What do you think?
Rate this book
Meccanomics: The March of the New Muslim Middle Class
Combining historical narrative with eye-opening on-the-ground research, "Meccanomics" introduces a Muslim world we've never seen before; one that is being transformed by booming economies and a vibrant middle class that will tip the balance away from extremists. This groundbreaking analysis from the author of the "New York Times'" best-selling "The Shia Revival", offers a powerful reassessment of a world where financial might - not fundamentalism - is doing the talking.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
11 people are currently reading
339 people want to read
About the author
Vali Nasr
23 books117 followersSon of renowned Iranian academic Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Vali Nasr was born in Tehran in 1960, went to school in England at age 16, and immigrated to the U.S. after the 1979 Revolution. He received his BA from Tufts University in International Relations summa cum laude. He earned his masters in International Economics and Middle East Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1984, then went on to earn his PhD in Political Science from MIT in 1991.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
February 16, 2014
This book is an examination of capitalism’s role in the economic development of Muslim countries, as well as distancing them and their populations from extremist ideologies. Starting from the existence of the modern nation state in the Middle East, it shows that rejection of capitalism, and much anti-Americanism, stemmed from a rejection of anything perceived to be linked to colonialism, and as a backlash to kemalism. There is a detailed analysis of why kemalism/authoritarian secularism and nationalism failed to develop a middle class capable of pushing for economic, political and social liberalisation, particularly in Iran, Turkey and Egypt, and instead created a thin layer of elites who were dependent on patronage and rapidly marginalised. The co-option of Iran’s middle classes by extremists when alienated by shah is explained, with a good in-depth analysis of current economic and political trends and their interactions to the present day.
The example of Turkey is shown as a successful case of economic development and free-market modernisation marginalising extreme ideologies, and creating a middle class deeply invested in stability and the success of the nation. Pakistan is also shown as an example which has failed thus far, but has the potential to go either way in the future. Much of the focus of the book is on Iran, arguing that the Turkey scenario will come to pass there eventually, and showing that a period of economic growth led to a sector of society becoming more engaged in politics and interested in transparency, ultimately fueling the green movement after the 2009 elections.
The book asserts, very similarly to Mustafa Akyol’s Islam Without Extremes (which gives a better examination of the religious perspective), that economic progress has a strong bearing on the presence and influence of extremism in a society. Nothing can take the place of economic development and promotion of economic freedom in order to make the Middle East a more peaceful place, and the most important take away lesson that “it matters less that the middle class is secular than that it is the right kind - rooted in commerce”. “No welfare, no legitimacy” is correctly identified as a dominant mindset in many Middle-Eastern countries, explaining why Islamic groups which focused on social work gained significant support in many different places in the absence and failure of government services, despite their often extreme ideologies. He also draws a link between torture and radicalisation, showing that the most extreme violent groups appeared as a consequence of torture of radicals by governments. An important and logical conclusion is that the best thing the US can do is to support economic development without attempting to get involved in ideological struggles, and to cease propping up tyrannical and regimes which have failed to lead their societies to prosperity
The argument against sanctions on “rogue” states is produced comprehensively, pointing out that only domestic pressures will remove the extremist regime without leaving chaos as in Iraq, and showing that sanctions harm the existence of the middle class, which is the driver of these domestic pressures. With economic sanctions a middle class cannot grow, leaving a vacuum in civil society and an impoverished lower class susceptible to the populism of the likes of Ahmadinejad. However, it is disappointing that he could still support the Algerian scenario for the fight against extremists elsewhere without seeing the contradiction there.
Although the book advocates the essentiality of adopting capitalism in order to create a middle class which will develop society, it never actually approaches the topic of what is meant by capitalism, or what form it should take. At a time when social justice is causing instability from Europe to the Middle-East and even discontent in America, and corporatism has highlighted the dysfunctionality of political systems worldwide, there needs to be more to the solution than merely eliminating corruption and cronyism in developing countries whilst encouraging capitalism. Although Nasr recognises that rising inequality presents a great danger of short-circuiting the process, the lack of a critical view on capitalism is a major weakness.
Another weakness is that the author seems to believe that the headscarf (or hejab, he insists on breaking established transliteration conventions) is in some way incompatible with liberalism or modernity, and needs to be pointed out as a qualifier - Amr Khaled “rejects extremism and openly criticizes Bin Laden, but “is also, however, an advocate of women wearing the hejab”. He also seems to have the misunderstanding that modern televangelists in the Muslim world teach that “going out to nightclubs...is in no way in conflict with Islam”. So despite his background as a scholar, it seems as though beyond the intellectual movements he has a very poor understanding of what the faith means to Muslims themselves.
At times sounds as though he feels kemalism as though the evils of it are unfortunate side effects of a positive ideology. Distinctions lacks nuance in his classifications, splitting Muslims into fundamentalist and otherwise. Rached Ghannouchi as also described as a fundamentalist; whatever the author thinks of the ideology of Ghannouchi’s Ennahda, describing the party which recently led the writing of Tunisia’s new constitution, which has been described as the most progressive on women’s equality in the world, with the same word used for the Taliban is incredibly sloppy.
So the book has obvious weaknesses that should be taken note of, but also strengths, including the historical view and the conclusions drawn about economic growth and the role of western support. A valuable addition is the forward glimpse the book presents to the process that will really drive the Arab spring, after the revolutions have settled down and state- and economy-building begins again.
The example of Turkey is shown as a successful case of economic development and free-market modernisation marginalising extreme ideologies, and creating a middle class deeply invested in stability and the success of the nation. Pakistan is also shown as an example which has failed thus far, but has the potential to go either way in the future. Much of the focus of the book is on Iran, arguing that the Turkey scenario will come to pass there eventually, and showing that a period of economic growth led to a sector of society becoming more engaged in politics and interested in transparency, ultimately fueling the green movement after the 2009 elections.
The book asserts, very similarly to Mustafa Akyol’s Islam Without Extremes (which gives a better examination of the religious perspective), that economic progress has a strong bearing on the presence and influence of extremism in a society. Nothing can take the place of economic development and promotion of economic freedom in order to make the Middle East a more peaceful place, and the most important take away lesson that “it matters less that the middle class is secular than that it is the right kind - rooted in commerce”. “No welfare, no legitimacy” is correctly identified as a dominant mindset in many Middle-Eastern countries, explaining why Islamic groups which focused on social work gained significant support in many different places in the absence and failure of government services, despite their often extreme ideologies. He also draws a link between torture and radicalisation, showing that the most extreme violent groups appeared as a consequence of torture of radicals by governments. An important and logical conclusion is that the best thing the US can do is to support economic development without attempting to get involved in ideological struggles, and to cease propping up tyrannical and regimes which have failed to lead their societies to prosperity
The argument against sanctions on “rogue” states is produced comprehensively, pointing out that only domestic pressures will remove the extremist regime without leaving chaos as in Iraq, and showing that sanctions harm the existence of the middle class, which is the driver of these domestic pressures. With economic sanctions a middle class cannot grow, leaving a vacuum in civil society and an impoverished lower class susceptible to the populism of the likes of Ahmadinejad. However, it is disappointing that he could still support the Algerian scenario for the fight against extremists elsewhere without seeing the contradiction there.
Although the book advocates the essentiality of adopting capitalism in order to create a middle class which will develop society, it never actually approaches the topic of what is meant by capitalism, or what form it should take. At a time when social justice is causing instability from Europe to the Middle-East and even discontent in America, and corporatism has highlighted the dysfunctionality of political systems worldwide, there needs to be more to the solution than merely eliminating corruption and cronyism in developing countries whilst encouraging capitalism. Although Nasr recognises that rising inequality presents a great danger of short-circuiting the process, the lack of a critical view on capitalism is a major weakness.
Another weakness is that the author seems to believe that the headscarf (or hejab, he insists on breaking established transliteration conventions) is in some way incompatible with liberalism or modernity, and needs to be pointed out as a qualifier - Amr Khaled “rejects extremism and openly criticizes Bin Laden, but “is also, however, an advocate of women wearing the hejab”. He also seems to have the misunderstanding that modern televangelists in the Muslim world teach that “going out to nightclubs...is in no way in conflict with Islam”. So despite his background as a scholar, it seems as though beyond the intellectual movements he has a very poor understanding of what the faith means to Muslims themselves.
At times sounds as though he feels kemalism as though the evils of it are unfortunate side effects of a positive ideology. Distinctions lacks nuance in his classifications, splitting Muslims into fundamentalist and otherwise. Rached Ghannouchi as also described as a fundamentalist; whatever the author thinks of the ideology of Ghannouchi’s Ennahda, describing the party which recently led the writing of Tunisia’s new constitution, which has been described as the most progressive on women’s equality in the world, with the same word used for the Taliban is incredibly sloppy.
So the book has obvious weaknesses that should be taken note of, but also strengths, including the historical view and the conclusions drawn about economic growth and the role of western support. A valuable addition is the forward glimpse the book presents to the process that will really drive the Arab spring, after the revolutions have settled down and state- and economy-building begins again.
July 17, 2022
I like this book. Nasr pays attention to what businesspeople are thinking and doing -- in Dubai, Turkey, Iran, or elsewhere in the Muslim world. On every side he details the successes of Muslim entrepreneurs and merchants, showing how their efforts are stimulating demand for education, trade relations, and freedom from government restrictions. It's true that Nasr does not anticipate a number of dramatic developments that followed this 2009 book, and he does presume a kind of American mission to foster neoliberal economic policy across the world. But the book remains helpful in shifting the spotlight -- to highlight what Muslim business people are doing to improve their world. And Nasr is still right that the best hope for peace and prosperity lies in improved trade relations, rather than punitive sanctions or military aid to order-keeping dictators.
March 21, 2012
“Forces of Fortune” is a pretty good book, but I feel a little like a victim of a bait-and-switch. The subtitle is “The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What it Will Mean for Our World,” which I took to mean that the book would be heavily focused on economics, but the book is very much focused on cultural, religious, and historical issues. I was disappointed that there wasn’t more of an economic focus. It’s also shoddily written in places. That said, I still learned a good deal.
The main thing I took away from the book is that Islamic fundamentalism is widespread, it’s here to stay, and it’s not the malevolent force we believe it to be. As I understand him, Nasr is defining Islamic fundamentalism broadly, as a movement by individuals to make Islam a more central focus of their lives. Fundamentalism is not necessarily corroborated with poor economics—even Turkey, the bright beacon of the Middle East, is becoming more fundamentalist even as its economy and European integration continue to boom. Nasr divorces fundamentalism from theocracy. He says that the harsh, politicized interpretation of Islam had its zenith in the Iranian Revolution, and while the Iranian clerics expected the revolution to spread, it never did. Radical, murderous Islam is of course a problem, but it’s certainly not the prevailing view in the Muslim world. The interpretations of Islam vary widely all over the Muslim world.
The main economic thread running through the book is Nasr’s condemnation of Kemalism, which is the idea pioneered by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism as Nasr explains it is a strong centralized government which is secular in nature and directs the economy from the top-down. While initially successful, it has failed spectacularly over the decades, leading to inefficient, corrupt societies in Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, until the latter’s flourishing. The worst thing about Kemalism is that it has prevented the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class across the Middle East.
Nasr’s thesis that economic liberation will change the Middle East is provocative, but it’s not entirely convincing to me. While economic liberation has lead to more political liberation in other countries, there is much more to it than that. He also argues that dumping sanctions against Iran and fostering economic ties is the approach we should be taking, but as much as I fear war with Iran, I don’t see much alternative to our sanctions regime. However, putting our main focus on economic ties in Iran and the wider Middle East may be worth a try, as our track record so far is less than stellar.
After reading the book, I was also struck by how much has changed since its publication. The “Arab Awakening” has transformed the Middle East (especially Egypt), though the results of the movement are far from being clear. Still, Iran has serious economic issues and Pakistan is a political and cultural nightmare.
The main thing I took away from the book is that Islamic fundamentalism is widespread, it’s here to stay, and it’s not the malevolent force we believe it to be. As I understand him, Nasr is defining Islamic fundamentalism broadly, as a movement by individuals to make Islam a more central focus of their lives. Fundamentalism is not necessarily corroborated with poor economics—even Turkey, the bright beacon of the Middle East, is becoming more fundamentalist even as its economy and European integration continue to boom. Nasr divorces fundamentalism from theocracy. He says that the harsh, politicized interpretation of Islam had its zenith in the Iranian Revolution, and while the Iranian clerics expected the revolution to spread, it never did. Radical, murderous Islam is of course a problem, but it’s certainly not the prevailing view in the Muslim world. The interpretations of Islam vary widely all over the Muslim world.
The main economic thread running through the book is Nasr’s condemnation of Kemalism, which is the idea pioneered by Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Kemalism as Nasr explains it is a strong centralized government which is secular in nature and directs the economy from the top-down. While initially successful, it has failed spectacularly over the decades, leading to inefficient, corrupt societies in Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, until the latter’s flourishing. The worst thing about Kemalism is that it has prevented the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class across the Middle East.
Nasr’s thesis that economic liberation will change the Middle East is provocative, but it’s not entirely convincing to me. While economic liberation has lead to more political liberation in other countries, there is much more to it than that. He also argues that dumping sanctions against Iran and fostering economic ties is the approach we should be taking, but as much as I fear war with Iran, I don’t see much alternative to our sanctions regime. However, putting our main focus on economic ties in Iran and the wider Middle East may be worth a try, as our track record so far is less than stellar.
After reading the book, I was also struck by how much has changed since its publication. The “Arab Awakening” has transformed the Middle East (especially Egypt), though the results of the movement are far from being clear. Still, Iran has serious economic issues and Pakistan is a political and cultural nightmare.
July 20, 2013
The author Vali Nasr describes the Middle East as
a place where struggling and thriving economies
are being developed by new classes of business elites
who are finding their way in the power structure of
many countries and changing the religious, social,
and political structure of their societies as part
of the process of change. He argues that it is time
to look beyond the rhetoric of so-called muslim
fundamentalism and recognize that the rising business
class (often associated with Islamic finance, i.e.
banking institution and services compatible with the
sharia) will eventually overcome the influence of islamic
extremists and possess the real centers of power in the
Middle East.
Nasr characterizes this new muslim middle class in terms
that are reminiscent of Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism. He argues that historically
what is good for business is good for Islam. The Prophet
himself is supposed to have said “A merchant is the beloved
of God.”
Nasr argues that this emerging, business–oriented middle
class is forcing improvements in the rule of law and advancing
moderation in the politics of the Middle East. Those who have
studied the rise of democratic institutions in the West have
often placed emphasis on the role of the bourgeoisie. The
eminent Harvard sociologist Barrington Moore famously wrote:
"No bourgeois, no democracy."
Nasr also has an interesting discussion of Middle East
secularism which has largely failed because of the authoritarian
imposition of western style modernity on traditional societies
as in Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran. Both Turkey and Iran
relied on large scale state-run industrial projects, which
transformed their economies, but failed to take hold and
generate loyalty, even among the middle class, because they
were top-down and directed from above. The Shah could not
take credit for the prosperity that his policies may have
produced because he lost the support of the the secular
middle class through his imperial authoritarianism.
Accordingly, Nasr concludes that the universal values of peace,
security, democracy, freedom, human rights, moderation, and
religious tolerance have not taken hold in muslim countries not
because of the fundamental nature of Islam but because the
propagation of these values must be the result of an empowered commercial class that initiate the process of change from the bottom-up and from below. Helping this critical middle class
grow is the best and surest way to guarantee that democracy
will develop and allow universal values to take root in muslim societies.
a place where struggling and thriving economies
are being developed by new classes of business elites
who are finding their way in the power structure of
many countries and changing the religious, social,
and political structure of their societies as part
of the process of change. He argues that it is time
to look beyond the rhetoric of so-called muslim
fundamentalism and recognize that the rising business
class (often associated with Islamic finance, i.e.
banking institution and services compatible with the
sharia) will eventually overcome the influence of islamic
extremists and possess the real centers of power in the
Middle East.
Nasr characterizes this new muslim middle class in terms
that are reminiscent of Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism. He argues that historically
what is good for business is good for Islam. The Prophet
himself is supposed to have said “A merchant is the beloved
of God.”
Nasr argues that this emerging, business–oriented middle
class is forcing improvements in the rule of law and advancing
moderation in the politics of the Middle East. Those who have
studied the rise of democratic institutions in the West have
often placed emphasis on the role of the bourgeoisie. The
eminent Harvard sociologist Barrington Moore famously wrote:
"No bourgeois, no democracy."
Nasr also has an interesting discussion of Middle East
secularism which has largely failed because of the authoritarian
imposition of western style modernity on traditional societies
as in Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran. Both Turkey and Iran
relied on large scale state-run industrial projects, which
transformed their economies, but failed to take hold and
generate loyalty, even among the middle class, because they
were top-down and directed from above. The Shah could not
take credit for the prosperity that his policies may have
produced because he lost the support of the the secular
middle class through his imperial authoritarianism.
Accordingly, Nasr concludes that the universal values of peace,
security, democracy, freedom, human rights, moderation, and
religious tolerance have not taken hold in muslim countries not
because of the fundamental nature of Islam but because the
propagation of these values must be the result of an empowered commercial class that initiate the process of change from the bottom-up and from below. Helping this critical middle class
grow is the best and surest way to guarantee that democracy
will develop and allow universal values to take root in muslim societies.
September 15, 2014
Vali Nasr is a great writer in his ability to look past individual events to grasp broader shifts beneath the surface. This book documents the rise of religiously conservative consumer classes in many Muslim-majority countries, and the prospects for engagement with them as a means to both open up and stabilize these societies. Nasr is someone who places a lot of faith in the benefits of the international system and he makes a strong case for the benefits of commerce here (David Rohde also wrote a similar book recently).
For me the best parts of the book were the writer's own erudition and his description of the cultural and political shifts that led to the rise of Kemalism in the Muslim world - essentially the authoritarian top-down secularization projects that most countries underwent. In analyzing both the initial successes and ultimate failures of this dictatorial approach, Nasr sketches out an impressive history of the cultural and political changes in the region over the past 100 years. Oftentimes we forget the historical lineages are of the various parties vying for power in the world today, and this book offers a good if brief history. While this work is not a wholesale indictment of Kemalism by any means, its clear that its limitations have stifled commercial and corresponding political and social freedom in Muslim countries.
Nasr offers that the path to liberalizing other societies is by empowering the business classes of these countries, as was done with Turkey. This recommendation comes from his own intensive experience in the region both as an observer and in his work in various political administrations. In my opinion the recommendation is sound; commerce and economic empowerment will do more to drive freedom, peace and stability by creating more non-zero sum outcomes for the people of the region than any ideological preaching or (God forbid) military campaigns ever could.
For me the best parts of the book were the writer's own erudition and his description of the cultural and political shifts that led to the rise of Kemalism in the Muslim world - essentially the authoritarian top-down secularization projects that most countries underwent. In analyzing both the initial successes and ultimate failures of this dictatorial approach, Nasr sketches out an impressive history of the cultural and political changes in the region over the past 100 years. Oftentimes we forget the historical lineages are of the various parties vying for power in the world today, and this book offers a good if brief history. While this work is not a wholesale indictment of Kemalism by any means, its clear that its limitations have stifled commercial and corresponding political and social freedom in Muslim countries.
Nasr offers that the path to liberalizing other societies is by empowering the business classes of these countries, as was done with Turkey. This recommendation comes from his own intensive experience in the region both as an observer and in his work in various political administrations. In my opinion the recommendation is sound; commerce and economic empowerment will do more to drive freedom, peace and stability by creating more non-zero sum outcomes for the people of the region than any ideological preaching or (God forbid) military campaigns ever could.
May 1, 2010
I'm biased against Islam and Arab world. While I buy into the idea that the average Muslim is a perfectly decent human being (just like the other people of faith that I know and am fond of), the last ten years and a lot of reading have left me convinced that the religion itself is vicious and backward. This book does nothing to change that.
What it does do is add some perspective. Islamic fundamentalism has caused more than its fair share of misery, but Vali makes the case that fundamentalism is a reaction to the secular autocrats of the early 20th century. Ataturk, Pahlavi, and the other rulers of Middle East accomplished a great deal by importing Western technology and political structures, but they believed progress came from the state, not the people. Their rigidity led to a backlash that we have been grappling with for thirty years.
Vali also shows how political freedom requires a strong, broad middle class. An elite can keep a country running for a while, but leaving the masses in poverty and ignorance opens the door to revolution. The countries that are achieving stability are the ones with economic growth (not oil riches) and social mobility. Islam may not be a force of enlightenment in countries like Turkey, but it does create a social network and doesn't seem to be doing any harm.
In the end, the book makes a strong case for doing as much business with the Middle East as we can. We can kill all the terrorists we like, but economic prosperity is the only thing that will kill the movement. And we need to keep an eye on our own stressed middle class while we're at it. The Iranian middle class thought they were fighting for freedom and faith in 1979, and they got stuck under the thumb of a fanatical theocracy. I can't help but wonder if there are some fans of the Tea Party who would be in for the same rude awakening.
What it does do is add some perspective. Islamic fundamentalism has caused more than its fair share of misery, but Vali makes the case that fundamentalism is a reaction to the secular autocrats of the early 20th century. Ataturk, Pahlavi, and the other rulers of Middle East accomplished a great deal by importing Western technology and political structures, but they believed progress came from the state, not the people. Their rigidity led to a backlash that we have been grappling with for thirty years.
Vali also shows how political freedom requires a strong, broad middle class. An elite can keep a country running for a while, but leaving the masses in poverty and ignorance opens the door to revolution. The countries that are achieving stability are the ones with economic growth (not oil riches) and social mobility. Islam may not be a force of enlightenment in countries like Turkey, but it does create a social network and doesn't seem to be doing any harm.
In the end, the book makes a strong case for doing as much business with the Middle East as we can. We can kill all the terrorists we like, but economic prosperity is the only thing that will kill the movement. And we need to keep an eye on our own stressed middle class while we're at it. The Iranian middle class thought they were fighting for freedom and faith in 1979, and they got stuck under the thumb of a fanatical theocracy. I can't help but wonder if there are some fans of the Tea Party who would be in for the same rude awakening.
June 8, 2010
A provocative proposal that economics will change the Middle East
Since September 11, 2001, the media has saturated Westerners with information about radical Islam. Many people view Islam as a monolithically fundamentalist creed whose followers hate the West. International politics professor Vali Nasr addresses this misconception, explaining that the members of the expanding Muslim middle class, notably in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Dubai (as seen before its economic woes), want many of the same things that Westerners want, but within an Islamic framework. Readers may find this unexpected, but Nasr makes the journey understandable by serving as economist, investigator and tour guide. getAbstract, which recommends books but takes no stand on politics or religion (the opinions in the summary are those of the author), suggests his solid analysis particularly to those interested in these four breaking-news countries. While Nasr thinks religious extremism has peaked, he believes Islam is not yet ready for Western-type religious reform, though he sees that as a potential future path. He predicts that religious moderation will slowly evolve to trump fundamentalism, but that change must come from within the Muslim community.
To learn more about this title, check out the following web page: https://www.getabstract.com/summary/1...
Since September 11, 2001, the media has saturated Westerners with information about radical Islam. Many people view Islam as a monolithically fundamentalist creed whose followers hate the West. International politics professor Vali Nasr addresses this misconception, explaining that the members of the expanding Muslim middle class, notably in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Dubai (as seen before its economic woes), want many of the same things that Westerners want, but within an Islamic framework. Readers may find this unexpected, but Nasr makes the journey understandable by serving as economist, investigator and tour guide. getAbstract, which recommends books but takes no stand on politics or religion (the opinions in the summary are those of the author), suggests his solid analysis particularly to those interested in these four breaking-news countries. While Nasr thinks religious extremism has peaked, he believes Islam is not yet ready for Western-type religious reform, though he sees that as a potential future path. He predicts that religious moderation will slowly evolve to trump fundamentalism, but that change must come from within the Muslim community.
To learn more about this title, check out the following web page: https://www.getabstract.com/summary/1...
August 9, 2010
Another book on the current state of affairs in the Middle East. This author offers up as a thesis that we (the West) would accomplish much more in the Middle East by encouraging and promoting business and trade with the region. I agree with his belief that the vast majority in the MIddle East do not approve of militant fanaticism but are interested in having the means to provide a comfortable living for their families with some of the modern conveniences and luxury/entertainment items that we more or less take for granted in our country. On the other hand, the author never really addresses the issue of how this might happen in an Islamic society. He gives one (maybe two) example of success of this sort in an Islamic environment (Turkey..and maybe UAE) but in each of these countries this has been achieved through some separation of church and state. However, in many other places (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, etc.) the pressures exerted by Islamic religious leaders and fanatics seems determined to keep the countries in third world economic status to protect their status quo. It will be interesting to watch Iran and Pakistan in the future to see how the secular versus religious pressures play out.
August 15, 2010
This book is basically a history of the past 50 or so years in the middle east and the rise of the fanatic fundamentalists in the region.
The author argues that there is now beginning an incipient middle class that is mainly interested in commerce, not jihad. That from this segment of the population is the hope that they will espouse and demand democratic governement and tolerance.
To further this trend the author urges that the West engage the middle eastern countries with programs to foster commerce and economic growth.
The problem is how. The author does not provide any real means to this end and I don't see any. The region is by and large ruled by more or less brutal dictatorships who are going to oppose such growth of a middle class precisely because they will demand democratic governement.
So while the author is hopeful I am not. I will talk to a Muslim friend from Lebanon about this to see what he thinks.
In any event this is an important book to read for all who are interested in the future peace of the world.
The author argues that there is now beginning an incipient middle class that is mainly interested in commerce, not jihad. That from this segment of the population is the hope that they will espouse and demand democratic governement and tolerance.
To further this trend the author urges that the West engage the middle eastern countries with programs to foster commerce and economic growth.
The problem is how. The author does not provide any real means to this end and I don't see any. The region is by and large ruled by more or less brutal dictatorships who are going to oppose such growth of a middle class precisely because they will demand democratic governement.
So while the author is hopeful I am not. I will talk to a Muslim friend from Lebanon about this to see what he thinks.
In any event this is an important book to read for all who are interested in the future peace of the world.
July 28, 2018
I was fooled by the cover thinking it was frivolous and smacks of tabloid. However on starting to read, I became drawn to its easy, accessible and compelling argument for looking at an alternative beyond the bias we so readily associate with the middle east, Islam religiosity, radicalism and piousness. VN puts easy parallel between the Christian Reformation, Catholic schooling and the journey that could accompany our impatient thoughtless reforms for fundamentalist practitioners of Islam. Citing history of Iran, Pakistan, Egypt etc VN makes a persuasive case instead of parroting censure of radicalism, we should spend time on the ground listening and understanding what terms to improve lives in the middle East to allow realisation of connection to the world at large in a humanistic and tolerant way.
January 29, 2010
This book helped me realize my prejudices and see how much I have in common with most Muslims. It was well written and the historical background for different Muslim countries was great. It was sad to realize I've lived through much of this history without having an appreciable interest in it. This book was so well written I quickly forgot Nasr's premise and just tried to absorb all the facts. That said, I appreciated Nasr's observation that Iran's version of an Islamic state hasn't taken hold in other Muslim countries and most Muslims think the Taliban interprets the Koran incorrectly and disagree with their governing methods.
Read
February 1, 2010There are two different types of middle class in the world today. Economic globalization is key for industrialized countries growth and future growth. In the oil rich middle east countries the middle class is financially supplied by the government, so they are really part of the global economy and are prone to strict secular activities warrented by their goverments, i.e. Iran and Sauia Arabia. On the other hand in countries where more moderate muslims live the middle class is a very big part of capitalism and are not under goverment control, i.e. Turkey, Indonesia and Quatar
March 8, 2010
Great Book on a very timely subject. Vali Nasr gives a different perspective that offers further insights to issues involved. The book provides a brief history on topics covered that help place a decent background on the current situation for a much better understanding of the subject. The book delves into the subject in a much deeper format than that of the many talking heads typical give their limited points of views on CNN and other so called main stream media. The author provides the solution which others fail to do or even understand.
March 29, 2012
Dean Vali Nasr captures the importance of Islam and capitalism in the MENA region. Excellent, if optimistic, analysis of Iran and Dubai. Some references are awkward (Annie Oakley?) and some intellectual history feels rushed. On balance, the author identifies the emergence of middle class Islamism in opposition to secular dictatorship in 2009, which is impressive.
July 30, 2012
I'm always thankful for books that cause me to think of something new. Instead of fearing radical Islam I can champion a cause that is more likely to re-shape the world: economic development through fostering free markets within Islamic countries.
January 14, 2014
This book should be a college textbook. Very detailed and informative but not a light read. Feel like I understand the Middle East better, especially Iran, and the role technology has in enlightening us all to our strengths.
July 28, 2010
Skimmed, need to read for nuggets, which may increase its value to me. If Nasr is within 89 degrees of true, then this is very important book, and first skim indicates he's in the zone.
May 6, 2013
Ambitious in general.
October 14, 2014
An excellent book. It brought a great perspective on the importance of middle class has an effect on keeping a country secular and progressive.
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews