after Italy’s disastrous and ill-prepared invasion of Greece.
Part 4 considers separately the impact of the Anglo-American alliance on British strategy in 1941 and the impact of Hitler’s decision to prioritise the attack on the Soviet Union on the Axis’ Mediterranean strategy.
Finally in Part 5 the focus returns to North Africa with Germany’s intervention, Rommel’s re-conquest of Cyrenaica, and British attempts to reverse this with Operations Brevity, Battleaxe and Crusader.
Schreiber et al have made ‘a conscious effort’ to highlight the interaction between the Axis partners.
When Italy joined the war on 10 June 1940 ‘neither the German nor the Italian leaders had analysed and thought out, within the framework of their respective political ambitions, the implications of the joint conduct of the war, the need for which had been under discussion since 1937-8.’
This ‘found its clearest expression at the outset in Mussolini’s phrase about the ‘parallel war’ which Italy conducted at Germany’s side but for her own purposes.’ The nature of the Axis partners’ relationship is captured in Ciano’s comment that “Germany was dangerous as an enemy, difficult as a friend”.
Throughout the war Germany and Italy had a loose tactical alliance but never converted this to a war coalition with an ‘agreed common strategy.
The authors explore the effect of this complete lack of joint strategic planning and highlight how the conflicting aims of the two Axis partners limited their strategic choices and impeded the effective implementation of their war aims.
Italy was unprepared when it opportunistically entered the war, with armoured divisions in Italy rather than North Africa and merchant shipping scattered around the world.
Italy’s desire for a parallel war saw them reject offers of German assistance when it could have had a decisive impact on the battles in North Africa in late 1940.
Mussolini’s pique when Hitler entered Romania, resulted in him sending an unprepared, ill-equipped and inadequate army into Greece in October 1940 winter. Schreiber highlights that in October 1940 Italy invaded and the Allies defended a regime in Greece that desired “to establish a fascist state on a permanent basis, and had ‘forged increasingly close links with Nazi Germany…’.
In 1941 Italy’s desire for a colonial empire in Africa conflicted with Germany’s desire to recruit Vichy France as an Axis ally and to foment an Arab rebellion. Scheiber provides informative insights on Germany’s interaction and relationship with Arab countries: Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia as well as Iraq and Palestine. But Hitler’s deference to Mussolini’s imperial ambitions meant a strategic opportunity to create an Axis partner in Iraq was missed.
Schreiber shines a light on the actions of Rommel. Rather than the almost legendary Desert Fox, Schreiber highlights how Rommel’s impetuosity saw him defy orders and attack too soon in February 1941. Although there had never been am aligned strategic plan for the offensives in the Balkans and North Africa, a delay of even a week or two in Rommel’s offensive in Libya, would have seen more Allied forces shipped to Greece and most likely into captivity. Rommel also underestimated his enemy, ignored supply constraints and broke his own principles on the use of tanks, when he launched under-strength units at Tobruk in Easter 1941 only to see them defeated.
Schreiber’s observes that Mussolini had a habit ‘of reserving to himself, more or less at random, both major and some decidedly minor decisions, was marked by inconsistencies and by his ceaseless interference in all spheres’.
These observations could equally have been made about Churchill. Schreiber shines on spotlight on Churchill’s repeated interference and strategic naivety.
It was Churchill that had put pressure on Wavell and Eden to send a force on a Quixotic campaign in Greece, blamed them for doing this when he started having misgivings, and deceived the Australian and New Zealand governments whose forces comprised the majority of the Allied troops on the ground. It was Churchill who persisted, despite evidence to the contrary, in believing that Yugoslavia would join the Allies and whose ill-equipped and ethnically based infantry be able to offer an effective resistance to Germany’s well-honed armoured divisions; who sought to coerce Turkey into joining the Allies and promised non-existent air unit in return. It was Churchill who, in February 1941, insisted on three landing strips being built in Crete, despite the lack of adequate planes in the Middle East air force, and by so doing, sowed the seeds of the Allis defeat in May 1941. It was Churchill who insisted that Wavell send his newly arrived tanks straight into battle despite the fact that they needed significant maintenance, resulting in their defeat in Operations Brevity and Battleaxe; and it was Churchill who insisted on sending an under-strength force, again mainly Australian, into Syria on the naïve expectation that the Vichy French would simply surrender, a decision which resulted in the Allies incurring about the same level of casualties as they had in Greece.
Surprisingly, for such a well researched book, a few factual errors have crept. Schreiber notes (p264) that 2052 Italians were killed in the Italian invasion of British Somaliland. In fact the total Italian casualties, including wounded and missing, were 2052 of which only about 500 were killed.
Stegemann notes (p644) that “Wavell flew to London on 8 August 1940”. While Wavell met with Eden and Churchill in London on 8 August 1940, he actually arrived in London on 7 August 1940, having departed Egypt on 4 August 1940. However these minor errors are unlikely to be noticed by most readers
The international acclaim which the series, that this volume forms part of, has achieved is well-deserved.
At 820 pages, this will not be a book for those with only a casual interest in the Mediterranean campaign. However for those interested in this era of military history it is essential reading.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews