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Last Chance For Victory: Robert E. Lee And The Gettysburg Campaign
Gettysburg is the most written about battle in American military history. Generations after nearly 50,000 soldiers shed their blood there, serious and fundamental misunderstandings persist about Robert E. Lee's generalship during the campaign and battle. Most are the basis of popular myths about the epic fight. Last Chance for Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign addresses these issues by studying Lee's choices before, during, and after the battle, the information he possessed at the time and each decision that was made, and why he acted as he did. Even options open to Lee that he did not act upon are carefully explored from the perspective of what Lee and his generals knew at the time. Some of the issues addressed Lee's orders to Jeb Stuart were discretionary and allowed him to conduct his raid around the Federal army. The authors conclusively answer this important question with the most original and unique analysis ever applied to this controversial issue;Why Richard Ewell did not attack Cemetery Hill as ordered by General Lee, and why every historian who has written that Lee's orders to Ewell were discretionary are dead wrong;Why Little Round Top was irrelevant to the July 2 fighting, a fact Lee clearly recognized;Why Cemetery Hill was the weakest point along the entire Federal line, and how close the Southerners came to capturing it;Why Lee decided to launch en echelon attack on July 2, and why most historians have never understood what it was or how close it came to success; Last Chance for Victory will be labeled heresy by some, blasphemy by others, all because its authors dare to call into question the dogmas of Gettysburg. But they do so carefully, using facts, logic, and reason to weave one of the most compelling and riveting military history books of our age.Readers will never look at Robert E. Lee and Gettysburg the same way again.
640 pages, Paperback
First published June 21, 2001
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February 17, 2025
A long overdue re-evaluation of Lee and his subordinates at Gettysburg, this volume earns its place on my short list of good modern studies in the Eastern theater's decisive campaign. The authors stake the claim that Lee was at his best during the three days of battle, and that his subordinates failed him just when he needed them most. From Ewell's lack of initiative to Longstreet's bullheadedness on July 3, the authors place the blame for Gettysburg's failure squarely where it belongs:on a complete collapse of the Confederate command structure. Definitely a worthy effort from the authors,and a must-read volume for those looking to better understand the Gettysburg campaign.
September 18, 2021
A Reconsideration Of Lee At Gettysburg
It is instructive to read Bowden and Ward's study, "Last Chance for Victory," because the book takes issue with much recent scholarship about the Battle of Gettysburg and of the factors which led to Southern defeat. Many students attribute the result of the battle to Southern overconfidence and to mistakes in judgment by the Confederate high command, particularly Robert E.Lee.
Bowden and Ward draw a basic distinction in their study between command decisions on the one hand and the execution of these decisions on the other hand. They conclude that Lee was actively involved in the Battle of Gettysburg, on both the first and the second day, and that the failures on these days were failures of execution by Lee's subordinates. Examples include Jeb Stuart's disobedience to Lee's orders early in the campaign, Richard Ewell's failure to take Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill, and A.P. Hill's failure to timely advance his divisions to attack the Union center on July 2 as part of Lee's en echelon plan of attack.
Bowden and Ward exonerate James Longstreet, in agreement with most recent studies of Gettysburg, of dilatoriness on the second day of the battle. But they are highly critical of Longstreet's performance on July 3 and come too close to accusing Longstreet of responsiblity for the failure of Pickett's charge. Bowden and Ward also criticize Lee for delegating too much responsiblity to Longstreet on day 3, particularly when he knew that Longstreet opposed the frontal assault, and for failing to assume direct control of the charge himself.
The aim of the study is polemical, in good part. The book is longer than it needs to be and many sections are too argumentative. Some of the argument I found unconvincing, which is not necessarily a bad thing in a book on a subject as controversial and difficult as the Battle of Gettysburg.
The book has some outstanding virtues. The writing is clear (although the book is marred by many typos). When Bowden and Ward get down to explaining the specifics of the battle, the writing is informative, consise, and not overly bogged-down in detail. After reading the account of the fighting on July 1 and July 2, I thought I understood the confusing action of these days better than I had before. The maps in the book are helpful. The authors do a good job relating Lee's military strategy at Gettysburg to military theory, particularly as developed in the Napoleonic campaigns.
"Last Chance for Victory" is not the only book a student of the Battle of Gettysburg should read because Bowden and Ward write from a standpoint presupposing some familiarity in the reader with recent accounts of the Battle. One of the cardinal virtues of the book is that it serves to remind the reader that there are many sides to a story. In any kind of serious study, it is good to learn to withhold judgment until one has considered a variety of points of view. This is a lesson in studying Gettysburg or in any serious study and the book teaches it well.
I learned a great deal from this book but came away not entirely convinced. The main difficulty I have with Bowden and Ward's argument is that they try to separate too sharply the orders that Lee gave and his battle plan from the execution of these plans by his subordinates. The plan and the execution were closely related at many critical points of the battle. The shortcomings in execution by Lee's subordinates cannot be sharply distinguished from Lee's orders. In spite of what Bowden and Ward argue, many of these orders were ambiguous and were so viewed by those to whom they were directed. Further Lee had the opportunity to rectify many of the dilatory actions of his subordinates (or many of their actions which perhaps did not accord with his orders) but did not do so. For example, Lee could have been much more explicit with Ewell about capturing Cemetry Hill to remove any grounds for doubt and could have followed-up agressively with him. Lee had the opportunity to tell A.P. Hill to correct his formations on July 2 and to have his (Hill's) subordinate commanders move more decisively following the actions of Longstreet's Corps. He did not do so. There was a great deal of difficulty to go around in the Confederate battle plan and in its execution in these three momentous days. In addition, as Bowden and Ward realize, there was the Union Army. When these factors are considered, Bowden and Hill can be read as modifying but not radically changing scholarly consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg.
Bowden and Ward try to foist responsiblity for the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3 on Longstreet. There is nothing in their brief treatment of day 3 of the battle that convinces me that Pickett's charge had much chance of success or that Longsteet was to blame for the conception of the attack or for its execution. I don't understand that Bowden and Ward contend that the attack would likely have succeeded if it had been executed as they claim Lee had planned. I think the treatment of the third day of the battle is the weakest portion of this book.
This book will help the student rethink the Battle of Gettysburg and to learn the value of deliberation before one draws overly firm and dogmatic conclusions about a difficult matter.
Robin Friedman
It is instructive to read Bowden and Ward's study, "Last Chance for Victory," because the book takes issue with much recent scholarship about the Battle of Gettysburg and of the factors which led to Southern defeat. Many students attribute the result of the battle to Southern overconfidence and to mistakes in judgment by the Confederate high command, particularly Robert E.Lee.
Bowden and Ward draw a basic distinction in their study between command decisions on the one hand and the execution of these decisions on the other hand. They conclude that Lee was actively involved in the Battle of Gettysburg, on both the first and the second day, and that the failures on these days were failures of execution by Lee's subordinates. Examples include Jeb Stuart's disobedience to Lee's orders early in the campaign, Richard Ewell's failure to take Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill, and A.P. Hill's failure to timely advance his divisions to attack the Union center on July 2 as part of Lee's en echelon plan of attack.
Bowden and Ward exonerate James Longstreet, in agreement with most recent studies of Gettysburg, of dilatoriness on the second day of the battle. But they are highly critical of Longstreet's performance on July 3 and come too close to accusing Longstreet of responsiblity for the failure of Pickett's charge. Bowden and Ward also criticize Lee for delegating too much responsiblity to Longstreet on day 3, particularly when he knew that Longstreet opposed the frontal assault, and for failing to assume direct control of the charge himself.
The aim of the study is polemical, in good part. The book is longer than it needs to be and many sections are too argumentative. Some of the argument I found unconvincing, which is not necessarily a bad thing in a book on a subject as controversial and difficult as the Battle of Gettysburg.
The book has some outstanding virtues. The writing is clear (although the book is marred by many typos). When Bowden and Ward get down to explaining the specifics of the battle, the writing is informative, consise, and not overly bogged-down in detail. After reading the account of the fighting on July 1 and July 2, I thought I understood the confusing action of these days better than I had before. The maps in the book are helpful. The authors do a good job relating Lee's military strategy at Gettysburg to military theory, particularly as developed in the Napoleonic campaigns.
"Last Chance for Victory" is not the only book a student of the Battle of Gettysburg should read because Bowden and Ward write from a standpoint presupposing some familiarity in the reader with recent accounts of the Battle. One of the cardinal virtues of the book is that it serves to remind the reader that there are many sides to a story. In any kind of serious study, it is good to learn to withhold judgment until one has considered a variety of points of view. This is a lesson in studying Gettysburg or in any serious study and the book teaches it well.
I learned a great deal from this book but came away not entirely convinced. The main difficulty I have with Bowden and Ward's argument is that they try to separate too sharply the orders that Lee gave and his battle plan from the execution of these plans by his subordinates. The plan and the execution were closely related at many critical points of the battle. The shortcomings in execution by Lee's subordinates cannot be sharply distinguished from Lee's orders. In spite of what Bowden and Ward argue, many of these orders were ambiguous and were so viewed by those to whom they were directed. Further Lee had the opportunity to rectify many of the dilatory actions of his subordinates (or many of their actions which perhaps did not accord with his orders) but did not do so. For example, Lee could have been much more explicit with Ewell about capturing Cemetry Hill to remove any grounds for doubt and could have followed-up agressively with him. Lee had the opportunity to tell A.P. Hill to correct his formations on July 2 and to have his (Hill's) subordinate commanders move more decisively following the actions of Longstreet's Corps. He did not do so. There was a great deal of difficulty to go around in the Confederate battle plan and in its execution in these three momentous days. In addition, as Bowden and Ward realize, there was the Union Army. When these factors are considered, Bowden and Hill can be read as modifying but not radically changing scholarly consideration of the Battle of Gettysburg.
Bowden and Ward try to foist responsiblity for the failure of "Pickett's Charge" on July 3 on Longstreet. There is nothing in their brief treatment of day 3 of the battle that convinces me that Pickett's charge had much chance of success or that Longsteet was to blame for the conception of the attack or for its execution. I don't understand that Bowden and Ward contend that the attack would likely have succeeded if it had been executed as they claim Lee had planned. I think the treatment of the third day of the battle is the weakest portion of this book.
This book will help the student rethink the Battle of Gettysburg and to learn the value of deliberation before one draws overly firm and dogmatic conclusions about a difficult matter.
Robin Friedman
July 12, 2016
This book is a hefty tome which I had standing on the shelve gathering dust for quite some time. Had I known how good it was I would have picked it up much earlier. Even though I have read over a hundred books on the battle/campaign of Gettysburg Last Chance for Victory is still very interesting and tells many a new thing from a viewpoint different then all other books available. Furthermore it does so in a convincing, altough sometimes a bit repettative, manner.
The surprising new insights and conclusions and make this perhaps one of the best book I have read on the battle. The chapter about July 2 is sheer brilliance, how close the Confederates came to victory and how much they bungled at the same time!
The chapter on July 3rd and Pickett's charge somewhat lacks the immense depth of the previous chapters however the conclusion is as interesting as the other ones are. One minor nitpick; there is an oversight of the partial success of part of Pettigrew's division during the July 3rd chargein favor of Pickett. Pettigrew's troops (mainly his own/Marshall's brigade) topped and captured the stone wall on Cemetery ridge as well. Furthermore they had to go further then Pickett's brigades had to and the terrain was less favourable to them. Like Pickett's they had to retreat after a short moment due to mounting pressure and lack of support.
Last Chance for Victory is very heartily recommended and would I be able to, I would give it 6 stars.
The surprising new insights and conclusions and make this perhaps one of the best book I have read on the battle. The chapter about July 2 is sheer brilliance, how close the Confederates came to victory and how much they bungled at the same time!
The chapter on July 3rd and Pickett's charge somewhat lacks the immense depth of the previous chapters however the conclusion is as interesting as the other ones are. One minor nitpick; there is an oversight of the partial success of part of Pettigrew's division during the July 3rd chargein favor of Pickett. Pettigrew's troops (mainly his own/Marshall's brigade) topped and captured the stone wall on Cemetery ridge as well. Furthermore they had to go further then Pickett's brigades had to and the terrain was less favourable to them. Like Pickett's they had to retreat after a short moment due to mounting pressure and lack of support.
Last Chance for Victory is very heartily recommended and would I be able to, I would give it 6 stars.
April 18, 2020
Of all the very many books written about the Gettysburg Campaign, few are written from the perspective of the field tent of the headquarters Army of Northern Virginia. Ok, maybe some, but I could never read all of the Gettysburg books ever written, or yet to be written, if I lived to be 150, and I am still a young man.
In this book, the authors do so much more than giving a very good, well written narrative of the Campaign itself. They analyze, and back up their analysis with incredibly convincing argumentation and cross examination of prior historiography, the command decisions, and their outcomes, of General Robert E Lee.
While the authors make no attempt to hide their opinion that Lee was the best commander of the war, and considering what he was able to do with limited resources, a dysfunctional government, and a broken logistical infrastructure, I tend to agree, this is not a hagiography.
This is a deeply detailed, very military and politics centric look at one of the most famous military campaigns in Western history (and you know it's true when you have friends from Russia, Ukraine, and Hong Kong who are very familiar with the tale).
Covering everything from the attempts to convince the Davis Administration to allow Lee to invade the North, to the end of the battle, every single major, and not a few minor decisions, are given a thorough examination and analyzed thoroughly.
To be sure, Lee comes out mostly ahead in these analyses, but when he makes errors, this is shown and they too are deeply analyzed.
Lee's greatest failing was in his lack of tactical control during the Battle, his prior relationship with Jackson and Longstreet, both of whom could be given mission oriented orders with the discretion to take whatever actions they saw fit to achieve their goals (a student of more than just American military history will recognize the Prussian and Napoleonic nature of Lee's command style, quite a few American historians miss this, as is pointed out in the book, Lee being a student of military history modeled his command style much after Napoleon and Frederick), failed to recognize that both Hill and Ewell were not similar to Longstreet or Jackson.
Lee would learn his lesson, and beginning in 1864, following a disappointing autumn series of campaigning against Meade, he would take much more tactical control into his own ends.
Even with this failing, however, the Confederates came very close, on numerous occasions, to achieving total victory. The authors point out the tactical superiority of the Rebel Army, and use statistical data to back up their claims. Their problem was in a failing in the chain of command at the middle level, the promotion of men to positions necessary after the losses in veteran officers during the triumph at Chancellorsville, while a necessity, meant that many men were unseasoned at higher command. Sometimes they outright failed to follow their orders, either by ignorance as to how, or of will, and sometimes they just plain proved they couldn't handle field command beyond their prior station.
Even so, the excellence of the Army of Northern Virginia in the rank and file, the NCO's, and regimental and brigade command level meant that even when major mistakes were made, their exceptional nature meant they often overcame despite these flaws, or came so very close to doing so regardless.
This is a truly exceptional read, and not for the feint of heart. This is not a simple narrative history, this is deep analysis and a certain intellectual level on the behalf of the reader is assumed by the authors. Bear in mind, this book was a part of the curriculum of the US Army's Command and General Staff College. That should key you in as to it's nature.
A book I cannot recommend highly enough, it has become one of my new favorites, and my personal favorite of the Gettysburg Campaign alongside Trudeau's excellent narrative history.
In this book, the authors do so much more than giving a very good, well written narrative of the Campaign itself. They analyze, and back up their analysis with incredibly convincing argumentation and cross examination of prior historiography, the command decisions, and their outcomes, of General Robert E Lee.
While the authors make no attempt to hide their opinion that Lee was the best commander of the war, and considering what he was able to do with limited resources, a dysfunctional government, and a broken logistical infrastructure, I tend to agree, this is not a hagiography.
This is a deeply detailed, very military and politics centric look at one of the most famous military campaigns in Western history (and you know it's true when you have friends from Russia, Ukraine, and Hong Kong who are very familiar with the tale).
Covering everything from the attempts to convince the Davis Administration to allow Lee to invade the North, to the end of the battle, every single major, and not a few minor decisions, are given a thorough examination and analyzed thoroughly.
To be sure, Lee comes out mostly ahead in these analyses, but when he makes errors, this is shown and they too are deeply analyzed.
Lee's greatest failing was in his lack of tactical control during the Battle, his prior relationship with Jackson and Longstreet, both of whom could be given mission oriented orders with the discretion to take whatever actions they saw fit to achieve their goals (a student of more than just American military history will recognize the Prussian and Napoleonic nature of Lee's command style, quite a few American historians miss this, as is pointed out in the book, Lee being a student of military history modeled his command style much after Napoleon and Frederick), failed to recognize that both Hill and Ewell were not similar to Longstreet or Jackson.
Lee would learn his lesson, and beginning in 1864, following a disappointing autumn series of campaigning against Meade, he would take much more tactical control into his own ends.
Even with this failing, however, the Confederates came very close, on numerous occasions, to achieving total victory. The authors point out the tactical superiority of the Rebel Army, and use statistical data to back up their claims. Their problem was in a failing in the chain of command at the middle level, the promotion of men to positions necessary after the losses in veteran officers during the triumph at Chancellorsville, while a necessity, meant that many men were unseasoned at higher command. Sometimes they outright failed to follow their orders, either by ignorance as to how, or of will, and sometimes they just plain proved they couldn't handle field command beyond their prior station.
Even so, the excellence of the Army of Northern Virginia in the rank and file, the NCO's, and regimental and brigade command level meant that even when major mistakes were made, their exceptional nature meant they often overcame despite these flaws, or came so very close to doing so regardless.
This is a truly exceptional read, and not for the feint of heart. This is not a simple narrative history, this is deep analysis and a certain intellectual level on the behalf of the reader is assumed by the authors. Bear in mind, this book was a part of the curriculum of the US Army's Command and General Staff College. That should key you in as to it's nature.
A book I cannot recommend highly enough, it has become one of my new favorites, and my personal favorite of the Gettysburg Campaign alongside Trudeau's excellent narrative history.
December 27, 2023
Last Chance For Victory is a an exceptional history of the Battle of Gettysburg hidden within a partisan defense of the generalship of Robert E. Lee. The focus of Bowden and Ward's thesis is that Lee's plan of action for both the invasion of Pennsylvania and the resulting battle at Gettysburg failed due to critical errors committed by his subordinates. These key moments, for example Stuart's failure to provide intelligence with his cavalry or Ewell's failure to seize Cemetery Hill on the evening of the first day of the battle, are parsed out with meticulous detail to convince the reader of that particular officer's misstep. Some of the author's contentions on these points are fascinating and convincing, while others remain interesting points of debate, leaving the reader with doubts. This would be true of any contentious Civil War history, and the authors cannot be criticized for their efforts. Where they get a little bogged down is in their repetition and "salesmanship." After making cogent and detailed defenses of each of their thesis points, the authors tend to re-summarize and repeat their objectives and conclusions over and over again throughout the text. At some points they repeat their conclusions so frequently you begin to think they are trying to convince themselves of the validity of their arguments instead of the reader. We get it Scott and Bill, you don't have to push that used car any harder, we already said yes!
Where this book really shines, and earns its 5 star review despite my above misgivings, is in those sections that describe and analyze the second day of battle at Gettysburg. Scott Bowden's vast knowledge of the Napoleonic era informs the reader of that period's influence over the conduct of the American Civil War. Napoleon's legacy lives large in the armies of the American Civil War and the authors demonstrate how this dictated the movement of troops, campaign strategies and battle tactics of General Lee. Their detailed examination of the complexities of the second day of battle are contextualized through an understanding of Lee's plan for a Napoleonic style "en echelon" attack, a narrative that is largely unexplained and frequently unremarked in most other Gettysburg histories. In that respect this becomes one of the essential histories of Gettysburg, particularly for those who seek a true understanding of the actual conduct of the American Civil War and the influence of military history.
Where this book really shines, and earns its 5 star review despite my above misgivings, is in those sections that describe and analyze the second day of battle at Gettysburg. Scott Bowden's vast knowledge of the Napoleonic era informs the reader of that period's influence over the conduct of the American Civil War. Napoleon's legacy lives large in the armies of the American Civil War and the authors demonstrate how this dictated the movement of troops, campaign strategies and battle tactics of General Lee. Their detailed examination of the complexities of the second day of battle are contextualized through an understanding of Lee's plan for a Napoleonic style "en echelon" attack, a narrative that is largely unexplained and frequently unremarked in most other Gettysburg histories. In that respect this becomes one of the essential histories of Gettysburg, particularly for those who seek a true understanding of the actual conduct of the American Civil War and the influence of military history.
June 16, 2018
Extensively researched and footnoted, the subtitle of this book should more accurately be either “Most of his decisions were correct,” or “He’s not to blame for the defeat.” The author appears to have written this book with the intent to make the case that Robert E. Lee is not to blame for the defeat at Gettysburg, rather, most of his command decisions were correct given the status of the battle at the time the decisions were made. As well, he credits some of the “if practical” phrasing in Lee’s orders to his generals to really mean - to carry out the order; that Lee’s word choice was based on his southern gentleman demeanor. I would assert that given the potential benefits to the South with a victory at Gettysburg; this was not the time to be gentlemanly, and that this was a major flaw in Lee’s style of generalship. The author also spends a great deal of time reviewing Lee’s order to JEB Stuart concerning “pass around” the enemy and the author asserts that phrase meant to pass through the gaps in the federal encampments, not around the federal army. He also asserts Stuart’s motivation for riding around the federal army was purely for personal glory. To that, I would disagree, noting that as a professional soldier, Stuart would have been motivated by what he thought was best for the Southern Cause, in keeping with the orders he had been given. With all this said, I would still recommend the book to those who have already read extensively on the Gettysburg Campaign. That readership would have the background to appreciate some of the author’s points, yet the knowledge to make their own determination of the arguments he presents.
April 18, 2022
After a lifetime spent in wargaming as well as in studying the history of the wars, battles, and campaigns that inspire most wargames, reading a book co-authored by Scott Bowden (always Scotty in my mind for some reason) is like sitting down with an old acquaintance and hashing over familiar ground – again. To their credit, the authors have presented (at least to me) new information about America’s favorite battle, Gettysburg. Their work is admittedly pro-Southern in attitude if not quite so in fact – though there is always room for a little spin in the interpretation! The battle narratives reflect that bias – to an uncomfortable degree given the liberal use of the historian's bane - adjectives and adverbs. However, the battle analysis is of a very high standard, and both are heavily supported by endnotes for each chapter. If you are building a library focused on the battle of Gettysburg or the Civil War more broadly, you need this book. Even if you wish to quibble with the authors’ almost advocacy of the Southern cause in the “war for Southern Independence”, you will appreciate the roughly 70 pages of appendices which include among other things the orders of battle of the two armies (with strength figures) and a roughly 20-page bibliography. And my wargamer half is intrigued by several ‘what-ifs’ presented by the authors as well.
July 8, 2013
Pg 604: The Bliss farm is mentioned six times in the index.
Pg 262: "Tige" Anderson supported Robertson. What did Robertson do? Pg Pg 285: Hood had a stubling start with "Tige" Anderson after he was wounded.
Pg 305: "Tige" anderson is wounded and only Joe Keshaw remained in that area of the field.
Pg 620: Sedgwick is mentioned severals times in the index.
Pg 319: A Col. George Willard is mentioned. Is he related to the Willard of the Lewis & Clark Expedition?
Pg 362: The 3rd Brig 3rd Div of the 6th Corp USA was at Plum Run and lost 50 men. Serg.F.W. Bliss was in the 2nd Brig. Col. H.L. Eustis was his commander.
Pg 306: The 3rd Brig. was the only Brig engaged for the 6th Corp.
Pg 427 The 6th Corp moved so hard thaey had stragglers which may have come in later. Serg F.W. Bliss may not have be engaged or was a straggler the first day.
Pg 465: Sedgwick's artilley was used at the corpse of trees and Capt andre Cowan witnessed the most critical monment when the battle hung on a thread. "Hurry up and wait" don't fall out. 2Tim 2:3ff be a strong soldier.
Pg 603: Ames, Gen Adlebert is mentioned several times in the index.
Pg 359: Two brigades, USA were routed on two days one of these was that of Lt. Francis M. Bliss. They lost the day but won the battle. "They were not capable for offensive action" Is this what was meant by Howard when he said he "had no confidance?"
Pg 363: 2nd Brig of 1st Div of 11th Corp USA lost 160 men, result; shattered.
Pg 349: 17th Conn Regiment has less than 200 of the 386 on July 2nd. Other sources say less than but how were they lost: Was Lt. F.M. Bliss Company Commander? How did he fair: Where there stragglers in town?
Pg 354: The presence of Ames insprired the men.
Pg 611: Howard, Gen Oliver O. is mentioned many times in the index.
Pg 165: Howard came to Gettysburg with a string of bad luck.
Pg 314: Barksdale came up on the flank of Howard and spoiled him.
Pg 409: Howard was saved by Carroll.
Pg 496: Howard and Wadworth of the 1st Corp, the two hardest hit copgs voted to attack Lee and the others did not. Where was Howard's faith? They sound like Josua and Caleb after spying out the land. The others didn't have the faith they cound do it. When was this vote taken?
Pg 363: Other Brigs lost more but were not shattered.
Pg 195: The Howard route north of Gettysburg was about 2 hours.
Pg 221: If Hill had been stopped Howard may have destroyed Ewell. Hadn't Lee ordered Hill to stop?
Pg 351: 11th Corpmen found it's rifle pits were ordered to the rear after an unnerving Rebel Cry.
Pg 357: Carrol the savior of Howard may have gone the other way had Posey's echelon attack had not stopped at the Bliss Farm.
Pg 508 Maybe Howard's officers didn't want to sacrifice their men after seeing what had happeded to the 1 Corp.
Pg 617: Newton, Gen. John is mentioned only twice in the index.
Pg 362: Where did Newton go? Did he infact get moved to the 1st Corp? Wheaton came out of the 3rd Brig which saw action and took the 3rd Div.
Pg 305: Wheaton was plugged in by Meade to fill a hole at Plum Run. He very well may have faced a Bliss under "Tige" Anderson. Later he was 0ver Serg. Frederick Wheller Bliss.
Pg 331: Map shows Posey stopped the eclelon attack at the Bliss house and failed to take the USA line. Was it the cheese wheel and chicken that his men found there that kept them from completing the echelon?
If so the Bliss farm may have stopped the CSA on July 2nd and their fence may have slowed them on July 3rd. Thus giving the battle the victory to the USA.
Pg 262: "Tige" Anderson supported Robertson. What did Robertson do? Pg Pg 285: Hood had a stubling start with "Tige" Anderson after he was wounded.
Pg 305: "Tige" anderson is wounded and only Joe Keshaw remained in that area of the field.
Pg 620: Sedgwick is mentioned severals times in the index.
Pg 319: A Col. George Willard is mentioned. Is he related to the Willard of the Lewis & Clark Expedition?
Pg 362: The 3rd Brig 3rd Div of the 6th Corp USA was at Plum Run and lost 50 men. Serg.F.W. Bliss was in the 2nd Brig. Col. H.L. Eustis was his commander.
Pg 306: The 3rd Brig. was the only Brig engaged for the 6th Corp.
Pg 427 The 6th Corp moved so hard thaey had stragglers which may have come in later. Serg F.W. Bliss may not have be engaged or was a straggler the first day.
Pg 465: Sedgwick's artilley was used at the corpse of trees and Capt andre Cowan witnessed the most critical monment when the battle hung on a thread. "Hurry up and wait" don't fall out. 2Tim 2:3ff be a strong soldier.
Pg 603: Ames, Gen Adlebert is mentioned several times in the index.
Pg 359: Two brigades, USA were routed on two days one of these was that of Lt. Francis M. Bliss. They lost the day but won the battle. "They were not capable for offensive action" Is this what was meant by Howard when he said he "had no confidance?"
Pg 363: 2nd Brig of 1st Div of 11th Corp USA lost 160 men, result; shattered.
Pg 349: 17th Conn Regiment has less than 200 of the 386 on July 2nd. Other sources say less than but how were they lost: Was Lt. F.M. Bliss Company Commander? How did he fair: Where there stragglers in town?
Pg 354: The presence of Ames insprired the men.
Pg 611: Howard, Gen Oliver O. is mentioned many times in the index.
Pg 165: Howard came to Gettysburg with a string of bad luck.
Pg 314: Barksdale came up on the flank of Howard and spoiled him.
Pg 409: Howard was saved by Carroll.
Pg 496: Howard and Wadworth of the 1st Corp, the two hardest hit copgs voted to attack Lee and the others did not. Where was Howard's faith? They sound like Josua and Caleb after spying out the land. The others didn't have the faith they cound do it. When was this vote taken?
Pg 363: Other Brigs lost more but were not shattered.
Pg 195: The Howard route north of Gettysburg was about 2 hours.
Pg 221: If Hill had been stopped Howard may have destroyed Ewell. Hadn't Lee ordered Hill to stop?
Pg 351: 11th Corpmen found it's rifle pits were ordered to the rear after an unnerving Rebel Cry.
Pg 357: Carrol the savior of Howard may have gone the other way had Posey's echelon attack had not stopped at the Bliss Farm.
Pg 508 Maybe Howard's officers didn't want to sacrifice their men after seeing what had happeded to the 1 Corp.
Pg 617: Newton, Gen. John is mentioned only twice in the index.
Pg 362: Where did Newton go? Did he infact get moved to the 1st Corp? Wheaton came out of the 3rd Brig which saw action and took the 3rd Div.
Pg 305: Wheaton was plugged in by Meade to fill a hole at Plum Run. He very well may have faced a Bliss under "Tige" Anderson. Later he was 0ver Serg. Frederick Wheller Bliss.
Pg 331: Map shows Posey stopped the eclelon attack at the Bliss house and failed to take the USA line. Was it the cheese wheel and chicken that his men found there that kept them from completing the echelon?
If so the Bliss farm may have stopped the CSA on July 2nd and their fence may have slowed them on July 3rd. Thus giving the battle the victory to the USA.
August 12, 2022
If y0u are an American Civil War buff this is a book you need to read. The three days of the battle of Gettysburg are the most studied days of US military history. It was a battle of close run events any of which could have turned the course of the war and of US history. The authors are pain staking in their documentation of events and actions (one chapter is 137 pages with over 300 footnotes) to a level rarely seen. They also unhesitatingly take on the myths and legends of the battle and either debunk them or validate the story. They are unsparing in praise and equally unsparingly critical.
History teaches many lessons and warfare is the strictest of all teachers, its lessons are learned in blood. Over the years the romance of the Southern Cause has waxed and waned with the political and cultural temper of the nation. At the present there is again among some sectors of society an admiration for the Confederacy which is as misplaced now as it was in the past. This book however shows how very close we came to being two nations occupying the same land area. As Lee said after the third day "another half an hour and we would have had victory." with that victory it is very possible there would have been peace negotiations leading to the Confederacy gaining independence.
One aspect of this book which impressed me was its exposure of the incredibly complex nature of warfare in a time without radio or instant communications. Messages would be lost or duplicated or not received. Fatigue affected the actions of generals, generals who had acted as loyal subordinates suddenly became insubordinate and there was no way to communicate the real situation.
I did find the book slanted to Lee's forces and in some cases slighted the heroic sacrifice of some of the Union forces and leaders.
As I said if you are a student of history or a Civil War buff this is a must read.
History teaches many lessons and warfare is the strictest of all teachers, its lessons are learned in blood. Over the years the romance of the Southern Cause has waxed and waned with the political and cultural temper of the nation. At the present there is again among some sectors of society an admiration for the Confederacy which is as misplaced now as it was in the past. This book however shows how very close we came to being two nations occupying the same land area. As Lee said after the third day "another half an hour and we would have had victory." with that victory it is very possible there would have been peace negotiations leading to the Confederacy gaining independence.
One aspect of this book which impressed me was its exposure of the incredibly complex nature of warfare in a time without radio or instant communications. Messages would be lost or duplicated or not received. Fatigue affected the actions of generals, generals who had acted as loyal subordinates suddenly became insubordinate and there was no way to communicate the real situation.
I did find the book slanted to Lee's forces and in some cases slighted the heroic sacrifice of some of the Union forces and leaders.
As I said if you are a student of history or a Civil War buff this is a must read.
June 17, 2025
One of the best
One of the best analysis of the battle, mainly from the view of the Confederate forces. The authors clear up, once and for all, a lot of misinformation about the battle and Robert E. Lee's roll in it. They also do a very good job of Longstreets attack on the second day and his reluctance and poor performance on July 3.
One of the best analysis of the battle, mainly from the view of the Confederate forces. The authors clear up, once and for all, a lot of misinformation about the battle and Robert E. Lee's roll in it. They also do a very good job of Longstreets attack on the second day and his reluctance and poor performance on July 3.
April 3, 2018
An extremely detailed study of why the Army of Northern Virginia lost the battle of Gettysburg. The authors conclude that Lee lead his army as he had in previous battles, but his new subordinate corps commanders were not equal to the challenge. A must read for any Civil War historian!
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 18, 2021
Excellent, very well researched (using original sources) detailed explanation of what happened those fateful 3 days in July, 1863, and the events leading up to them. Flawed by poor editing ("house" versus "horse" in one footnote).
June 12, 2023
Lost me at, General Meade was a native of Spain?
Read this book at your own peril. It contains errors in fact (like the one above) and proof reading errors, like the Yorktown Pike. For these reasons this book could be misleading to the reader.
Read this book at your own peril. It contains errors in fact (like the one above) and proof reading errors, like the Yorktown Pike. For these reasons this book could be misleading to the reader.
December 3, 2022
Excellent content, disconcerting typos
The analysis of the battle is very good, and also refreshing, but there are so many typos in the book that they distract from the content.
The analysis of the battle is very good, and also refreshing, but there are so many typos in the book that they distract from the content.
June 10, 2025
excellent
Superb analysis of lees command at this battle reveals that it was his subordinates that failed not lee he caught a near perfect battle
Superb analysis of lees command at this battle reveals that it was his subordinates that failed not lee he caught a near perfect battle
November 2, 2009
This book begins with a rhetorical question (page i): "'Do we really need another book about Gettysburg and Pickett's charge?'. . .. The short answer to that question is yes, another book is necessary." Why? The authors argue that Lee's battle plan at Gettysburg, in fact, was stellar and that defeat there was the result of many factors beyond his control (and some within his control). In short, they reject some of the recent revisionist histories of Lee's flaws as a general officer (e.g., McKenzie's "Uncertain Glory" and Nolan's "Lee Considered").
They note that he marshaled his forces well on the first day, as he seized control of the accidental encounter. By the end of the day, his forces had wrecked two Union corps (the First and the Eleventh). On the second day? They contend that his en echelon attack was perfect to confuse Union forces as the Confederate meat grinder continued, as the attack proceeded sequentially from their right toward their center, drawing in Union forces to meet immediate threats, only to have a follow up attack further down the line. Indeed, one can easily make the case that July 2nd, the second day of Gettysburg, was a great triumph for Lee and for Longstreet, whose First Corps did great damage to Union forces, even though outnumbered at most turns. Indeed, the second day at Gettysburg was one of Longstreet's best moments of the war (and he had quite a few good ones). But Hill's inept leadership of his corps led to a "fizzling out" of the en echelon attack (with some blame also attaching to his supposedly dependable division commander, Richard Anderson, who refused to send in additional brigades to continue the pressure on Union forces).
The third day. . . The charge by troops led by George Pickett, Isaac Trimble, and James J. Pettigrew, as we know was turned back with heavy casualties. The book places much of the blame at the feet of the officer Lee ordered to organize the attack--James Longstreet. And, indeed, this was not Longstreet's greatest hour.
In the end, according to the authors, Lee's generalship was sound and inspired, but he was undone by an enumeration of seventeen causes, among which were: poor selection of troops to lead the attack on July 3rd (many of these troops had been badly handled on the first day of the battle and were not in good condition to play such a role); Winfield Scott Hancock's stunning leadership on all three days of the battle; Longstreet's performance on the third day; Jefferson Davis, Confederate President, not forwarding several brigades of top notch troops from North Carolina to the Army of Northern Virginia; A. P. Hill's poor performance as leader of the newly created Third Corps; the breakdown of the en echelon attack on July 2nd.
As far as it goes, these arguments do make sense. However, Lee must bear considerable responsibility. After all, he was responsible for selecting the troops to make the charge on the third day; he had a record of high casualties among officers (replacing good officers with mediocre or inexperienced ones was, by this time, a way of life for his army) and troops by emphasizing aggressive tactics, thereby bleeding down his forces; too much of a "hands off" attitude when battle began (A. P. Hill was having a lousy three days; continuing to give him latitude was unwise, to put it mildly).
This is an interesting volume and is useful as a response to some overly critical revisionist critiques of Lee's generalship at Gettysburg and elsewhere. But to go to the other extreme, as the authors come close to doing here, is not the answer. Balance is what is needed in an examination of Lee's generalship. To be sure, he failed in a number of areas over time; he was also someone who could inspire his troops and pull victory out of hat looked to be defeat. Neither romanticization nor harsh critique serves Lee's leadership well. Balance. . . .
They note that he marshaled his forces well on the first day, as he seized control of the accidental encounter. By the end of the day, his forces had wrecked two Union corps (the First and the Eleventh). On the second day? They contend that his en echelon attack was perfect to confuse Union forces as the Confederate meat grinder continued, as the attack proceeded sequentially from their right toward their center, drawing in Union forces to meet immediate threats, only to have a follow up attack further down the line. Indeed, one can easily make the case that July 2nd, the second day of Gettysburg, was a great triumph for Lee and for Longstreet, whose First Corps did great damage to Union forces, even though outnumbered at most turns. Indeed, the second day at Gettysburg was one of Longstreet's best moments of the war (and he had quite a few good ones). But Hill's inept leadership of his corps led to a "fizzling out" of the en echelon attack (with some blame also attaching to his supposedly dependable division commander, Richard Anderson, who refused to send in additional brigades to continue the pressure on Union forces).
The third day. . . The charge by troops led by George Pickett, Isaac Trimble, and James J. Pettigrew, as we know was turned back with heavy casualties. The book places much of the blame at the feet of the officer Lee ordered to organize the attack--James Longstreet. And, indeed, this was not Longstreet's greatest hour.
In the end, according to the authors, Lee's generalship was sound and inspired, but he was undone by an enumeration of seventeen causes, among which were: poor selection of troops to lead the attack on July 3rd (many of these troops had been badly handled on the first day of the battle and were not in good condition to play such a role); Winfield Scott Hancock's stunning leadership on all three days of the battle; Longstreet's performance on the third day; Jefferson Davis, Confederate President, not forwarding several brigades of top notch troops from North Carolina to the Army of Northern Virginia; A. P. Hill's poor performance as leader of the newly created Third Corps; the breakdown of the en echelon attack on July 2nd.
As far as it goes, these arguments do make sense. However, Lee must bear considerable responsibility. After all, he was responsible for selecting the troops to make the charge on the third day; he had a record of high casualties among officers (replacing good officers with mediocre or inexperienced ones was, by this time, a way of life for his army) and troops by emphasizing aggressive tactics, thereby bleeding down his forces; too much of a "hands off" attitude when battle began (A. P. Hill was having a lousy three days; continuing to give him latitude was unwise, to put it mildly).
This is an interesting volume and is useful as a response to some overly critical revisionist critiques of Lee's generalship at Gettysburg and elsewhere. But to go to the other extreme, as the authors come close to doing here, is not the answer. Balance is what is needed in an examination of Lee's generalship. To be sure, he failed in a number of areas over time; he was also someone who could inspire his troops and pull victory out of hat looked to be defeat. Neither romanticization nor harsh critique serves Lee's leadership well. Balance. . . .
March 13, 2015
This was definitely a 'goodread'. For any student of the campaign, the battle and the American Civil War it really is a 'mustread'.
It is a somewhat controversial, probably certainly so at the time of publication, but well overdue fresh examination of Lee and Gettysburg. An important counter to the previous views of Lee and indeed Longstreet during this battle.
Its always possible the learned professors came at the subject with an agenda, but the fact remains this is a well researched and above all well argued book.
Above all it gives a clear elucidation of Lees plans and demonstrates that Lee had a clear strategy for both the campaign and the battle when it was eventually fought. Certainly the battle was not the one Lee hoped for - the whole issue of Stuarts failure is well discussed - but as it opened up and evolved it was clearly the kind of opportunity Lee was aiming for. His purpose was to force the Union Army to chase after him, force it to straggle in its haste and create the possibility of defeating it in detail. This he very nearly did both on Day 1 and 2. Whilst Meade may have made no blunders, his reactions at nearly all times were what Lee hoped for.
The coverage of Day 2 in particular shows that Lee's plans were clearly focussed, and readily adaptable, not so much on the southern flank but on Cemetery Hill as the key to the Union position. More recent research seem to confirm this and perhaps the most important aspect of this book is its treatment of Lees echelon attack (and its praise of Longstreet) on Day 2.
Both the campaign and battle of Gettysburg raise a host of controversial incidents and this is surely one reason for its continued fascination. This book does a good job, an excellent job, of exploring them all.
There is one other thing which becomes apparent when studying Gettysburg (and other ACW battles) - Despite it being between 2 English speaking armies despite it being well documented and despite it being relatively recent (within the age of photography), despite all this, there is endless contradiction and uncertainty from all the eye witnesses. This strikes me as a salutary lesson for any historian. Strengths losses timings positions movements - purposes, all have become lost, mired both in controversy and in the ready submission to a flawed received wisdom of what actually happened.
It is a somewhat controversial, probably certainly so at the time of publication, but well overdue fresh examination of Lee and Gettysburg. An important counter to the previous views of Lee and indeed Longstreet during this battle.
Its always possible the learned professors came at the subject with an agenda, but the fact remains this is a well researched and above all well argued book.
Above all it gives a clear elucidation of Lees plans and demonstrates that Lee had a clear strategy for both the campaign and the battle when it was eventually fought. Certainly the battle was not the one Lee hoped for - the whole issue of Stuarts failure is well discussed - but as it opened up and evolved it was clearly the kind of opportunity Lee was aiming for. His purpose was to force the Union Army to chase after him, force it to straggle in its haste and create the possibility of defeating it in detail. This he very nearly did both on Day 1 and 2. Whilst Meade may have made no blunders, his reactions at nearly all times were what Lee hoped for.
The coverage of Day 2 in particular shows that Lee's plans were clearly focussed, and readily adaptable, not so much on the southern flank but on Cemetery Hill as the key to the Union position. More recent research seem to confirm this and perhaps the most important aspect of this book is its treatment of Lees echelon attack (and its praise of Longstreet) on Day 2.
Both the campaign and battle of Gettysburg raise a host of controversial incidents and this is surely one reason for its continued fascination. This book does a good job, an excellent job, of exploring them all.
There is one other thing which becomes apparent when studying Gettysburg (and other ACW battles) - Despite it being between 2 English speaking armies despite it being well documented and despite it being relatively recent (within the age of photography), despite all this, there is endless contradiction and uncertainty from all the eye witnesses. This strikes me as a salutary lesson for any historian. Strengths losses timings positions movements - purposes, all have become lost, mired both in controversy and in the ready submission to a flawed received wisdom of what actually happened.
April 17, 2009
Excellent book that details the Confederate strategy and tactics of those three days. My research and "view" was always from the Federal side (my g-g-uncle was there with the 63rd PA), so it was interesting reading a well-researched study of the strengths and weaknesses of Lee's forces and leaders. It also includes summaries of those leaders' good and bad decisions,. I thoroughly enjoyed it, and it's an invaluable addition to any Gettysburg library.
Currently reading
November 30, 2010So far...so good
December 8, 2013
Good but it has been so long since I read the book that I cannot remember specifics. My favorite is still High Tide at Gettysburg.
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