(p. 142) "Well, Mario, you showed me what it means to be poor all right. Poverty is when your kid's hair falls out because you can't give him enough food--because your husband can't work, because he has a problem in his head which he can't treat, because he can't afford the medicine the doctor prescribed, and even if he could afford it, maybe that's not what he needs, but he doesn't know for sure.
"Poverty is when your family has to survive for who knows how long on your wife's wages--which in almost every plantation in the region is half what a man receives--and what a man receives is already below the legal minimum wage--and the legal minimum wage isn't anywhere near what it would take to give your kid a truly healthy diet and a decent education.
"Poverty is the first child dead, the second one ailing, and perhaps no chance of having a third. Poverty is no medical attention--or on rare occasions too much, but never fully understanding what's happening and rarely having much control.
"That's the crux: poverty is not having control. Not controlling your diet, your work, your health, not even who enters your home. That's right, Mario, poverty is when your kid’s hair comes loose--but more than that, it's when strangers can walk into your home and pull it out."
(p. 144) "Criticize them, and they would call you a hypocrite. They were no different from people in Europe and the United States, who preferred to buy coffee from the countries that provided the cheapest labor. And they were no different from employers in those affluent countries who also minimized their labor costs in order to maximize their profits. But there was a difference. Here in Guatemala's coffee fields, employers met practically no resistance, no organized labor, few legal restraints. They had complete control of life in the plantation; their workers had almost none.
"There had been one brief period of time when the coffee workers of La Igualdad had gained some share of control over plantation life. That had been forty years ago. Now they had so little they didn't dare recall what it had been like."
(p. 166) "Had the agrarian reform done only this [land redistribution], it would have alienated the plantation elite. But it went further. In order to obtain land, workers had to take the initiative. They had to submit a petition to the government. And to submit a petition, they had to form an agrarian committee and elect their peers to lead it. In this way the reform would not only make it possible for workers to act independently of the plantation, it would engage them right away as independent actors. It would mobilize them as a political force that would be capable of dominating elections for years to come.
"And that is precisely what worried the U.S. government--not the reform's impact on the economy, but its impact on national politics. American aid officials considered it 'constructive and democratic in its aims.' And in fact, the CIA was actually encouraging other countries to implement similar reforms at the time. But in Guatemala, U.S. officials feared that the reform's success would benefit the communists who had designed it."
(p. 323) "Then I told him that the rest of the country, with the exception of people on the left, did not seem to be very interested in any of the candidates, not even in Gramajo. I had found a considerable amount of apathy regarding the elections.
"'This apathy is provoked, It's deliberate,' Gramajo responded, now looking a bit piqued. He told me that it resulted from a conspiracy of the 'oligarchy' to delegitimize politicians so that few people would vote and their own candidate could carry the election."
(p. 327-8) "Consider also what Ronald Reagan had to say about Rios Montt after the two presidents met in Honduras on December 5, 1982...
"'Well, I learned a lot,' the ever-affable Reagan told reporters on Air Force One as they left Central America that day. 'You'd be surprised. They're all individual countries.' As for Rios Montt, Reagan praised the general as 'a man of great personal integrity' who was 'totally dedicated to democracy,' but unfortunately was 'faced with a challenge from guerrillas armed and supported from those outside Guatemala.' And he dismissed the charges of widespread human rights abuses as simply 'a bum rap.'
"The next day, as Rios Montt's troops raped and killed the residents of Las Dos Erres, the U.S. news cycle was devoted largely to the question of whether or not the president had known before his trip that Central America consisted of 'individual countries.' It would seem that Ronald Reagan, while at the pinnacle of the world political order, may have had one thing in common with the Guatemalan peasants at the bottom: a mastery of the strategic use of professed ignorance."
(p. 344) "Another way to tell the history of Guatemala's war is this: it took four decades of violence to stamp out what the Agrarian Reform had created--the commitment to the future that those men had shared, the belief that they could transform their nation."
(p. 351) "The Guatemalan army made the guerrillas turn to acts of terror by making it impossible for them to do politics.
"How did the army do this? They did it through the sort of killing that took place in La Igualdad, which is to say, not by killing guerrillas, but by killing their supporters and potential supporters within the civilian population, and by doing so in such an arbitrary and vicious fashion that people in the region came to feel an intense and overwhelming fear, not merely of supporting the guerrillas, but of doing anything that might suggest they sympathized with the guerrillas' cause--such as denouncing the army's methods or giving voice to their own fear. The army did it, in other words, through an extremely effective campaign of terror."