Why do some governing parties limit their opportunistic behavior and constrain the extraction of private gains from the state? This analysis of post-communist state reconstruction provides surprising answers to this fundamental question of party politics. Across the post-communist democracies, governing parties have opportunistically reconstructed the state - simultaneously exploiting it by extracting state resources and building new institutions that further such extraction. They enfeebled or delayed formal state institutions of monitoring and oversight, established new discretionary structures of state administration, and extracted enormous informal profits from the privatization of the communist economy. By examining how post-communist political parties rebuilt the state in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Grzymala-Busse explains how even opportunistic political parties will limit their corrupt behavior and abuse of state resources when faced with strong political competition.
Anna Maria Grzymala-Busse is an American political scientist. She is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the department of political science at Stanford University. She is also a senior fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and director of The Europe Center at Stanford University. Grzymala-Busse is known for her research on state development and transformation, religion and politics, political parties, informal political institutions, and post-communist politics. Previously, she was the Ronald Eileen Weiser Professor at University of Michigan.
Grzymala-Busse received a doctorate in government from Harvard University in 2000. Grzymala attended Princeton University (AB, Public and International Affairs, 1992) and Cambridge University (M.Phil., 1993).
In 2017, she was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Gryzmala-Busse’s central thesis is that in post-communist states, higher rates of party competition result in higher rates of institutions that minimize exploitation and corruption in elite-level politics. Competition brought in criticism of the government and regulatory oversight. We see this most clearly when we analyze the politics of countries with strong anticommunist movements, resulting in Gryzmala-Busse's exemplary case study in comparative politics.
A great analysis, but definitely reserved for those who specialize in political science. For those interested in the region, this should be a non-negotiable read.