Taylor examines three problems with the overall modern societal structures and cultures, and argues that these reinforce a more fundamental, problematic ethical ideal of authenticity. These problems are that (1) 'Disenchantment': there is no supernatural or higher purpose built into the universe, but any meaning given is human-made and contingent, (2) The primacy of instrumental, rational thinking: being reasonable amounts to maximizing efficiency and output with respect to any decision-making process at hand, and (3) Increasing lack of participation in the political sphere: people retreat to the private sphere and are politically passive, as long as the government can continue to provide their familiar material goods.
Taylor argues that (1) has lead to a moral relativism or subjectivism. We think that there are no objective, ethical values, but every person is entitled to her own way of life, as long as she doesn't make it impossible for others to live their own ways of life. In the lacuna of particular, ethical values, the only ethical 'value' that is deemed universally respectable is the formal, empty value of being able to choose for oneself. This value of self-determination and choice is implicit in and drives the position of moral relativism. The glorification of individual choice is coupled with a certain ethical ideal regarding how we ought to live. Individuals ought to live authentically; that is, we should be 'in touch' with our inner feelings, be true to our own desires, and shake off the constraints imposed by others.
There have been heated debates over whether this ethical ideal is a good one. Critics argue that we should reject the ideal of authenticity altogether; it leads to narcissism and egoism, distracting us from the genuine ethical ideals of helping one another and merging into something greater than ourselves. Supporters argue that this ideal is the highest calling a human being can satisfy, and it stands for ultimate freedom. Taylor side-steps this debate. Instead of supporting or critiquing the ideal of authenticity, he redefines authenticity.
Taylor argues that our modern understanding of authenticity is shallow and confused. In order to be able to pursue authenticity at all, we must be able to choose values for ourselves. Values must exist. But where do values come from? They come from our social groups and interpersonal interactions. Our sense of who we are, and all that defines or character, is sculpted by the dialogic relations we have with others in our communities. This new definition of authenticity - that the values that are true to ourselves are not totally self-created in a vacuum, but rather depend on our heritage and embeddedness in certain social groups and - is not prone to the problems critiques of authenticity identify with the distorted, mainstream notion of authenticity. This new definition cannot lead to retreat into the ego, but requires interaction with others and embrace of our common histories.
When this richer sense of authenticity is recognized, we see that purely calculative thinking does not lead to a good life. We do not choose values on the basis of efficiency and output maximization, but we are beholden to our communities for our values. In order for something's maximization to be good, we must already first have a determinate value in mind; so culture precedes calculative thinking. Nurturance of our heritage and traditions is necessary in order for calculative thinking to have any usefulness in helping us achieve greater happiness and freedom. It goes without saying that this richer sense of authenticity also places community and political participation at the forefront.
Taylor concludes with a strong hopefulness. He thinks that rationally understanding the true nature of authenticity can change our collective attitudes and ameliorate those three 'malaises' of modernity. This project is critical for our personal well-being, political harmony, and ecological standing.
Overall, this was an interesting read. Many of the points are intuitive or well-known. But Taylor puts the puzzle pieces together, to a gripping and convincing effect. Moreover, the book as a transcription of a lecture is very easy and quick to read. I'd recommend this book to anyone who wants a clear-eyed overview and critique of the broad-sweeping complaints we hear all the time about the increasing fragmentation of society, increasing meaninglessness, etc.
Here's a side-note regarding my thinking at this time. I feel a tremendous unease with Taylor's conclusion. I am skeptical about preserving authenticity as the highest ethical ideal, even if it is expanded. Taylor defends authenticity in this way. When people live authentically, they are thoughtful regarding how they want to live, and this makes them more responsible for their lives; such responsibility is a good. Moreover, authenticity makes possible cultural progress and. Only when we question the values handed down to us can we possibly critique and change them.
I find this defense unsatisfying. Why think being more responsible for one's own life is a good in itself? Why think continuous cultural change is a good in itself? Taylor fails to examine these goods any further, to see what about them makes them good. I think it's implicit that responsibility is good only insofar as it might increase the chances that people will not treat one another cruelly, or live more morally, in accordance to a deeper set of moral norms regarding the importance to protect sentient beings. The same goes for continuous cultural change; such change is good only insofar as it makes it possible to correct certain cultural states that lead to unnecessary suffering.
Moreover, I think the value of critical thinking can accomplish these two goods Taylor names. When we reflect and think critically, we take responsibility for our actions, and we enable cultural change. There is no need to throw the rhetorical of authenticity into the mix. In fact, a minimal necessary condition of the legitimacy of the concept of authenticity is that there is a self at all. The nature and existence of the self is disputable, and there are philosophical traditions that deny its existence. So authenticity does not stand hand-in-hand with genuine liberalism; it cuts out the voices of those who stand outside the western tradition of reifying the self.
Perhaps it's just my dogma or bias, but I think the ultimate ethical ideal should be that of attending to and alleviating human suffering. It should not be authenticity, defined in any way. Authenticity only serves this ethical ideal.
The reason why people hesitate from endorsing any ethical ideal other than that of authenticity is that in liberalism we want to preserve people's individual freedom to choose the way of life that they want. I do not have enough background in moral or political philosophy to make a coherent argument for the misguidedness or incompleteness of this formulation of liberalism. But I could sketch out a few points perhaps. First are the points made above; we should examine why we think freedom of choice matters at all, and the notion authenticity comes with its own cultural baggage. Second, I think there's a chance of showing that the ideal of alleviating human suffering is a necessary condition for the achievement of liberalism; for example, survival and living above certain minimal material conditions is a precondition for pursuing any value at all.
It is very dangerous to be parochial to certain industrialized societies in which these minimal living conditions are almost universally met, and so the ethical troubles at hand are only those that can arise downstream of satisfaction of those conditions. There are many places in the world, and many targeting communities in industrialized societies, in which these minimal conditions are not met. An immediate task that falls from the ethical ideal of the alleviation of suffering is to attend to that injustice. And then, even in wealthy communities, suffering is abundant. Choosing one's own values does not guarantee fulfillment and freedom from suffering by any means.
I'm not making an argument here, but just spelling out the unease I have with discourses like Taylor's that focus on authenticity above all else. Perhaps the ultimate malaise of modernity is the insensitivity to the suffering of others that can easily follow from having one's own life be materially comfortable...