Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-first Century

by Eric Kaufmann

Dawkins and Hitchens have convinced many western intellectuals that secularism is the way forward. But most people don't read their books before deciding whether to be religious. Instead, they inherit their faith from their parents, who often innoculate them against the elegant arguments of secularists. And what no one has noticed is that far from declining, the religious are expanding their share of the population: in fact, the more religious people are, the more children they have. The cumulative effect of immigration from religious countries, and religious fertility will be to reverse the secularisation process in the West. Not only will the religious eventually triumph over the non-religious, but it is those who are the most extreme in their beliefs who have the largest families.

Within Judaism, the Ultra-Orthodox may achieve majority status over their liberal counterparts by mid-century. Islamist Muslims have won the culture war in much of the Muslim world, and their success provides a glimpse of what awaits the Christian West and Israel. Based on a wealth of demographic research, considering questions of multiculturalism and terrorism, Kaufmann examines the implications of the decline in liberal secularism as religious conservatism rises - and what this means for the future of western modernity.

Genres: Religion, Politics, Sociology, Nonfiction, History, Christianity, Cultural

320 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2010

About the author

Eric Peter Kaufmann is a Canadian professor of politics at Birkbeck College, University of London. He is a specialist on Orangeism in Northern Ireland, nationalism, political demography and demography of the religious/irreligious.

Reviews

[Paul H. · Rating 4 out of 5]

As someone who has read far too many European philosophers writing about the death of God and disenchantment of the world (from Hegel, who was the lantern that Nietzsche's madman was holding, to Heidegger and the rest), I have to say that it's incredibly amusing to think that this supposed end of history and endgame of Western thought will just fizzle out in a century or two due to secular Westerners contracepting and aborting themselves out of existence. (I mean, I suppose it's also sad at some level, but after all they're choosing to do it?)

When you think about all of the autumnal and vaguely melodramatic things written about this topic, from Matthew Arnold's "Dover Beach," to Eliot's line about "these fragments I have shored against my ruins," Heidegger spending a decade desperately trying to find some way to revive European religious life (through his 1930s writings on the "last god" etc.), it turns out that this was just a temporary condition, a case of certain people in certain cities in America and Western Europe turning away from God for a couple centuries, until they simply fade out of existence and humanity returns to its usual religious orientation. And the beauty of it is that even if religious populations slowly 'moderate' or secularize over time -- for example, Europe will almost certainly be majority Muslim by 2080, but let's say that these Muslims slowly secularize -- the cycle will start again; believers will have children, secularists will stop having children, etc.

Popular/nerd culture (and Vox et al.) seem to accept it as a given that the inevitable endgame of history is, like, the Starfleet Federation Council in 2342 A.D., a super-U.N. where culture is irrelevant, no one is religious, everyone is a scientist, etc., but this may not necessarily be the case . . . hormonal birth control is a hell of a drug.

[Kevin K · Rating 4 out of 5]

In much of the first world, we live in an era of triumphal liberalism, so it's hard to imagine how anything could turn the tide the other way. This eye-opening book points out liberalism's Achilles heel: it's failure to produce children. Indeed, the core of liberalism is structured around anti-natalist "sacred cows" like birth control, abortion, homosexuality, and working women. So liberal dominance faces a serious demographic challenge from fundamentalist religions meeting two conditions: 1) a high total fertility rate, 2) segregation from the mainstream and other measures to minimize defections. In short, liberalism can be conquered, over the long-term, by fighting on a battleground where it is sure to lose: the maternity ward.

The most interesting section of this book was the chapter about the Haredim (ultra-orthodox Jews) of Israel. It turns out that the "outbreed secular liberals" strategy has actually worked for the Haredim, and it's just a matter of time until they take over the country. As Kaufmann writes:

"At the end of the Second World War, the Haredim looked to be a fading relic. The new state of Israel and the wider Jewish diaspora indulged their needs, largely out of pity and nostalgia. Then in the 1950s, the Haredim began to cordon themselves off and their fertility advantage over other Jews increased. With increasing retention of members and three times the birth rate of other Jews, their share of world Jewry began to skyrocket. In Britain, they constitute only 17 percent of Jews but account for 75% of Jewish births. In Israel, they have increased from a few percent of Jewish schoolchildren in 1950 to a third of all Jewish pupils. In both places, the majority of Jews may be Haredi by 2050 and certainly by 2100."

As this takeover plays out, the Haredim are sure to be an inspiring model for fundamentalists everywhere. The idea is "hot," and Kaufmann details Haredi-like trends in the US, Europe and the Islamic world.

Problems: This is a fascinating five-star book, but I docked a star due to issues with the writing. First, the book is too long. It contains a lot of material, on Islam in particular, which is tangential to the book, and familiar from other sources. He should have kept the focus strictly on demographics and trimmed the page count. Second, the citations were sloppy and inadequate.

[Stefan Schubert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Big-picture, rich with facts, and very well-written. I checked some number, though, and it seems that fertility rates and retention rates of some of the discussed religious groups have fallen a bit. I might guess Kaufmann exaggerates the probability that religion will make a comeback.

[Rivka · Rating 4 out of 5]

I would recommend this book to anyone who feels passionately about religion. The tone is scholarly, the writing is excellent, and I learned so much that I did not know before!

I gave the book only four stars because it errs where many thought-provoking books that touch on religion err. Three examples. First, (p 44) the author cites a rubric for ascertaining the religiosity of a subject based on three factors: affiliation, belief, and attendance. I puzzled over this for a time, until I realized that it was a rubric rooted in Christianity imposed on all other religions. In Judaism, for example, the factors would be affiliation, belief and observance of Jewish law. Attendance is not typically a barometer of anything in Judaism- it would be observance of the Sabbath, and kashruth/ dietary laws. This inexactness is emblematic of a flippancy in the treatment of religion, and religious texts, in books written by secular authors. A rubric that comes from one religion does not belong imposed on another.

Another example is in the chapter on Haredim where the author contends that Haredim have invented a new religion over the past century. Ouch. That would be very difficult to defend among the knowledgeable. That widespread full-time Torah study was not around historically when most Jews lived in terrible poverty and persecution is defensible, but the rest of what the author claims- that Haredi practice is extremism that sprouted- is untrue. The foundation of being Haredi is a respect for ancient laws and customs that Jews have clung to- willing to risk life and limb- for 3,000 years.

A third example would be the way the author lumps together violence perpetrated by people of faith. Terrorism that is frequent and terrifying enough to affect government policies globally, that religious organizations take official responsibility for, is not the same as a smattering of acts of fringe elements and mentally unstable individuals that are immediately condemned by mainstream members of the same faith (and sect).

[Matthew · Rating 3 out of 5]

In the interests of full disclosure I did not read this book in its entirety, just the first few chapters and the last chapter as my interest in the topic of religious/secular demographics is confined primarily to the United States. The thesis of the book is that increasing differences in fertility between secular and religious people, especially between secular and extremely religious people, will lead to a relatively more religious future than one would otherwise predict based upon the secularization thesis. At first glance the argument is strong as the author brings up the experience of the 20th century which saw the dramatic growth of Mormonism and other small Christian sects like the Amish. A statistic he brings up is that in the beginning of the 20th century, Mormons accounted for 60% of Utah’s population. One would expect that with the invention of the automobile, the interstate highway system, and the mobility that affords, the state would eventually resemble more of the nation as a whole, that is, it would be much more non-Mormon. In actual fact by the year 2000, Utah was 75% Mormon. Despite migration of non-Mormons into the state, the natural birthrate differential increased the Mormon share of the population.

Kaufman argues that this effect is increasing as the birthrates among groups with closer together in the past while today religious people are having more children while secular people are having a lot less. When the numbers are smaller in general, the effects are further magnified. For example, if I had one child and another person had two, they’d have a 100% fertility advantage compared to me. The differences are still there and matter if say I had three and they had four but it would be less and take more time to fully manifest themselves demographically.

The wrench thrown into all of this of course is conversion. Right now more people are converting into the secular group than are into the various religious groups. While the US has historically bucked the secularizing trend that has befallen Europe, the current trends are clearly going in the secular direction as increasing numbers of Americans identify as “none” when asked about their religious affiliation, becoming one of the larger groupings of Americans on par with Catholics.

I think this singular fact argues strongly against Kaufman’s thesis or at least mitigates his thesis. The thing is that we simply don’t know what future conversion rates will be. This secularization trend could continue apace or it could be forestalled. Kaufman believes and I agree that much of the current secularization trend is due to some Americans being turned off by how the country’s main religions have allied themselves with the Republican Party. When ‘religious entrepreneurs’ create a space for religion for left-wing people, this trend will be arrested at least according to Kaufman. I am skeptical of this claim as Kaufman himself notes that the liberal mainline of Protestantism is declining due both to birthrates and a lack of people converting into the mainline. I see neo-paganism and New Age type stuff being more attractive to the left wing types. I suppose those count as ‘religion’ in the strictest sense but is wholly different than Judaism or Christianity.

Of what I read of it, this was an interesting book. Shall the religious inherit the Earth? It depends. Demography says it will be here in the future but it depends on conversion rates which depend upon political alliances, plausibility structures changing, historical events, economics, in sort, it depends on a lot of factors. Demographics can help give us a rough guide to what may happen but it isn’t rock solid. I could see Mormons en masse falling away from their faith or a resurgence of Catholic faith. I can see the opposite happening too. All depends.

[Scott Kennedy · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a Christian, I often feel that in the West at least, we are a dying breed. Kaufmann's analysis suggests otherwise. The higher fertility of conservative/fundamentalist religious compared with secular, and the low rate of defections from these groups suggests that over time, the religious will have a larger chunk of the population of the West. Plenty of research has gone into this book. Perhaps it is a little too long. Read the introduction and conclusion and one would get the key thrust of the book.

Kaufmann seems disappointed at where his research points and has a superior tone in his treatment of 'fundamentalists' like myself. He worries over future attempts to roll back abortion and homosexual marriage laws. What I find amusing about all this is that the secularist worldview leads us to this point. Secularist philosophy emphasises individualism, leads to postponing of marriage, discourages women from finding fulfillment in motherhood and encourages abortion on demand as well as homosexual marriage. The seeds of its own destruction lie in its worldview.

An interesting passage that highlighted the failure of secularism to answer in a compelling way the questions of life occurred in the first chapter.

There is simply no non-religious way to deal with disturbing existential questions like 'Why are we here?' or ' What will happen after death?' other than to forget about them. Consider the following advice from a British bereavement website, whose message is so typical that few of us notice its modernist philosophy:

"It's alright to cry and feel sad when someone you love dies. It hurts - just like when you hurt yourself if you fall over. At first it hurts very much but the pain will go away after a while. It takes time for you knee to heal, and it hurts less and less each day. It is the same when somebody dies...No one knows what happens when you die. All we know for sure is that it will happen one day - to all of us. Don't worry or think about it for very long, as there are a lot more interesting and wonderful experiences to look forward to."

As I write this on Easter Sunday, I am struck once again with the emptiness of secularism. As a Christian, I have a real hope. I am loved by a resurrected king. I have an inheritance that can never perish spoil or fade. Death is not the end, thus I do not have to live as if this life alone is all there is, turning from one distraction to another, trying vainly, like a child, fingers in his ears, to forget the meaninglessness of my brief existence.

[Edward Brynes · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book answers the question of its title with a loud clear YES. It’s about demography, the statistical study of human populations. This is a complex subject. Author Eric Kaufmann has written other books in the field, including the recent ‘Whiteshift’ which I’ve reviewed for Amazon.

The basic question of demography is, “How do numbers of a population change?” The obvious answer is that women have babies, people emigrate out of the population, migrate into it, and die. For most of human history, these rates have not varied a great deal. For a human group to maintain its population, a woman must bear over her lifetime an average of 2.1 children. The current U. S. total fertility rate (TFR) is currently 1.765.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the industrial revolution and other scientific and technological events in the West led to continually increasing birthrates over the world. Between the World Wars, birthrates levelled off and began to decrease. After World War II there was a brief reversal but the downward trend resumed and in general has spread, irregularly, to other regions of the world. This is known as the Second Demographic Transition.

There is a parallel between population growth in human communities, viewed as simply aggregates, and population growth in religious communities. The religious believe certain doctrines and can increase their numbers by having more children and bringing them up within the faith (endogenous growth) The author also states in connection with the Mormon church: “No religion can grow without enlisting converts from the wider society.... the two strategies for fundamentalist expansion are external proselytization and endogenous growth ... Since 1830, [Mormons] have averaged over 40 per cent growth per decade, maintaining this pace in all five post-Second World War decades.”(p. 31)

Mormonism is an example of what may appear an unusual trend: a fast-growing American religion of intensely motivated followers that is socially and politically conservative. Even if we stick to the U. S., we can find other confirming instances. Consider the Hutterites, an Anabaptist sect living in Canada and the Northwestern U. S. From 400 individuals in 1880 they have increased to 50,000 today. They dress distinctively, speak a German dialect which is unintelligible to their neighbors, and hold property in common. Their communities are largely self-sufficient. The Amish are another example, also Anabaptists, who have grown from 5000 in 1900 to a quarter of a million today. These sects typically have 4 or 5 children per family.

After the famous Scopes trial of 1925, the liberal Protestant establishment (then known as Federal Council of Churches, later renamed as the National Council of Churches) in the U. S. resolved to move in step with the leading secular values. “In effect, literalist Protestants were waking up to the realization that they were not the country, and would have to fall back on their own resources to preserve their culture.” (p.77) Among the resources were ideas such as premillennial dispensationism, proposed well before Scopes, promoted by later evangelists and later popularized by Hal Lindsey in his bestselling fiction series ‘The Late Great Planet Earth.’ In this prophecy, those who commit to Christ will be saved during the “Rapture”, a seven-year period in which the earth will succumb to the End Times. The theology is too complex to explain here. But the author explains the circumstances: “Conversion of mainline Protestants to evangelical denominations is part of the story, and represents an important change from previous eras, when the cachet of mainline Protestant churches attracted converts from humbler fundamentalist sects.” (p.89) Currently increases in evangelical fertility has largely ended. But a new source of endogenous growth among whites is underway, known as Quiverfull after a certain Biblical passage. The author comments “Early signs are that Quiverfull is emulating the successful retention record of Anabaptists and Mormons. Infused with a sense of mission and divine election, Quiverfull children have been raised in opposition to the secular and even evangelical mainstream. ... its concerns resonate with wider Western fears of population decline.” One theologian, Russell Moore at Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, has written “Let’s outbreed the Mormons.” (p. 39)

Of course beginning with Christians themselves there have been dissenting groups who split off from a parent group over disagreements in doctrine, and later became independent of the parent. Along with doctrinal independence came economic independence as well. This has been the story for the Protestant groups previously discussed. But there are certain dissenters within the Jewish community, the Haredim. Before the state of Israel was established, they were the traditional ruling group. Although nearly devastated in World War II they were resuscitated by subsidies although their distinctive function within Jewish society was replaced in most ways by the new Israeli secular government. But these Haredi students have not lost their political standing. Their study of religious texts is heavily government-subsidized; they are paid allowances for their children while studying; they obtain numerous government benefits; and above all they have a high fertility rate. For Haredim in Kiryas Joel, NY the average family size is 6.6. There are other conservative sects and parties which are not dependent on government benefits, and the Haredi are not popular. It’s hard for me to see why, with so many conservative sects the Haredi are singled out so generously.

Even while mainstream Christianity in Europe appears to be in decline, this trend is flattening. Jews in Britain, Conservative Christians such as Pentecostals, charismatics, Laestadian Lutherans (in Finland), and Calvinists (in the Netherlands) are flourishing. The author writes, “ Several recent studies examine the connection between religiosity - whether defined as attendance, belief, or affiliation - and fertility in Europe. Traditionally, education was considered the main determinant of a woman’s fertility. Yet in many European studies, a woman’s level of religiosity is as or more important than her education in determining the number of children she will bear.” (p.160) This generalization applies to Muslim immigrants as well as Christians and Jews. Getting accurate data of Muslims in Europe is difficult, though, because “no demographers have performed projections of Europe’s religious composition akin to those of the US Census Bureau for America’s racial composition ...” (p.169) Still he performs these estimates using what data exists and provides a lot of interesting information although Reflections on the Revolution in Europe by Christopher Caldwell is in general more illuminating concernign this group. This is a valuable book.

[Luke · Rating 5 out of 5]

This should be required reading for any student of modern history, or anyone who wishes a more in depth understanding of the current political landscape (broadly speaking) in the Western and Islamic worlds.

The main argument advanced by Kaufmann is that current demographic trends are pointing toward religious people (and fundamentalists in particular) growing as a proportion of the population to the point where they will become a majority or significant portion of the population, this varies from country to country but the trend is present across all.

The introductory chapters of the book are a tad dry but Kaufmann excels when he comes into his main anlyses of case studies. These focus in turn on Christianity, Islam and Judaism and each present compelling evidence and, at the very least, interesting analyses of communities such as the ‘Quiverfull’ Christian movement and the extraordinary growth of the Haredi Jewish communities in Israel.

Kaufmann writes simultaneously in a scholarly and lucid prose which is extremely useful when he is explaining terms unfamiliar to most and makes the book an enjoyable read. I would highly recommend this to anyone wishing a greater understanding of how the world may look like in the coming century and why religious issues remain a persistent political issue across the world.


As an addendum I would note that unfortunately physical copies of this seem hard to find or ludicrously expensive. I would recommend reading on a kindle if at all possible.

[Jason Reese · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book contained many interesting facts, but the author's commentary consistently was off putting. In the end, I have rarely so enjoyed written by someone who obviously despises me and all of my people.

[Frumenty · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kaufmann's thesis, at first blush, is a little hard to believe in this part of the world - Australia - but there are many places - USA, South America, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, much of the Middle East, and so on - where it is not so. There used to be a public consensus in Australia that one at least paid lip-service to the Church, and radio and television hosts would usually invite a churchman whenever they discussed topical moral issues. That has declined in my lifetime. The influence of the 'God delusion' seems to dissipate like a mist in the morning sunshine.
Throughout much of the globe the total fertility rate (TFR) is falling below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. This seems to be a concomitant of prosperity, education, female emancipation, and of modernity in general. Religious fundamentalism, a direct reaction to modernity, is often accompanied by above-replacement rates of fertility. And high TFR works like compound interest so populations may multiply with increasing rapidity over successive generations. Even a group with TFR below replacement will grow in proportion to the society in which it exists if its TFR exceeds that of the rest of society.
Kaufmann cites various 'endogenous growth sects' that predominantly keep to themselves, do not marry out, punish those that leave (with 'shunning' or worse), and eschew family planning. The Mormons in Utah, and the Haredim in Israel are cases in point. Liberal streams of the world's religions tend toward the TFRs of secular society, and in time so do immigrant populations from predominantly religious to predominantly secular societies.
Kaufmann's knowledge of the sociology of religion is beyond impressive. Since the 1990s, when jihadist terrorism sparked a huge moral panic in the West about Islam, I've been reading with a view to acquiring a nuanced understanding of the multiplicity of Islam's adherents. I was never willing to accept the black and white image of Islam that tabloid journalism was popularising. Mormonism, which is in some ways analogous to Islam, also piqued my interest. I've read a lot about both, and I'm not easy to impress.
I'm doing an undergraduate degree in my retirement years, and I've just been granted permission to convert my basic degree to a 'flexible double degree.' The upshot is that I've been casting around for a new direction of study. Options I have considered are sociology, international relations, and political science. Kaufmann's admirable book has decided me. Demography it is. Demography may not be destiny, but I'm persuaded that as a predictor of the shape of things to come it has more to offer than those other disciplines that I was considering. Thank you Eric Kaufmann.

[Cathryn Conroy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read with caution: This is a challenging and thought-provoking book that is either alarming or exciting, depending on your point of view.

The basic treatise is that the super-religious—that is, fundamentalists of all faiths—will be in control of government and culture worldwide within 50 years or so simply because they are having more babies than the less-religious or non-religious. Demographics trumps everything as religious fundamentalism is on course to take over the world, including the United States, simply because these devout, fervent believers will be in the majority. This will have a profound and lasting effect on women's rights, reproductive rights, gay rights, and possibly our freedom of speech.

Written by Eric Kaufmann, a Canadian professor of politics at Birkbeck College, University of London, this is a highly academic tome—just so you know if you choose to read it. (It was recommended to me by a friend who read it as part of his studies for a Ph.D. in political science at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.)

Kaufmann delineates our current society, especially the United States, into three parts:
• Religious fundamentalists, which include evangelical Protestant Christians, ultra-Orthodox Jews (also known as Haredi Jews), traditionalist Catholics, Hispanic Catholics, Mormons, Old Order Amish, and Islamic fundamentalists.

• The "mushy middle" or moderates, which include anyone who identifies with one of the mainline Catholic-Anglican-Protestant churches, Reform Jews, and Muslims.

• The liberal seculars, who are not religious and rarely or never attend worship services, although they may still believe in God. They favor social equality, a liberal democracy, political freedom, and the separation of church and state.

This is a challenging, difficult, and somewhat dense book to read. It is filled with statistics, and the footnotes and index comprise about 40 percent of the book. If you choose to read it, it will take time and a bit of work. But it's worth it! This book is vitally important and provocative as it portends our future through the lens of demographics.

[Abu Dhabi · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is an old joke:

Two Jews are talking in a bar.
"I notice you had the Daily Stormer on your phone, Chaim," says one. "Why do you read that Nazi drivel?"
"You know, Moshe," replies the other, "when you read the NYT, all you hear about is how the Jews are assimilating, that we're being driven from Europe by anti-semites, that Israel should give up all that land to Palestine, and so forth."
"Yeah, so?"
"But when I read the Daily Stormer, it's a completely different picture - we have all the money, we're everywhere in the government, and basically run the whole world!"

---

Reading this book feels like that. The author is obviously hostile to fundamentalism (which in his view is basically every extremist religious sect or cult), but thinks that his way of like, secularism, is doomed to die, because the religious will outbreed the liberals - and the more religious, the faster they will do it.

[Raúl Terego · Rating 3 out of 5]

Book written by my former professor at Birkbeck - I finally got to read it, over 10 years later…
The central thesis is interesting, and scary (for secularism). Crucially, it barely explores what secular societies can or should do to face the threat of fundamentalist demographic booms.
It could have been much shorter, many of the ideas seemed repetitive. In terms of style, the author didn’t make up his mind, and the prose is at times engaging and universal, but many other times too “university paper”-like, filled with citations of obscure names, only known in the relevant academic literature. In terms of structure, the conclusion seemed disjoint from much of the rest of the book.
To sum up - good effort, but a much shorter version/article form would have sufficed.

[Anton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kaufmann's thesis essentially boils down to this: religious fundamentalists, of all the major Abrahamic religions, look set to dominate the world by the turn of the next century, primarily as the secular among us are having less kids, and the religious continue to have more kids than the secular. Whilst population will decline in the West overall, the religious will have a larger slice of a smaller pie.

The book then takes a deep dive into each of the major Abrahamic religions, helping the reader to understanding the history of Christian, Islamic and Judeo religious fundamentalism.

[Karen Phillips · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is more than a
logical thought process,; it’s a
study in the growth rate of
populations in different parts of the world that brings to mind the use of evangelism in many
sectors of world society.

[Neal Javia]

I had been thinking a lot about this before I came across this book.

[Adam Langham · Rating 5 out of 5]

Eric Kaufmann has produced a work of seminal importance for anyone interested in the futures of the Western societies. He postulates the case that as women are more religious their birthrate increases. The most religious women thus produce most babies in any given society, the most secular women the least. The more religious the community the person is brought up in, the more likely the person is to remain highly religious, this means the amount of highly religious people expands rapidly while the amount of secular and less-religious people dwindles.

The effect of this is that the share of highly-religious people as a total of the population is expanding rapidly, he names Israel which has gone from 2% Ultra-Orthodox to over 25% Ultra-Orthodox since its creation. The demographics have shifted so dramatically it has become virtually impossible for the secular parties to win elections in former strongholds such as the City of Jerusalem, and the share of the Ultra-Orthodox has increased in the Knesset at the expense of centrist, secular parties. Other examples are the expansion of Mormonism in the United States, leading to Mitt Romney running for President in 2012, the first non-Christian to do so. And while overtaken by recent events he also describes the demographic transformation of Islam in Western Europe, a very topical subject with the migrant crisis in full swing.

Mr Kaufmann uses a wealth of data and statistics to convincingly build his case, sometimes his secular partisanship shines through between the lines, but that is forgivable as it is not overt and it is impossible to write truly without bias.

[Diane · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book has an interesting thesis; that because religious people consistently have larger families than non-religious people, all societies, including those of seemingly secular Western Europe, tend to become more religious over time. Unfortunately, the author does not really provide enough facts to demonstrate his thesis. The only religious groups that he can demonstrate are actually expanding in this way are Mormons and Orthodox Jews; for all of the other groups, he relies on anecdotal evidence or claims that they are having children at higher rates than the non-religious without providing any data. In addition, he looks at demographic cycles over a century or more, apparently assuming that nothing will change over such a long period of time, which I think is a highly doubtful assumption. The book is also riddled with factual errors, which I found to be grating. For example, he refers to a set of paintings by Thomas Cole that he says are located in the Smithsonian Institute, while it is a different set of paintings by the same artist that are located at the National Gallery of Art in Washington DC (not part of the Smithsonian). Finally, as other reviews have mentioned, his snide tone is extremely grating.

[Will · Rating 5 out of 5]

Re-read:

I continue to be surprised by how relevant this book is for today's world and how under discussed the issues it raises are-- the massive divergence in fertility rates between the secular and the religious, the demographic war that religious people all over the world are winning (without secular people even knowing there's a battle going on!), and the self-conscious separation many groups, like Quiverful Christians, Old-order Hutterites, and Haredi Jews, utilize to maximize fertility and retention rates.

Highly highly recommended.


longer review incoming.

for now: thesis of the book is that Western countries have or will shortly reach Peak Secularism. Minority religious groups that consciously defy modernity have much higher fertility rates than secular Westerners, and this dynamic will be the main demographic story of the 21st century, along with the 'Browning' of America.

this book is not just a polemic against Islam or Christianity-- it mostly withholds judgements, and shows that many popular conceptions of current demographics, for instance, Muslim fertility in Europe or the US, are vastly oversimplified.

really interesting stuff. highly recommend, even though it is about 20% too long

[Michael Wallace · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting overview of demographics and the challenges faced by liberal democracies in the face of this disparity in birth rates between the secular and moderately religious with orthodox, fundamentalist, and tribal cultures. I did feel that the book didn't cover as much ground as it could have, and there was a fair amount of material that wasn't new to me or, I suspect, to the type of reader who is likely to pick up this book.

[Villate · Rating 2 out of 5]

Repetitive, condescending, bigoted, scare-mongering. There was plenty of very interesting information about demographics and the way populations grow, change, and decline, but the author's snobby tone and snarky asides about "the religious" really grated on me.

[Fred R · Rating 4 out of 5]

Is this a standard historical cycle? I wish he'd done a little more historical analysis to go along with his predictions.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating statistics and a novel argument, if slightly disorganised and repetitive. Some of the philosophical asides are also somewhat facile.

[Tyler Tidwell · Rating 4 out of 5]

My review here:

https://www.sowespeak.com/post/to-who...