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Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan
No published work examines General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s role in depth during the Pacific War of 1944-1945, in the context of planning for the destruction of Japan. In this new study, Herman S. Wolk, retired Senior Historian of the U.S. Air Force, examines the thinking of Hap Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces (AAF), during World War II. Specifically, Wolk concentrates on Arnold’s leadership in crafting the weapons, organization, and command of the strategic bombing offensive against Japan, which culminated in Japan’s capitulation in the summer of 1945, ending the Pacific War.
The narrative is, in a real sense, a sustained controversy over strategy, organization, and command in the war against Japan. The B-29 long-range bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands dictated unprecedented organization and command; hence, Arnold established the Twentieth Air Force, commanded by himself from Washington and reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This new type of bombing offensive–distinct in command, organization, range, and weapons from the European experience–also called for exemplary operational combat leadership in the field. Here Arnold excelled in his command of the AAF, relieving a long-time colleague (Hansell) in favor of a hard-nosed operator (LeMay). This crucial move was a turning point in the Pacific war.
In the spring and summer of 1945, Arnold was a driven leader, almost willing the B-29 campaign and the air and sea blockade to collapse Japan before the scheduled massive invasion of Kyushu on November 1st. It was a tense race against the invasion clock and the conviction of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, that an invasion was absolutely necessary. Although the Soviet declaration of war on Japan was a factor in the Japanese surrender, it was the atomic bomb that politically shocked the Japanese to capitulation. Arnold, the architect of the bombing offensive, emphasized that Japan was already defeated in the summer of 1945 by the bombing and blockade and that it was not militarily necessary to drop the atomic bomb.
Wolk brings out important rationales and connections in doctrine, organization, and command not previously published. He also mines sources not previously exploited, including the author’s interviews with General LeMay, Hansell, and Eaker; Arnold’s wartime correspondence; documentation from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; and postwar interrogations of Japanese officials and civilians. Cataclysm will prove an important addition to the history of the Pacific War, airpower, and the debate over the use of the atomic bomb against Japan.
The narrative is, in a real sense, a sustained controversy over strategy, organization, and command in the war against Japan. The B-29 long-range bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands dictated unprecedented organization and command; hence, Arnold established the Twentieth Air Force, commanded by himself from Washington and reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This new type of bombing offensive–distinct in command, organization, range, and weapons from the European experience–also called for exemplary operational combat leadership in the field. Here Arnold excelled in his command of the AAF, relieving a long-time colleague (Hansell) in favor of a hard-nosed operator (LeMay). This crucial move was a turning point in the Pacific war.
In the spring and summer of 1945, Arnold was a driven leader, almost willing the B-29 campaign and the air and sea blockade to collapse Japan before the scheduled massive invasion of Kyushu on November 1st. It was a tense race against the invasion clock and the conviction of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, that an invasion was absolutely necessary. Although the Soviet declaration of war on Japan was a factor in the Japanese surrender, it was the atomic bomb that politically shocked the Japanese to capitulation. Arnold, the architect of the bombing offensive, emphasized that Japan was already defeated in the summer of 1945 by the bombing and blockade and that it was not militarily necessary to drop the atomic bomb.
Wolk brings out important rationales and connections in doctrine, organization, and command not previously published. He also mines sources not previously exploited, including the author’s interviews with General LeMay, Hansell, and Eaker; Arnold’s wartime correspondence; documentation from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; and postwar interrogations of Japanese officials and civilians. Cataclysm will prove an important addition to the history of the Pacific War, airpower, and the debate over the use of the atomic bomb against Japan.
344 pages, Hardcover
First published March 26, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
March 2, 2020
I have read many books about General Hap Arnold, the founder of the United States Air Force. In this book the author limited himself to the role of the Army Air Corp in the last part of World War Two in the Pacific.
The book is well written and researched. Wolk cover General Arnold’s battle to build a long-range bomber. The bomber that was built by Boeing was the B-29 Superfortress. Unlike in Europe the bombers had to travel long distances over water to attack Japan. Wolk also covered General LeMay’s bombing raids over Japan particularly discussing the incendiary bombs. Because Wolk limited his time frame, he was able to discuss in more detail the problems and solutions of the last part of the War. My biggest complaint about the book was its repetition. The book could have been maybe half the size without the constant repetition. It is important to judge this book within its time frame and not from an eighty year later rewrite. If you are a history buff, you will enjoy reading this book.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is eight hours and forty minutes. Roger A. Wyatt does a good job narrating the book. Wyatt is a voice-over artist and audiobook narrator.
I
The book is well written and researched. Wolk cover General Arnold’s battle to build a long-range bomber. The bomber that was built by Boeing was the B-29 Superfortress. Unlike in Europe the bombers had to travel long distances over water to attack Japan. Wolk also covered General LeMay’s bombing raids over Japan particularly discussing the incendiary bombs. Because Wolk limited his time frame, he was able to discuss in more detail the problems and solutions of the last part of the War. My biggest complaint about the book was its repetition. The book could have been maybe half the size without the constant repetition. It is important to judge this book within its time frame and not from an eighty year later rewrite. If you are a history buff, you will enjoy reading this book.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is eight hours and forty minutes. Roger A. Wyatt does a good job narrating the book. Wyatt is a voice-over artist and audiobook narrator.
I
August 8, 2019
I generally reserve 4 and 5 star ratings for books that are either very well written and make it hard for me to want to put down, or cause me to seriously think about the subject matter. This book falls into the second category for me.
It started off pretty dry and I could easily see why it was withdrawn from the public library system. But when it began to discuss the possible alternatives to dropping the atom bomb, and the impact of our fire-bombing campaign, the book took on a whole new dimension. Post war interviews with both Japanese civilians and military personnel were a real eye-opener.
One interesting point of view for me was the idea that, while the Japanese civilian population was probably willing to accept the idea of surrender by the summer of 1945, it took the atom bomb to give the Japanese military a face-saving option to surrender. That's right; a face-saving option. With a 300,000 man army and close to 1,000 suicide planes ready to repel a potential invasion, the atom bomb could be used by the Japanese military as a excuse for them to claim that they were not defeated by an enemy military, but rather by an enemy's scientific technology. Their military could therefore surrender and still save face.
Hap Arnold was convinced that the war could still be won without the Bomb or an invasion eventually by a continuation of the fire-bombing, the blockade, and the destruction of Japan's railway system resulting in the elimination of food distribution within Japan and a widespread starvation. But the resulting number of deaths would have been substantially greater and the question would certainly be, would that have been more humane?
It started off pretty dry and I could easily see why it was withdrawn from the public library system. But when it began to discuss the possible alternatives to dropping the atom bomb, and the impact of our fire-bombing campaign, the book took on a whole new dimension. Post war interviews with both Japanese civilians and military personnel were a real eye-opener.
One interesting point of view for me was the idea that, while the Japanese civilian population was probably willing to accept the idea of surrender by the summer of 1945, it took the atom bomb to give the Japanese military a face-saving option to surrender. That's right; a face-saving option. With a 300,000 man army and close to 1,000 suicide planes ready to repel a potential invasion, the atom bomb could be used by the Japanese military as a excuse for them to claim that they were not defeated by an enemy military, but rather by an enemy's scientific technology. Their military could therefore surrender and still save face.
Hap Arnold was convinced that the war could still be won without the Bomb or an invasion eventually by a continuation of the fire-bombing, the blockade, and the destruction of Japan's railway system resulting in the elimination of food distribution within Japan and a widespread starvation. But the resulting number of deaths would have been substantially greater and the question would certainly be, would that have been more humane?
February 14, 2024
Overall a pretty good book, even though the author kept repeating the same themes over and over again. But it did give me a better understanding of the military and political situation in the Pacific. With General Hap Arnold keeping control of the 20th Air Force to ensure that the USAAF would not become a part of Nimitz's a or MacArthur's Command but a separate command. I t prove that the naval blockade and the area bombing brought Japan to its knees. The Japanese admitted that area bombing, the atomic bombs and the Soviets attacking Manchuria were the most important factors in them giving up. MacArthur and Marshall both wanted to make the invasion of Japan and even though Arnold backed them. He still believed that air power alone could end the war without a physical invasion that would would have cost thousands of casualties.
February 9, 2025
The book is well written and researched. It started off pretty dry but accelerated as the author dipped into B-29 employment. Arnold was convinced that WW2 could be won with continuation of the fire-bombing, blockade, and the destruction of Japan's railway system. Author takes a uniquely American view that the people were tired of the war and could stop it while minimizing the impact of Japan's military class. Hap Arnold, more than any other, helped define the US Air Force and this book describes his core views. Overall a pretty good book, even though the author kept repeating the same themes.
October 4, 2012
Enjoyed the book, but I understand some folks' problems with its repetitive nature. Probably could have cut out around 50 pages if the author had only mentioned five times that Arnold believed the air/naval blockades combined with the B-29 bombing would be sufficient to knock Japan out of the war instead of 25 times.
That said, Cataclysm is an entertaining and easy read about the various decisions surrounding the strategic bombardment of Japan through the eyes of Hap Arnold. The author's central proposition is that Arnold was an "indispensable leader who built the Army Air Forces and made possible the B-29 campaign that played a decisive role in ending the war in the Pacific." He does an effective job backing this up and provides enough details for the casual reader to be pulled in to what otherwise might be a relatively dry retelling of national-level debates surrounding military strategy questions. Also interesting is Wolk's stringent argument that despite the traditional view of ACTS thinking surrounding only precision bombing against the industrial web, they also thought a good bit about the potential morale effect bombing might have on the enemy and that the decisions in WWII to move to area bombing and targeting of morale were a more natural extension of ACTS theories than traditionally understood.
The final interesting tidbit especially prescient still today is the quote from Arnold that "the effect of strategic air warfare...was rarely immediately apparent: 'its effect was more like that of cancer, producing internal decay ultimately resulting in death.'" Today's Air Force still struggles with this aspect of air power - it's hard to build the right weapons and create the right strategy when you're having trouble showing your effect on "the fight tonight."
That said, Cataclysm is an entertaining and easy read about the various decisions surrounding the strategic bombardment of Japan through the eyes of Hap Arnold. The author's central proposition is that Arnold was an "indispensable leader who built the Army Air Forces and made possible the B-29 campaign that played a decisive role in ending the war in the Pacific." He does an effective job backing this up and provides enough details for the casual reader to be pulled in to what otherwise might be a relatively dry retelling of national-level debates surrounding military strategy questions. Also interesting is Wolk's stringent argument that despite the traditional view of ACTS thinking surrounding only precision bombing against the industrial web, they also thought a good bit about the potential morale effect bombing might have on the enemy and that the decisions in WWII to move to area bombing and targeting of morale were a more natural extension of ACTS theories than traditionally understood.
The final interesting tidbit especially prescient still today is the quote from Arnold that "the effect of strategic air warfare...was rarely immediately apparent: 'its effect was more like that of cancer, producing internal decay ultimately resulting in death.'" Today's Air Force still struggles with this aspect of air power - it's hard to build the right weapons and create the right strategy when you're having trouble showing your effect on "the fight tonight."
October 2, 2012
Only 3 stars because of how repetitive it was. Also his argument that unconditional surrender was the correct policy based upon the "implacable feelings aroused by the total was unleaded by Japan" is flimsy. Although this might be why the US wanted unconditional surrender, saying that its good to make strategy decisions only based upon personal feelings leads to poor strategy in my opinion.
August 3, 2012
How Hap Arnold set up and ran the strategic bombing campaign in Japan, culminating in the atomic bombs. A new and different view of the decisive aerial campaign in the Pacific.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews