Ten years ago, I bought this book out of necessity, having left my e-reader at my mother’s place before an eight-hour flight from New Zealand back to Townsville. As a New Zealander with a long-standing interest in history, I picked it up in an airport bookshop thinking it might at least keep me occupied. Once my e-reader arrived in the post, I placed the book in my “to read” pile, where it then sat untouched for a decade. Only recently did I return to it. I chose to read and review it in two parts, following Belich’s own structure of Making Māori and Making Pākehā. I am glad I did. Both halves offered insights that surprised me and challenged assumptions I had absorbed over the years.
The first half, Making Māori, had been sitting in the back of my mind for years because of Belich’s discussion of archetypes — or, as he calls them, “lenses” — through which Europeans viewed Māori. As a Jungian-aligned therapist, I found these lenses profoundly resonant. They articulated something I had sensed in the historical record but never seen expressed so clearly by a historian. Belich identifies seven lenses — clear, grey, white, black, red, brown, and green — a spectrum of distorted perspectives that Europeans projected onto Indigenous peoples. These lenses shaped everything: first encounters, missionary work, trade relationships, and later colonial policy. The most striking point is that the “clear lens,” which attempted a relatively unbiased view, was always smudged by ethnocentrism; some Europeans saw Māori more clearly than others, but no one saw them perfectly. Even so, Belich argues, the European record remains usable if handled with care — a point that feels particularly relevant to anyone working with symbolic systems or collective narratives.
Belich’s reconstruction of early Māori history relies on archaeology, oral traditions, and careful inference. He estimates Māori arrival around 1000 CE, accompanied by the familiar human pattern seen in Australia and the Americas: swift exploitation of megafauna (moa and seals), rapid population growth, and then collapse once resources disappeared. By the 1500s Māori had developed sustainable social, agricultural, and political structures. Belich describes this period with a kind of respectful clarity: Māori were neither “noble savages” nor “brutish primitives,” but a people navigating ecological constraints and human realities.
European contact began in 1642 with Abel Tasman, whose first encounter ended violently with four of his men killed — and, according to Māori oral history, eaten — at what is now Murderers Bay. Cook’s arrival in 1769 initiated more sustained contact, but Europeans repeatedly misread Māori motives and capacities. Early settlers who assumed Māori were simple or subordinate quickly learned otherwise. Modern revisionists still sometimes revert to this simplistic frame, ironically repeating the same mistake in a different ideological costume. Māori chiefs, Belich argues, often treated missionaries and traders as sources of mana, assets to be managed — not authorities to be obeyed. For much of the early contact period, Māori acted as protectors of Europeans, not dependents.
The Musket Wars of the 1820s and 1830s were among the most transformative events in Māori history. Māori uptake of muskets was rapid and sophisticated. Belich estimates that the population may have halved during this period due to war, enslavement, and displacement. He describes scenes that overturn the idea of Māori as passive victims: victorious tribes killing enemy men, selling women and children into slavery, and participating in complex regional trades. One of the earliest commodities was sex. Europeans wanted it; Māori supplied it. The cultural misunderstandings were extraordinary. Māori initially thought European sailors must all be homosexual because they travelled in all-male groups, and so first offered boys and young men before recalibrating their assumptions.
Belich summarises European expectations of empire in three categories: conversion, conquest, and fatal impact. New Zealand never neatly fit any of these. In the twenty years after 1840, he describes three overlapping New Zealands — independent Māori territories, the early-contact interface, and the settler-dominated colony. Contrary to folk history, the first two did not disappear instantly with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.
His discussion of the Land Wars in the 1860s was especially challenging to read, because it undermined several assumptions I had carried since childhood. Māori were not a single, unified people resisting the Crown. Nor were settlers a unified bloc supporting it. Alliances were pragmatic, relational, and often opportunistic. Māori tactical adaptation was remarkable. They shifted from hilltop pā to trench-based earthwork fortifications that neutralised British artillery. They had abundant guns from decades of trade and even developed technological innovations of their own, such as flax armour that could stop musket rounds. Belich argues the war could easily have gone the other way had there been small differences in manpower. The outcome was not a crushing conquest but a partial, ambiguous, negotiated settlement.
This leads to Belich’s critique of the black armband narrative that Māori were easily tricked or overwhelmed. He shows convincingly that Māori retained autonomy far longer than most New Zealanders appreciate. In some periods, if a chief disapproved of a relative being jailed, they simply arrived at the lock-up and demanded the prisoner be released — and the Crown complied. Māori independence in substantial parts of the country persisted into the 1880s. Empire came slowly, and its slowness mattered.
Belich closes Making Māori with a meditation on mythmaking: myths obscured Māori resilience, exaggerated European success, and became self-fulfilling. They shaped British intervention, fuelled the 1860s wars, and later created the illusion that Māori independence had disappeared long before it actually had. He argues that the most striking fact of New Zealand history is not Māori bending, but their not breaking — that Māori resilience, adaptability, and cultural endurance deserve far more attention than they usually receive.
Making Pākehā
I originally bought this book expecting to learn something about Māori history; I didn’t anticipate learning so much about Pākehā identity. The second half, Making Pākehā, charts the extraordinary marketing campaign that sold New Zealand to Britain as “Greater Britain,” a prosperous and near-utopian land blessed with giant vegetables, abundant opportunity, and easy social mobility. It was advertising on a grand scale. Reality rarely matched the promise. Compared with closer frontiers like America and Australia, New Zealand was expensive, remote, and much harder to thrive in. But once settlers arrived, returning home was difficult and often socially impossible. New Zealand was, for many, a one-way ticket to a fabricated dream.
Belich emphasises that the Gentry — New Zealand’s early political elite — relied heavily on exaggeration to finance infrastructure. Their strategy was essentially “act first, justify later.” They secured loans from Britain on optimistic projections of future wealth, and then used the borrowed money to build the infrastructure that might one day justify the projections. It was a national version of “fake it till you make it,” and surprisingly, it worked. Infrastructure created its own demand. Gold, immigration, and conflict all stimulated growth temporarily, but it was the steady expansion of roads, ports, and railways that built the colony’s long-term economic base.
Social mobility was far more accessible than in Britain. Settlers could rise quickly, and the Gentry were often expected to work alongside labourers. Many migrants intended to be servants only temporarily; they aspired to own land and improve their status. Labour shortages raised wages, and Pākehā men enjoyed freedoms — hunting, eating well, land opportunities — they would never have had in Britain. Demographically, the colony suffered from a surplus of men and a shortage of women, which created its own social tensions, especially since many of the women were Irish Catholics unwilling to marry outside their faith.
Women in early New Zealand occupied an unexpectedly strong social position. Work was plentiful and often paid twice the English rate. Because they were scarce, women had genuine agency in choosing partners, or choosing none. Widows commonly ran farms or businesses. Despite spending much of their adulthood pregnant — Canterbury women averaged nine children — life in New Zealand was often materially and socially better than what they had left behind. It’s unsurprising, as Belich notes, that New Zealand became the first country to grant women the vote.
Money in early New Zealand circulated largely as credit, not currency, reminding me of the parable of the travelling salesman and the $100 note: wealth emerging from movement rather than accumulation. “Kiwi ingenuity” likewise emerged from necessity. With no practical ability to return broken machinery to England, settlers had to fix everything themselves. Farming was largely for local consumption; exports were too expensive. Many farmers needed second jobs. Horses and bullocks powered the colony, making oats the largest cash crop despite its inability to generate export revenue.
Merino sheep, imported from Australia, were crucial to early economic growth, sometimes offering returns of 200 percent within a few years. Gold mining, by contrast, created population spikes but rarely lasting wealth. Miners were often reduced to a form of serfdom due to the capital-intensive nature of the work.
Belich highlights the dramatic transformation of communication systems. In 1840, it took weeks for messages to travel between Auckland and Wellington. With the arrival of the telegraph, communication became almost instantaneous, with seismic effects on politics and identity. National unity was not inevitable; the provinces did not commit to forming a single country until the 1870s. Only after the Land Wars were considered “settled” did the South Island agree to merge its fate with the North.
Reading this section deepened my sense of Pākehā identity. Pākehā built a functioning society at the far edge of the world on a mixture of exaggeration, optimism, and sheer audacity. They had no choice but to make things work because distance ruled out retreat. Everyone came from somewhere else. Embedded in this heritage is a familiar psychological posture: a willingness to gamble everything on something better, and to trust — despite evidence — that things will work out. For good or ill, that attitude remains recognisable today.