The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 1945-1953

by Robert Dallek

"Robert Dallek brings to this majestic work a profound understanding of history, a deep engagement in foreign policy, and a lifetime of studying leadership. The story of what went wrong during the postwar period…has never been more intelligently explored." —Doris Kearns Goodwin, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning Team of Rivals Robert Dalleck follows his bestselling Nixon and Partners in Power and An Unfinished John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 with this masterful account of the crucial period that shaped the postwar world. As the Obama Administration struggles to define its strategy for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Dallek's critical and compelling look at Truman, Churchill, Stalin, and other world leaders in the wake of World War II not only offers important historical perspective but provides timely insight on America's course into the future.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Military History, Leadership, The World, War

432 pages, Hardcover

First published October 15, 2010

About the author

Robert A. Dallek is an American historian specializing in the presidents of the United States, including Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon.
In 2004 he retired as a history professor at Boston University after previously having taught at Columbia University, the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and Oxford University.
He won the Bancroft Prize for his 1979 book Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945, as well as other awards for scholarship and teaching.

Reviews

[J.S. · Rating 3 out of 5]

The second World War was destruction on a scale not previously seen in history. Was it possible that, given such a frenzy of brutality and atrocity, mankind might have turned from its warlike ways and sought a true end to all wars? Alas, it's a moot point as we know the history that followed. Although no global conflicts on a similar scale have occurred since, the respite has hardly been peaceful.

The back of this book calls it "a striking reinterpretation of the postwar years." I wondered, did "reinterpretation" mean "revisionist," which has become just another byword for those who blame the United States for all the woes of the world? I was encouraged by the Preface in which Mr. Dallek says: "While I highlight the failings of the notable men who dominated the scene during this time, I am not intent on denying them their due, or in the case of the greatest villains of the day, revising their reputations for wrongdoing" (pg xi). And indeed, he seems blunt in his denouncement of the duplicitous dealings of Stalin with his allies, declaring he had little intention of keeping his word when signing treaties. His assessment of the situation in China is interesting - suggesting we might have done better opening a dialog with Mao Tse-tung, who was very reluctant to join the Soviet orbit and made overtures to the U.S., than clinging to the corrupt and unpopular regime of Chiang Kai-shek. His description of the atmosphere in America is likewise interesting, saying those on the left were naïve in their faith in communist benevolence, while decrying the provoking militancy of the right. Such uncompromising ideologues as Joseph McCarthy left few political options for American leaders who had to be mindful of public opinion.

Mr. Dallek has written a fascinating and thought-provoking book, but I went from marking what seemed to be brilliantly insightful passages to marking ones that strained the limits of credibility. In an effort to appear balanced, Dallek is highly critical of Western leaders for reacting to Stalin and Mao with "knee-jerk anticommunism." He is hard on comments by Western leaders but soft on Soviet and Chinese rhetoric. He justifies Stalin's paranoia as "Russian fear of invasion from the West" (pg 246) and dismisses Soviet espionage and foreign manipulations as "the greatly exaggerated threat of Communist subversion" (pg 269). Even while he explains Western needs to avoid the kind of appeasement that enabled Hitler's murderous spree, he suggests Truman should have met with Stalin and "candidly explained America's reluctance to build weapons of such destructive power and invited the Soviets to join him in a shared effort to ban" them (pg 297). He downplays Soviet involvement in instigating the Korean conflict and blames it on "America's inattentiveness" (pg 314). And even though "Mao, like Stalin, didn't hesitate to sacrifice lives for the sake of communism and his personal rule" (pg 327), he seems to advocate that the West should have negotiated with such leaders in good faith. (Can you say "appeasement?!?") And for all his lamentations over atomic weapons, he credits them with being an ironic deterrent to further large-scale conflict (pg 364-5).

He is also embarrassingly fawning over George Kennan, a diplomat who - according to Dallek - had the best understanding of Soviet thinking. Yet he quotes Kennan as dismissing the "Czech coup and the Berlin blockade as 'just the predictable baring of the fangs'" (pg 263) as though such events were harmless and inconsequential. His acknowledgements that Stalin and Mao were responsible for the deaths and brutal oppression of millions (!!!) of their own people seem lost in the jumble of so much history, almost dismissed as unimportant.

And yet... there was a good deal to like here. Dallek's study can be intriguing - and it's certainly well-written. He is mindful that his analysis has the benefit of historical hindsight, but that's the point and he claims the historian's responsibility to render judgments and offer alternatives - a not unreasonable premise. But while I admire much he had to say, I was deeply troubled by his uneven judgments and minimizing the threat of Soviet communism. To suggest that Stalin might have been neutralized (or "rehabilitated"?) with plain and simple honesty is disturbing and seems the pinnacle of naïveté. Still, a worthwhile read for those interested in the mistakes of leadership that led to the Cold War. Just don't take everything at face value.

[Sky Thibedeau · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dallak's book chronicles the beginnings of the Cold War from the closing days of the Second World War to Korea. Though he shows that Uncle Joe and his minions in Moscow were very paranoid of Roosevelt and Churchill and saw them probably the same way he saw Hitler when he signed the Non-Agression pact in 1939, he hints that the Cold War was the fault of the West for not seeing until after the collapse of 1989 what an economic basket case the Soviet Union actually was.

The premise is that George Keenan in the State Department planning office wrote a 79 page memo (the Long Telegram) on Soviet post war capabilities from Moscow in 1946 that stated the Soviet Union was expanionist like the Fascists before them. This influenced President Truman to embark on a policy of containment to ensure that the West would stand up to the aggressive Soviet totalitarians as it had failed to do with Hitler. Dallek seems to indicate that had the 'Long Telegram' not been sent and the focus on the Soviets as the new Nazis averted, perhaps a more conciliatory post war would have emerged and Korea, Vietnam, and perhaps the Chinese Civil war averted.

Most of this is pie in the sky reasoning as Stalin wanted his buffer against the West, wanted to insure Germany did not rise a third time to invade the Motherland again, and still believed in replacing the Western capitalists with Soviet Style Communism.

Still the "Lost Peace" is a good starting point for delving into the History of the Cold War. I'm thankful my children born post 1989 will have no recollection of those years.

[Jack · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nothing was so daunting a task to the world as the destruction of the Axis Powers. Yet, once that task was finished, the victorious Allies succumbed to suspicion, arrogance, and the murky world of power politics. Set in the aftermath of WWII and covering the time until the breakout of the Korean War, The Lost Peace explores how Britain, France, Russia, and the United States slowly polarized into the West versus the East. Democracy versus Communism. Good against evil. Much was driven by the personalities of Stalin, De Gaulle, Truman, and Churchill. Each would create his own world view which became national policy. Mix in England and France trying to hold onto the last vestiges of the empires creating the Colonial Wars, and now you have a splendid situation known as the beginnings of the Cold War. I found this one entertaining and enlightening.

[Jared Nelson · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not a fan! I bought this book online because it's dust jacket description sounded promising. I was introduced quite early in the book to its main theme and realized only then that this might not have been a good choice for me. Quite a negative overtone about what might have been if only this or that leader had chosen more wisely in this or that circumstance.

The author's writing style failed to capture my attention at any point in the narrative and I only kept reading until page 107 out of respect for the subject matter...my favorite, political histories!

Worse than a good fiction novel, this book projects unfair expectations on real historical actors. Reminded me of a person who on the Monday morning after eating lots of junk food the day before and watching all the Sunday NFL games, now hopes to quarterback what might have saved each game. Blech!

Not worth a minute of your time, folks!

[Doug · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dallek attempts to trace today's problems back to mistakes made during the early post-war years. For example, he argues that if the Republican Congress had properly debated Harry Truman, then Vietnam and the second Iraq War would have been prevented, and the Korean War, too. There's too much armchair governing in this history book for me to enjoy it. Hindsight is always 20/20, if we study history. But only if we study it and learn from it can we reduce likelihood of repeating the mistakes of the past.

[John Kaufmann · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great history of the immediate post-World War II era. The book nominally focuses on the big personalities of the time to tell the story - Churchill, Truman, Eisenhower, Stalin, Mao, Churchill, Syngman Rhee. By the time you're done, you are thankful we muddled through when it would have been so easy to destroy ourselves. It provides a glimpse of real politik operating in the late 40s and early 50s, where idealism was banished from the scene.

[Peggy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Overall, quite an interesting book. I was born in a time our American history classes ended with the end of WWII. I learned little of the Cold War and Korea, except by what I lived thru in the late 60's. It was interesting to read how actually unsettled the world was after WWII's conclusion. I don't agree with everthing that Dallek hypothesized could have made a difference. I see Stalin as a very rigid character. This book ended up as largely a comment on the Truman administration, due to the period it covered. I think Dallek did not give as much acknowledgement to the fact that "world policeman" was a whole new role for the US. After WWI, the US retreated into isolationism. We didn't do that after WWII, but how to be the world leader? That is the rub. Overall, the book did give me alternate opinions and food for thought. I found it worth the read.

[Steve Smits · Rating 3 out of 5]

How did the Cold War start? Could it have been avoided? The paths taken from the end of WWII to the death of Stalin and the conclusion of the Korean War seem to us looking back now to have been inevitable. Dalleck analyzes the choices made by leaders and nations and concludes that the options chosen by the super powers were by no means the only ones available to them. He suggests that a number of factors - largely domestic in nature - led to the hardening of attitudes between the east and west and the resultant diplomatic and military courses taken. At the core of the two nations' schism was, of course, the abhorrence each held for the other's political ideology, but did this mean that no accommodation was possible? The US failed, Dalleck concludes, to recognize that Stalin's intent to buffer Russia from future attacks from Western Europe was a prime motivating imperative in installing satellite regimes in the Eastern European nations that his armies controlled. The enormous sacrifices experienced by Russia compelled Stalin to ring his country with friendly allies that separated Germany from access to Russian soil. Did Stalin have intentions, given any opportunity, to push further west? Dalleck argues that Stalin was aware of how weak his country was after the war and that he knew that aggression against Western Europe was foolhardy. Stalin was a despicable autocrat whose repression of his people exceeded that even of Hitler's, but he was a brilliant strategist in securing his country's interests. Russia's vehement anti-western aggressive blustering and his overt deceit and manipulation hardened western views about his intentions. Dalleck draws attention to the thinking of George Kennan, the pre-eminent thinker on Soviet matters who understood what was driving Stalin's decisions, but whose ideas were largely rejected by policy makers in the executive branch.

In the US the force of domestic political dynamics, especially from the right wing, compelled Truman to take a hard line and to eschew any overtures to the USSR that could be seen as coddling the communists. Dalleck points out how the near hysterical and nonsensical allegations that communists were subverting the US from inside the government constrained the more subtle positions the administration could have taken toward the Soviets. The right wing's distorted, but powerfully effective, position on China shows how domestic currents had a profound affect on the government's policy. The false hope that the Nationalist regime could ever have prevailed led to charges that it was our diplomats who were responsible for the communist take over and foreclosed exploration that understandings with Mao could have been in our national interest.

Could the nuclear arms race have been avoided? At the advent of the development of nuclear weapons there were many people who felt that there were opportunities to control the spread of these weapons, whose principal use (especially the H-bomb) was not military, but clearly genocidal. The decision by Roosevelt and Churchill, later upheld by Truman, to withhold weapons technology from the Soviets heightened Stalin's suspicions that the west was determined to align against his country. Like the world's treatment of gas warfare following WWI, it was entirely possible that another course could have been followed to ban the use of nuclear weapons and their stockpiling. These weapons became a tool of power diplomacy between the opposing nations, a dangerous game since several times their use came awfully close.

Dalleck reviews the thinking of war time leaders about the wisdom of a world body that could bring about collective action to prevent war. Given the deep suspicions held by the major nations and their sharp focus on preserving their national interests, it is not surprising that this lofty aim was never achieved.

[Amy Johanning · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an interesting revisionist account of the end of the World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. Actually, it might be less of a revisionist account and more of a "what might have been" reading of history. Dallak writes a thorough account of the political maneuverings beginning the last year of the European Theater and and how they affected the peace process. He points out several opportunities that each side missed and suggests that if only one side or the other would have held a different viewpoint, that perhaps the Cold War, and the arms race, Third World conflicts and brinksmanship that resulted from it could have been avoided. There is also the ultimate hope that our current leaders will learn from the mistakes of the past and as such, we will avoid repeating our own history.

The challenge with this period of history, is not the missed opportunities but the holistic understanding of the Allies' relationships and ability to trust. The reality was - Stalin was a paranoid megalomanic, hell bent on power and suppression of dissidents, real or imagined. At his word, millions of Russian were murdered in an effort to solidify power within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The Americans and British were not without fault. Leaders from both countries were beholden to polls; not unlike today, public opinion changed with the wind. In the United States, that meant every 2 year election cycle. In Britain, Churchill lost his majority in the middle of Potsdam. He was replaced by the Labor Party leader who had different objectives. Throw in both Britain and France's desire to reclaim their colonial holdings and thus, their 'empire' and everyone had an ulterior motive.

In sum, while altruistic and hopeful, I doubt that the outcome of those few years after World War II would have been significantly altered had world leaders given each other the benefit of the doubt. What is more surprising, is how the world survived the Cold War given our leaders willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. That reality - the examples of brinksmanship and how close the world's heads of state came to dropping atomic bombs on each other (before the theory of mutually assured destruction became a reality) is frightening.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent summary that bridges the gap from WWII to the height of the Cold War. Dallek does a great job just explaining what happened without the overuse of detail or opinions.

The Allies who needed Stalin to eliminate the greater evil Hitler, suddenly turn the cold shoulder to him once the war is over. Stalin is left in the cold doghouse while the US and England decide what to do with all their new weapons technology. Moreover, the map from Germany eastward all the way to Asia is redrawn without any input or rewards for the Soviets...not to mention the people actually living in these places. What ensues from then on for the next 40 some years is the slow and painful elimination of Communism.

[Abraham · Rating 3 out of 5]

What feels like a classic big man view interpretation of the emerging Cold War period is actually a bit deeper, in that it shows how much domestic politics and economic concerns of the time shaped the decisions Britain and the U.S. This challenges the notion of a purely ideological struggle, though it surely was perceived as such by many at the time. The majority of this book focuses on the foreign policies of the Truman administration, and it does very well in that aspect. It bounces a bit, amongst topics (e.g. the Chinese civil war, Japanese restoration) that certainly deserve a bit more attention in order to really appreciate their relevance here, but all in all very readable and bound to teach you something new.

[Charles van Buren · Rating 1 out of 5]

Leftist apologia for Stalin and Mao. There was no peace to lose. Just ask the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles about Stalin's desire for peace. He was a bloody tyrant, a butcher on the same scale as Hitler. There was no practical difference between Hitler's Nazis and Stalin's Communists.

[Colin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Looks at the post-WWII era in a different light ---- perhaps Truman and the others got it completely wrong, establishing a national-security state that caused a long, deadly, costly cold war that is bleeding us dry still today?

[Neil Crocker · Rating 4 out of 5]

An enlightening history of the early years of the Cold War.

It didn't need to happen but it did.

WW2 left huge scars everywhere but in the US. America had outsized power as the only country that emerged from WW2 healthier than when it entered it, a huge ego (arrogance?) stemming from its huge WW2 victories, and monopoly rights to shiny new toy. The West thought Communism was a disease you could catch. The West failed to consider that post WW2 Russia was a basket case. The West failed to notice that China and Russia (and Vietnam and.....) were not in cahoots. Leaders did not trust each other (frequently for good reason.) Leaders had huge egos, huge visions and (when democratically elected) their relatively uninformed but highly opinionated citizens to please. The invention of the atomic bomb destabilized everything. The end of colonialism left leadership vacuums to fill all around the world. Much of the world was worried about their next meal, not their form of government. Truman was no Roosevelt, but wasn't chopped liver either, despite the need for on-the-job training. America generally was a rookie Super Power. Stalin was a bad (and probably crazy) guy who hung around way too long, essentially unopposed.

The book argues (correctly) that the Cold War didn't have to happen; the story could have been different with better leadership.

The story could always be different with better leadership!

Which is why to this day it is critical for citizens to hold their leaders accountable to more responsibly differentiate between geopolitical developments that have no material impact on us and real, credible threats that should to be countered, hopefully with diplomacy rather than treasure and lives.

[Grommit · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sweeping. Comprehensive. Tells the story of what happened after WWII. Presents answers to the question of why, after a truly world-wide war, we really never achieved peace. Yes, the battles ended. Most soldiers/sailors/airmen returned home...at least they did in the US. But, conflicts remained, to the point where we confronted nuclear exchanges.
I really like a book that fills in gaps and tells me even move. This book does that.
The author spreads the blame over just about every player: Churchill, Stalin, FDR/Truman, etc, DeGaulle, Mao, Ho, et al. If there is a flaw, it is the belief that "if only we had talked to ...". Or, if only Kennan's arguments had carried the day.
Here I dare to disagree with the author. Stalin, Mao, Rhee...they were NOT going to trust "the West" and they despised Capitalism. Likewise, the West feared the spread of Communism. For example, Stalin was convinced that he needed buffer states to prevent any more invasions from his Western front. And Mao wanted Chiang's corruption and nationalism out of the way. DeGaulle wanted the French colonies (IndoChina...Vietnam) back under French control. Etc. In fact, pick any player and you get the overarching distrust, coupled with the thought that they needed an army to hold off the opponent. Sigh...this is still the world in which we live.
And one last thought: the description of Stalin: bully, easily threatened, thin-skinned, quick to anger...certainly seems to resonate with a national leader we all know. The only difference is that Stalin blatantly "disappeared" opponents in the thousands.

[Joshua · Rating 3 out of 5]

Robert Dallek is a master of using primary sources to help explain the thoughts and actions of leaders. In "The Lost Peace" he does this with US President Harry Truman and American diplomat George F. Kennan exceptionally well. His insights into their experiences between 1945-1953 shows the complicated choices presenting world leaders and especially American and Soviet leaders during the end of World War II to the end of the fighting of the Korean War. Dallek has insights into both Truman and Kennan's thoughts and decisions that show how many different ways the Soviet-American relationship could have gone.

Unfortunately the rest of the major world leaders discussed don't have the same amount of attention and time spent on them so large sections of the middle of the book end up feeling bloated with Dallek forced to try different ways to say "If both sides hadn't been so paranoid and mistrusting, a working relationship could have been worked out". Some of that could be the lack of primary sources for leaders like Stalin and Mao, but it leaves them very two dimensional.

[Abby · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book argues that a failure to image a better future in the seven years between the end of WWII and the beginning of Eisenhower's presidency prevented world leaders from pursuing a better future. I concur that creatively envisioning a better future is necessary for wise leadership. I am not convinced that it is sufficient. Dallek doesn't sufficiently address how the various leaders might have convinced other people to also believe in a hypothetical better future and that I believe is the crux of the problem.

[Ronald]

Key post war events and profiles of leaders and good and many bad decisions that shaped the postwar world - fascinating history of a really critical period in the modern world. Stalin, Churchill, Truman, Korea, Vietnam, the key roles of fear of nuclear war and fear of communism, ...
I was surprised how little i knew about these people and events. But this happens almost every time i read a history book.

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

I felt the book did a good job of identifying the power politics within the White House as well as with Great Britain and Russia. The author outlined the struggles faced with the development and use of the atomic bomb. The fact that its use toward the end of World War Two was unnecessary and was the catalyst to the world nuclear arms race. Overall, I do think the book is a good read for all interested in history.

[Robert G Micciulla · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fine examination of post-war leadership

A well-written study of the major political figures on the international scene beginning with the final days of the Second World War. I would have liked more about the situation in Southern Asia included, as the independence and split up of the subcontinent was easily as significant as the Korean War. Overall an excellent work.

[Louis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dallek turns his years of writing on American diplomatic history into this look at the origins and early years of the Cold War. Neither a traditionalist or a revisionist, he considers the miscalculations on both sides that caused the breach. He finds leaders who, even in the wake of the carnage of World War II rely on old-fashioned power politics. A bit dry but a rewarding read.

[Evelyn Mcmanis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pretty meh. This would be a great book to assign to a class of students who are just beginning to learn about the post-war period, but as someone with the knowledge already, there was nothing new here.

[Grant · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dallek addresses the series of bad, or at least misguided, decisions that led to the outbreak of the Cold War and its intensification. While the various leaders could have been wiser, Dallek admits that they were in many ways bound by ideology, public opinion, or sheer momentum.

[Robin Case · Rating 2 out of 5]

Arrogance on the half shell.

[Julie Gavin · Rating 3 out of 5]

I liked the way this was laid out into profiles of the different world leaders, but it was rather slow and repetitive. Didn't really hold my interest.

[Billhotto · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kind of what if? Internal political pressures, ideology, temperament, ideology, suspicion, personal relationships usually outweigh logic and statecraft in making foreign policy. It took Hitler to bring Stalin, Churchill and FDR together. Germany's defeat in 1945 left the USSR in control of Eastern Europe and the US providing the counterweight in Western Europe for the next 45 years. Dalek posits that a more reasonable outcome could have been achieved. But,at least WW IIi was avoided.

[Kim · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is more overview than indepth analysis but it raised and attempted to answer some interesting post WWII questions regarding nationhood and foreign policy and the inevitable conflicts between morally right and politically necessary compromises/failures. Definitely worth a look. Ultimately seems hopeful for humankind...unlike the next book I read.

[Grindy Stone · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not a bad read, but the history of the early years of the Cold War has been done before and Dallek adds very little, other than a fair argument that organizing NATO was a mistake. Best as a volume for the reader looking for an intro on the topic.

[Kevin · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was pretty clear to me which side of center Mr. Dallek stands on, but he still managed to present the issues of the day in a fairly clear light.

[Bob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting argument Dallek advances that world leaders just after World War II missed opportunities to build a lasting peace and avoid a Cold War through misunderstandings and hubris. Good read.