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The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq
One of the most influential experts on military history and strategy has now written his magnum opus, an original and provocative account of the past hundred years of global conflict. The Changing Face of War is the book that reveals the path that led to the impasse in Iraq, why powerful standing armies are now helpless against ill-equipped insurgents, and how the security of sovereign nations may be maintained in the future.
While paying close attention to the unpredictable human element, Martin van Creveld takes us on a journey from the last century’s clashes of massive armies to today’s short, high-tech, lopsided skirmishes and frustrating quagmires. Here is the world as it was in 1900, controlled by a handful of “great powers,” mostly European, with the memories of eighteenth-century wars still fresh. Armies were still led by officers riding on horses, messages conveyed by hand, drum, and bugle. As the telegraph, telephone, and radio revolutionized communications, big-gun battleships like the British Dreadnought, the tank, and the airplane altered warfare.
Van Creveld paints a powerful portrait of World War I, in which armies would be counted in the millions, casualties–such as those in the cataclysmic battle of the Marne–would become staggering, and deadly new weapons, such as poison gas, would be introduced. Ultimately, Germany’s plans to outmaneuver her enemies to victory came to naught as the battle lines ossified and the winners proved to be those who could produce the most weapons and provide the most soldiers.
The Changing Face of War then propels us to the even greater global carnage of World War II. Innovations in armored warfare and airpower, along with technological breakthroughs from radar to the atom bomb, transformed war from simple slaughter to a complex event requiring new expertise–all in the service of savagery, from Pearl Harbor to Dachau to Hiroshima. The further development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War shifts nations from fighting wars to deterring The number of active troops shrinks and the influence of the military declines as civilian think tanks set policy and volunteer forces “decouple” the idea of defense from the world of everyday people.
War today, van Crevald tells us, is a mix of the ancient and the advanced, as state-of-the-art armies fail to defeat small groups of crudely outfitted guerrilla and terrorists, a pattern that began with Britain’s exit from India and culminating in American misadventures in Vietnam and Iraq, examples of what the author calls a “long, almost unbroken record of failure.”
How to learn from the recent past to reshape the military for this new challenge–how to still save, in a sense, the free world–is the ultimate lesson of this big, bold, and cautionary work. The Changing Face of War is sure to become the standard source on this essential subject.
While paying close attention to the unpredictable human element, Martin van Creveld takes us on a journey from the last century’s clashes of massive armies to today’s short, high-tech, lopsided skirmishes and frustrating quagmires. Here is the world as it was in 1900, controlled by a handful of “great powers,” mostly European, with the memories of eighteenth-century wars still fresh. Armies were still led by officers riding on horses, messages conveyed by hand, drum, and bugle. As the telegraph, telephone, and radio revolutionized communications, big-gun battleships like the British Dreadnought, the tank, and the airplane altered warfare.
Van Creveld paints a powerful portrait of World War I, in which armies would be counted in the millions, casualties–such as those in the cataclysmic battle of the Marne–would become staggering, and deadly new weapons, such as poison gas, would be introduced. Ultimately, Germany’s plans to outmaneuver her enemies to victory came to naught as the battle lines ossified and the winners proved to be those who could produce the most weapons and provide the most soldiers.
The Changing Face of War then propels us to the even greater global carnage of World War II. Innovations in armored warfare and airpower, along with technological breakthroughs from radar to the atom bomb, transformed war from simple slaughter to a complex event requiring new expertise–all in the service of savagery, from Pearl Harbor to Dachau to Hiroshima. The further development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War shifts nations from fighting wars to deterring The number of active troops shrinks and the influence of the military declines as civilian think tanks set policy and volunteer forces “decouple” the idea of defense from the world of everyday people.
War today, van Crevald tells us, is a mix of the ancient and the advanced, as state-of-the-art armies fail to defeat small groups of crudely outfitted guerrilla and terrorists, a pattern that began with Britain’s exit from India and culminating in American misadventures in Vietnam and Iraq, examples of what the author calls a “long, almost unbroken record of failure.”
How to learn from the recent past to reshape the military for this new challenge–how to still save, in a sense, the free world–is the ultimate lesson of this big, bold, and cautionary work. The Changing Face of War is sure to become the standard source on this essential subject.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published February 27, 2007
30 people are currently reading
268 people want to read
About the author
Martin van Creveld
65 books128 followersMartin Levi van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
Van Creveld was born in the Netherlands in the city of Rotterdam, and has lived in Israel since shortly after his birth. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he has been on the faculty since 1971. He is the author of seventeen books on military history and strategy, of which Command in War (1985), Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004), The Transformation of War (1991), The Sword and the Olive (1998) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at many strategic institutes in the Western world, including the U.S. Naval War College.
- wikipedia.org
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
November 19, 2008
"The Changing Face of War" by Martin van Creveld is thin--about 270 pages. Sadly, so was van Creveld. The old contrarian often excelled at looking at the overlooked and making arguments so out of left field that it forced the reader to re-think accepted history. But this book a recitation of past works, with previous books finding echoes in various chapters. "The Education of Officers" was spotted haunting chapter 5. "Technology and War" was caught skulking throughout chapters 1-4. The bulk of the book was a standard recitation of war in the 20th century, long on conventional war and studded with a handful small, annoying factual errors.
Where van Creveld attained his contrarian strength was in chapter 6, when he addressed counter-insurgency. Aside from taking John Keegan to task for the alt.hist. "what if Germany won WWII," van Creveld notes that only 18 wars were "conventional" since the end of WWII, yet many, many more were insurgencies or guerilla struggles. As time is the guerilla's main weapon, a successful strategy uses time against the insurgent.
The first successful counter-insurgency case study van Creveld offers is the British in Northern Ireland. The army deployed to keep all sides from killing each other, practicing great restraint while reliance was placed on the Royal Ulster Constabulary to do the actual work of arresting IRA terrorists and bringing them to trial.
The other is Syrian dictator Assad's destruction of Hama in the early 1980s. Basically Syria pre-empted the spread of rebellion by striking with ruthless and excessive force to cow resistance.
In both cases, however, the state power was operating in circumstances where the rebels shared a common language and culture. That is not typical in many nationbuilding/peacekeeping operations, where the troops will be a foreign presence in the state suffering the insurgency.
But there was one contrarian dart van Creveld tossed with glee. The overwhelming majority of counter-insurgency literature has been written by the officers of armies who lost those campaigns. Van Creveld would rather dump the whole load of books unread and stick to overarching restraint or unrestrained violence as the two solutions to counter-insurgency.
Where van Creveld attained his contrarian strength was in chapter 6, when he addressed counter-insurgency. Aside from taking John Keegan to task for the alt.hist. "what if Germany won WWII," van Creveld notes that only 18 wars were "conventional" since the end of WWII, yet many, many more were insurgencies or guerilla struggles. As time is the guerilla's main weapon, a successful strategy uses time against the insurgent.
The first successful counter-insurgency case study van Creveld offers is the British in Northern Ireland. The army deployed to keep all sides from killing each other, practicing great restraint while reliance was placed on the Royal Ulster Constabulary to do the actual work of arresting IRA terrorists and bringing them to trial.
The other is Syrian dictator Assad's destruction of Hama in the early 1980s. Basically Syria pre-empted the spread of rebellion by striking with ruthless and excessive force to cow resistance.
In both cases, however, the state power was operating in circumstances where the rebels shared a common language and culture. That is not typical in many nationbuilding/peacekeeping operations, where the troops will be a foreign presence in the state suffering the insurgency.
But there was one contrarian dart van Creveld tossed with glee. The overwhelming majority of counter-insurgency literature has been written by the officers of armies who lost those campaigns. Van Creveld would rather dump the whole load of books unread and stick to overarching restraint or unrestrained violence as the two solutions to counter-insurgency.
April 28, 2019
“The Changing Face of War” has proven to be a polemical work of modern military history, perhaps by one of the most polemical yet eminent contemporary military historians. Starting with an invocation to understand present circumstances by understanding the past, Professor Van Creveld’s starting point is “Where did 20th Century Warfare come from?” It seems, however, that he is really more interested in analyzing 21st Century military events, most especially the American campaigns in the Middle East, rather than a profound or detailed analysis of the origins of war in the 20th Century.
This work suffers from some imprecision, some hyperbole, and a good deal of contrarian—almost revisionist—predilection which strikes as politically inspired. Additionally, I could not determine the central argument and driving force behind “The Changing Face of War;” to me, the imperative to understand the past in order to place the present into context and focus is not an argument but a fact. The book culminates in a criticism of contemporaneous American counter-insurgency efforts which, as deservedly as they may certainly prove to be, read more like screed than history. This critique aside, Van Creveld has many strengths to offer as well. He is one of the few to make what seems an obvious point: studying failure is not nearly as helpful in promoting success as studying success. He is right that the recent history of "Counter-Insurgency" from the perspective of the counter-insurgent is largely an object lesson in military failure and Americans seemed obsessed with revisiting the military aspects of past counter-insurgencies (mostly unsuccessful). Unfortunately, I think Van Creveld could do more here in linking modern counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism; they are virtually indistinguishable to Americans today while other traditions of violence like those in Russia do not even consider such combat actions war but rather “counter-banditry” operations (which are therefore not subject to the laws of war and its ethical and legal restrictions upon violence). Such distinctions would be of great use and benefit in such a discussion. Similarly, while I share Van Creveld’s underlying suspicion of the “science” of war which permeates this book, this theme is never drawn out. Van Creveld correctly understands that war is much more than simple battlefield calculus and therefore he seeks to understand the much broader social, cultural, and political dimensions of war. As such, I think it would help if he approached this directly as his title, “The Changing Face of War,” implies this, being an allusion to John Keegan’s seminal “The Face of Battle.” This shortcoming underscores my largest disappointment of "The Changing Face of War”: the conflation of war, warfare, battle, the political, and policy. In sum, the understanding of war, warfare, and battle—let alone confronting their “faces”—is an enormously challenging undertaking.
This work suffers from some imprecision, some hyperbole, and a good deal of contrarian—almost revisionist—predilection which strikes as politically inspired. Additionally, I could not determine the central argument and driving force behind “The Changing Face of War;” to me, the imperative to understand the past in order to place the present into context and focus is not an argument but a fact. The book culminates in a criticism of contemporaneous American counter-insurgency efforts which, as deservedly as they may certainly prove to be, read more like screed than history. This critique aside, Van Creveld has many strengths to offer as well. He is one of the few to make what seems an obvious point: studying failure is not nearly as helpful in promoting success as studying success. He is right that the recent history of "Counter-Insurgency" from the perspective of the counter-insurgent is largely an object lesson in military failure and Americans seemed obsessed with revisiting the military aspects of past counter-insurgencies (mostly unsuccessful). Unfortunately, I think Van Creveld could do more here in linking modern counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism; they are virtually indistinguishable to Americans today while other traditions of violence like those in Russia do not even consider such combat actions war but rather “counter-banditry” operations (which are therefore not subject to the laws of war and its ethical and legal restrictions upon violence). Such distinctions would be of great use and benefit in such a discussion. Similarly, while I share Van Creveld’s underlying suspicion of the “science” of war which permeates this book, this theme is never drawn out. Van Creveld correctly understands that war is much more than simple battlefield calculus and therefore he seeks to understand the much broader social, cultural, and political dimensions of war. As such, I think it would help if he approached this directly as his title, “The Changing Face of War,” implies this, being an allusion to John Keegan’s seminal “The Face of Battle.” This shortcoming underscores my largest disappointment of "The Changing Face of War”: the conflation of war, warfare, battle, the political, and policy. In sum, the understanding of war, warfare, and battle—let alone confronting their “faces”—is an enormously challenging undertaking.
August 28, 2010
Carl Sandburg said the past is a bucket of ashes. Van Creveld says it, too. His conclusions in The Changing Face of War point to a landscape in military operations in which the lessons of the large wars of the 20th century--Vietnam apart--no longer apply. The book is a study of the evolution of war in the century. His experience and keen insight allow him to pinpoint and articulate the major determinants of the course militaries have taken. Some of those include the advent of the airplane, the internal combustion engine which allowed mechanization of armies, the maturation of the tank which restored mobility to armies in midcentury, followed almost immediately by perhaps the most far-reaching development of all, that of nuclear weapons. Because of the apocalyptic destruction of nuclear weapons, it's thought today that total wars between belligerents possessing large conventional armies aren't possible. The number of states possessing such militaries isn't a large one. And only the United States has a military whose reach is global. Technological innovation in military equipment has progressed to a condition in which most states can't compete with the few technically advanced ones. The result has been a rapid increase in the number of small insurgencies. The problem, as van Creveld convincingly explains, is that the modern armies of the west are now so doctrinally bound to their technology that they're essentially impotent, ineffective in suppressing military action by smaller, less sophisticated, more lightly-armed forces which challenge legitimate governments. His argument is very carefully laid out, backed by facts and intelligently organized. The problem with the book, as I see it, is that he tends to lose objectivity. The thrust of his test is aimed at the present day. His analysis of the past, his ability to explain the how and why of doctrinal and technical change and in what ways they shaped the years after them is discerning and revelatory. However, his perspective on the present, that the modern centers of power can't cope with insurgencies or smaller forces who oppose legitimate authority, is often supported by findings which appear to be of the should-have-known-better variety, and his tone frequently becomes sarcastic. This breakdown in objectivity tends to water down the force of his otherwise forceful arguments.
November 16, 2021
Interesting but dense reading and overview of how military history and strategy has changed over time from the Battle of Marne to Iraq. In particular, I felt it was beneficial to learn more about influential military strategists. For example Giulio Douhet and his advocacy and development of the strategic bombing doctrine. Alongside J. F. C. Fuller a military theorist in support of armored warfare before it would be seen fully in WWII by the Germans.
Such as throwing out the majority of the reading and analysis done of counterinsurgency because it is told by the losers. Instead in this section of the book he offers two examples of success: practice heavy restraint as did the British in Ireland, or what he covers more heavily practice unrestrained and draconian action against insurgent forces. I hope I can find a book or journal article that can provide an alternate view on it and see those two sides stand up against one another.
TLDR: Good overall read of military history. Some suggestions put forward by van Creveld can be seen as unhelpful.
Such as throwing out the majority of the reading and analysis done of counterinsurgency because it is told by the losers. Instead in this section of the book he offers two examples of success: practice heavy restraint as did the British in Ireland, or what he covers more heavily practice unrestrained and draconian action against insurgent forces. I hope I can find a book or journal article that can provide an alternate view on it and see those two sides stand up against one another.
TLDR: Good overall read of military history. Some suggestions put forward by van Creveld can be seen as unhelpful.
October 26, 2023
This is the first time I read a book by the man who has the reputation to be a "guru" in the field of military history, and I am not overly impressed.
To be fair, the book succeeds pretty well in giving a concise summary of war from the First World War to the US invasion of Iraq. And it does contain several interesting insights (the lessons learned by the Britisch Army during "the troubles" being the most important).
But the book contains several factual mistakes on trivial issues (the number of US aircraft carriers at Midway, for instance), that somewhat undermine its general credibility. But, more importantly, van Creveld makes a lot of very strong statements for which he provides little of no evidence beyond his own selfconfidence - well, I suppose that's what makes a guru.
To be fair, the book succeeds pretty well in giving a concise summary of war from the First World War to the US invasion of Iraq. And it does contain several interesting insights (the lessons learned by the Britisch Army during "the troubles" being the most important).
But the book contains several factual mistakes on trivial issues (the number of US aircraft carriers at Midway, for instance), that somewhat undermine its general credibility. But, more importantly, van Creveld makes a lot of very strong statements for which he provides little of no evidence beyond his own selfconfidence - well, I suppose that's what makes a guru.
February 12, 2008
I found this book much less substantive than the others I've read from Van Creveld; he does an unexceptional job of covering the many dimensions of military change from the early 20th century to the early 21st century, but instead of the keen analysis in some of his earlier books he seems content to vent sarcasm at frequent intervals, more and more so as he gets into the past few decades. I also spotted factual mistakes too often, some as obvious as his basic data on Midway - he talks about there being two U.S. carriers, rather than the three that participated, and about how their planes sank three Japanese carriers when it was actually four. There were similar errors in a number of other places. Some of the logic of his strategic arguments was based on clearly invalid assumptions, too.
Perhaps Martin Van Creveld was just having a bad year when he wrote this, but it falls far short of his former standard. I wouldn't recommend this to anyone who already knows much modern military history unless you are just looking to complete a collection of this author's works.
Perhaps Martin Van Creveld was just having a bad year when he wrote this, but it falls far short of his former standard. I wouldn't recommend this to anyone who already knows much modern military history unless you are just looking to complete a collection of this author's works.
February 10, 2012
Nice, short book by Van Creveld on the change in warfare (and maybe even more: politics) in the 20th (and 21st) century.
It takes him threequarter of the book to get to the point where he shows how after WWII insurgents have won about 95% of all strugles. The weakness lies not in the material or technological side of the battle, it is the moral and mental side that wears the top dog down.
An insurgent who doesn't lose, is winning! His two solutions are maybe a bit one dimensional (treating insurgents as criminals and 'policing' the fight to an end, or dealing such a short, heavy, all out blow to each and everyone who is suspected of resistance that they will quit immediately) but in my view convincing enough. You can argue with Van Creveld that there are more ways to deal with insurgency, but almost 10 years of the West losing the war in Iraq and Afghanistan make his points convincing
It takes him threequarter of the book to get to the point where he shows how after WWII insurgents have won about 95% of all strugles. The weakness lies not in the material or technological side of the battle, it is the moral and mental side that wears the top dog down.
An insurgent who doesn't lose, is winning! His two solutions are maybe a bit one dimensional (treating insurgents as criminals and 'policing' the fight to an end, or dealing such a short, heavy, all out blow to each and everyone who is suspected of resistance that they will quit immediately) but in my view convincing enough. You can argue with Van Creveld that there are more ways to deal with insurgency, but almost 10 years of the West losing the war in Iraq and Afghanistan make his points convincing
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December 29, 2020The book was really interesting and give many insights about WWI and WWII, and explain many factors of modern warfare that are not so popular in public.
On the other hand this did not come without flaws, mistakes and compensations, i.e. although Yugoslavian resistance was very intense it cannot be compared with the Greek resistance.
Also author concentrate his study only in wars where at least on of the belligerents was a state. Thus neglected to refer to proxy wars, divide n conquer methodologies, ethnic cleansing policies (like N.Cyprus by Turkey) etc.
It's a very good book that the title "Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq" is an overkill.
On the other hand this did not come without flaws, mistakes and compensations, i.e. although Yugoslavian resistance was very intense it cannot be compared with the Greek resistance.
Also author concentrate his study only in wars where at least on of the belligerents was a state. Thus neglected to refer to proxy wars, divide n conquer methodologies, ethnic cleansing policies (like N.Cyprus by Turkey) etc.
It's a very good book that the title "Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq" is an overkill.
February 3, 2016
Standard work for anyone interested in the developments in warfare since the 20th century. Van Creveld goes from Hafez al-Assad in Hama to the British during the Troubles and paints a complete picture of counterinsurgency since world war II.
It was however bothersome that the author couldn't stop himself from making constant denigrating comments towards women, Russians and Arabs.
It was however bothersome that the author couldn't stop himself from making constant denigrating comments towards women, Russians and Arabs.
June 6, 2012
I thought it interesting and informative. van Creveld is a bit overly Nazi-hating, but I guess that's not necessarily surprising. He seems to hate Americans equally.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews