I am very late to the party with this book, which has been out for around two decades now, but I’m very glad I read it. Biddle’s argument has to be understood in the context of the 1990s debate over the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Starting in the late 1970s, the US military began developing a bevy of new technologies designed to enable deep strikes against Soviet follow-on formations in Europe. This was what undergirded the US doctrine of AirLand Battle, which sought to win fast and early and relied on airpower to knock out the Soviet Union’s numerically superior reserves in Europe. Although the doctrine was, thankfully, never tested against the Soviets, the Gulf War proved a useful test case. And the overwhelming dominance of Coalition forces suggested to many that this AirLand Battle concept had fundamentally revolutionized the way wars would be fought. Instead of relying on massed maneuver formations, as the argument went, the future belonged to stealth and sensors. This is the position against which Biddle is reacting, and he offers a powerful rejoinder. His central claim is that technology is largely window dressing. It impacts warfare on the margins, but the central manner in which wars have been fought has largely remained constant since World War One. According to Biddle, the enormous increase in firepower afforded by heavy artillery and machine guns at the turn of the century created a significant break in warfare, and much of World War One was spent testing ways out of this stalemate. The solution was what he terms “the modern system,” an approach that emphasizes force employment rather than force composition. The core insight, according to Biddle, was that the key to overcoming the massed firepower of the modern battlefield is dispersion, cover, concealment, and small unit autonomy. The book is an exemplar of multi-methods analysis (especially for its time), and employs case studies from WWI, WWII, and Desert Storm as well as computer simulation and regression analysis. The cases all helpfully flesh out some of the more abstract theorizing, and they lend plausibility to the argument. Though, as with all small-N work, one worries about selection effects and external validity. The simulation component was particularly interesting and novel, but the program itself is a black box with, if I understood correctly, data coming exclusively from the Battle of 73 Eastings (which is also a major part of one of the case studies). Given the suspect data fed into programs like TACWAR, I must say I am inherently skeptical of these kinds of DoD programs. The regression analysis was a bit more compelling, though I struggled to fully understand how the selected proxy variables corresponded to elements of the “the modern system.” But this is more a criticism of the writing style than the methodology. Overall, I found the book quite persuasive, and I think it’s a particularly useful corrective, especially within the American strategic culture that so obsessively focuses on platforms and tech at the expense of capabilities and doctrine. That said, I still had reservations. The first concerns the increasing prevalence (though let’s not pretend this is something novel) of insurgencies and sub-state warfare. These guerilla conflicts do not map clearly onto the kinds of battles Biddle concentrates on, and so I wonder if by posing the late Cold War RMA as his foil he is chasing a red herring. That said, Biddle just published a new book related to this issue, which I very much look forward to reading. The second concern I have is simply that we may not have given the new technology enough time to mature and diffuse. After all, there were many decades between the discovery of electricity and the electrification of the US (much less the rest of the world), and of course Solow famously remarked that “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” The point is that it takes a very long time for new ideas to be fully developed and adopted, and so I worry that Biddle might be too quick to dismiss this alleged RMA. With attritable aircraft being developed and other uncrewed platforms entering the American arsenal, perhaps concealment and small unit flexibility aren’t going to be so important after all. I have no idea, but I suspect it might still be too soon to tell.