Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House

California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy

by Gary W. Cox, Mathew D. McCubbins

The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.

Genres: Politics, Political Science, Academic, Nonfiction

328 pages, Paperback

First published March 6, 1993

Reviews

[J.R. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Important for its time because it answers how individual politicians, who are motives by their own re-elections, are still incentivized to follow party platforms once in office.

Basically, parties act like "legislative cartels". Each individual legislator has increases their own odds of being re-elected when the party as a whole does well. This produces a sort of collective action issue, where everyone in the party benefits from a strong party performance, but each individual might benefit from breaking away from the party on a certain issue.

This collective action problem is overcome by delegating certain institutional powers to party leaders. These are broad, but committe assignments and agenda authority are the two major ones. Parties put reliable members on choice committees, which help the individual legislator with votes for their constituents (and donors), and in return the parties control what gets voted on (avoiding potentially divisive votes).