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The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider's View
In October 1970, Robert Bourassa's provincial government refused to exchange political hostages for twenty-three FLQ terrorists. By the evening of 15 October, 3,000 outraged Quebecers appeared poised to riot. Fearing insurrection, the federal government implemented the War Measures Act and jailed 497 people.
Most Canadian historians cite this event as an unjustified assault on civil rights and political liberty - The October Crisis, 1970 challenges this assumption. William Tetley, then a minister in Bourassa's cabinet, breaks the government's silence about the event and, with meticulous reference to now available documentation and passages from his own 1970 diary, reveals details of the government's decision-making process. He also points out facts that most historical interpretations gloss for instance, all but sixty of those apprehended were soon released, not a window was broken, and the calm that descended on Quebec and Canada has lasted for four decades.
Most Canadian historians cite this event as an unjustified assault on civil rights and political liberty - The October Crisis, 1970 challenges this assumption. William Tetley, then a minister in Bourassa's cabinet, breaks the government's silence about the event and, with meticulous reference to now available documentation and passages from his own 1970 diary, reveals details of the government's decision-making process. He also points out facts that most historical interpretations gloss for instance, all but sixty of those apprehended were soon released, not a window was broken, and the calm that descended on Quebec and Canada has lasted for four decades.
- GenresHistoryCanadaNonfiction
376 pages, Paperback
First published October 26, 2006
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
September 26, 2024
Un ministre libéral sous Bourassa vous explique comment tous les historiens ont tord, mais, que lui, a raison
October 21, 2020
I cannot recommend this book.
When I bought this book I expected, as is advertised on the front cover, an insider's perspective of the events of Quebec's October Crisis. That is, however, not what is contained within this book. There is not explanation of why decisions were made, no insider's view of closed door discussions, and no attempt to meaningfully reflect on the full impact of these events. Instead, this book is little more than an aggressive rant aimed at discrediting any and all critics of the government's decision to use the War Measures Act to stop the FLQ.
I admit that I expected some bias, and the author freely admits it in his intro, but it is nonetheless staggering just how bias this book is. Virtually every chapter, even oddly enough the chapter titled "The War Measures Act: What Went Wrong", is a collection of anecdotes regarding the government's perfect conduct. Moreover, every chapter seems to contain a string of incredibly leading questions which insinuate that the PQ and every other critic of the Bourassa government must have had nefarious motives, usually that they were somehow in league with the FLQ. Take, for example, these questions asked of the motives of the Mouvement pour la défense des prisonniers politiques du Québec (MDPPQ) on page 97: "Could they not have helped the police? A single tidbit of information might have been a useful lead in saving the life of Laporte. For example, did they know the name of Paul Rose's girl friend, with whom he hid at one time? And if the MDPPQ truly believed in justice and democracy, why did they not publicly denounce the kidnappings and call on the FLQ to release Cross and Laporte? The MDPPQ was not only influential in Quebec as a whole but with some of the kidnappers as well. If the MDPPQ had spoken up, would the outcome of the Crisis have been different?" The message if clear: if you were not 100% with us you were against us.
Strangest of all, however, is the complete lack of rigour one finds in this book. All of these assertions and anecdotes are more often than not backed up by little more than the author's own personal assumptions. No effort is made to even attempt to make this book appear well researched in any sense of the word. Often too, these assumptions are not even relevant to the book itself but just bizarre asides that the author decided to add in. I can think of no better example that this odd exert from page 9-10: "A phenomenon that is particular to Quebec and no other province is the use of the term "intellectual." Many Anglo-Canadians would be aghast (or, at the very least, would smile) if they were to be called "intellectual," while the public would laugh at the presumption of anyone applying the name to himself or herself in English." What on Earth is he talking about?
As I began by saying, I cannot recommend this book. It is devoid of useful information and contains only the bias and unsubstantiated rantings of a man who cannot accept that the decisions made in October of 1970 by the federal and Quebec governments were complex, weighty, and the objects of some valid criticisms.
When I bought this book I expected, as is advertised on the front cover, an insider's perspective of the events of Quebec's October Crisis. That is, however, not what is contained within this book. There is not explanation of why decisions were made, no insider's view of closed door discussions, and no attempt to meaningfully reflect on the full impact of these events. Instead, this book is little more than an aggressive rant aimed at discrediting any and all critics of the government's decision to use the War Measures Act to stop the FLQ.
I admit that I expected some bias, and the author freely admits it in his intro, but it is nonetheless staggering just how bias this book is. Virtually every chapter, even oddly enough the chapter titled "The War Measures Act: What Went Wrong", is a collection of anecdotes regarding the government's perfect conduct. Moreover, every chapter seems to contain a string of incredibly leading questions which insinuate that the PQ and every other critic of the Bourassa government must have had nefarious motives, usually that they were somehow in league with the FLQ. Take, for example, these questions asked of the motives of the Mouvement pour la défense des prisonniers politiques du Québec (MDPPQ) on page 97: "Could they not have helped the police? A single tidbit of information might have been a useful lead in saving the life of Laporte. For example, did they know the name of Paul Rose's girl friend, with whom he hid at one time? And if the MDPPQ truly believed in justice and democracy, why did they not publicly denounce the kidnappings and call on the FLQ to release Cross and Laporte? The MDPPQ was not only influential in Quebec as a whole but with some of the kidnappers as well. If the MDPPQ had spoken up, would the outcome of the Crisis have been different?" The message if clear: if you were not 100% with us you were against us.
Strangest of all, however, is the complete lack of rigour one finds in this book. All of these assertions and anecdotes are more often than not backed up by little more than the author's own personal assumptions. No effort is made to even attempt to make this book appear well researched in any sense of the word. Often too, these assumptions are not even relevant to the book itself but just bizarre asides that the author decided to add in. I can think of no better example that this odd exert from page 9-10: "A phenomenon that is particular to Quebec and no other province is the use of the term "intellectual." Many Anglo-Canadians would be aghast (or, at the very least, would smile) if they were to be called "intellectual," while the public would laugh at the presumption of anyone applying the name to himself or herself in English." What on Earth is he talking about?
As I began by saying, I cannot recommend this book. It is devoid of useful information and contains only the bias and unsubstantiated rantings of a man who cannot accept that the decisions made in October of 1970 by the federal and Quebec governments were complex, weighty, and the objects of some valid criticisms.
September 28, 2020
J'ai lu la version française, enrichie, de cet ouvrage.
Tetley était ministre du Revenu pendant la crise et il a une opinion très tranchée: il est favorable à l'utilisation de la loi des mesures de guerre.
Le livre est intéressant aussi car il livre son journal quotidien de ministre et nous fait ainsi entrer dans la délibération du cabinet Bourassa pendant la crise.
L'ouvrage a donc été d'un grand secours pour la rédaction de mon récit sur la prise de décision politique pendant la crise: Insurrection appréhendée, le grand mensonge d'Octobre 70.
Tetley était ministre du Revenu pendant la crise et il a une opinion très tranchée: il est favorable à l'utilisation de la loi des mesures de guerre.
Le livre est intéressant aussi car il livre son journal quotidien de ministre et nous fait ainsi entrer dans la délibération du cabinet Bourassa pendant la crise.
L'ouvrage a donc été d'un grand secours pour la rédaction de mon récit sur la prise de décision politique pendant la crise: Insurrection appréhendée, le grand mensonge d'Octobre 70.
October 20, 2018
Rather dry and the author writes in a way that assumes the reader already has extensive knowledge of the events.
October 31, 2018
This book provides little more than a guide to talking points about the October Crisis for anglophone liberals.
Tetley's disclosure of personal bias in the introduction does not absolve him of his blatant failure to even attempt fair and nuanced writing. Everyone who disagrees with his views is described as lacking reason, objectivity, or knowledge of the facts. Everyone who agrees is described as fair-minded and reasonable.
Although he mentions an RCMP report which criticised the Bourassa government for "lack of knowledge/appreciation of" the social context (p. 95), Tetley himself does not appear to have made genuine effort to understand the FLQ and its supporters/"apologists". For instance, over two chapters, he argues that the government's actions were justified by the Constitution and the federalist division of powers. He presents these arguments as if they were dispositive of any questions regarding the legitimacy of the government's actions. He fails to acknowledge that the Constitution is wholly beside the point for separatist supporters or "apologists" of the FLQ. Since the separatists want to, you know, separate from Canada, they necessarily do not support the Constitution or federalism as they pertain to Québec (an independent Québec would presumably create its own Constitution).
This book also contains frustrating inconsistencies that undermine its credibility. For example, Tetley really wants us to believe that the RCMP's conduct was flawless: "There were no incidents whatsoever as a result of their presence ... from 15 October 1970 to 4 January 1971" (p.64). Only towards the end of the book does he very briefly mention that the Keable Commission "found that six RCMP operations after December 1970 clearly broke the law" (p. 175). Too bad Tetley, for reasons unknown, only discusses the Duchaîne report, glossing over the Keable and McDonald Commissions.
Another example: Tetley tries really hard to convince the reader that the Bourassa government's decision to call in the army was completely separate from its request to apply the War Measures Act. One of his arguments rests upon extraordinarily obfuscating language: "the Quebec government called in the army on 15 October" but the request to apply the War Measures Act wasn't made "until that same day." What? So even by his own account, the Bourassa government may have received the request to apply the Act in the morning, then subsequently decided to call in the army. In any case, it's pretty implausible that these two decisions are completely unrelated. I'm not even sure why it matters so much to Tetley, other than it's probably easier to justify each one individually than both as a joint measure.
This book nonetheless has value for readers who are familiar with the crisis and with competing opinions - it does add to the conversation by concisely formulating a liberal, anglo, pro-government perspective.
Tetley's disclosure of personal bias in the introduction does not absolve him of his blatant failure to even attempt fair and nuanced writing. Everyone who disagrees with his views is described as lacking reason, objectivity, or knowledge of the facts. Everyone who agrees is described as fair-minded and reasonable.
Although he mentions an RCMP report which criticised the Bourassa government for "lack of knowledge/appreciation of" the social context (p. 95), Tetley himself does not appear to have made genuine effort to understand the FLQ and its supporters/"apologists". For instance, over two chapters, he argues that the government's actions were justified by the Constitution and the federalist division of powers. He presents these arguments as if they were dispositive of any questions regarding the legitimacy of the government's actions. He fails to acknowledge that the Constitution is wholly beside the point for separatist supporters or "apologists" of the FLQ. Since the separatists want to, you know, separate from Canada, they necessarily do not support the Constitution or federalism as they pertain to Québec (an independent Québec would presumably create its own Constitution).
This book also contains frustrating inconsistencies that undermine its credibility. For example, Tetley really wants us to believe that the RCMP's conduct was flawless: "There were no incidents whatsoever as a result of their presence ... from 15 October 1970 to 4 January 1971" (p.64). Only towards the end of the book does he very briefly mention that the Keable Commission "found that six RCMP operations after December 1970 clearly broke the law" (p. 175). Too bad Tetley, for reasons unknown, only discusses the Duchaîne report, glossing over the Keable and McDonald Commissions.
Another example: Tetley tries really hard to convince the reader that the Bourassa government's decision to call in the army was completely separate from its request to apply the War Measures Act. One of his arguments rests upon extraordinarily obfuscating language: "the Quebec government called in the army on 15 October" but the request to apply the War Measures Act wasn't made "until that same day." What? So even by his own account, the Bourassa government may have received the request to apply the Act in the morning, then subsequently decided to call in the army. In any case, it's pretty implausible that these two decisions are completely unrelated. I'm not even sure why it matters so much to Tetley, other than it's probably easier to justify each one individually than both as a joint measure.
This book nonetheless has value for readers who are familiar with the crisis and with competing opinions - it does add to the conversation by concisely formulating a liberal, anglo, pro-government perspective.
January 7, 2026
My Canadian partner won this in an essay competition at uni, never read it, and I was going to Quebec for the first time so felt I ought to read something thematic. And overall - I enjoyed this! it assumes a fair bit of background knowledge (and I had essentially none), but it's engaging and well written for what it is - a rather one-sided account with a fair few enjoyable potshots at the other side - I only wish I knew anything about the other side at all.
Tetley was a minister in the Québec government during the 1970 October Crisis, which saw the FLQ kidnap a British diplomat (Cross) and another Québec government minister (Laporte). The FLQ made a set of demands, the Québec government took a hard line, and there was some unrest especially in Montreal. The affair seems from my view to mirror a general trend of the late 60s and early 70s of urban guerrilla violence (Italy and West Germany stand out) as well as a tense political atmosphere evoking France '68 (or West Germany again!)
Like France '68, the crisis passed, though not without the murder of Laporte, one of the hostages. Tetley makes very clear his view that this was a dangerous moment, and the invocation of the War Measures Act was the decision and reasoned step at the right time that allowed the crisis to be peacefully resolved.
Tetley breaks the book down into a series of questions, which each chapter roughly addresses. Its not a chronological account and not much of an overview, so a reader coming in from nothing as I did can feel rather lost. At the same time, it is an enjoyable read and clearly something Tetley was involved in at the time, and his diary is included in the appendix which is very interesting to read.
I think I'll read more about the October Crisis going forward, and I'm interested to know more about the other side - Tetley does not paint the Parti Québecois in a good light at all, but he closes the book on a reflective note - had the shoe been on the other foot, he admits, he may have been quite oppositional too.
Tetley was a minister in the Québec government during the 1970 October Crisis, which saw the FLQ kidnap a British diplomat (Cross) and another Québec government minister (Laporte). The FLQ made a set of demands, the Québec government took a hard line, and there was some unrest especially in Montreal. The affair seems from my view to mirror a general trend of the late 60s and early 70s of urban guerrilla violence (Italy and West Germany stand out) as well as a tense political atmosphere evoking France '68 (or West Germany again!)
Like France '68, the crisis passed, though not without the murder of Laporte, one of the hostages. Tetley makes very clear his view that this was a dangerous moment, and the invocation of the War Measures Act was the decision and reasoned step at the right time that allowed the crisis to be peacefully resolved.
Tetley breaks the book down into a series of questions, which each chapter roughly addresses. Its not a chronological account and not much of an overview, so a reader coming in from nothing as I did can feel rather lost. At the same time, it is an enjoyable read and clearly something Tetley was involved in at the time, and his diary is included in the appendix which is very interesting to read.
I think I'll read more about the October Crisis going forward, and I'm interested to know more about the other side - Tetley does not paint the Parti Québecois in a good light at all, but he closes the book on a reflective note - had the shoe been on the other foot, he admits, he may have been quite oppositional too.
February 28, 2023
This book is far from the definitive story of the October Crisis, but it does offer a perspective on it that is worth reading for anyone with a diehard interest in the subject.
December 1, 2015
An extremely dynamic period in modern Canadian history. Anyone interested in Quebec provincial politics, the October (FLQ) crisis or Canadian political history - this is a good book. I did several papers on Quebec separatism and on the October crisis during my undergraduate years. This book brought back some interesting thoughts and made me re=consider a few things. Well organized, concise and analytical - but easy to digest and follow.
December 30, 2011
Fascinating to see how many corrections he has made to a story retold for 40+ years.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews