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Duration and Simultaneity: with reference to Einstein's Theory
Analysis of Einstein's Theories of Relativity by Henri Bergson
196 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1922
6 people are currently reading
274 people want to read
About the author
Henri Bergson
502 books809 followersPopular and accessible works of French philosopher and writer Henri Louis Bergson include
Creative Evolution
(1907) and
The Creative Mind
(1934) and largely concern the importance of intuition as a means of attaining knowledge and the élan vital present in all living things; he won the Nobel Prize of 1927 for literature.
Although international fame and influence of this late 19th century-early 20th century man reached heights like cult during his lifetime, after the Second World War, his influence decreased notably. Whereas such thinkers as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, and Lévinas explicitly acknowledged his influence on their thought, Bergsonism of Gilles Deleuze in 1966 marked the reawakening of interest. Deleuze recognized his concept of multiplicity as his most enduring contribution to thinking. This concept attempts to unify heterogeneity and continuity, contradictory features, in a consistent way. This revolutionary multiplicity despite its difficulty opens the way to a re-conception of community, or so many today think.
Although international fame and influence of this late 19th century-early 20th century man reached heights like cult during his lifetime, after the Second World War, his influence decreased notably. Whereas such thinkers as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, and Lévinas explicitly acknowledged his influence on their thought, Bergsonism of Gilles Deleuze in 1966 marked the reawakening of interest. Deleuze recognized his concept of multiplicity as his most enduring contribution to thinking. This concept attempts to unify heterogeneity and continuity, contradictory features, in a consistent way. This revolutionary multiplicity despite its difficulty opens the way to a re-conception of community, or so many today think.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 31, 2019
Dans "Durée et simultanéité: à propos de la théorie d'Einstein" Henri Bergson propose que c'est notre capacité de percevoir le temps comme une durée qui est la qualité de base de notre condition humaine. Cette œuvre a beaucoup influencer Marcel Proust qui était le garçon d'honneur au mariage de Bergson. d'ou vient vraisemblablement son importance principale.
Lisez "À la recherche temps perdu" intégralement trois fois avant d'entreprendre la lecture de cette curiosité
Lisez "À la recherche temps perdu" intégralement trois fois avant d'entreprendre la lecture de cette curiosité
December 20, 2021
Henri Bergson is a philosopher largely forgotten to many now, because his philosophy ran counter to the positivist and conventionalist trends of his era. Einstein himself gave support to a positivist reading of his theories, which I believe has led to many misunderstandings, and to a false ontological hypostatisation of a mathematical model of reality being confused with reality. Bergson also believed this was an ontological error, and in this book he argues for this with an exploration of the notion of time dilation and Minkowski space-time.
He shows how the supposed plurality of time of the relativity of simultaneity still relies on one real lived time, and that the other times in this system are merely phantasmal emanations from the mathematical modelling, by exposing the paradoxes one gets embroiled in if one does not make this key distinction. The attempt to reduce time to an illusion, like the attempt to reduce consciousness to an illusion in the behavioral approach in psychology is just a case of positivist over reach, at at time when confidence in science was at an all time high.
Here are some quotes of notes I wrote while reading the book:
"Fascinating current chapter in relation to the whole paradox debate surrounding Einstein's relativity of simultaneity. Bergson is clearly keen to maintain a notion of a "real" time, and sees relativity as not undermining this, because it in fact always privileges one point of view in its calculations, whereby other points of view are virtual, not real."
"The problem is then how to account for the real effects of time dilation, given when things are reunited there is a disparity in their simultaneity. Clearly this is not just a virtual effect. However Bergson is right to criticise because special relativity itself does not have a consistent account of this point, it instead appeals to general relativity, and accelerations that one object undergoes, as a source of the asymmetry and non-reciprocity in time dilation between a moving observer and a non-moving observer."
"Of course if such distinctions between moving and non-moving can be made we are talking about some level of reinstatement of either privileged perspectives or of an aether, because the only way to avoid this would be a pure relationalist account of space as in Machs proposal, which remains absent."
"There is also in this section a hinting of space as being degrees of remoteness, rather than a real thing, with his example of the two artists and their different perspectives on painting an individual from two places. This is akin to the notion of space explored in more technical depth recently by Lee Smolin in Time Reborn, and his attempt at a true relational account of space."
"Bergson sees the reciprocity in special relativity as a reason to see these time dilation effects as merely phantasmal and virtual, and under a correct reading of relativity this could be the case, but relativity is not completed in this way because an asymmetry is introduced to allow for more time dilation of one who moves through "more" supposed space-time. This "more" and asymmetry being determined based on acceleration effects that have no place in the special theory but come to prominence in the general theory. A strange jump is made here from one theory to another. As if an inconsistency in one theory can be removed by appealing to another theory that actually depends first on the truth of the former."
"Very intriguing critique of the block Minkowski space-time model of special relativity. It fails to account for the real experienced passing of time as duration. This is very similar to the idea Lee Smolin takes up in the book I was reading before this. Space-time is a Platonic, mathematical idealisation of time, that loses something from real time, and does not correspond to it adequately. As a result, if you are stuck within that ontological view point of space-time you tend to dismiss real time as somehow a mere appearance, as if our phenomenologically lived real experience of time that we are immediately and intimately aware of could be inferior to some mathematical, platonic idealisation, in which there is no free asymmetrical development of time, only a predetermined symmetrical structure."
"But can we think in this way and do justice to the reality of our lived experience? I guess this is a deeply phenomenological question and is where you could go on to the work of figures such as Merleau-Ponty etc. The problem is that later, this field becomes reified from ontology, when really at its source, this is an ontological debate about what is fundamentally real, in which perhaps wrong choices have been made"
So, is Bergson successful in his critique? If so, why has this discussion been largely relegated to a footnote in history, compared to the presumed, and promoted as, basically flawless theories of special and general relativity?
Well, others did criticise the twin paradox and inconsistencies in the treatment of asymmetrical time dilation. Notably a person called Herbert Dingle. If, as I think at this point is most likely, the conspiracy theories about the experiments proving time dilation, are wrong in their critique. We are left with a real effect of time dilation, but with a theory that in itself does not consistently account for the effect, but instead appeals to another theory, namely the general theory which as far as I can see is supposed to rely on the prior truth already of the special theory.
I am not sure how we break out of this loop and base the theories on some clear and consistent principled theory. To my mind most of the confusion and problems come because of Minkowski space-time diagrams that give a false impression of representing and modelling a space-time arena extended over space and time, that they in fact do not represent at all. The space-time diagrams only work from one point, the privileged point of the current inertial observer, and this is the main argument throughout Bergson's book against the reality of plural times, but instead of their virtual or phantasmal quality.
The mainstream approach has took the opposite course to Bergson and taken the privileged view of the observer to be illusory and the plural times to be real, and gone down the route of embracing various time paradoxes, later with Godel and others in General relativity. Yet this is inconsistent with a Minkowski space-time diagram that always privileges the first-person inertial observer while giving a false impression of representing a larger space-time arena. It is when you get caught up in thinking this larger representation is real that you get stuck in the twin paradox issues.
I think what may be required is a reappraisal of what we choose to take as fundamentally real in our ontology. Thinkers recently such as Lee Smolin have suggested we reembrace the reality of time, based partly on realisation of the absurdities you are led to if you embrace the reality of the block time of Minkowski space-time. Perhaps the best exemplification of this reduction to absurdity is the Platonia end of time perspective that Julian Barbour set up. He himself has also later moved away from this model to try and adopt a new view on time. Combine this with the work of Roger Penrose on the cyclic cosmos, and his notion of Weyl curvature you can see how many even of the top physicists think there is something not quite right in the conventional physics model of space and time.
The recent explosion of dimensions in string theory and explosion of particles in the particle zoo, has also been a source of the increasing skepticism of this whole fixed background space-time model approach. Perhaps, Bergson all that time ago was on to something, and was not merely acting as a parochial, conservative philosopher, scared of embracing new radical scientific perspectives on the world. Positivist dogma, and their support from Einstein, has probably helped to create the ontological commitment to a block space-time that could be stultifying the progress now in our understanding of and appreciation for the true nature of our universe.
He shows how the supposed plurality of time of the relativity of simultaneity still relies on one real lived time, and that the other times in this system are merely phantasmal emanations from the mathematical modelling, by exposing the paradoxes one gets embroiled in if one does not make this key distinction. The attempt to reduce time to an illusion, like the attempt to reduce consciousness to an illusion in the behavioral approach in psychology is just a case of positivist over reach, at at time when confidence in science was at an all time high.
Here are some quotes of notes I wrote while reading the book:
"Fascinating current chapter in relation to the whole paradox debate surrounding Einstein's relativity of simultaneity. Bergson is clearly keen to maintain a notion of a "real" time, and sees relativity as not undermining this, because it in fact always privileges one point of view in its calculations, whereby other points of view are virtual, not real."
"The problem is then how to account for the real effects of time dilation, given when things are reunited there is a disparity in their simultaneity. Clearly this is not just a virtual effect. However Bergson is right to criticise because special relativity itself does not have a consistent account of this point, it instead appeals to general relativity, and accelerations that one object undergoes, as a source of the asymmetry and non-reciprocity in time dilation between a moving observer and a non-moving observer."
"Of course if such distinctions between moving and non-moving can be made we are talking about some level of reinstatement of either privileged perspectives or of an aether, because the only way to avoid this would be a pure relationalist account of space as in Machs proposal, which remains absent."
"There is also in this section a hinting of space as being degrees of remoteness, rather than a real thing, with his example of the two artists and their different perspectives on painting an individual from two places. This is akin to the notion of space explored in more technical depth recently by Lee Smolin in Time Reborn, and his attempt at a true relational account of space."
"Bergson sees the reciprocity in special relativity as a reason to see these time dilation effects as merely phantasmal and virtual, and under a correct reading of relativity this could be the case, but relativity is not completed in this way because an asymmetry is introduced to allow for more time dilation of one who moves through "more" supposed space-time. This "more" and asymmetry being determined based on acceleration effects that have no place in the special theory but come to prominence in the general theory. A strange jump is made here from one theory to another. As if an inconsistency in one theory can be removed by appealing to another theory that actually depends first on the truth of the former."
"Very intriguing critique of the block Minkowski space-time model of special relativity. It fails to account for the real experienced passing of time as duration. This is very similar to the idea Lee Smolin takes up in the book I was reading before this. Space-time is a Platonic, mathematical idealisation of time, that loses something from real time, and does not correspond to it adequately. As a result, if you are stuck within that ontological view point of space-time you tend to dismiss real time as somehow a mere appearance, as if our phenomenologically lived real experience of time that we are immediately and intimately aware of could be inferior to some mathematical, platonic idealisation, in which there is no free asymmetrical development of time, only a predetermined symmetrical structure."
"But can we think in this way and do justice to the reality of our lived experience? I guess this is a deeply phenomenological question and is where you could go on to the work of figures such as Merleau-Ponty etc. The problem is that later, this field becomes reified from ontology, when really at its source, this is an ontological debate about what is fundamentally real, in which perhaps wrong choices have been made"
So, is Bergson successful in his critique? If so, why has this discussion been largely relegated to a footnote in history, compared to the presumed, and promoted as, basically flawless theories of special and general relativity?
Well, others did criticise the twin paradox and inconsistencies in the treatment of asymmetrical time dilation. Notably a person called Herbert Dingle. If, as I think at this point is most likely, the conspiracy theories about the experiments proving time dilation, are wrong in their critique. We are left with a real effect of time dilation, but with a theory that in itself does not consistently account for the effect, but instead appeals to another theory, namely the general theory which as far as I can see is supposed to rely on the prior truth already of the special theory.
I am not sure how we break out of this loop and base the theories on some clear and consistent principled theory. To my mind most of the confusion and problems come because of Minkowski space-time diagrams that give a false impression of representing and modelling a space-time arena extended over space and time, that they in fact do not represent at all. The space-time diagrams only work from one point, the privileged point of the current inertial observer, and this is the main argument throughout Bergson's book against the reality of plural times, but instead of their virtual or phantasmal quality.
The mainstream approach has took the opposite course to Bergson and taken the privileged view of the observer to be illusory and the plural times to be real, and gone down the route of embracing various time paradoxes, later with Godel and others in General relativity. Yet this is inconsistent with a Minkowski space-time diagram that always privileges the first-person inertial observer while giving a false impression of representing a larger space-time arena. It is when you get caught up in thinking this larger representation is real that you get stuck in the twin paradox issues.
I think what may be required is a reappraisal of what we choose to take as fundamentally real in our ontology. Thinkers recently such as Lee Smolin have suggested we reembrace the reality of time, based partly on realisation of the absurdities you are led to if you embrace the reality of the block time of Minkowski space-time. Perhaps the best exemplification of this reduction to absurdity is the Platonia end of time perspective that Julian Barbour set up. He himself has also later moved away from this model to try and adopt a new view on time. Combine this with the work of Roger Penrose on the cyclic cosmos, and his notion of Weyl curvature you can see how many even of the top physicists think there is something not quite right in the conventional physics model of space and time.
The recent explosion of dimensions in string theory and explosion of particles in the particle zoo, has also been a source of the increasing skepticism of this whole fixed background space-time model approach. Perhaps, Bergson all that time ago was on to something, and was not merely acting as a parochial, conservative philosopher, scared of embracing new radical scientific perspectives on the world. Positivist dogma, and their support from Einstein, has probably helped to create the ontological commitment to a block space-time that could be stultifying the progress now in our understanding of and appreciation for the true nature of our universe.
January 29, 2016
Bergson seems needlessly technical here. His depiction of the consequences of special relativity are very detailed. He does have trouble separating his point, and various physicists in response do not seem to understand what he is saying at all. In the appendixes they merely state that he is wrong and that philosophical time does not exist.
The very crux of the Bergson's argument is not existence or measurement, because simultaneity does not exist without a frame of reference. As a philosopher, Bergson here shows a transcendental duration as being the frame of reference; to that end, he introduces a new measurement to confound the other two measurements. In other words, from the point of view of the equations the existence of their phenomenon bespeaks of the absolute objectivity of their relations beyond locating any content view as being "Peter" or "Paul". The physicists instead only take as real an expressed view of reality, one that is contingent, refusing the veracity of their equations as being expressively real for-itself. They mistake measurement for reality whereas Bergson attempts to get beyond the measurements to the equations themselves.
In a way this is a silly book about something inherently undecidable. In a way, the insistence of there being a reality beyond the equations on both parties is an attempt at sense making that is perhaps too generous from Bergson (although coherent) and too strict from Einstein and Metz because they wish to remain physicists and not speculate. What makes this book hard to read is that Bergson attempts to explain the theory of relativity directly and then attribute that understanding to duration on top of that. Bergson's work is already pretty abstract to begin with, so I expect this is a bit of a challenge.
The very crux of the Bergson's argument is not existence or measurement, because simultaneity does not exist without a frame of reference. As a philosopher, Bergson here shows a transcendental duration as being the frame of reference; to that end, he introduces a new measurement to confound the other two measurements. In other words, from the point of view of the equations the existence of their phenomenon bespeaks of the absolute objectivity of their relations beyond locating any content view as being "Peter" or "Paul". The physicists instead only take as real an expressed view of reality, one that is contingent, refusing the veracity of their equations as being expressively real for-itself. They mistake measurement for reality whereas Bergson attempts to get beyond the measurements to the equations themselves.
In a way this is a silly book about something inherently undecidable. In a way, the insistence of there being a reality beyond the equations on both parties is an attempt at sense making that is perhaps too generous from Bergson (although coherent) and too strict from Einstein and Metz because they wish to remain physicists and not speculate. What makes this book hard to read is that Bergson attempts to explain the theory of relativity directly and then attribute that understanding to duration on top of that. Bergson's work is already pretty abstract to begin with, so I expect this is a bit of a challenge.
February 10, 2023
Ce livre est une introduction fantastique à l’œuvre d’Henri Bergson et à la théorie de la relativité (restreinte et généralisée). Néanmoins, Bergson a tendance à se perdre dans ses explications. En particulier, son exploration répétée de la relativité/durée avec les physiciens hypothétiques Pierre et Paul est plus déroutante qu’utile. Pour terminer, avant de lire ce livre, je ne saurais trop vous recommander de vous familiariser avec les équations de Lorenz. Il les utilise beaucoup pour son analyse d’Einstein.
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