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The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict
Here is a brief, intelligent, even-handed analytical account of the origins of the Arab-Zionist conflict and its development from early in the twentieth century until 1948, focusing particularly on the period when Britain ruled Palestine under mandate from the League of Nations.
200 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1987
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August 17, 2018
Lectures of Interest
Well written summary with some interesting perspectives. The book is based on a series of 4 lectures Prof. Cohen gave in 1980 at American universities and is geared towards a general audience. The time frame is from the close of the Ottoman Empire (roughly beginning around 1840) until Israel's Declaration of Independence in May of '48.
Cohen first focuses on early Arab Nationalist and his take on the McMahon/Hussein correspondences is that neither party was empowered to make the offers that they did, nor did they was there much of an understanding as to what they entailed. Rather than taking it seriously he makes a well supported argument that these promises were nothing more than each side feeling each other out.
He then examines early Zionism before Herzl leading up to the Balfour declaration in 1917. Political Zionisms is traced to a group known as "Hovevei Tsion" as a reaction to Russian pogroms in the 1880s and strongly influenced by Leo Pinsker and his book Auto-Emancipation. It wasn't until 15 years later that Herzl conceived of The Jewish State: How the Zionists Created the Jewish Ethnostate and lobbied both Western and Turkish leadership for the right of Jews to return. There's an interesting side note that Herzl would have preferred greater success as a playwright than as a journalist and political figures - as such it is the times that make the man.
The book continues with the Sykes-Picot agreement and on to Balfour. Cohen's interpretation is that Britain's military goal was the creation of a sympathetic buffer state to protect the Suez canal from the east - the desert having proved not to be a sufficient barrier to attack in WW I. Resistance to Weizman's original request came from the unlikely source of Jewish members of the British Cabinet who felt that an independent Jewish State would lead to charges of dual loyalty and undermine hard won work at gaining Jews equal status in English society.
Lecture/Chapter 3 covers the period of British Mandatory rule up to 1945, opposition to Jewish migration voices by factions led by the Grand Mufti (a title created by the British) Hajj Amin Husayni, counterbalanced by Jewish and British investment. Whereas the Jews organized themselves to the necessary infrastructure to create a state, Cohen opines that local Arab culture viewed politics more as a means towards personal advancement and influence than national interest. Paradoxically Jewish interest in buying land monetized Arab wealth that was largely based in land, not in capital, and some of the largest sellers of land were also the loudest critics. Economic development also undermined traditional Arab clan notables among the Hussaynis and Nashashibis who lived in Jerusalem with new elites based in Jaffa and especially Haifa which was developing into a major port. The change in England to Labour government where Churchill was relegated to the opposition resulted in a lack of empathy for the 1929 Arab attacks on Jews and for Zionism. (Cohen is also the author of "Churchill and the Jews"). There's a good discussion of how the assassination of Lord Moyne by the splinter Lehi group lead to its rejection by the mainstream Hagana. One of the reasons given is that Moyne, a personal friend of Churchill, was blamed by Lehi members for the sinking of the refugee ship Struma in the Bosporus in 1942 as well has his rejection of saving Hungarian Jews.
The final chapter covers the period from 1945-48. There was considerable political pressure to find a resolution to the problem of Jewish refugees still interred in DP camps throughout Europe, most of whom were reluctant to return to their destroyed communities and instead wanted to be admitted to Palestine. The Morrison-Grady plan would have allowed 100,000 of these in, provided that Jewish autonomy would be shelved and that the Hagana would give up it's weapons, which the Zionists felt was both insufficient and suicidal. For it's part Britain was looking for a way to get out of this mess as the cost of maintaining a garrison in the Middle East was costing far more than they could afford. The members of the Arab League, formed in 1945, was ineffectually jockeying for position - none of whom trusted each other. Cohen blames Jordan's King Abdallah with his well trained armed forces for driving the other league members into the 1948 war - each of the rival interests were as much interested in their share of the spoils as driving out the Jews.
The downside of the book is that there are no footnotes to source the material, though there is a list of suggested supplementary reading for each chapter. Also included are illustrative excerpts from 13 historic documents, most of which can be found (and more) in the comprehensive "Arab-Israeli Reader, with the exception of two interesting documents: The 1914 Cairo Arab Nationalist Manifesto and the 1945 "Pact of the Arab League". The former is an anti-union Islamic manifesto which pleads for Christians and Jews to unite with Arab nationalists against the irreligious Turks. The latter argues for a new Mandate be established in Palestine under the a league of Arab states, until such time as that country is ready for independence.
I have read more detailed accounts but I found it to be an informative and readable summary of events.
Recommended.
Well written summary with some interesting perspectives. The book is based on a series of 4 lectures Prof. Cohen gave in 1980 at American universities and is geared towards a general audience. The time frame is from the close of the Ottoman Empire (roughly beginning around 1840) until Israel's Declaration of Independence in May of '48.
Cohen first focuses on early Arab Nationalist and his take on the McMahon/Hussein correspondences is that neither party was empowered to make the offers that they did, nor did they was there much of an understanding as to what they entailed. Rather than taking it seriously he makes a well supported argument that these promises were nothing more than each side feeling each other out.
He then examines early Zionism before Herzl leading up to the Balfour declaration in 1917. Political Zionisms is traced to a group known as "Hovevei Tsion" as a reaction to Russian pogroms in the 1880s and strongly influenced by Leo Pinsker and his book Auto-Emancipation. It wasn't until 15 years later that Herzl conceived of The Jewish State: How the Zionists Created the Jewish Ethnostate and lobbied both Western and Turkish leadership for the right of Jews to return. There's an interesting side note that Herzl would have preferred greater success as a playwright than as a journalist and political figures - as such it is the times that make the man.
The book continues with the Sykes-Picot agreement and on to Balfour. Cohen's interpretation is that Britain's military goal was the creation of a sympathetic buffer state to protect the Suez canal from the east - the desert having proved not to be a sufficient barrier to attack in WW I. Resistance to Weizman's original request came from the unlikely source of Jewish members of the British Cabinet who felt that an independent Jewish State would lead to charges of dual loyalty and undermine hard won work at gaining Jews equal status in English society.
Lecture/Chapter 3 covers the period of British Mandatory rule up to 1945, opposition to Jewish migration voices by factions led by the Grand Mufti (a title created by the British) Hajj Amin Husayni, counterbalanced by Jewish and British investment. Whereas the Jews organized themselves to the necessary infrastructure to create a state, Cohen opines that local Arab culture viewed politics more as a means towards personal advancement and influence than national interest. Paradoxically Jewish interest in buying land monetized Arab wealth that was largely based in land, not in capital, and some of the largest sellers of land were also the loudest critics. Economic development also undermined traditional Arab clan notables among the Hussaynis and Nashashibis who lived in Jerusalem with new elites based in Jaffa and especially Haifa which was developing into a major port. The change in England to Labour government where Churchill was relegated to the opposition resulted in a lack of empathy for the 1929 Arab attacks on Jews and for Zionism. (Cohen is also the author of "Churchill and the Jews"). There's a good discussion of how the assassination of Lord Moyne by the splinter Lehi group lead to its rejection by the mainstream Hagana. One of the reasons given is that Moyne, a personal friend of Churchill, was blamed by Lehi members for the sinking of the refugee ship Struma in the Bosporus in 1942 as well has his rejection of saving Hungarian Jews.
The final chapter covers the period from 1945-48. There was considerable political pressure to find a resolution to the problem of Jewish refugees still interred in DP camps throughout Europe, most of whom were reluctant to return to their destroyed communities and instead wanted to be admitted to Palestine. The Morrison-Grady plan would have allowed 100,000 of these in, provided that Jewish autonomy would be shelved and that the Hagana would give up it's weapons, which the Zionists felt was both insufficient and suicidal. For it's part Britain was looking for a way to get out of this mess as the cost of maintaining a garrison in the Middle East was costing far more than they could afford. The members of the Arab League, formed in 1945, was ineffectually jockeying for position - none of whom trusted each other. Cohen blames Jordan's King Abdallah with his well trained armed forces for driving the other league members into the 1948 war - each of the rival interests were as much interested in their share of the spoils as driving out the Jews.
The downside of the book is that there are no footnotes to source the material, though there is a list of suggested supplementary reading for each chapter. Also included are illustrative excerpts from 13 historic documents, most of which can be found (and more) in the comprehensive "Arab-Israeli Reader, with the exception of two interesting documents: The 1914 Cairo Arab Nationalist Manifesto and the 1945 "Pact of the Arab League". The former is an anti-union Islamic manifesto which pleads for Christians and Jews to unite with Arab nationalists against the irreligious Turks. The latter argues for a new Mandate be established in Palestine under the a league of Arab states, until such time as that country is ready for independence.
I have read more detailed accounts but I found it to be an informative and readable summary of events.
Recommended.
March 22, 2011
Concise, balanced, informative.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews