What do you think?
Rate this book
Algının Önceliği ve Onun Felsefi Sonuçları
Yirminci yüzyılın önemli filozoflarından Maurice Merleau-Ponty algı sorununun, özellikle de "kendi bedeninin algısı" sorununun günün koşullarında yeniden ele alınmasının yerinde olacağına inanmıştır. Bu çalışma, yazarın deyimiyle, algı örneği üzerinden bize mevcut ve canlı varlığı verecek bir yaklaşım yöntemi tanımlamaya çalışıyor. Ve bu yöntem daha sonra kaçınılmaz olarak insanın dil, bilgi, toplum ve din içinde diğer insanlarla kurduğu ilişkilere doğru genişletilmelidir. Ahlak da bu sorgulamanın dışında kalamaz: "[bir] başkasının algısı, beni ve bakış açılarımı diğer herkesin görüş alanına taşıyarak ahlakı kurar." Bu bağlamda, "algının önceliği şüpheciliğin ve kötümserciliğin devasıdır". Kitapta bulunan ilk iki metin 1933-1934 yıllarında, son metin ise 1946 yılında kaleme alındı. Eser, bize bir filozofun algıyı algılayışı ve felsefesini anıtlaştırmasının yazınsal tanıklığını ve en özlü ifadesini sunarken, diğer çalışmaları için de güvenilir bir kılavuz niteliği taşımaktadır.
96 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1964
35 people are currently reading
1154 people want to read
About the author
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
122 books599 followersFrench phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in addition to being closely associated with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role that perception plays in understanding the world as well as engaging with the world. Like the other major phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty expressed his philosophical insights in writings on art, literature, and politics; however Merleau-Ponty was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the Twentieth Century to engage extensively with the sciences, and especially with descriptive psychology. Because of this engagement, his writings have become influential with the recent project of naturalizing phenomenology in which phenomenologists utilize the results of psychology and cognitive science.
Merleau-Ponty was born in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Maritime. His father was killed in World War 1 when Merleau-Ponty was 3. After secondary schooling at the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty became a student at the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied alongside Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil. He passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1930.
Merleau-Ponty first taught at Chartres, then became a tutor at the École Normale Supérieure, where he was awarded his doctorate on the basis of two important books: La structure du comportement (1942) and Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945).
After teaching at the University of Lyon from 1945 to 1948, Merleau-Ponty lectured on child psychology and education at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952. He was awarded the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 until his death in 1961, making him the youngest person to have been elected to a Chair.
Besides his teaching, Merleau-Ponty was also political editor for Les Temps Modernes from the founding of the journal in October 1945 until December 1952.
Aged 53, he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961, apparently while preparing for a class on Descartes. He was buried in Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.
Merleau-Ponty was born in Rochefort-sur-Mer, Charente-Maritime. His father was killed in World War 1 when Merleau-Ponty was 3. After secondary schooling at the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris, Maurice Merleau-Ponty became a student at the École Normale Supérieure, where he studied alongside Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil. He passed the agrégation in philosophy in 1930.
Merleau-Ponty first taught at Chartres, then became a tutor at the École Normale Supérieure, where he was awarded his doctorate on the basis of two important books: La structure du comportement (1942) and Phénoménologie de la Perception (1945).
After teaching at the University of Lyon from 1945 to 1948, Merleau-Ponty lectured on child psychology and education at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952. He was awarded the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France from 1952 until his death in 1961, making him the youngest person to have been elected to a Chair.
Besides his teaching, Merleau-Ponty was also political editor for Les Temps Modernes from the founding of the journal in October 1945 until December 1952.
Aged 53, he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961, apparently while preparing for a class on Descartes. He was buried in Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
August 7, 2012
While some of Merleau-Ponty's ideas seem naive today, this is almost entirely due to the technological constraints of his time. People at mid-century simply didn't know as much about the brain as we do now. However, he was incredibly insightful, with some of his intuitive speculation being proven 40 or 50 years later by advances in fMRI technology and cognitive neuroscience. One such example is his discussion of the way a body doesn't simply occupy space like other objects, but actually "haunts" it by way of "motor projects" that "radiate" from the body into the environment. This phenomenon is nearly confirmed by recent analysis of those suffering from Alien Hand Syndrome, whereby a subject has no conscious control over the obviously goal-directed movements of their hand or limb.
I read most of his writing here sympathetically, only put-off by certain passages in which he seems to have trouble letting go of a Cartesian-type dualism. I don't think he commits to it entirely, but something about his language on the topic felt intentionally blurry and sometimes dubious. Given the contemporary loss of free will, I think he attributes too much "control" to our conscious selves. He says philosophers might say, "we are compromising rationality by founding it on the texture of experience, as it is manifested in perceptual experience." To this, he says, "When philosophers wish to place reason above the vicissitudes of history they cannot purely and simply forget what psychology, sociology, ethnography, history, and psychiatry have taught us about the conditioning of human behavior. It would be a very romantic way of showing one's love for reason to base its reign on the disavowal of acquired knowledge." But he goes on to say that his philosophy satisfies the "valid" demand that "man never be submitted to the fate of an external nature or history and stripped of his consciousness" And that's what I have a problem with: this characteristically mid-century appeal to an autonomous consciousness that dozens of new books on the topic convincingly dispute.
However, his contentions that we "never cease living in the world of perception," and that " the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, [and] values are constituted for us [...]," signal a necessary reappraisal of the contribution of perception to our idea of truth. I totally see why this stuff was so influential to artists around the 50's, 60's, and even through to today. Read the book and you may find yourself more often falling into the fabric of the world, succumbing to the primacy of perception, and, inevitably, trusting the present.
I read most of his writing here sympathetically, only put-off by certain passages in which he seems to have trouble letting go of a Cartesian-type dualism. I don't think he commits to it entirely, but something about his language on the topic felt intentionally blurry and sometimes dubious. Given the contemporary loss of free will, I think he attributes too much "control" to our conscious selves. He says philosophers might say, "we are compromising rationality by founding it on the texture of experience, as it is manifested in perceptual experience." To this, he says, "When philosophers wish to place reason above the vicissitudes of history they cannot purely and simply forget what psychology, sociology, ethnography, history, and psychiatry have taught us about the conditioning of human behavior. It would be a very romantic way of showing one's love for reason to base its reign on the disavowal of acquired knowledge." But he goes on to say that his philosophy satisfies the "valid" demand that "man never be submitted to the fate of an external nature or history and stripped of his consciousness" And that's what I have a problem with: this characteristically mid-century appeal to an autonomous consciousness that dozens of new books on the topic convincingly dispute.
However, his contentions that we "never cease living in the world of perception," and that " the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, [and] values are constituted for us [...]," signal a necessary reappraisal of the contribution of perception to our idea of truth. I totally see why this stuff was so influential to artists around the 50's, 60's, and even through to today. Read the book and you may find yourself more often falling into the fabric of the world, succumbing to the primacy of perception, and, inevitably, trusting the present.
March 10, 2020
Dear god, if there's any book that can become the definition of pedantic it's this one. I really tried hard to give this a solid chance, yet every page I kept getting exhausted with how unnecessarily complicated the sentences were. I couldn't even comprehend the nuances between the words and their meanings, which is what I believe this overly-complex text was trying to do. I couldn't tell if it was simply unskilled translation from French or whether the topic wasn't developed enough where the writer/philosopher had to go round and round in circles to arrive at nowhere. They even included such topics as how perception relates to linguistics and art, which I was overjoyed to get into but it was a mere letdown. Instead there were fruitless rambles in conversational form with other philosophers trying to disprove this theory. Merleau-Ponty kept disproving them by saying "no you're considering things separately when in fact it is all one".... I'll tell you right now that's the only thing I got out of the 60% of pages I was able to read from this book.
I mean phenomenology is a difficult topic to discuss after all, I acknowledge that. But it can't be so difficult that it seems like only the writer knows what they're talking about and there's no sense of trying to explain their grasp of it to the reader. Even brief definitions or a glossary would've helped. Then I assumed perhaps this wasn't an introductory text on the subject, but honestly even textbooks aren't this pedantic. I would suspect grasping the concepts of perception wouldn't be so hard, as it relates to a monistic phenomena on Consciousness. The writer should've framed it as something readers would be quite familiar with, i.e. we should be able to relate it to our own experience of perception.
As an avid reader of abstract concepts from metaphysics, Buddhism and new age spirituality, I was excited to delve into phenomenology. I found out about it from the Waking Cosmos Podcast. It seems this book definitely was not the starting point, and I won't let myself get turned off from it, but attempting to read this did not do any good. Plainly said it was a waste of time, and I plan to read on phenomenology from another author instead, such as the book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality by Philip Goff.
I mean phenomenology is a difficult topic to discuss after all, I acknowledge that. But it can't be so difficult that it seems like only the writer knows what they're talking about and there's no sense of trying to explain their grasp of it to the reader. Even brief definitions or a glossary would've helped. Then I assumed perhaps this wasn't an introductory text on the subject, but honestly even textbooks aren't this pedantic. I would suspect grasping the concepts of perception wouldn't be so hard, as it relates to a monistic phenomena on Consciousness. The writer should've framed it as something readers would be quite familiar with, i.e. we should be able to relate it to our own experience of perception.
As an avid reader of abstract concepts from metaphysics, Buddhism and new age spirituality, I was excited to delve into phenomenology. I found out about it from the Waking Cosmos Podcast. It seems this book definitely was not the starting point, and I won't let myself get turned off from it, but attempting to read this did not do any good. Plainly said it was a waste of time, and I plan to read on phenomenology from another author instead, such as the book Consciousness and Fundamental Reality by Philip Goff.
February 8, 2016
The Primacy of Perception is a decent introduction to the thought of Merleau-Ponty, but is probably best read by someone who has at least a passing knowledge of Merleau-Ponty's thought and his larger work Phenomenology of Perception.
July 17, 2025
Ponty died young, leaving a lot up for grabs. You never know what he could have achieved or whether he is accurately represented for what he did write posthumously. This one helps define what it is to be a phenomenologist and one way psychology crosses over into philosophy, I think. One thing I love about Ponty is his willingness to get actively political with the material. Signs is another book where he goes off politically. Primacy of Perception is going to be a book of historical importance, depending on how you look at it, and who is publishing it.
I like how Ponty uses Henri Wallon and modern psychology to explain how perception is learned and applied throughout life. Any psychology that attempts to be more behaviorally predictive needs to understand representation as it applies to the senses. Then how it applies to the conceptualization of a social mileu or real. Lacan famously gets into this too, but more on the semiotic side. Ponty considers where exactly evolution and biology connects to sensory experience.
Phenomenology lacks belief even today. Especially in America. It might as well be called magic. Mainly because it’s hard to hold consistent the claim it’s making on reality. It’s interpreted as some form of solipsism or anthropocentrism since operationalizing variables is the whole philosophical problem to begin with. The “primacy” of perception is a way to consider how sensory experience fundamentally colors our perceptual reality over time. Not only from birth to death but genetically from one lifetime to the next.
Today there are philosophies that go beyond phenomenology. Philosophy is again in a position where the majority of consumers don’t believe in the first step, and yet the serious academics who are already on the next step must find a way to sell their ideas to the representatives of keeping those ideas quiet, or brokenly recede into intellectual obscurity. At the same time we have social technologies able to exploit these mediums and ontologies toward political ends and eventualities. As long as it predicts or orchestrates social behavior. This cross over is, needless to say, an important science to keep visual and in the public domain!
I like how Ponty uses Henri Wallon and modern psychology to explain how perception is learned and applied throughout life. Any psychology that attempts to be more behaviorally predictive needs to understand representation as it applies to the senses. Then how it applies to the conceptualization of a social mileu or real. Lacan famously gets into this too, but more on the semiotic side. Ponty considers where exactly evolution and biology connects to sensory experience.
Phenomenology lacks belief even today. Especially in America. It might as well be called magic. Mainly because it’s hard to hold consistent the claim it’s making on reality. It’s interpreted as some form of solipsism or anthropocentrism since operationalizing variables is the whole philosophical problem to begin with. The “primacy” of perception is a way to consider how sensory experience fundamentally colors our perceptual reality over time. Not only from birth to death but genetically from one lifetime to the next.
Today there are philosophies that go beyond phenomenology. Philosophy is again in a position where the majority of consumers don’t believe in the first step, and yet the serious academics who are already on the next step must find a way to sell their ideas to the representatives of keeping those ideas quiet, or brokenly recede into intellectual obscurity. At the same time we have social technologies able to exploit these mediums and ontologies toward political ends and eventualities. As long as it predicts or orchestrates social behavior. This cross over is, needless to say, an important science to keep visual and in the public domain!
August 27, 2020
"Ao dizer que amo alguém neste momento, será que posso, neste amor, me assegurar de ter atingido a substância da pessoa, uma substância que absolutamente não mudará? Posso garantir que o que sei dessa pessoa e que faz que eu a ame se verificará em toda a sua vida? A percepção antecipa, vai na frente. Não pediria para ver mais e melhor, mas me parece que ninguém vê melhor. Posso prometer aqui certa conduta, mas não posso prometer certos sentimentos. É preciso, então, confiar na generosidade da vida que fez com que Montaigne pudesse escrever no último livro dos Ensaios: 'Cumpri muito mais do que prometi e mesmo do que devia.'"
March 13, 2024
Challenging and stimulating. Need to read it second time.
September 15, 2019
Klee: "In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. I felt that the trees were looking at me."
October 20, 2020
kralsın mqqq
October 16, 2024
A COLLECTION OF MERLEAU-PONTY’S PREVIOUSLY UNPUBLISHED ESSAYS
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher; he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 at age 53.
The editor wrote in the Introduction, “The purpose of this volume is to bring together and to present to the English-speaking world a number of important and hitherto scattered studies …. Which appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961… The content of the present volume was dictated solely by the fortuitous circumstance that the studies included here represent the most important of Merleau-Ponty’s writings which still remain untranslated… since each one deals with a different question, and since they are of very unequal length, this volume cannot but appear to be a somewhat heteroclite and miscellaneous collection.”
Merleau-Ponty wrote in the first essay, “Now if perception is thus the common act of all our motor and affective functions, no less than the sensory, we must rediscover the structure of the perceived world through a process similar to that of an archaeologist. For the structure of the perceived world is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge.” (Pg. 5)
He begins the second essay, “The unprejudiced study of perception by psychologists has finally revealed that the perceived world is not a sum of objects … that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought, and finally that the validity of the unity of the perceived thing, as perceived by several consciousnesses, is not comparable to the unity of a proposition, as understood by several thinkers, any more than perceived existence is comparable to ideal existence. As a result we cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which ‘interprets,’ ‘deciphers,’ or ‘orders’ a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses.” (Pg. 12)
He goes on, “But there is a third meaning of the cogito, the only solid one: the act of doubting in which I put in question all possible objects of my experience. This act grasps itself in its own operation…and thus cannot doubt itself. The very fact of doubting obturates doubt. The certitude I have of myself is here a veritable perception: I grasp myself, not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and constitutes the totality of every possible object of thought and experience, but as a particular thought, as a thought engaged with certain objects, as a thought in act: and it is in this sense that I am certain of myself. Thought is given to itself; I somehow find myself thinking and I become aware of it. In this sense I am certain that I am thinking this or that as well as being certain that I am simply thinking. Thus I can get outside the psychological cogito---without, however, taking myself to be a universal thinker.” (Pg. 22)
At the end of this essay, he states, “If… as the primacy of perception requires, we call what we perceive ‘the world,’ and what we love ‘the person,’ there is a type of doubt concerning man, and a type of spite, which become impossible. Certainly, the world which we thus find is not absolutely reassuring… But it is TRUE, and the moment of this promise, that our love extends beyond QUALITIES, beyond the body, beyond time, even though we could not love without qualities, bodies, and time.” (Pg. 26-27)
In a later essay, he asserts, “How can pretend as a philosopher that one is holding truths, even eternal truths, as long as it is clear that the different philosophies, when placed in the psychological, social, and historical frame where they belong, are only the expression of external causes? In order to practice philosophy, in order to distinguish between the true and the false, it is necessary for the philosopher to express not merely certain natural or historical conditions external to him but also a direct and internal contact of the mind with itself, an ‘intrinsic’ truth which seems impossible so long as research in the field of the human sciences shows that at each moment this mind is externally conditioned.” (Pg. 44)
In another essay, he observes, “the question of a causal sequence of the two phenomena is meaningless. For it to be meaningful would require that the two phenomena be capable of standing in isolation. But this is never the case. In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have prejudices has been molded by his environment, and in that respect has undergone a certain exercise of parental authority. Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp, in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can never say that the way in which the child structures … his social environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous system. He himself is the one who structures his surroundings, after all… it is impossible to establish a cleavage between what will be ‘natural’ in the individual and what will be acquired from his social upbringing. In reality the two orders are not distinct; they are part and parcel of a single global phenomenon.” (Pg. 107-108)
As the editor noted, this is a somewhat disjointed collection; but it will be of value to anyone studying Merleau-Ponty’s thought.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher; he died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 at age 53.
The editor wrote in the Introduction, “The purpose of this volume is to bring together and to present to the English-speaking world a number of important and hitherto scattered studies …. Which appeared in various publications from 1947 to 1961… The content of the present volume was dictated solely by the fortuitous circumstance that the studies included here represent the most important of Merleau-Ponty’s writings which still remain untranslated… since each one deals with a different question, and since they are of very unequal length, this volume cannot but appear to be a somewhat heteroclite and miscellaneous collection.”
Merleau-Ponty wrote in the first essay, “Now if perception is thus the common act of all our motor and affective functions, no less than the sensory, we must rediscover the structure of the perceived world through a process similar to that of an archaeologist. For the structure of the perceived world is buried under the sedimentations of later knowledge.” (Pg. 5)
He begins the second essay, “The unprejudiced study of perception by psychologists has finally revealed that the perceived world is not a sum of objects … that our relation to the world is not that of a thinker to an object of thought, and finally that the validity of the unity of the perceived thing, as perceived by several consciousnesses, is not comparable to the unity of a proposition, as understood by several thinkers, any more than perceived existence is comparable to ideal existence. As a result we cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which ‘interprets,’ ‘deciphers,’ or ‘orders’ a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses.” (Pg. 12)
He goes on, “But there is a third meaning of the cogito, the only solid one: the act of doubting in which I put in question all possible objects of my experience. This act grasps itself in its own operation…and thus cannot doubt itself. The very fact of doubting obturates doubt. The certitude I have of myself is here a veritable perception: I grasp myself, not as a constituting subject which is transparent to itself, and constitutes the totality of every possible object of thought and experience, but as a particular thought, as a thought engaged with certain objects, as a thought in act: and it is in this sense that I am certain of myself. Thought is given to itself; I somehow find myself thinking and I become aware of it. In this sense I am certain that I am thinking this or that as well as being certain that I am simply thinking. Thus I can get outside the psychological cogito---without, however, taking myself to be a universal thinker.” (Pg. 22)
At the end of this essay, he states, “If… as the primacy of perception requires, we call what we perceive ‘the world,’ and what we love ‘the person,’ there is a type of doubt concerning man, and a type of spite, which become impossible. Certainly, the world which we thus find is not absolutely reassuring… But it is TRUE, and the moment of this promise, that our love extends beyond QUALITIES, beyond the body, beyond time, even though we could not love without qualities, bodies, and time.” (Pg. 26-27)
In a later essay, he asserts, “How can pretend as a philosopher that one is holding truths, even eternal truths, as long as it is clear that the different philosophies, when placed in the psychological, social, and historical frame where they belong, are only the expression of external causes? In order to practice philosophy, in order to distinguish between the true and the false, it is necessary for the philosopher to express not merely certain natural or historical conditions external to him but also a direct and internal contact of the mind with itself, an ‘intrinsic’ truth which seems impossible so long as research in the field of the human sciences shows that at each moment this mind is externally conditioned.” (Pg. 44)
In another essay, he observes, “the question of a causal sequence of the two phenomena is meaningless. For it to be meaningful would require that the two phenomena be capable of standing in isolation. But this is never the case. In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have prejudices has been molded by his environment, and in that respect has undergone a certain exercise of parental authority. Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp, in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can never say that the way in which the child structures … his social environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous system. He himself is the one who structures his surroundings, after all… it is impossible to establish a cleavage between what will be ‘natural’ in the individual and what will be acquired from his social upbringing. In reality the two orders are not distinct; they are part and parcel of a single global phenomenon.” (Pg. 107-108)
As the editor noted, this is a somewhat disjointed collection; but it will be of value to anyone studying Merleau-Ponty’s thought.
September 7, 2023
I can make a lot of comments on perception on this book, i choose one different and important topic which must be pointed.
While i was reading Maurice’s and Pascal’s opinions on love, about the question of “do we love person itself or person’s attributes?” I remember bible verses on love for enemies.
Matthew 5
“43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor[a] and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. 46 If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? 47 And if you greet only your own people, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? 48 Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.””
So Bible teaches us loving enemies but not their world doings, it teaches us to love people but not their attributes. This is one of the most important teachings of bible which every christian must be never forget.
Hate the sin, not the sinner.
While i was reading Maurice’s and Pascal’s opinions on love, about the question of “do we love person itself or person’s attributes?” I remember bible verses on love for enemies.
Matthew 5
“43 “You have heard that it was said, ‘Love your neighbor[a] and hate your enemy.’ 44 But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, 45 that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. 46 If you love those who love you, what reward will you get? Are not even the tax collectors doing that? 47 And if you greet only your own people, what are you doing more than others? Do not even pagans do that? 48 Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect.””
So Bible teaches us loving enemies but not their world doings, it teaches us to love people but not their attributes. This is one of the most important teachings of bible which every christian must be never forget.
Hate the sin, not the sinner.
August 18, 2023
This is a profound collection that profoundly impacted my understanding of phenomenology and its interdisciplinary applications. This book intricately weaves together essays that delve into the essence of perception, artistic interpretation, historical context, and the intricate interplay of politics. The book's exploration of the interconnectedness of these fields under the umbrella of phenomenology, as rendered by Merleau-Ponty, opens up new avenues of thought and deepens my appreciation for the complexities of human experience. This collection, in my view, not only enriches philosophical discourse but also encourages us to examine the multifaceted dimensions of perception and its implications across diverse realms.
Amazing book.
Amazing book.
June 17, 2024
Algılarımızın nasıl şekillendiğini aslında bireysel olarak hangi kriterlere göre nasıl bir sınır çizdiğimizi gayet iyi bir şekilde anlatıyor kitap. Diyalog halinde geçmesi özellikle iyi olmuş diyebilirim çünkü ortaya atılan savların yine hangi algı anlayışına göre çürütülüp hangi algı anlayışına göre desteklendiğini anlamakta bir hayli kolaylık sağlıyor. Algımız her şeyimizdir.
December 14, 2020
Algının doğası üzerine bir çalışma projesi, oturumun senesi: 1934
Ehh yani Nörobilim bunca senede epey geliştirdi kendini ama bu projenin ve algının önceliğinin felsefi sonuçları artık nakil açısından sabit değilse de keşfen sahihtir.
Merleau-Ponty hiç yanıltmaz.
Ehh yani Nörobilim bunca senede epey geliştirdi kendini ama bu projenin ve algının önceliğinin felsefi sonuçları artık nakil açısından sabit değilse de keşfen sahihtir.
Merleau-Ponty hiç yanıltmaz.
November 3, 2020
A difficult book...the last chapter, a critique of Koetler's the Yogi and the Commissar is well worth a reread.
Read
August 1, 2021"Yaşama boyun mu eğmeliyiz yoksa onu yaratmalı mıyız?"
October 22, 2025
I appreciate the effort
April 11, 2018
Um bom apanhado das idéias trabalhados por Merleau-Ponty em "Fenomenologia da Percepção", servindo mais como uma introdução ao seu estudo filosófico-perceptivo do que como uma leitura totalmente elucidativa.
June 23, 2013
Mein Fehler: Habe das Buch versehentlich, anstatt "Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung", gekauft. Es enthält keine zusammenhängende Darstellung von M-Ps Theorie, sondern frühe Skizzen des Arbeitsprogramms und das Protokoll einer Sitzung der Société française de Philosophie mit Diskussion seiner Thesen, plus eine erläuternden Aufsatz von L. Wiesig. Die Diskussion ist spassig zu lesen, ansonsten eher von ideen-geschichtlichem Interesse.
June 14, 2024
When parched for a phenomenological philosophy of mind that remembers we are a collection of cells, this was water. Merleau-Ponty starts his point of inquiry from the body of an organism relating to all other organisms in environment(s) (visible and invisible) which also act on the body and places ‘mind’ within the practice of intersubjective sense-making. Eye and Mind might be my favorite essay, ever.
April 4, 2014
This is a really helpful book for anyone studying the thought of Merleau-Ponty. It may seem a bit like simplifications of his work at first blush, but the beginnings of the push in his work in the direction of expression is one of the most helpful facets of this book.
October 11, 2013
Very good book
I have learned many things about this book, worthy of your days and time of reading.
I have learned many things about this book, worthy of your days and time of reading.
September 16, 2013
"The painter's vision is a continued birth."
Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews